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Preface and acknowledgements 
This book continues a tradition that goes back to the first national 
election in Papua New Guinea in 1964. It is essentially a record of 
aspects of the 1992 Papua New Guinea national election. But there 
are backward glances to earlier elections in order to show trends in 
Papua New Guinea's electoral politics. A very brief summary of the 
political background to the 1992 election will be in order. 
At the end of the 1987 national elections, the outgoing Prime 
Minister, Paias Wingti, re-emerged as Prime Minister, having 
obtained the support of 54 MPs, against 51 for Michael Somare, the 
leader of Pangu Pati. Wingti led a coalition of his People's 
Democratic Movement, Sir Julius Chan's People's Progress Party, Ted 
Diro's People's Action Party, two smaller parties and Independents, 
five of whom were given ministries, in a cabinet of 27. Ted Diro, who 
coveted the Deputy Prime Ministership, was the king-maker on this 
occasion. His party had managed to attract to its fold virtually all 
the Independent MPs from the Papuan region. 
But two days after Diro had helped to put Wingti in power, 
news of a major corruption scandal involving him hit the headlines. 
As Forests Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister in the outgoing 
government, Diro allegedly misused his position for private 
accumulation. He was forced to resign from cabinet in November on 
account of damaging revelations and five counts of perjury at a 
Commission enquiring into the allegations. From then on, Diro's 
thwarted ambition became a source of great instability. Wingti's 
coalition fell in a parliamentary vote of no confidence in July 1988 
when Diro switched his support to a Pangu-led coalition, and 
Rabbie Namaliu, Pangu Pati leader only since May, became Prime 
Minister by a vote of 58 to Wingti's 50. 
Although he was still to clear his name, Diro became a 
minister, and then Deputy Prime Minister, in Namaliu's government 
until April 1991, when a Leadership Tribunal found him guilty on 81 
counts of misconduct as a Leader. The other major parties in the 
Namaliu government, besides Namaliu's Pangu and Diro's People's 
Action Party, were the Melanesian Alliance, led by John Momis, the 
Regional Member for Bougainville, and the League for National 
Advancement, a group which broke away from Pangu in 1986 and 
was led in Parliament by Karl Stack. Namaliu's prime ministership 
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coincided with a very difficult period for PNG, economically, 
politically and socially . 
Within six months of Namaliu's accession to the Prime 
Ministership, a violent agitation by a landowner group began on 
Bougainville . It developed into an armed secessionist rebellion 
which resulted not only in the closure of the Panguna copper mine, on 
which Papua New Guinea depended for 40 per cent of its annual 
foreign exchange earnings and 17 per cent of its internal revenue, and 
the loss of cocoa and copra exports from the province, but also in the 
prosecution of a costly counter-insurgency warfare. From 1990, under 
the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank, the government began 
to impose austerity measures in order to balance its books. 
On top of the extraordinary j olts to the economy and the 
authority of the state represented by the Bougainville rebellion, a 
veritable compensation mania broke out all over the country . 
Demands for very large sums, with threats and use of violence, were 
made by landowners on resource developers and the government, 
clearly a demonstration effect of the Panguna landowner rebellion. 
In 1992, the Bougainville crisis showed no sign of being resolved 
soon. 
An endemic law and order problem also got much worse. 
Politically motivated criminal activities, such as breaking into the 
Ombudsman's Offices and razing the offices of the National Fraud 
Squad and the Police Anti Corruption Unit to the ground, featured 
strongly alongside the usual armed robbery, rape, break and enter 
and tribal fighting. In the Highlands, premiers publicly lamented 
the take-over of their provinces by criminals, and sought a 
declaration of a state of emergency. 
Despite mounting evidence that the country faced serious 
difficulties on practically every front, members of parliament 
showed no inclination to curb their constant resort to the vote of no 
confidence which destabilised government but enabled MPs to 
advance themselves through the cabinet reshuffles which such 
motions and votes of no confidence usually induced . Rabbie 
Namaliu's government survived until the 1992 election, but at the 
cost of open payments to disgruntled MPs, truncated parliamentary 
sessions and long periods of non-convening of parliament. 
Although the economy had managed to recover by the time of 
the 1992 elections, through fiscal discipline, the opening of new gold 
mines and the support oi donor countrie�, the so-called 'Pacific 
paradox' ( whereby a contraction of real economic activity 
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apparently coexists with healthy macroeconomic indicators) was 
evidently at work. There was no improvement in the unemployment 
problem, Papua New Guinea's number one social problem, along with 
its related law and order problem. 
As with two earlier studies in which I participated, those on 
the 1982 and 1987 elections, the number of interested observers of 
Papua New Guinea affairs who stayed the course for this study is 
smaller than the number that started. It is to this group, those who 
delivered on their promise, the contributors, that my special thanks 
go. Without them, there would be no book. 
Reuben Kaiulo, the Electoral Commissioner, and his staff 
were as friendly and as helpful as ever. My indebtedness to them 
goes back a long way. Several contributors make their own 
acknowledgment of the help they received from the Electoral 
Commissioner and his staff. 
The following must be thanked individually for their much 
appreciated contributions towards the production of the book: at 
UPNG, Marlene Karu, Bonnie Tauvala, Francis Sakala, Vagi Raula, 
David Kleinsasser and Roselyn Bauwai; at ANU, Claire Smith, 
Bev Fraser, Ron May, Sinclair Dinnen, Bill Standish and Alison 
Ley. 
Petty academic politics prevented the UPNG Arts Faculty 
Research and Publications Committee from giving the necessary 
support in 1992 . That is also hereby acknowledged but, needless to 
say, not at all gratefully. 
Yaw Saffu 
Canberra 
March 1996 
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Continuity and Change in PNG Electoral 
Politics* 
Yaw Saffu 
The importance of elections in the evolution of PNG's statehood 
needs little discussion. The first three national elections, in 1964, 
1968 and 1972, were key elements in the decolonisation process. They 
were a significant part of the political learning process and of the 
largely unplanned transfer of decision-making power from Canberra 
to Port Moresby. These twin processes included political education 
programmes organised by the colonial administration (Reay 1964; 
Baker 1970; May 1976) ,  the establishment of local government 
councils (Fenbury 1980), the evolution of the legislature and the 
cabinet system (Parker and Wolfers 1971; Wolfers 1976) ,  the 
emergence of political parties towards the end of the 1960s (Wolfers 
1 970) ,  and the making of the Independence C onstitution 
(Constitutional Planning Committee 1974). 
The post-independence elections of 1977, 1982, 1987 and 1992 
have performed the primary functions assigned to elections in 
liberal democracies, namely, recruiting political leaders and 
legitimizing their rule. The transition from traditional 'big-man ' 
leadership to that of the youthful, Western-educated, politician 
has been effected through these elections. Free, over-subscribed, 
keenly-contested elections have underpinned PNG's brand of 
exuberant, vibrant and populist democracy. By one test of democracy, 
what might be termed 'the extent of uncertainty of electoral 
outcomes test' (Przeworski 1986; Seligson 1989), and by another test, 
Robert Dahl 's test of 'public contestation and participation' (Dahl 
My thanks to Ron May, Sinclair Dinnen and Bill Standish for their helpful 
comments on the draft of this chapter. 
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1971, 1989), PNG must be counted as one of the most democratic states 
in the world. 
Over the thirty-year period of these elections, PNG has 
undergone very rapid and enormous changes in practically every 
aspect of society (Strathem 1984, 1993) . These changes have been 
reflected, to some degree, in electoral politics (Bettison et al .1 965; 
Epstein et a l . 1971; Stone 1976; Hegarty 1983; King 1 989; Oliver 
1989). The dominant concerns of both politicians and the public (and 
of the colonial administration also in the earlier period) and, 
therefore, the themes that emerged most forcefully, varied over 
time. The study of the 1972 election, for instance, was subtitled 
Prelude to Self-Gnnernment. Self-government was the dominant 
theme, among the elite and the small attentive public at least. Lack 
of understanding and fear of what self-government would entail 
were widespread, with deliberate disinformation on the issue by a 
self-interested expatriate planter class. 
In those early years, threats of disruption to elections did not 
emanate from the Highlands, which is where election-related 
violence is most commonly expected nowadays (Dinnen; Ketan this 
volume) .  Then, it was areas such as East Sepik, the Gazelle 
peninsula in East New Britain and the coastal areas of Papua, such 
as Rigo and Abau, which presented threats of boycott, on account of 
cargo cultist activities or militant micro-nationalist agitations.  
These caused such official anguish that they prompted the 
Electoral C ommissioner, supported by the leading national 
politician, Michael Somare, to advocate compulsory voting (Stone 
1976:62-67) . 
The large amount of space devoted to cargo cultism in the earlier 
studies reflected the considerable lack of sophistication on the part 
of very large sections of the population, as they struggled to make 
sense of colonialism and all its manifestations, particularly the 
enormous gap in affluence and technology between themselves and 
the white colonisers (Harding and Lawrence 1971; Stone 1976:67-
167) . The enormous influence of individual expatriates in electoral 
affairs, as indeed in district and regional affairs in general, another 
reflection of the times, progressively declined with every election. 
The basis of elect0ra.l choice (whose discovery is, ultimately, the 
objective of all electoral stud�es) was also affected by the factors in 
social change, even if to a lesser extent than it might have been 
expected. 
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After reviewing the first four elections, David Hegarty (1983) 
concluded that the 1977 election had been characterised as much by 
continuity as by change. On the side of continuity, he referred to the 
continuing weakness of parties in electoral politics, 'clan ' 
mobilisation by candidates as primary strategy, and voters ' 
pragmatic and essentially materialistic expectations. On the side of 
change, he pointed to the disappearance of secessionist agitations 
and platforms, the Papua Besena and the Napidakoe Navitu 
movements having become spent forces by then . However, if a 
distinction is made between the context of elections and the 
behaviour of actors and participants, as this chapter seeks to do, it 
can be argued that, despite an undoubted rapid social change over 
the period, continuity in electoral behaviour, rather than change, 
has been the more striking feature. 
Continuity and change in context and behaviour 
Continuity and change are two sides of the s ame historical coin 
(Barker 1949) .  The ability to speak intelligibly of trends is the 
clearest acknowledgement of this. Trends connote change, but within 
a recognisable framework of continuity. Thus, continuity and change 
are not mutually exclusive. They co-exist and are relative. Indeed, 
students of Revolution are constantly aware of the persistence of 
tradition in the face of revolutionary change (Dunn 1989; C alvert 
1970) .  
Observable changes in PNG electoral politics in the period have 
stemmed mainly from changes in the contexts in which the 
successive elections have been held, rather than from changes in the 
basis of electoral choice. For instance, the arrival of political 
parties on the scene (effectively, only after the second election), and 
the transfer of sovereign state power to Papua New Guineans, with 
the coming of independence, were both very significant changes in 
the context. The electoral system has been changed once (after the 
third election) and there have been electoral boundary changes 
(although not'since 1977, in spite of two national censuses in 1980 and 
1990 which show a need for such changes) .  There have been 
amendments to the Organic Law on National Elections (as Reilly 's 
chapter, this volume, discusses). 
In the sense of context, electoral politics have come a long way, 
along with expanding participation in, and increasing control of, 
the economy by Papua New Guineans, and with increasing education 
and the spread of worldly sophistication . Thus, some expatriate 
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campaign gimmicks during the earlier elections, seeking to win votes 
simply on the basis of the technological wonders of the polaroid 
camera, for instance, would now be laughed out of court. However, 
while the socio-economic, legal and institutional environments and 
the political atmosphere surrounding elections have changed 
enormously, the determinants of electoral choice (or electoral 
behaviour), by comparison, have hardly changed over the period . 
The 'parochial handout mentality model ' (Filer this volume),or 
the 'parochial good works ' model (Parker 1971 ), still reigns 
supreme, in 1992 as in 1964 and 1968 . Filer observes: 'Communities 
vote for the candidate who offers the greatest material reward and 
candidates normally offer the greatest reward to their own 
community' .  Studies in this volume confirm that questions of local 
conflict and local development, the personality, status and wealth 
of the individual candidate, and his or her ascribed relationship 
with the relevant ethnic/language groups in the electorate, which 
the earlier published studies identified, continue to be primary 
considerations in electoral choice. 
However, 'primary' is not the same as 'exclusive'. To attempt to 
sub stitute 'exclusive ' for 'primary' ,  and ignore completely the 
influence of secondary association factors (such as church affiliation 
and political party affiliation) and other specific situational 
factors (such as current local conflicts and issues and the skill and 
energy which candidates put into their campaigning) in a l l  
electorates, would be t o  allow the imperatives of parsimony and 
elegance of 'theory' to get in the way of comprehensiveness and 
validity of explanation. If the unvarnished, unadorned ethnic/ clan 
vote explanation of electoral outcomes works well at all on its own, 
without the need to consider other factors, this would be so only in 
some Highlands electorates where clans can be relatively large (say 
1500 members) and candidates are many (over thirty is normal). An 
appropriate weight also has to be given, these days, to the serious 
inroads which the ever-expanding and evidently all-embracing 
commoditisation process has made into electoral p,olitics (Ketan 
1995; Yasi this volume;. 
From a p olitica l  development perspective (Huntington and 
Dominguez 1975; Weiner and Huntington 1987), electoral politics in 
PNG have either remained essentially unchanged, stuck in the 
moulds in which they emerged in the first national election in 1964, 
or they have 'decayed'. as exemplified by an increasing election 
violence and an open sale of blocs of votes by 'vote contractors ', 
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particularly in the Highlands (according to students in my second 
year PNG Politics c lass in 1992; Ketan 1 995; The Na tional 
31 / 1 /95:15 'Lessons from the WHP polls ' ) .  PNG's commendable 
persistence with free, competitive elections as the primary mode of 
addressing the political succession problem is, of course, in itself, a 
major contribution to the process of political development, to the 
extent that a tradition of governance which incorporates regular 
renewals of mandate of rulers in this manner is regarded as a key 
element in political development. 
However, political development also involves processes of 
increasing governmental capabilities, of penetrating and regulating 
society, of extracting necessary resources and compliance, and using 
these to meet aspirations of citizens for peace, security, health, 
education, material improvements, and so on (Almond and Powell 
1966; Migdal 1988) . The nature of PNG electoral politics, as 
analysed in the studies assembled here, and in those of the earlier 
volumes, and the fragile coalition governments and free-wheeling 
parliamentary politics they give rise to, have tended to undermine 
political development, understood as increasing the effectiveness of 
state institutions (Saffu 1988a, 1988b ) .  
Similarly, an increasing shift o f  attachment o f  citizens away 
from sub-national or sub-territorial, kinship-related, primordial 
and ascriptive symbols to more national or territorial, more secular, 
secondary organisation-based, achievement-oriented symbols and 
criteria is widely accepted as an important variable in political 
development. But, after thirty years, PNG elections continue to be 
essentially separate electorate-based contests. The politics of 
choosing representatives and political leaders continue to be very 
much grounded in local issues and in intricate relationships among 
local groups. Thus the 'national' in national elections remains 
something of a misnomer, despite the obvious national attributes of 
the exercise: the role of the national Electoral Commission and 
members of the national public service who officiate; the national 
police and defence force who provide much needed security; the role 
of the media; political parties which sponsor candidates across the 
country and national leaders who criss-cross the country to campaign 
for their party's nominees. 
Despite the existence of these political parties, no linkages can 
as yet be found between parties, voting and governance, particularly 
with respect to policy outcomes. Fluidity, formlessness and an 
apparent lack of an effective, integrative centre thus characterise 
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PNG's parliamentary system. Holding governments accountable in 
these circumstances becomes virtually impossible. The electors' 
insistence on, and exercise of, their powers and rights of 
accountability miss the target, namely, the government. Instead, the 
result is a massive sixty per cent re-election failure rate of MPs in 
1992, ten per cent more than the preceding average, with all that 
such high failure rates entail for non-accumulation and non­
consolidation of experience in governing, and for the likelihood of 
extreme self-regarding behaviour on the part of insecure, essentially 
one-term MPs. 
So far, since independence, more PNG governments have been 
changed through parliamentary votes of no confidence than through 
elections. Governments have changed through elections twice, in 
1982 and 1992, and through votes of no confidence four times, in 1980, 
1985, 1988 and 1994. This reflects the failure of elections to induce 
the growth of cohesive parties that significantly influence (not to 
say dominate) electoral politics .  (But it is also a reflection, 
admittedly, of the absence in PNC of the usual Westminster, prime 
ministerial constitutional weapon of dissolution of a recalcitrant 
p arliament) .  Party organisation continues to be weak. Party 
identification is not an important basis of electoral choice. A 1987 
survey of electors established that the party principle does not 
feature prominently in the decision calculus of electors (Saffu 1989) .  
The low premium which electors place on parties explains the large 
number of candidates who stand as Independents, and win (see 
Tables 1.9 and 1 .10 below).  
In the absence of the party factor, there is an overwhelming 
concentration on candidate evaluation, which is based primarily on 
candidates' personal attributes, particularly their kinship and 
ethnic affiliations .  These affiliations are assumed to define 
automatically the candidates' positions on local conflicts. It is on 
the basis of local issues and considerations, generally, not on 
national issues (these are not usually canvassed by candidates) that 
representatives are chosen during elections . Summing up the 1968 
election, R.S. Parker (1971) observed that there was widespread 
rejection of those candidates who raised issues broader than the 
material needs of their localities. On the whole, candidates still do 
not raise broad issues. But parties do issue manifestos which purport 
to raise issues and offer party policies. Party leaders also usually 
raise broad, national issues, and the national media do publicise 
them. However, the consensus among observers, as reported in the 
Continuity and Change in PNG Electoral Politics 7 
published studies, is that local issues overwhelmingly predominate 
at the electorate level where the electoral choice is made. Thus the 
electoral process in PNG does not do very much, directly, for 
national integration, even if it does not, unlike in many African 
countries, actually help to undermine national integration (Zolberg 
1968; Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1988) .  
An increasing participation by citizens in the election of  their 
rulers (which should enhance accountability and responsiveness on 
the part of the rulers), and in the determination of the basic agenda 
and outcomes of public policy, would be accepted generally as a 
significant element in the concept of political development. In that 
regard, voter turnout rates in PNG have been consistently high: 72.3 
per cent in 1964; 63 per cent in 1968; 60 per cent in 1972; 68.9 per cent in 
1977; 66.3 per cent in 1982; 72.9 per cent in 1987 (PNG Electoral 
Commission 1987:5) and 81.2 per cent in 1992. Although the pre-1992 
turnout figures need to be discounted somewhat, because of the 
operation of section 141 of the Organic Law on National Elections 
(explained below), turnout rates have remained high since the first 
elections, when some commentators sought to explain them in terms 
of slavish obedience of simple villagers to kiaps' orders (Hughes 
and van der Veur 1965:400-402). The predominantly parochial basis 
of electoral politics in PNG, however, undermines the effect, 
particularly the developmental import, of popular participation, as 
the papers by Ben Reilly and Joe Ketan (this volume), in very 
different ways, argue. 
The large numbers of candidates in PNG elections account for a 
great deal of the healthy looking turnout rates, because kinsmen 
have an incentive and an obligation to go out and vote. But if the 
large numbers of candidates boost popular participation, they are 
also responsible for the diminishing proportion of the votes obtained 
by winning candidates, as Table 1 . 1, 1 .2 and 1.3 below would show. 
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Table 1 . 1 :  Average Number of Candidates Per Electorate 
Year No. of % Av. No. of A v. Increase % 
Increase Candidates in Candidates Increase 
Per Electorate Per Electorate 
1964 298 5.5 
1968 484 62 .4  5 .8  0 .3  5 .4  
1972 61 1 26 .2 6.1 0.3 5 .2 
1977 879 43 .9  8 . 1  2 .0  32 .8  
1982 1 125 28 . 0  10.3 2.2 27.2 
1987 1513 34 .5  13.9 3 .6  34 .9  
1992 1655 9 .4  15.2 1 .3 9 .4  
Note: 
( i )  The number of electorates was 54 in 1964, 84 in 1968 and 100 in 
1972. It has remained 109 since 1977. 
( i i )  The optional preferential electoral system operated until the 
1972 election. The current first past the post system began in 
1977. Some commentators have posited a relationship between 
the explosion in the number of candidates and the introduction 
of that system (e.g. Reilly this volume) . But it must also be 
remembered that the election of 1977 was the first after 
Independence. 
Table 1.2: Per cent Votes Obtained By Winning Candidates 
Year Under 10% 10-19% 20-29% 30-39% 40-49% 50% + 
1977 11 37 26 16 19 
1982 4 20 33 20 14 18 
1987 2 39 41 13 4 7 
1992 9 45 33 14 3 5 
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Table 1.3:  Per cent Votes Obtained By Winners in 1992 By Region 
Region Under 1 0% 10-19% 20-29% 30-39% 40-49% 50% + 
Islands 2 5 4 2 4 
Papua 1 10 8 1 
Mamose 1 13 9 5 1 
NCD 1 3 
Highlands 6 17 11 5 
Total 9 (8.2%) 45(41 .3%) 33(30.3%) 14(12.8%) 3 (2.8%) 5(4 .6%) 
Cum.Tot. 9(8 .2) 54(49 .5)  87(79 .8) 1 0 1 (92.6) 1 04(95.4) 1 09 
Note: Papua in these tables excludes Southern Highlands Province which is 
included in the Highlands 
Aspects of the results of the election will be examined later. 
Here, I want to use the distribution of votes obtained by winning 
candidates in 1992 to point out a persistent and pervasive feature of 
PNG electoral politics, namely, the contrast between the Islands 
region and the Highlands region. For instance, whereas the only 
two-person contest in the whole election occurred in Namatanai, in 
the Islands region, the record for the highest number of candidates 
standing in an electorate was, once again, set in the Highlands 
region, 48 in Sinasina Yonggomugl (up from 29 in Kundiawa in 1982, 
and 45 in Kerowagi in 1987, all in Chimbu province). 
From the point of view of political development, Table 1. 3 
presents a discouraging picture. In terms of the number of candidates 
and the percentage of votes obtained by winning candidates, the 
situation in the National Capital District (NCD), the most 
modernised area of the country, is more akin to the Highlands 
situation than it is to that of the more politically advanced Islands. 
The percentages of winning votes in the four NCD seats were 9.6, 
12.9, 14.5 and 16.1. The cause of the low winning percentages was the 
same as in the Highlands, the large number of candidates: 41, 26, 27 
and 18 respectively. Further aspects of the 1992 results will be 
examined later. Meanwhile, we shall seek further perspectives on 
change and continuity in PNG electoral politics through a brief 
summary of findings of a survey of candidates in the 1992 election. 
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A profile of PNG's emergent political elite 
Among the many engrossing sets of data which the PNG Electoral 
Commission (PNGEC) routinely, and helpfully, makes available to 
academics and other commentators after each quinquennial national 
election are the bio-data of candidates . Information is provided on 
gender, age, education, current occupation and, where available or 
applicable, a brief history of previous employment. Successive 
studies of PNG elections have used these data to chart the changing 
profile of PNG's emergent political elite since the first election: the 
progressive reduction (until recently) in the average age of its 
members; their increasing educational levels and corresponding 
improvements in their occupation and experience in the environment 
of modern organisations; the extent of the turnover of its 
parliamentary wing; and (since 1987) their party affiliation at the 
time of the election. 
The profiles drawn from such data have generally been 
incorporated into constituency and general overview studies on the 
elections. But Turner (1989) used the PNGEC data to compare the 
subset of successful candidates in the 1987 election with the larger 
set of all the candidates to see if there were significant differences 
between the two groups of successful and unsuccessful candidates on 
gender, age and educational levels. He found that regional 
differences appeared more marked on the age and education 
dimensions than differences between winning and losing 
candidates. I 
While the bio-data of candidates compiled by the PNGEC 
yields a great deal of information about the emergent PNG political 
elite, to draw a more rounded portrait of this elite, much more 
information than is obtained and offered by the PNGEC is required. 
For instance, what factors primarily motivate the PNG political 
elite? What are its opinions, attitudes and knowledge regarding 
political, social and economic issues? Indeed, what is its perception 
of politics in general, and of the PNG political culture in particular? 
How does it perceive the electors and what beliefs does it hold on 
how to campaign and win elections in PNG? What conception of 
representation does it hold? Partly to provide data on these 
additional dimensions of the PNG political elite, and partly to 
1 Incidentally, in a survey of electors in that election, region of residence 
turned out to be the most significant explanation of electoral behaviour in 
PNG (Saffu 1989). 
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obtain data to check the findings of a survey of electors undertaken 
during the 1987 election on the determinants of electoral choice in 
PNG (Saffu 1989), and thus to provide another perspective on 
electoral behaviour in PNG, a survey of candidates in the 1992 
national election was undertaken. 
The survey 
In May, just over seven hundred questionnaires were sent to 
candidates who had provided postal addresses to the PNGEC, and 
senior undergraduate students taking a Methods course with the 
author tracked down about a half of the candidates in the National 
Capital District (NCD). In June, Dr Bill Standish distributed one 
hundred questionnaires in Chimbu province. 252 completed 
questionnaires, representing about a third of the total sent out, but a 
mere fifteen per cent of the entire population of candidates, were 
returned. The sample was, essentially, self-selected. However, 
because of the PNGEC data, it was possible to compare some sample 
statistics with their corresponding population parameters, and to 
determine the extent to which this essentially self-selected sample 
was representative. For instance, Table 1.4 compares the sample and 
population on gender, while Table 1 .5 compares the age distribution 
of the sample with that of the population. 
Table 1.4: Comparison Between Sample and Population on Gender 
Sample 
All Candidates 
Total 
252 
1655 
Male 
249(98.8%) 
1639(99%) 
Female 
3(1 .2%) 
16(1 %) 
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Table 1 .5: Age Distribution of Candidates 
Under 30 30-39 40-49 Over 50 Unknown 
Sample 
All Candidates 
13(5 .2%) 133(52.8) 74(29 .5) 24(9.6) 8(3 .5) 
89 (5 .4%) 905 (54 .7) 495(29 .9) 1 28(7 .7)  36(2 .5)  
Table 1 .6 compares the educational levels of the sample members 
and those of all candidates. 
Table 1. 6: Distribution of Educational Levels of Candidates 
Below Gr.6+ Tr I Gr. lO+Tr/ Gr.12+Tr/ Post- Unknown 
Gr.6 Gr.7-10 Gr. 1 1 -12 Tertiary Tertiary 
Sample 23(9) 38(15) 84(33) 53(21)  42(17) 1 7( 5 )  
All Cs. 1 89( 1 1 )  735(44) 368(22) 285(17) 20(1 )  58(4)  
Finally, Table 1 .7 compares the regional distribution of the 
candidates in the sample and in the population of candidates. 
Table 1 .7: Candidates by Region 
Sample 
All Cands. 
Islands Papua Mamose 
19(7%) 33(13%) 48(19%) 
100(6%) 296(17%) 404(24%) 
NCD 
72(28%) 
1 12(7%) 
Highlands 
80( 32%) 
743 (45cYo) 
While the sample statistics and the population parameters can 
hardly be distinguished on gender and age, the better educated 
candidates are over-represented in the sample, as is to be expected 
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in a survey which relies predominantly on a mailed questionnaire. 
Whereas only a quarter of the sample had not gone beyond Grade 10 
or its equivalent (i.e. Grade six plus some job training), among all the 
candidates the proportion was 55 per cent. At the top end of the 
education variable, whereas 16.7 per cent of the sample had 
obtained post-tertiary education, in the wider set of all the 
candidates only 1.2 per cent had had such education. In this respect 
then, characteristics drawn from the sample, as we shall seek to do 
here, can be regarded as perhaps tending to emphasise features at 
the advanced end of the spectrum of the emergent elite, a point 
which the relative over-representation of NCD candidates and the 
relative under-representation of Highlands candidates probably 
reinforce. However, on the showing of these comparisons, it can be 
claimed that the sample is representative enough to base 
generalisations about the emergent PNG political elite on it. 
Without entering into any debate about what the term 'political 
elite' means (Lasswell et al. 1954; Meisel 1958; Macrae 1984), the 
term is used here very loosely to refer to all those who are, have 
been, or clearly aspire to be, through elections, in positions to make 
political decisions through the structures of the modem state for, 
and on behalf of, their fellow compatriots. It certainly is not meant 
to connote, much less to denote, the existence of a self-conscious 
minority which is characterised by what Meisel has formulated as 
'consciousness, coherence and conspiracy', in relation to the wider 
society (Meisel 1958: 4). A less fertile ground than traditional PNG 
for that kind of elite is difficult to imagine. PNG societies generally 
lacked the sort of hierarchical structures and their supporting 
ideologies and legitimating principles which are synonymous with 
domination by enduring, self-perpetuating minorities (May 1984). 
Modem, introduced hierarchies and inequalities are still too recent 
to have produced consolidated elites characterised by Meisel's 
three 'Cs'. 
Some demographic characteristics 
The gender composition of the emergent political elite reflects the 
unequivocally patriarchal, male-dominated society that PNG is 
(see Sepoe this volume) .  The proportion of women candidates has 
remained minuscule, at around one per cent in each of the four 
elections since independence. Female MPs have become more than a 
rarity and an endangered species; they have actually disappeared 
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altogether. From three in the 109-member chamber in 1977 to one in 
1982, there has been no successful female candidate since 1982. 
As Table 1 .5 indicates, the PNG political elite is predominantly 
young. Sixty one per cent of all candidates who declared their age 
were below 40, with the 30-39 age cohort accounting for 56 per cent. 
Only eight per cent were aged 50 or more. This has been the pattern 
of age distribution of candidates in the three national elections 
preceding 1992 (Turner 1989:60) . However, since independence, there 
has been a perceptible shift in the age distribution at the younger 
end. The proportion of candidates aged 30 or less declined from 32.4 
per cent in 1977 to 17.6 per cent in 1982, and to only 5.5 per cent in 
1992. The juvenescence of the PNG political elite, during the 
transition to independence and in the immediate aftermath, with 
all that it has entailed, for the relative dearth of deep, relevant 
experience, has almost certainly bottomed out. The modal age of the 
political elite, ten years from the 1992 election, will most likely be 
the 40-49 bracket. By international standards, it will still be a 
young elite. But compared with the situation up to the 1990's, its 
members are likely to exhibit indices of higher levels of training 
and experience that correlate with their advancing age. 
Similar observations can be made about the educational levels of 
members of the political elite. The distribution in Table 1 .6 suggests 
that the political elite is probably somewhat poorly educated, even 
by Third World standards .  However, compared with the 
educational attainments of the indigenous members of the first two 
Houses of Assembly, progress on this front has been impressive. 
Wolfers (1968: 273) commented as follows on the educational 
background of members of the Second House of Assembly after the 
1968 election: 'The new indigenous members . .  . are, on average, 
probably better educated . . .  than their predecessors; only 26 of them 
have no formal education at all [out of 61 indigenous members : my 
parenthesis ] while 19 have some post-primary (i .e. post-standard 
VI) education to their credit, including two who have completed a 
year's university, and one Highlander . . .  with 4 years' post-primary 
missionary training. ' The educational levels of members of the 
political elite have gone up with every election, and there is no 
reason why that should not continue. 
The Electoral Commissior;.'s data on the occupation of candidates 
are often (though not deliberately) misleading. Candidates who 
have resigned their j obs a year or two earlier to return to the 
electorate tend to describe themselves on the nomination forms as 
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'subsistence farmer' or as 'unemployed'. Our survey took respondents 
back five years before the election and worked our way through 
whatever jobs they had had over that period . On the basis of 
responses to four related questions, the categories drawn up, with 
the distributions of respondents, were as listed in the following 
table .  
Table 1 .8: Broad Occupational Backgrounds of Sample Candidates 
Category Number 
1 .  Never Employed 3 
2. Unemployed Now 11 
3.  Self-employed Now 25 
4. Self-employed( small) 15 
5 .  Self-employed(big) 33 
6. Employee(low) 66 
7. Employee(high) 69 
8.  Politician 20 
9. No Response 9 
Notes: 
1 .  Now (in 2 and 3 )  means in the last year or two. 
Percentage 
1 .2 
4.4 
10.0 
6.0 
13.1 
26.3 
27.5 
8 .0 
3.6 
2. Small means an annual income of less than Kl0,000 
3. Low means non-supervisory, clerk/ artisan/ equivalent 
4. Those in categories 2 and 3 came from 6 and 7 in the ratio of 
virtually 1 :  1 
Ninety four per cent of the respondents were married while 3 per 
cent had never been married. Unlike the traditional 'big-men', 
members of the emergent political elite are predominantly 
monogamous (81 .7%), as against 10 per cent who have more than one 
wife. If the family size of the members of the elite group is any 
indication of the population policy they will support, advocates of 
a slower population growth in PNG evidently have a battle on their 
hands. More than one half of the respondents (52.2%) have four or 
more children. In fact, 15 per cent of the respondents have seven 
children or more. 
It is not known how much the considerable influence of the 
Catholic Church contributes to the large family size . What is 
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known though, from observation, and confirmed by the survey, is 
that, if the degree of religiousness can be indicated by the number of 
times a person goes to church, religion is taken seriously by members 
of the political elite . Almost two thirds of the respondents (64.9c1o) 
said they went to church at least once a week, almost certainly a 
higher rate of church attendance among the elite than in most other 
places. Twenty two per cent attended once or twice a week; 1 1  per 
cent said they never went to church. 
The claim which is often made by PNG leaders, that PNG is a 
Christian country, evidently, has some empirical basis, if the extent 
of church membership among the political elite is the yardstick. 
Only 3 per cent of the respondents said they belong to no church. The 
longest established churches accounted for over 60 per cent of the 
respondents: Lutherans (22.7%); Catholics (20 .7%); United (15 .l  %); 
Anglicans (2 .8%) .  The Baptist, SDA and Assembly of God 
altogether accounted for another 20 per cent. 
Political characteristics 
Moving now towards characteristics with more obvious political 
significance, it has to be said that a substantial proportion of the 
members did not appear to fit the conception of politicians finding 
their metier in their youth or by joining voluntary associations. For 
instance, two-thirds of the respondents ( 66. 1  % ) said they had never 
taken part in any public protest or demonstration of any sort. Exactly 
one half of the 25 per cent who said they had, had done so as 
students; 6 per cent had taken part in a protest as a member of a 
trade union; the rest had participated as members of a traditional 
community. 
A significant proportion were not 'joiners' . Thirty six per cent of 
the respondents said they were not involved in any voluntary 
organisation of any sort, while another 16 per cent said they were 
inactive members of the associations they were involved in. That 
makes more than one half of the respondents. Even among those who 
said they were active in voluntary organisations, only a few (5 per 
cent of the respondents) were involved in associations which had 
political aims, and only 1 .5 per cent were involved in trade unions. 
Religious organisations (9.6%) and social/sporting clubs (8%) both 
had more respondents working for them. But, in the spirit of 
Melanesian reciprocity, the few who were actively involved in 
voluntary associations expected to receive help of one kind or 
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another in their campaign, although not monetary help, which only 
4 per cent expected 
Why would individuals who had previously shown such weak 
indications of interest in politics become candidates? Who was 
prodding them? Nineteen per cent said 'nobody'; it was their own 
decision. The largest response category was: 'the community' 
(33.5%).  This was followed by 'relations' (12.0%), 'friends' (10.0%), 
'party I other candidates' (4 .4%), 'church' (4 .4%) and 'the youth' 
(3.6%) .  To a direct question, 'Why did you choose to stand as a 
candidate?', 'ambition or career', which is probably the truest 
response, was mentioned or implied by 14 per cent, the fourth largest 
response category. Three larger response categories were more like 
what one would expect to hear: 'failure of M.P. / government' 
(19.5%); 'I can deliver' (15.5%); 'poor services' (14.7%). Another 1 1  
per cent said they stood because 'people urged them', while 
'corruption' was the reason given by 8 per cent. It is interesting that 
corruption was not mentioned by a larger number. Corruption was 
constantly in the public view at the time. Ombudsman-initiated 
leadership tribunals were investigating four government back-bench 
MPs for corruption at the time and opposition leaders were flogging 
corruption allegations for all they were worth. 
Some candidates (22.7%) said they had decided only within the 
preceding twelve months to stand, while 8 per cent said they had 
harboured the ambition since independence. In between these two 
were those who said 'since the last election' (28.3%) and 'more than 
five years ago' (20.6%) . For 38 per cent, this was not their first time 
as candidates. Eighteen per cent had stood for national parliament 
elections, 14 per cent had stood for provincial assembly elections 
and 6 per cent had tried for both. 
Perspectives on campaigning 
One of the most consistent findings from the 1987 survey concerned 
the unimportance of political parties in the decision calculus of 
electors . Nevertheless, it has been argued that because of the 
organisational support which parties can give to candidates their 
role in elections should not be dismissed out of hand (Oliver 1989; 
King 1989) .  I expected that candidates would be in a privileged 
position to throw some light on the significance of the party factor 
in campaigning. 
First of all, 61 per cent of the respondents said they had no party 
affiliation. Pangu had the largest number of adherents (5.6%), with 
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only three other parties People's Progress Party (PPP), People's 
Action Party (PAP) and League for National Advancement (LNA) 
each claiming more than 3 per cent of the respondents. Of those who 
were affiliated, only 24 (or 9.6% of the total number of respondents) 
had been party members for five years or more. Of the respondents 
who were members of political parties, only a small minority 
(15.5%) could be classified as serious members, using criteria such as 
paying dues or attending meetings. 
Secondly, it is clear that parties are not fussy about whom they 
sponsor as candidates; they do not insist on party membership. Thus, 
sixty per cent of the respondents (far more than those who claimed 
party affiliation) said they were sponsored by parties. It was thus 
confirmed, as some contributors in this volume point out, that not all 
' independent candidates' are genuinely independent. The three 
parties sponsoring the largest number of candidates in the sample 
were PPP (22.7%), Pangu (16 .3%) and Melanesian Alliance (MA) 
( 12 . 7%) .  
Thirdly, despite the large number of  respondents who said they 
were party-sponsored, when they were asked what organisations 
were helping them in their campaign, only a tiny number (2 .4%) 
mentioned the party. The distribution of responses to that question 
was: 'informal committee of friends and relations' (31 .5%); 'none; no 
group' (16 .3%); 'group I am associated with', namely, 'sports club' 
(14 .3%), 'work-mates ' (14 .3%), 'church group' (10.4%) and 'village 
group' (8 .8%) . 
What, then, does party support mean, in practice? For some of 
the respondents who claimed to be party-sponsored, evidently party 
support meant nothing. One half of the respondents (49 .4<J1o ) said 
they received no 'material support' from the party; but nineteen per 
cent did, with Pangu (5.2%) accounting for the greatest number. 
When a question was asked about who was funding their campaign, 
only a small proportion of those who answered (7.6%) mentioned 
either the party or the party leader. The sources of funding, for the 
96 per cent who responded, were : ' self and wantoks' (77.6%); 
'traditional community ' (4.4°/ci) ;  and 'business associates' ( 1 .2%); 
'other' (2 .0%).  
Given the high cost of everything in Papua New Guinea, 
anecdotal evidence, and ubservation of what is involved in 
campaigning in Papua New Guinea (feasts, beer, handouts, including 
money),  the amounts of monies candidates claimed to have spent 
were usually easily credible, although, of course, there was no way 
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o f  checking on the claims. At the low end, a quarter o f  the 
respondents (23.1 %) said they had spent, or would have spent by the 
end of the campaign, up to K5,000. At the top end, 8 per cent claimed 
campaign expenditure in excess of K50,000. The modal range was 
Kl0-20,000 (27.1%). The rest was: K5,000-10,000 (19.9%); K21,000-
49,000 (18.7%); 'no response' (3.2%). 
Lack of funds (45.8%) and transportation (20.7%) were the two 
main problems of campaigning according to the respondents. Other 
problems were 'demands by electors' (5 .6%) and 'threats' (2.4%) . A 
tenth of the respondents said they faced 'no problems' .  Identical 
proportions of candidates (44% each) moved around their electorate 
mostly on foot or by car (their own or their friends' or relations') .  
Only two respondents, less than one per cent, mentioned 'party 
vehicle' as the major means of getting around in their electorate. 
House-to-house campaigning was the preferred mode of 
campaigning for about a third of the respondents (33.1 %), with 
public address systems (or rallies) and posters (17.1 %) and mumus 
and traditional entertainment (6%) a long way behind.  Other 
methods of campaigning mentioned by respondents were 'church 
meetings' (3.6%), 'payment for electors' services' (2.8%) and 
'tv /radio/newspaper promotion' (2.4%). 
The phenomenon of localised support is one of the most clearly 
established features of electoral p olitics in PNG. How do 
candidates explain the phenomenon? Their own campaign plans and 
activities could be expected to give clues about what they believed 
to be major determinants of electoral choice in PNG. One of the 
questions intended to probe this area was the question: 'Which of 
the other candidates standing against you do you consider to be your 
major opponents?'  The follow up question, as usual, was 'Why?' 
'Incumbency' was clearly, in the view of most respondents 
(35.5%), the reason for the electoral strength of the feared opponent. 
Name recognition and the provision of services were the two 
elements that were most often associated with the advantages of 
incumbency. Although money was mentioned separately (by 16.7%), 
it must also be regarded as a related explanation in some of the cases 
of incumbency. It is interesting that the 'size of his/her traditional 
group' was cited by only 2 per cent of the respondents in this 
connection . However, 'splitting my b ase' ,  which is also an 
acknowledgement of the primordial factor, was the reason given by 
6.4 per cent. 'The party behind him/her' was put forward by only 3.6 
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per cent. Some respondents (14.3%) were so confident about their own 
chances that they did not believe that any opponent was 'major'. 
To a more direct question about which areas candidates were 
concentrating attention on, and why, 'one's own home area or wife's 
home area' (33 .9%), 'where one has lived/worked' (17. 1  %) and 
'where one is not known' (7.6%) were the three answers given most 
frequently. Other answers were 'because the area has no strong 
candidate or has no candidate of its own' (3 .6%) and 'co-religionists' 
(1 .6%). Candidates stood predominantly where they were working 
(63.3%) or they resigned to go back and live for a year (9.6%) or two 
(3 .2%) in the electorate before the election. Only seventeen per cent 
stood in a different place from where they worked and yet did not 
resign at least one year before the election. But as May's reference to 
the poor performance by the 'Foreign Sepiks' suggests, 'showing the 
face' only for electoral benefit evidently does not pay these days. 
The final question on this issue was: 'The people who will vote 
for you, why do you think they will vote for you?' The most 
numerous response category was 'community and traditional reasons' 
( 37.5%), and it was followed by 'personal attributes, honesty, 
ability, education, experience', (all 16.8%), and then by 'past 
service or help given' (15 .9%) . 'Associates or party' was the reason 
given by only 4.5 per cent of the respondents. 
The political elite and issues 
The existing studies on Papua New Guinea elections have 
established that issues do not play a significant role in the choice 
calculus of electors. Compared with most other liberal democracies, 
to the extent that issues count with electors in Papua New Guinea, 
they are local issues. Party leaders issue glossy manifestos, and the 
national press give the national issues put forward by the leaders 
some prominence. But the issues raised at the national level usually 
do not go much beyond very general promises of action, and do not 
generally provoke sustained or searching debates. There are many 
reasons for that. First, there are no known ideological differences 
among the parties. Secondly, no party devotes time or resources to 
research in order to develop policies. Thirdly, even party-sponsored 
candidates are not keen to dwell on national issues when it is local 
issues that make the runs. Finally, with so many independents, 
issues cannot really crystallize. Nevertheless, some issues raised at 
the national level in the 1992 election, corruption in particular, and 
promises made, for instance, PDM's free education and subsidy to 
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tree crop farmers, and the LNA's Village Services Scheme, seeped 
through to the local, grassrooots level, as Foster and May, for 
instance, show in their chapters. 
But even if issues do not win elections in PNG, and rational 
candidates, therefore, do not spend a great deal of time and energy 
raising them in their campaign, presumably, as people who are 
asking for a mandate to make decisions, candidates have views on 
what might be wrong in the society and how these might be fixed? 
What problems do they consider need most attention? What 
solutions, if any, do they propose? 
An item in the questionnaire asked candidates: 'What do you 
consider to be the three main problems in the country today?' The 
following table ranks the four problems which were mentioned most 
often on each of the three responses, with the percentage of 
respondents endorsing them in brackets: 
First Response Second Response Third Response 
Law and order (28.8) Unemployment (27.5) Unemployment (14.3) 
Corruption (20.8) Law and Order (16.7) Law and Order (13. 1 )  
Unemployment (15.6) Corruption (14.3) Corruption (10.0) 
Attitudes (5.2) Poor Infrastructure (4.0) Attitudes (5.6) 
Clearly, there was a high degree of consensus among the 
candidates about the core problems that needed tackling. More 
important, the problems identified were all major problems in the 
country. However, to the follow-up question ('How can you help to 
solve them if you are elected?), disappointingly, 8 per cent did not 
answer that question, and another 8 .4 per cent were coded as having 
'no clue' .  Two of the largest categories of respondents, 25.9 per cent 
who said (or implied) that they would 'initiate laws', and 9.6 per 
cent who said (or implied) that they would 'implement tough laws', 
were obviously addressing the law and order problem, and they 
showed touching faith in the coercive capacities of the state. A 
smaller group, 4.4 per cent, who indicated that they would do 
something about 'party system/ state institution building' were the 
only other respondents whose views could be described in any way as 
state-centric. The rest, who said (or implied) that they would 
encourage private enterprise (25.9%), or who implied a preference 
for the market by saying they would push for privatisation (3.2%) 
or who said (or implied) that they would involve the church ( 4.0%) 
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were obviously not putting their faith in the state, whether it was 
the law and order problem or the unemployment problem which 
they were addressing. Not only were such respondents evidently on 
the right track, according to the current, dominant views on economic 
development and how to achieve it (Toye 1987), their responses 
were consistent with what has been observed about a generalised 
distrust of the state in PNG (Filer 1995). An interesting category of 
respondents were the 10.8 per cent who saw their own advancement, 
their appointment as ministers, as a solution. 
Such a category is totally consistent with what is known about 
the behaviour of MPs in PNG: the perpetual motion in parliament, 
crossing and recrossing the carpet, and flitting from party to party, 
in search of ministerial positions . Did candidates think that a 
period of apprenticeship was necessary for new MPs before they 
could be appointed to a ministerial position? Surprisingly, in view 
of what goes on in the period of mustering the numbers to form a 
government after an election (see below), almost one half of the 
respondents (46.6%) said a period of apprenticeship was necessary, 
while 31 . 1  per cent said 'it depends' and only 16.7 per cent said it 
was not necessary, with 5.6 per cent not responding. 
Two previous questions, seeking to probe the same areas as the 
follow-up question, were: 'What are some of the things you think 
the present MP should have done that he has not done?' and 'What 
do you plan to do as a Member of Parliament?' 'Failure to deliver 
development to the electorate (45 .8%) and 'lack of responsiveness' 
(8.8%) were the two major failures of incumbent MPs, according to 
their rivals. Both were failures at the local level. Failure in terms 
of the national economy (6.8%), indigenisation or localisation (6%), 
law and order (3.2%i) ,  and corruption (2.4%) were the specific 
categories of failure on national issues. As to what they themselves 
would do as MPs, the priorities implied by their responses were 
national (36.3%), local (30.3%) and both (23.5'/'o ) ,  with neither 
national nor local (e.g. those who would pursue some international 
agenda) (8.8%) and 'no response' (1 .2%) bringing up the rear. 
To assess the value to be placed on responses to the questions 
touching on issues and what MPs could do about them, and also 
because of the paucity of specific knowledge of what MPs do, which 
was revealed by the 1987 survey of electors (Saffu 1 989:24), a 
question was asked about MP's work. Unlike the electors, the 
majority of candidates (85.2%) knew the sort of activities MPs are 
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involved in. But 12.7 per cent of the candidates clearly did not know 
the work of MPs, while 2. 1 per cent did not answer. 
Two questions were asked to elicit candidates' conceptions of 
representation and to provide some clue about how they view other 
PNG politicians. These were: 'If you are defeated, do you expect the 
winner to represent equally all the people and interests in your 
electorate?' The follow-up question was: 'Why do you say that? ' 
Almost one half (41 . 8%) said they did not expect the winning 
opponent to represent all fairly and equally; a third (35.5%) said 
they did, and almost one quarter (21.5%) said they did not know 
what to expect of the winner regarding how fair-minded and non­
clannish he would be as a representative. While a quarter of the 
respondents (25 .1  %) suggested that MPs act on the basis of 'duty', for 
another quarter (22.3%) 'electoral realities' are what move MPs; for 
a tenth of the respondents notions of 'reciprocity' are at the basis of 
their judgement about whom the winner will represent. 
Policies are what decision-makers intend to do about problems or 
issues . Interests, knowledge and ideals all have a role to play in 
shaping policies . We know something of the dominant interest of 
MPs, especially when the success rate of re-election is so dismal. It is 
called 're-election concerns'. However, not nearly as much is known 
about the ideals PNG politicians subscribe to, or how they view the 
future of PNG, whether they are essentially optimists or 
pessimists . To the question, 'How do you see the future of this 
country?' ,  more than one half of the respondents (52.2%) were 
pessimistic; 30.3 per cent were optimistic; 1 1 .2 per cent gave 
conditional, qualified or mixed answers;  2.8 per cent gave 
inappropriate responses and 3.6 per cent did not respond. 
The questions seeking to elicit information about the political 
ideals the political elite subscribes to were: (a) 'Which world 
leaders do you admire most?'; (b) 'What about PNG leaders? Which 
PNG leaders do you admire most?'; and (c) 'Why?', as a follow-up 
question to each of the above questions. The world leaders who were 
most admired, by 57.4 per cent of the respondents, were leaders of 
liberal democratic countries, whereas only 175 per cent of the heroes 
named were authoritarian political leaders. The heroes named by 
6.4 per cent of respondents were non-political figures while there 
was a large 'no response' category (14 .3%) .  The bases of the 
admiration were effectiveness/achievement (26.3%); the help they 
had given to PNG (these generally tended to be Australian Prime 
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Ministers) (22.7%); the ideas they stood for (21 . 1  %);  and their 
nationalism (9.6%). 
As for the most admired PNG leaders, apart from a large 
(15 . 1  %) category of 'nobody /no response' ,  the following was the 
ranking:  Chan (22 .7%); Somare (20.7%); Okuk ( 1 7.5%); Wingti 
(9.6%); Momis (2%); and Diro (1 .2%) .  Iambakey Okuk, the 
flamboyant Highlands leader, who died in November 1986, had a 
reputation for being 'strong/ decisive', which was the reason given 
by the largest category of respondents (23.5%) for the choice of their 
PNG heroes. Most PNG-watchers will no doubt be able to match the 
other bases of admiration with particular leaders in the list: 
'efficient manager' (15.5%) (would mostly mean Chan, who appears 
to have this reputation); 'consensus seeker' (9.6%) and 'nationalism' 
(6 .8%) w ould be mostly Somare, while 'welfarist/ grassroots 
policies'  (8.8%) would fit practically every PNG political leader of 
the first generation (all of them populist politicians) with the 
possible exception of Chan. But the most astonishing, and revealing, 
comment that the political elite makes about itself is the omission 
of Rabbie Namaliu's name from the list. Arguably the best Prime 
Minister PNG has had to date (his handling of the Bougainville 
crisis, particularly the economic policies his government embraced 
following the closure of the Panguna mine and the consequent loss 
over night of 40% of PNG's foreign exchange earnings and 17% of 
internal revenue makes him a very strong candidate for that 
accolade), certainly the best educated and most articulate, and with 
a personal integrity that is absolutely untainted by rumour, 
Namaliu was not named by even one half of one per cent of the 
respondents as the most admired PNG leader. 
The conduct of the election 
The law governing the conduct of elections is an important aspect of 
the context for electoral politics .  In November 1991 ,  parliament 
belatedly passed into law several recommendations for changes in 
the Organic Law on Elections which the independent Electoral 
Commissioner had made in 1987, in his Report to Parliament on that 
year's national election. The timing of these amendments, coming as 
late as they did (th� changes \Vere gazetted only on 11 February 1992 
while the writs for the election were issued on 26 March) 
undoubtedly affected the quality of the conduct of the election. In 
many places all over the country, with respect to the conduct of the 
election, the bureaucracy simply broke down. Even without the 
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added pressure from these late amendments, the Commission's 
inability in the past to administer all the varied aspects of the 
electoral process without a hitch had been noticed (Stone 1976: 86; 
Wijeweera 1989:41) .  
Thirteen changes were passed into law but one of  them, the issue 
of identification cards as a requirement for voting, was ruled 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, which thus made it possible 
for the election to proceed as planned. The Electoral Commission 
would have found it impossible to issue identification cards to all 
prospective voters in such a short time. A major aim of several of the 
changes was a reduction in the number of candidates. The nomination 
fee was raised from KlOO to KlOOO, the proportion of votes required 
to be won by candidates to obtain refund of their deposits also went 
up, as did the fee required to lodge an election petition. Although 
the number of candidates went up despite these increased fees, the 
rate of increase fell for the first time since 1972. 
Other changes in the election law and administration were 
intended to reduce election-related violence and corruption and to 
enhance the legitimating effect of elections. The nomination period 
was reduced from six to four weeks. The voting period was also 
reduced, from three weeks to a maximum of two weeks, with one-day 
voting planned for the Highlands provinces (except the Eastern 
Highlands), Manus and Port Moresby .  The period of mustering 
numbers to form a government, between the return of writs and the 
first day of parliament, was also reduced, from three weeks to one, 
while the period of lodging petitions in the Court of Disputed 
Returns was also reduced, from 60 to 40 days. 
The 'whisper vote' (by which illiterate voters were allowed to 
whisper their choice to the electoral officer who then makes the 
appropriate mark on the ballot paper for the voter) was eliminated. 
In its place, a practice that had gone on for years in many parts of 
the country, namely, illiterate v oters taking a kinsman to the 
polling booth to assist, was legalised. The much-abused section 141 
of the Organic Law on National Elections, the so-called 'sectional 
vote' provision, was abolished. 
This provision had allowed people whose names were not on the 
electoral roll to vote, after signing or thumb-printing a statutory 
declaration to the effect that they were otherwise eligible to vote. 
An Electoral Commission Report indicated that 21 .6 per cent of all 
those who voted in the 1982 election did so under that provision 
(Electoral Commission 1987) . The provision had been used by 
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candidates to import 'guest voters' .  It was known to encourage under­
age and multiple voting. Its abolition was long overdue. However, 
its abolition so close to the election meant that there was not enough 
time to get the message through to voters about the consequences this 
time of not enrolling. Consequently, the chronic inability to compile 
a satisfactory electoral roll, which section 141  had helped the 
Electoral Commission to hide, was now fully exposed. All over the 
country, thousands of voters were turned away on polling day 
because their names were not on the roll. 
The electoral process in PNG has remained a very long-drawn 
out affair. Writs for the election were issued on 26 March 1992. The 
nomination period stretched from that day to 24 April. Polling 
began on 13 June and went on in many parts of the country for two 
weeks, to 27 June. The counting and the declaration of winners were 
not completed nationally until ten days after the end of polling. 
Then there was one week of intensive lobbying by party leaders for 
the support of the successful candidates in their bid to form a 
government on the floor of parliament when it convened on 15 July. 
Further, unlike other Westminster parliamentary systems, dates for 
the holding of elections are absolutely fixed. They are not subject to 
manipulation by the prime minister. But, on the other hand, on the 
negative side, as the date for the issue of writs is known to all 
politicians and intending politicians, a period of eighteen months or 
so before the issue of writs should realistically be included in the 
election campaign period . Intending candidates, including 
incumbents, begin campaigning around that time, that is about 
eighteen months earlier. 
The conduct of national elections has always been a most 
gruelling examination of the state of PNG's organisational capacity. 
In 1992, 15,225 polling officials, divided into 3,065 polling teams, 
operated 8415 polling stations, with most teams moving around to 
operate several polling stations over the two week period. In the 
PNG environment of pervasive casualness towards official 
responsibility, of underdeveloped communications and transport 
infrastucture, vast expanses, isolated villages and difficult terrain, 
and often poorly educated and inadequately trained electoral 
officials, the likelihood and the frequency of administrative slip­
up are high. The conduct of elections occurs under the intense scrutiny 
of anxious and ambitious politicians (and their followers), a great 
many of whom have invested a lot of money, energy, and time in 
their quest. The consequences of administrative failures for the 
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incidence o f  election-related violence and for the legitimating effect 
of elections are increasingly worrisome. 
However, so far, no matter how poorly the Electoral Commission 
has performed (admittedly in the face of these daunting obstacles), 
and no matter how vociferously condemnatory powerful politicians 
have been of such performance during the election (as in 1992, in the 
face of thousands being turned away because their names were not on 
the electoral rolls), as soon as results are declared, the more 
powerful fraction of the political elite, the winning candidates, 
immediately cease all criticism. Evidently, a level of performance 
that obviously has not disadvantaged them must be acceptable, and 
there is no need to give the ever increasing number of candidates who 
dispute the results in the courts (63 in 1992 compared with 47 in 1982) 
any ammunition. To some extent, the increase in the number of 
disputed returns reflects the problems of electoral administration, 
which do not appear to have diminished with successive elections. 
However, an evident increase in the willingness by candidates to 
bribe and intimidate voters is also a factor (Nongorr 1994) . 
Since the 1987 election at least, the Electoral Commission had 
recognised the twin problems of 'multiple entries' and 'no entries' in 
the compilation of electoral rolls and had based requests for funds to 
computerise its operations on those shortcomings.2 In February 1991, 
anticipating the abolition of the 'sectional vote' provision, and the 
necessity, therefore, for the common roll to be as complete as 
possible, the Commission organised a meeting in Wewak of kiaps 
(district managers, as they are now called) from all over the country 
to discuss what could be done to ensure maximum registration of 
voters. Two further meetings followed in Port Moresby. With a staff 
ceiling of fifty-six, divided between headquarters and the 
provinces, the Commission itself could not undertake the task of 
compiling the common roll in each of the 89 open electorates. It had 
to rely on the kiaps, as it had done since 1964. But the 'kiap system' 
of district administration has collapsed (Gordon 1983; Strathern 
1984) . The new, indigenous kiaps no longer go on patrols to the 
villages . Consequently, the Provincial Data System on which the 
Commission had depended in the past to compile the common roll 
had not been updated since 1980. The Commission considered using 
2 This section is based on notes taken at a debriefing session for Provincial 
Electoral Officers and Returning Oficers at the Travelodge Hotel in Port 
Moresby in September 1992. 
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local councillors who live in the villages to compile the rolls but felt 
it might compromise its integrity by doing so. Being politicians, 
their impartiality in compiling the rolls could not be guaranteed. 
Teachers were the other obvious group . But it appears that the 
question of funds had ruled out their use. 
While a crisis in district administration was identified as a 
major source of the Electoral Commission's problems, electoral 
officials in the Eastern Highlands and Madang provided another 
perspective: rural, grassroot alienation from the state. It was 
claimed that in a number of places, enumerators were not welcome. 
People refused to give their names and officials were chased away. 
While such a lack of grassroot cooperation impeded registration, a 
claim that a similar lack of cooperation occurred at the very top of 
the provincial public administration (the secretaries of two 
provincial departments were identified as 'totally uncooperative') 
was even more depressing. 
In defence of their inadequate input and inability to update the 
Rural Population Register and the Provincial Data System, the 
provincial departments could also probably plead lack of funds and 
adequate personnel. Presumably, they could also blame sections of 
the people for their uncooperative attitude, the same rural, 
grassroots alienation referred to above. Commentators on PNG 
affairs have observed the lack of cooperation between the state and 
the people ( Gordon and Meggitt 1985; Morauta 1987) .  However, 
while PNG certainly has no monopoly over inter-agency and inter­
bureaucratic rivalry and jealousy, it has been observed: 'The 
achievements or initiatives of one agency are sometimes viewed 
with suspicion and received less than warmly by others' (Morauta 
1987: 14) .  Traditional village jealousy and rivalry for prestige 
appear to have been carried over into the modern bureaucratic 
environment. 
Although that was not the objective of the Electoral 
C ommission 's debriefing meeting, a crisis in PNG public 
administration was identified.  How to get appropriate data from 
the villages on a continuous basis so as to continuously update the 
electoral rolls has been a persistent problem. The Electoral 
Commission itself, not unlike other agencies within the PNG public 
administration, has not been without its own problems of 
inefficiency. It accepted responsibility for the late arrival of 
election materials in the provinces. But it was claimed that security 
considerations, safeguarding of ballot papers, for instance, had to be 
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balanced against early printing. The consensus of  opinion among the 
electoral officials was that the timing of the distribution had been 
wrong; materials should have been sent at least a week earlier. 
The results 
Appendix A provides a complete list of the 1992 results in all 109 
electorates, while Appendix B shows where the parties put up 
candidates, indicating where party leaders believed they had 
support, and how they actually performed, in the provinces and 
regions. Together with the map of the electorates and the index to 
the map, these appendices are meant for those who might wish to 
pursue further analyses of aspects of PNG elections and politics. 
Tables 1 .9 and 1 . 10 below summarise several aspects of the 
results. In addition, Table 1. 9 compares aspects of the 1987 and 1992 
elections and, thereby, provides indications of trends . Table 1 .9 
highlights a deterioration in the base of the parliamentary 
superstructure. The large number of candidates has already been 
noted above, an average of 15 per electorate in 1992. The second 
feature highlighted by the table is the large role assumed by 
independent candidates .  In 1992, for every party-sponsored 
candidate, there were three independent candidates. They obtained 
almost two thirds of the votes cast and 39 of the 109 seats, compared 
with 41 per cent of the votes and 22 seats in 1987. Independents have 
been a great source of instability in both the governing and opposing 
coalitions that are put together in parliament, as they flit from 
coalition to coalition in search of the opportunities that can help 
their re-election chances. 
Their movements largely account for the difference in the state 
of the parties at the beginning and at the end of the 1987-1992 
Parliament. As the strength of the Independents has increased at 
elections, so the strength of the parties which constitute the core of 
the coalitions has decreased .  
Since 1986, seven parties (Pangu, Peoples Democratic Movement 
(PDM), Peoples Progress Party (PPP), Melanesian Alliance (MA), 
Peoples Action Party (PAP), League for National Advancement 
(LNA) and National) have provided the core of the two opposing 
coalitions in Parliament. In 1987 they won 51 per cent of the votes 
and 76 of the 106 seats contested. In 1992, their share of the vote was 
down to only 32 per cent while managing to secure 68 out of the 109 
seats. 
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Table 1 .9: Parties and Independents in the 1987 and 1992 Elections 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Party 1987 (%) Seats Seats 1992 1992 (%) Seats 
Vote Won at Diss- Cand. Vote Won 
olution 
Pangu 408802 (14.9) 26 35 94 294738 (9.3) 20 
PDM 298715 (10.9) 17  20 52 247379 (7.8) 15 
PAP 87836 (3.2) 6 3 43 147538 (4.7) 1 2  
MA 153611 (5.6) 7 4 45 134903 (4.3) 7 
PPP 168280 (6.4) 5 13 47 90465 (2.9) 8 
LNA 132001 (4.8} 3 5 40 68188 (2.2) 4 
Natnal 135761 (5.0) 12 11 13 26303 (0.8) 2 
Country 10743 (0.4) 0 0 24 18646 (0.6) 0 
United 87243 (3.2) 1 6 1 2539 (0.1)  0 
MIG 60922 (2.2) 4 0 
Papua 34636 (1.3) 3 3 
PBesena 17122 (0.6) 0 0 
Wantok 17028 (0.6) 0 0 
Leiba 2611 (0.1) 0 0 
NSettlement 164 (0.0) 0 0 
PSP ( -) 28 94902 (3.0) 0 
Liberal (- ) 37 29979 (0.9) 1 
BAP (- ) 9 9817 (0.3) 1 
PLabour ( -) 1 274 (0.0) 0 
Indeps 1117635 (40.9) 22 8 1226 1994132 (63. 1  ) 3 9  
TOTAL 2732390 106 108 1655 3159803 109 
Source: Report to the Fourth National Parliament, 2 August 1987 (Port Moresby: The 
Electoral Commission, July 1987); PNG National Election 1992: Total Votes Polled by 
Candidates (Port Moresby: The Electoral Commission); Bio-Data on Candidates for the 
Fifth National Parliament General Election 1992 (Port Moresby: The Electoral 
Commission). 
Note: 
1. Elections in three electorates were postponed in 1987 on account of the deaths of 
candidates during the campaign period, hence the total of only 106 seats. 
2. Six parties which had participated in the 1987 election had disappeared by 1992, 
while four new parties emerged to participate in the 1992 election. 
The ephemerality of political organisations in PNG can also be 
captured in the table. Six parties which competed in the 1987 
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elections had disappeared by 1992. The Morobe Independent Group 
(MIG), the political vehicle by which the one time premier of 
Morobe Province, Utula Samana, had taken himself to the national 
arena, transformed itself into the Melanesian United Front in 1988. 
It waxed and waned in the frenetic parliamentary numbers games. 
By 1992, however, MIG/MUF had evaporated; as had Papua Besena 
and Papua Party and three paper parties. Meanwhile, as with 
every election since 1968, new parties emerged to contest the 1992 
election: People's Solidarity Party (PSP), the Liberal Party, the 
Black Action Party (BAP), People's Labour Party (PLP) and Country 
Party, which had no known connection with the Country Party of 
the seventies. There were also several very loose groupings of 
independent candidates. The People's Rights Independents Group, 
spearheaded by the National Capital District MP and businessman, 
Hugo Berghuser, himself a PAP-endorsed candidate, was the best 
known of these. 
The most substantial of the new parties, PSP, essentially a 
breakaway party of ex-PAP members, which polled more votes than 
PPP and more than the LNA and the National Party together, won 
no seat while PPP won eight and LNA and National together won 
six. Several of the parties listed in the table are a reminder of a 
strong tendency to political fragmentation in PNG, as if in imitation 
of the marked segmentation of PNG social structures. PSP' s 
breakaway from PAP severely checked the growth of the latter's  
electvral strength in 1992, in the same way that PDM and LNA's 
breakaway from Pangu had done, from the mid-1980s. We will never 
know how differently, and how much more effectively, PNG's  
parliamentary system could be performing in the 1990's and beyond, 
but for this marked, apparently traditional, fissiparous tendencies 
in PNG political culture (May 1982; May and Nelson 1982). 
Table 1 . 10  summarises aspects of the party system. First, the 
table shows clearly the fragmented nature of the party system. 
Secondly, it illustrates the strong regionalist element in PNG 
politics . Each of the three largest parties, in terms of the number of 
seats won, has a strong regional base. At least 50 per cent of the 
seats won by each of them are in their 'home region' :  Pangu in 
Mamose, PDM in the Highlands and PPP in the Islands.  Thirdly, 
the table underlines the result of Pangu' s continuous decline. (Pangu' s 
performance in 1992 should be compared with its best performance 
ever, in 1982, when it won 34 per cent of the vote and 51 of the 109 
seats). As the party that had the best nationalist credentials, urban 
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support and trade union links in its formative years, Pangu could now 
collect only 5.6 per cent of the NCD vote, and it failed to win a seat 
in the capital. Pangu is still the largest party in PNG and the most 
institutionalised, having survived three changes of the party 
leader. But it is no longer dominant in any region. Even in its 'home 
region', the north coast Mamose region, where it performed best, its 
share of the vote was only twenty per cent, although it took forty 
per cent of the seats. 
Table 1 . 10: Percent Votes/No. of Seats Won By Parties By Region 
Party Islands NCD Papua Mamose Highlands 
Pangu 10.6/3 5.6/0 7.1/4 20.1/12 3.4/2 
PDM 8.3/2 5.5/2 2.6/l 3.7 /2 11 .8/9 
PPP 12.2/4 4.5/0 2.4/1 2.5/2 1 .3/1 
MA 22.5/2 0.2/0 2.0/0 5.7/2 1 .9/3 
PAP 0/0 11.0/1 10.9/6 2.0/1 4.6/4 
I.NA 4.7/1 0.1 /0 2.0/0 3.3/2 2.3/2 
PSP 0.2/0 2.2/0 4.5/0 2.9/0 3.1 /0 
National 0.1 /0 8.4/1 0.8/0 0.7/0 1 .6/1  
BAP 0.4/0 0.7/0 0/0 0.1/0 0.5/1  
Liberal 0/0 1.9/0 1 .4/l 0.5/0 1 .4/0 
Country 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1 .6/0 
United 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
PLP 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Independents 36.1/5 60.1/0 66.5/7 57.4/9 66.1 / 17 
As Table 1 .10 shows, no party won even twenty per cent of the 
seats. Even if the parties in the Namaliu /Pangu-led government 
coalition (Pangu, MA, PAP, LNA and the Paul Pora faction of the 
National Party had stuck together after the elections, they would 
still have been short of a winning coalition. Therefore, the familiar, 
frenetic and unedifying post-election trade in MPs, which has 
characterised PNG elections since 1972, had to be undertaken, but 
with ever more imaginative strategems. 
As convention dictates, the core parties and members of each of 
the two opposing groups vying to put together a winning coalition set 
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up camp in some resort hotel, and trusted emissaries are then sent out 
to bring in any uncommitted MPs they can find. At the beginning of 
the exercise, this usually means at least fifty per cent of all MPs. 
The MPs, even party-sponsored ones, are keen to find out what 
package deal each coalition leader is prepared to negotiate with 
them, in exchange for their support in the election of the prime 
minister on the first day of parliament. 
A ministerial position is the hardest currency, and everybody's 
opening gambit bears a name with 'minister' in it . But the 
constitution-makers, with uncanny prescience, put a constitutional 
limit on the number of ministerial positions available. However, in 
recent years, Parliament, in its wisdom, has created deputy 
ministerial positions. So those are also available. And inflated 
election expenses might be looked at, with a view to reimbursement, 
and so on. 
The Pangu-led group, consisting of the coalition partners in the 
outgoing Namaliu government, namely, PAP, MA and, initially, 
LNA, gathered at the Madang Resort Hotel, whose owner, a 
naturalised citizen, happened to have just been elected to the 
Madang Regional seat in the new parliament, as an independent. 
The Wingti-Chan group, with PDM and PPP as the core, had a 
master strategist, also a naturalised citizen, an independent and a 
new Regional Member, for Milne Bay. His strategy was brilliant. 
Three camps, not one, were established on remote islands in Milne 
Bay. The only way a curious MP could get there to find out what was 
happening, and return after having checked things out, was by 
courtesy of Sir Julius Chan's helicopter. MPs on one island had news 
of what was going on the other two islands and, indeed, in Madang, 
via the leaders. Issues of the Post-Courier for the week preceding 
the July 15 1992 meeting of parliament have several reports of 
alleged kidnappings and detentions of MPs. 
Only one case of an alleged detention will be cited here. This 
involved a new Southern Highlands MP. He stood as an MA 
candidate . The Electoral Commission's official publications, 
including the ballot paper, leave no doubt at all on that score. He 
went to the Wingti-Chan camp evidently to compare 'packages', in 
the usual manner of new MPs. The MA MPs were at Madang with the 
Pangu-led coalition. The deputy leader of MA, the party that 
sponsored him, was sent to Alotau, the provincial capital of Milne 
Bay, to talk to this MP. He returned from Alotau, not having been 
able to see him. 
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As Wingti won the prime ministership by a single vote, the 
casting vote of the Speaker, his coalition's nominee for the position 
who had just been elected, it would be no exaggeration at all to say 
that the inspired choice of venue, and the controlled means of 
getting back from it, rather than the defection of the LNA from the 
Namaliu-led coalition, is what delivered the prime ministership to 
Wingti., who led a coalition made up of his PDM, Chan's PPP, LNA 
and a host of Independents. 
The studies in this book 
Ben Reilly's paper discusses the impacts of two electoral systems on 
PNG politics, the optional preferential system used for the first 
three national elections and the first past the post or simple 
majority system in use since 1977. He contrasts the camaraderie 
among candidates and the high proportions of the vote obtained by 
the winning candidates under the former system with the vote 
splitting tactics, the concentration of candidates' campaigns on, and 
votes from, a small section of the electorate, and the increasingly 
low proportions of the votes obtained by winning candidates under 
the first past the post system. He argues that these cannot be good 
for democracy. 
Observers of the earlier elections remarked on how extremely 
polite and civil the candidates were towards one another (Parker 
1971; Strathern 1976) .  Although candidates could afford to be 
sporting in the pre-independence days when the stakes were not so 
high , the contribution of the optional preferential system to the 
avoidance of mudslinging could have been substantial. 
Legal provisions and institutional arrangements obviously affect 
(political) behaviour. But, equally, if the law and the institutions 
fail to take sufficient account of social realities, such as the very 
high degree of social fragmentation in the case of PNG, then the 
law and the institutions themselves may forfeit their legitimacy. 
Reilly makes this point cogently and, consequently, argues the 
superiority of the optional preferential system in the PNG context. 
However, the ingenuity of aspirants to political power in PNG and 
the administrative capacity required for the more complicated 
optional preferential  sy stem are p robably  somewhat 
underestimated. 
If the optional preferential system were reintroduced, it would 
be as likely to be adaptively domesticated as the simple plurality 
system has been. Instead of the 'splitting strategies' engendered by 
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the current simple plurality system, i t  is 'sponsoring strategies', as 
practised currently by regional/provincial candidates (for instance, 
by Paias Wingti in the Western Highlands in 1987, where he 
indulged in multiple endorsement of PDM candidates in the Open 
seats in the province, and by Peter Kuman in Chimbu in 1992, where 
through his Country Party he sponsored as many as 26 candidates in 
the six Open seats) that will flourish. In terms of the impact on the 
number of candidates who stand, the 'sponsoring strategy' is not 
likely to differ from the 'splitting strategy' .  Yet, the fundamental 
problem that has to be addressed by any electoral reform in PNG is 
the large number of candidates in PNG elections. 
Sinclair Dinnen provides a detailed account of the elaborate 
security measures that were taken, in view of rumours of threatened 
widespread election-related violence. These measures included 
liquor bans, declaration of fighting zones in several Highlands areas 
and a massive show of police and defence force presence through 
staged parades in the provincial capitals . The actual election­
related violence that occurred before, during and immediately after 
the polling and the counting of votes, is also meticulously assembled. 
Whether one deplores electoral violence, because it can threaten the 
legitimacy of the democratic process, as most observers and 
commentators would argue, or whether one views it as signalling the 
vigour of the democratic process itself, as a Post-Courier editorial 
cited by Dinnen suggests, Dinnen argues that election-related 
violence is more often than not the latest episode in an ongoing, even 
if temporarily dormant, inter-group conflict which would have been 
settled, traditionally, by violence (Joe Ketan's paper (this volume) 
is also an extended elaboration of this point). 
Thus, until the balance of authority between the PNG state and 
the predominantly autonomous entities constituting the PNG society 
shifts decisively in favour of the state, so that its laws and 
regulations hold sway over the latter, it would appear that 
elections will always have to be approached with the kind of 
extensive and intensive security preparations that Dinnen describes. 
A collective sigh of relief can then be breathed when, as in 1992, the 
level of violence turns out to be lower than expected. 
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The subtitle of Orovu Sepoe' s paper on women candidates in the 
election, 'Casualties of PNG Political Culture' is an apt summary of 
its main arguments. In this area of improving women's access to 
political decision making positions, PNG has gone backwards. 
Several features of the PNG political system which go to explain 
the absence of a female MP since 1987 are highlighted: the relative 
unimportance of ideology and principles in PNG politics; the 
relative irrelevance of parties in the decision-making calculus of 
electors; the continuing strength of traditional ideas and practices in 
modern PNG, in this case the transfer to the modern arena of the 
political minority status of women in most parts of traditional PNG; 
the increasing role of money in PNG elections; a marked tendency 
towards social and organisational fragmentation, which affects 
women's organisations also. 
Support for an increased number of females in elective political 
positions might conceivably, in special circumstances, be based on 
pragmatic grounds. But it is more easily presented as a matter of 
principle. Where principles are at a discount, as in PNG politics, 
then an issue like the desirability of an increased number of females 
in political decision-making positions, on grounds of principle, is not 
likely to obtain widespread endorsement. Similarly, if political 
parties were more influential in determining the choice which 
electors make, then party sponsorship of female candidates in safe 
seats could help to overcome entrenched prejudices in a male­
dominated society such as PNG. 
The chapters dealing with individual electorates provide a 
range of explanations for the election results. The retrospective look 
which several authors take, in response to the editor's request, 
provides perspectives on the theme of continuity and change. 
In explaining the victory of the PPP leader, Sir Julius Chan, over 
his Pangu-sponsored challenger and civil servant, Esekia Tomon, in 
the only two-person race in the whole election, Robert Foster takes a 
retrospective look at the 1987 election in Namatanai to discuss the 
findings of MacQueen (1989) regarding an apparent erosion of PPP's 
position and Chan's popularity. Foster takes issue with MacQueen's 
claim of the existence of age/ education cleavage and generational 
politics where the young and educated overwhelmingly support 
Tomon and Pangu while the· older and less educated folk throw in 
their lot with Chan and the PPP. 
Foster argues that a more effective local organisation of Chan' s 
campaign, which was not unrelated to the vastly superior financial 
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resources at his disposal ( a  multi-millionaire businessman, in 
parliament continuously since 1968, a rare feat in PNG accomplished 
in 1992 by only two other persons, Sir Michael Somare and Sir Pita 
Lus, and with an aggregate of twelve years as minister or prime 
minister) was the primary explanation of his victory. Chan's local 
organisation also mobilised a diffuse sentiment of anti-incumbency, 
a perception of a need for change at the national level, which 
benefitted the opposition leaders, including Chan. What Foster 
reports as ontap (national) issues, corruption and the Bougainville 
crisis, for instance, permeated the electorate and favoured Chan. 
The prolongation of the Bougainville crisis and its inevitable 
impact on a relatively nearby electorate like Namatanai (locals 
forced to return because of the conflict, the consequent cessation of 
remittances and greater pressure on local resources) all worked 
against the Pangu candidate. The impression had been created by 
the opposition parties that a quick military solution was available 
but was being passed up by Namaliu, the prime minister and Pangu 
Pati leader. 
Besides explaining Chan's victory, Foster also probes the 
meaning and the significance to the electors of the state and its 
various institutions, including elections and the voting act. Foster 
suggests that the election should be viewed as a state ritual. Voting 
is a secular ritual through which citizens, as voters, acquire 
transient social identities as members of the national community of 
voters, and through which the state makes itself visible and real to 
ordinary, rural Papua New Guineans. 
Pokawin and Rooney's paper on electoral politics in Manus 
provides a detailed exposition of the factors that determine 
electoral outcomes on that politically sophisticated island. The 
first factor is the 'home base' .  The support of the cluster of villages 
making up the ethnic group to which the candidate belongs, and the 
support of its traditional allies, if any, must be secured if one is to 
have a realistic chance of being elected. Thus the size of the group 
and of its allies matters, as does the number of candidates from the 
group seeking to represent it and the electorate. However, no ethnic 
group is large enough to ensure victory on its own, even when it 
assumes, for the purpose of the election, a temporary regional 
identity and leadership in apparent competition with perceived 
other 'regional rivals' .  Therefore, support is needed from beyond the 
'home base', however variably this is defined.  
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The candidate' s  reputation, especially that which is gained 
through incumbency, and church support (and the Makasol or Win 
Neisin, originally a sort of cultist group, must be seen as virtually a 
church) are v ital. Imaginative and active campaigning, for 
newcomers especially, is also important. The authors also allude, 
subtly, to the role of money. There is no party vote to speak of, as the 
telling differences in the votes obtained by open and provincial 
candidates of the same party make abundantly clear. The party 
factor is weighed by electors alongside other factors, and it is not 
usually at the top of the list. Pragmatism and tolerance (which can 
deceive the unwary candidate, especially when it is combined with 
Manusian hospitality) are the two principal values underlying 
electoral politics in Manus. 
Colin Filer sets out primarily to explain the electoral success of 
Christopher Sambre in the Nuku electorate in the West Sepik 
province, and of Karl Stack in the West Sepik provincial, from 1977 
(until Stack evidently lost interest in winning in 1992, perhaps 
having already decided to renounce his PNG citizenship and resume 
his Australian citizenship, which he did in 1993) . A subsidiary 
question Filer sets out to answer is the extent to which the alliance 
forged between those two contrasting personalities (one an ex­
Fransiscan monk, the other an ex-kiap) contributed towards their 
respective electoral successes. Such alliances between provincial 
candidates and those in the open seats are common, even without the 
added party dimension which obtained in this case . One of the 
many achievements of Filer ' s  paper is that it succeeds in 
demonstrating the wide range and the complexity of factors that 
explain electoral outcomes in Nuku, and the inadequacy, therefore, 
of what he puts forward as the dominant academic explanatory 
model of PNG electoral politics: 'the parochial handout mentality, 
which combines the value of primary group loyalty (parochialism) 
and the distribution of material benefits (handouts) in a circle of 
instrumental rationality' .  
Filer's own data would not allow him to deny, and he does not 
deny, the operation of the 'parochial handout mentality' as a major 
factor in electoral politics in Nuku. However, Sambre's own ethnic 
group is less than five per cent of the electorate and, in 1992, deeply 
divided, fielding four cand i.dates . Sambre had not succeeded in 
getting amenities for the electorate. He had never held a 
ministerial position and, thus, had had only limited influence to 
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peddle in Moresby, and only modest personal means to 'buy' support. 
The dominant academic model is not helpful in this case. 
What explains Sambre's continued success, according to Filer, is 
largely the turning of ethnic competition into a moral contest: the 
group that wins is the group that exhibits best what leadership 
should be. Thus the Namblo, Sambre's group, showed its moral pre­
eminence because its candidates drew votes from the more numerous 
groups, even from those with their own candidates. But Filer 
ultimately seeks to explain Sambre' s victory in terms of his own 
personal authority and the influence of the Pangu Pati. Sambre's 
personal authority had been propagated throughout the electorate 
through a network of personal devotees, Catholic Church catechists 
and Pangu Pati local organisers. 
In sum, Filer's analysis shows, in many places, the importance of 
ethnicity and locality, church and party, Sambre's personal 
authority, a generational factor, political economy questions and a 
'complex of material transactions' in Nuku' s electoral politics. 
Ron May brings to bear on his analysis of electoral politics in the 
East Sepik province perspectives gained over twenty years of close 
observation of PNG affairs. 'Mit na Bun' (Meat and Bone),  like 
Filer's 'Steak and Grease', is a powerful evocation of the central 
focus and concerns of the type of politics which is encountered in 
Third World societies of severe poverty and deprivation, and which 
has been summarised, for Africa, as 'The Politics of the Belly' 
(Bayart 1993) . The prominence of cargo cultism in the East Sepik in 
the sixties and seventies (the cult leader, Yaliwan, was elected in 
1972 with 87 per-cent of the vote, the highest margin of electoral 
victory in PNG to date) indicated the centrality of popular 
aspirations for material goods. May hints at whiffs of cargoism in 
the 1992 campaign. But it was the mainstream churches, especially 
the Catholic Church, that had to be taken seriously into account in 
explaining electoral outcomes in the province. 
Ron May confronts head on a question which editors of at least 
three of the election studies on PNG have put at the core of their 
overviews, namely, the role and significance of political parties in 
PNG elections (Hegarty 1983; King 1989; Oliver 1989). In explaining 
the election results, May explores the extent to which political 
parties can be said to have penetrated the PNG political system. 
The East Sepik province is the home base of the Pangu Pati, courtesy 
of Sir Michael Somare, a founding father and the leader of the 
Pangu Pati for twenty years, and the representative of the East 
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Sepik province in parliament for even longer. Thus, it was as good a 
place as any to test the claim which was made after the 1982 
election (Jackson and Hegarty 1983) that parties were becoming more 
salient in PNG elections. 
Already, in 1987, May had observed that party organisation and 
party competition seemed weaker, compared with 1982 (May 1989). 
This was not surprising. Pangu had suffered two severe 
haemorrhages in 1985 and 1986. First, Paias Wingti, then Pangu Pati 
deputy leader and deputy prime minister, defected with 14 Pangu 
backbenchers to form the People's Democratic Movement. A year 
later, there was another defection, by some of Pangu's most senior, 
energetic and brightest leaders, including Tony Siaguru, Barry 
Holloway, John Nilkare and Karl Stack, to form the League tor 
National Advancement. Thus, within two years, Pangu had split 
into three. May's conclusion, after looking again at the role of the 
parties in the East Sepik province in 1992, is that ' there has been 
little progress towards an integrative, ideologically-based party 
system' and that even in the East Sepik 'where party loyalty has 
been maintained over several elections, the value of Pangu Pati 
endorsement lies in the fact that the party is identified with the 
Sepik itself' . 
Joe Ketan's paper has been referred to several times already. Of 
all the studies collected here, Ke tan's is the most relentless 
exposition of the traditional community vote thesis. Politics at all 
levels in Hagen are 'organised along traditional structural lines ' .  
His paper shows, once again, why national elections are really 
separate electorate competitions. The central role assigned to 
complex historical and cultural relationships in electoral behaviour 
and outcomes suggests that knowledge of electoral politics in one 
electorate does not necessarily equip one to discourse confidently on 
what might be happening in the next electorate. 
Yasi's paper is the only one from my 1992 second year PNG 
Politics class to be included here . I had hoped to be able to include 
more than one paper from the group, to provide the kind of reports 
that I believed would reflect more closely how the ordinary 
participants in the drama themselves viewed and interpreted what 
was happening. According to him, the popular definition of a 
serious candidate m imuvnggu these days includes, interestingly, 
the capacity to pay electors for their votes, in addition, of course, to 
the ability to bring development. (Joe Ketan also mention s 'big 
money' alongside strong traditional support and 'resources ' in his 
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characterisation o f  ' serious contenders ' . )  I t  appears that in 
Imbonggu, not unlike many electorates in PNG, church support is of 
far more significance than party support. Yasi gives interesting 
thumb-nail descriptions of the Imbo11 ggu section of the new political 
el i te .  
The last chapter, Bill Standish's wide-ranging paper on the 
national significance of trends of decay in Chimbu electoral politics, 
was written after all the other chapters, including this one, had 
been finalised, almost ready to go to the printers. Amidst continuity 
in clan rather than political party voting there are also dramatic 
changes. The tale Standish tells of recent electioneering by threat in 
Chimbu is chilling, and his conclusion that elections in Chimbu can 
no longer be described as free and fair appears warranted. But it 
provokes questions. Exactly who is denying freedom and fairness to 
whom in this instance is a pertinent question. There is no hint of 
government manipulation, or of a systematically co-ordinated 
undermining of the central tenets of Free Elections. Ironically, it is 
untramelled competition rather than any effective curb on it that 
seems to be a major part of the problem. But, as he says, correctly, if 
the pattern of electoral behaviour he describes for Chimbu, and the 
extent of bumbling electoral administration there, were to occur more 
widely in Papua New Guinea, the legitimacy national governments 
derive from elections would be seriously eroded. However, there is 
enough evidence in the rest of the book to show that the Chimbu 
pattern of violent, intimidatory, corrupt and thuggish behaviour he 
describes is not the dominant pattern in Papua New Guinea. 
Conclusion 
The studies collected here provide confirmation that elections in 
Papua New Guinea continue to be free and fair, at least as far as 
government control and manipulation are concerned. But they also 
confirm the continuity of the two fundamental features of Papua 
New Guinea elections: the relative unimportance of political 
parties in the electoral process and the essentially local character 
of electoral politics .  These two features are related to the 
phenomenon of pronounced localised support for candidates, the 
large numbers of candidates, the success of independent candidates, 
the virtual impossibility of predicting national electoral outcomes 
in Papua New Guinea and, indeed, the turning of national elections 
into primaries where the elected representatives, not the people, 
really determine who heads government. The generally weak 
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coalition governments that result from these elections, and the 
excessively pragmatic behaviour of MPs, in their support of party 
leaders and policies, are also related to the two basic features. Until 
political parties become better established and acquire a more 
central role in the choice calculus of more electors, the negative 
developmental impacts of Papua New Guinea electoral politics, 
which emerge clearly in this book, will continue and, probably, 
escalate. 
2 
The Effects of the Electoral System in 
Papua New Guinea 
Ben Reilly 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) approached the 1992 elections in a 
reformist mood. The greatest number of amendments to the electoral 
system since independence -including a vastly reduced polling 
period, a tenfold increase in the nomination fee, and the abolition of 
'sectional voting'l-were passed by Parliament in November 1991, 
three months prior to the issue of election writs in March 1992. A 
further change, providing for the introduction of a Voter 
Identification Card (with a photograph of the voter) was also 
adopted. However, after representations from the Electoral 
Commission, the Supreme Court ruled the Identification Card 
unconstitutional-much to the relief of the PNG Electoral 
Commission, which otherwise would have faced an impossible 
administrative task in implementing the ID card provision so close 
to a national election (Kaiulo 1993). Most of these changes were 
designed either to simplify the administration of PNG elections or 
to combat two perennial problems: extremely high candidacy rates, 
and abuse of the system through fraudulent 'sectional voting' and 
the increasing incidence of election-related violence. 
The success of these measures was, in retrospect, limited. The 
tradition of 'zestful participatory democracy'2 continued with a 
1 Under the old section 141 of the Organic Law on National Elections, people 
whose names were not recorded on the electoral roll were allowed to cast 
a "sectional vote" by swearing to the electoral official that they were over 
18 and had lived in the electorate for more than six months. The provision 
was widely thought to be abused, especially by under-age electors, 
although its removal, so close to the 1992 election, meant that many voters 
throughout the country were not able to cast a vote. 
2 The phrase is Jim Griffin's. 
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record 1655 candidates standing for election to 109 seats-an increase 
of 142 on the 1987 figure, but a slower rate of growth than for the 
previous six elections, each of which saw a marked increase from 
the preceding election in the total number of candidates. The 
polling period was relatively peaceful, and suspicious occurrences 
were, if anything, less prevalent than in the past. Yet the Electoral 
Commissioner, Reuben Kaiulo, still felt compelled to avoid 'a chorus 
of complaints from angry candidates during the counting period, by 
going into hiding, shaving his moustache and moving to a hotel' 
(Callick 1992: 33), a move that would be seen as drastic in most 
democracies but raised little more than a passing mention in PNG. 
One factor that has rnme increasingly under the spotlight in 
PNG is the first-past-the-post (plurality) electoral system. PNG 
has used this system since it abandoned the Australian-based 
system of optional preferential voting (OPV) in 1975. This paper 
examines the history of the debate concerning the merits of these 
two electoral systems in PNG, and examines the claims made for and 
against both systems. It also looks at the effects of the two most 
basic components of PNG's current electoral system: single member 
electorates and the plurality method of vote counting. It concludes 
by arguing that the electoral system has had a distinct and largely 
unrecognised influence upon PNG's unique example of representative 
democracy.  Specifically, it contends that the plurality system is 
particularly poorly suited to PNG's highly fractionalised polity 
and its social and territorial conditions, and has served to undermine 
the legitimacy of the electoral process in PNG, and that a reversion 
to the OPV system for future elections may well be justified. 
The Optional Preferential Vote in PNG 
PNG's first three elections in 1964, 1968 and 1972 were held under 
the OPV, a watered-down version of the 'full preferential' method 
used in Australia at the federal level. Electors were required to 
express a first preference (defined as the number 1) for a candidate, 
and then an option of further preferences (2,3,4 etc) for other 
candidates listed on the ballot paper. In a departure from the 
Australian practice, it was reasoned that it would not be necessary 
to compel voters to express preferences for all candidates. 
Considering PNG's low literacy and numeracy rates, this was a 
sound move, as an imitation of the full preferential system would 
have seen any numbering mistakes render a ballot paper informal-
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which would have had dramatic ramifications .3 In a similarly 
sensible move, the Australian system of compulsory voting was not 
introduced 'because of the novelty of the elections and the problems 
of terrain and climate ' (Hughes & van der Veur 1965:406) .  With 
those important exceptions, the remainder of the PNG Electoral 
Ordinance 1963 was a direct copy of the Australian Commonwealth 
Electoral Act of 1918. 
The introduction of preferential voting was an example of a 
colonial 'institutional transfer' in which both the metropole and 
colony were happy to persist with familiar institutions rather than 
experiment with something new. Hughes noted that the First 
Interim Report of the Select Committee on Political Development 
(October 1962), which had been charged with the task of making 
recommendations on the Territory ' s  future representative 
institutions, had favoured the preferential system as 'giving the 
fairest result' (Hughes 1 965 :36), declaring that four-fifths of 
witnesses to the Committee had supported this option. The 
recommendation was readily accepted by both the colonial 
administration and the Australian government. 
PNG 's first nationwide elections were held in 1964. While 
preferences were distributed in the great majority of electorates the 
final result differed from that provided by a first-past-the-post 
system in only five of the 44 electorates: Henganofi, Tari, Kaindi, 
Markham and South Markham Special. Henganofi provided a 
classic example of the way disciplined preference swapping amongst 
a group of aligned candidates can overcome a single dominant 
plurality winner (see Table 2. 1 ) .  Candidate Bono, with massive 
support from his own region but negligible support elsewhere, lost to 
candidate U gi, situated in the centre of the electorate and attracting 
a considerably broader range of support. Ugi was well behind on 
first preferences, but gained the majority of all other candidates ' 
preferences to win the seat. 
3 However, it was the optional nature of the preference marking that led the 
Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission (PNGEC) to abandon the OPV 
system in 1975, arguing that the optional nature of preference marking 
under the OPV system meant that "voting results tend to swing towards 
that" of first-past-the-post (PNGEC 1983:78) .  
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Table 2 .1 :  Allocation of  Preferences in Henganofi Open Electorate, 
1964 
C andidate First Second Third Fourth Final 
count count count count count 
Fora pi  787 ( 787) 
Posi 1758 12 ( 1 770) 
Punupa 3708 73 41 (3822) 
Bono 8028 12 35 224 8299 
Ugi 3925 667 1362 3274 9228 
Exhausted* 23 334 324 681 
* An 'exhausted' vote comprises a ballot where preferences have 
not or cannot be assigned to a continuing candidate, hence 
'exhausting' before the full distribution of preferences. 
In 1968, due to the distribution of preferences, eleven electorates (out 
of a total of 84) returned different results than would have been the 
case under a straight plurality system. Neither the 1967 Final 
Report from the Select Committee on Constitutional Development, 
nor the 1968 Report of the Chief Electoral Officer on the House of 
Assembly Election 1968 made any recommendations for changing the 
system. But the Chief Electoral Officer's report stated: 'The 
strongest argument against the preferential system is its complexity 
for the average voter and its complexity for the count . . .  Much has 
been said in this election of the merits of the "first past the post 
system" and how simple it is to operate' .  But in a prescient remark, 
he also noted that first-past-the-post in the British Solomon 
Islands had resulted in one particular candidate being elected with 
388 votes out of an electorate of 10,000 voters ! (Chief Electoral 
Officer 1 968:32-3) .  Even the United Nations Visiting Mission 
conceded that 'while there were drawbacks in the preferential 
system it felt bound to acknowledge that it is probably the best 
system to use in the circumstances prevailing in the Territory ' 
(Visiting Mission 1968:68) .  But the Mission went on to make the 
quite impractical recommendation that a minimum of four 
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preferences should be expressed on all ballots where there were four 
or more candidates in future elections, a provision which would, if 
adopted, have resulted in a large number of votes being rendered 
informal. The recommendation was not adopted. 
In the meantime, opposition to preferential voting was growing 
amongst a small but influential band of commentators. Writing in 
January 1968, E .P .  Wolfers claimed that the preferential system 
had 'deceived' voters in the past-and that voters in two by­
elections in 1965 and 1967 had accordingly 'indicated far fewer 
preferences than in 1964' .  He went on: 'One thing is sure, however, a 
preferential system in which it is not compulsory to number all 
squares (as it is in Australia) may produce an almost random result: 
if it fails to produce a result identical with that which would result 
from a plurality vote, it can produce any of a variety of results, 
depending simply on how soon the supporters of the candidates first 
eliminated tire of indicating their preferences. Is it any wonder 
that some candidates are urging their supporters to indicate only a 
first preference? '  (Wolfers 1968:70) . Despite this line of argument, 
increasing numbers of candidates in PNG were elected in both 1968 
and 1972 as a result of preference swapping (see Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2: Cases where leading candidate on first preferences was 
defeated after distribution of preferences, 1964-1972 
Year· 
1964 
1968 
1972 
No of 
cases 
5 
11  
16  
Electorates involved Percentage of 
all elected seats 
Kaindi, Henganofi, 
Tari, Markham, 9 
South Markham Special 
Finschhafen, Goilala, 
Goroka, Gumine, Ialibu, 13 
Kandep-Tambul,Kerowagi, 
Nawae, Sinasina, Sohe, Tari 
Bulolo, Hagen, Henganofi, 16 
Ialibu-Pangia, Kandrian-
Gloucester, Koroba-Kopiago, 
Kundiawa, Lagaip, Lufa, Nawae, 
Nipa, North Fly, Okapa, Poroma­
Kutubu, Sinasina, Tambul-Nebilyer 
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The Report of the Electoral Commission of Inquiry into Electoral 
Procedures (1970) came down firmly in favour of preferential voting. 
It argued cogently the benefits of the preferential vote, suggesting 
that if voters 'are unable to gather enough votes to have their 
'local' man elected then their next preference is a man who can 
adequately represent them in the House because he is literate, 
articulate and able to move freely throughout the electorate . In 
addition they feel that such a man would represent all groups 
without prejudice, something they fear will not happen at this 
stage if a man is elected from another language group ' (Chief 
Electoral Officer 1970:2) .  
Preferential voting and accommodation 
This argument maintains that the use of preferential voting would 
result in superior and more representative candidates being elected. 
The negative of vote-splitting can be transformed into the positive 
of preference-swapping. Does preference swapping have any other 
useful properties? At least one possible benefit has been raised by 
political scientists looking at schemes for post-apartheid South 
Africa elections : the need for parties and candidates to swap 
preferences in pursuit of vic tory creates incentives for 
accommodation between competing interests, and is thus 
particularly appropriate for elections in deeply divided or 
fractionalised societies .  Arend Lijphart ( 1 985) and Donald 
Horowitz ( 1991) have both produced detailed studies concerning 
electoral engineering for divided societies, with South Africa as 
their main focus of study. Lijphart argues for a lis t system of 
proportional representation as a catalyst to co'llition government 
and thus, he hopes, a consociational version of accommodation and 
power sharing at the parliamentary level. Horowitz, by contrast, 
begins from the point of view of the voter and campaigning parties, 
arguing that the most feasible path to inter-group accommodation is 
via a preferential voting system. 
Horowitz's study of electoral systems is particularly interesting 
for PNG, because he makes clear that preferential voting, alone 
amongst the major voting systems, produces considerable incentives 
for candidates to broaden support bases in search of a majority. This 
has very significant benefits at both the constituency and 
parliamentary level: 
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The price of successful negotiation is intergroup 
accommodation and compromise. The exchange of second 
and third preferences, based on reciprocal concessions on 
ethnic issues, is likely to lead to an accommodative 
interethnic coalition if no party can form a government 
alone (Horowitz 1991 : 189). 
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Preference swapping also directly affects the behaviour of 
political actors: 
[Preferential voting] will make moderation rewarding 
by making politicians reciprocally dependent on the 
votes of members of groups other than their own. The 
dependence is only marginal, of course, but it will 
sometimes be the margin of victory. Since parties must 
pool votes before they pool merely seats, they must find 
ways before the election to communicate their 
ethnically and racially conciliatory intentions to the 
voters. After the election, they must deliver on those 
commitments or risk electoral retribution (ibid: 196). 
Horowitz's conclusion could have been written with PNG's 
severely fractionalised and divided society in mind. Looking 
particularly at the way preferential voting works in such societies, 
he sees many benefits. Under a preferential voting system, he notes, 
'many elections will turn on second and third preferences. Parties 
that succeed in negotiating for second and third preferences will be 
rewarded . . .  Under conditions of party proliferation, therefore, 
[preferential voting] is likely to produce governments committed to 
accommodative policies' (ibid: 190) . 
These benefits of preferential voting appear to have been 
largely overlooked by commentators in Papua New Guinea prior to 
independence (and the change to plurality) in 1975. Of the numerous 
studies, mostly by Australian authors, detailing the period leading 
up to independence, it appears that only Ballard had noted the fact 
that OPV 'encouraged collaboration among candidates within an 
electorate' (Ballard 1978 : 1 1 ) .  
The former PNG Minister (and now Deputy Secretary-General of 
the Commonwealth), Sir Anthony Siaguru, has been one of the most 
perceptive critics of PNG's current electoral system. He first 
campaigned publicly for electoral reform in 1982, proposing three 
fundamental changes aimed at stabilising parliamentary politics: 
constitutional amendment to allow a Prime Minister to call an 
5 0  Reilly 
election if he lost the confidence of parliament; 'anti-hopping' 
provisions to force members who switch parties to face an immediate 
by-election; and a return to optional preferential voting. Siaguru 
argued, like the 1970 Report of the Electoral Commission of Inquiry 
into Electoral Procedures, that a return to optional preferential 
voting would result in the election of superior candidates with 
broader support: 
(Electors) consider themselves bound by social and 
family obligations to cast their first vote for their 
relative or a person from their own clan, house line or 
language group. It might not be that that person is the 
best candidate in the judgement of the voter! But he or 
she is obliged because of social traditions to vote for 
him. I know of elections in the past, when the optional 
preferential system was in use, where candidates went 
around the electorate saying 'Don't vote for me as your 
first choice. I know you will have to give your first 
choice to your line candidate. But give me second. ' And 
they did get in on second preferences or third 
preferences. They did it with far greater representative 
support than, say, the member who has got in with less 
than ten per cent of the vote. That is ridiculous ! (quoted 
in Dorney 1990:78-9) .  
Despite being supported by Prime Minister Somare' s Cabinet in 
1982, none of these three changes was ever put to Parliament. It 
appears that many backbenchers were (understandably) reluctant to 
introduce changes which, in the process of disciplining the 
parliamentary political process, would have severely affected some 
of their career prospects (through the early election and 'anti­
hopping' proposals) and indeed their re-election prospects. Their 
actions emphasised the truth of Richard Rose's dictum that 'once 
chosen, electoral rules tend to persist by their own inertia' (Rose 
1 983:42-3) . Electoral reform will always be difficult to achieve, 
because the legislature will always be a product of the existing 
laws, and consequently will tend to resist the uncertain 
ramifications of change. 
Nonetheless, Siaguru co�tinued his campaign for electoral and 
constitutional reform following the elections. In 1985, in an article 
published in both the Times of Papua New Guinea and the 
Aus tra l ian ,  he put forward a penetrating case for widespread 
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constitutional reform, arguing that the Westminster system in PNG 
was reminiscent of 18th-century England in its unstable faction- and 
personality-driven politics. He suggested a number of measures to 
enhance effective government and strengthen the position of the 
Prime Minister, including the re-introduction of preferential voting; 
official registration of all political parties; halving (to 14) the size 
of the Ministry; compulsory by-elections for MPs changing parties 
after their election; and a constitutional amendment to allow a 
Prime Minister to request the Governor-General to dissolve 
Parliament and call fresh elections. 
Siaguru argued that preferential voting is 'complementary to 
the emergence of disciplined parties, since it encourages the 
presentation of disciplined philosophies of government as the basis 
for the elector to cast his preferences' and would thus 'be a major step 
in realising a national consciousness among Highlanders, Papuans, 
Islanders and New Guineans' (Times of Papua New Guinea, 21 July 
1985) . He refined this argument in a similar article after the 1987 
elections, writing that 
The recent election has borne out all my worst fears. The 
extreme multiplicity of candidates, combined with 
first-past-the-post, has produced results not only absurd 
but dangerous. As more and more candidates stand, so 
the appeal to the electorate becomes more and more 
localised. The candidate with the largest localised 
support base wins. Elected members emerge with a 
ridiculously low percentage of the vote . . .  The system 
no longer provides for the best representation, not does it 
provide for the most able leaders. The consequences of 
frustration and disillusionment among the electorate 
lead to violence and community upheaval. 
An optional preferential system will not only enable 
fairer representation, but by encouraging the 
presentation of genuine philosophies (rather than 
parochial appeal) as a basis for the elector to cast his 
preferences, it will make for more disciplined political 
parties (Post Courier, 5 August 1987). 
In 1986, Siaguru introduced a private members bill to reintroduce 
OPV for PNG's national elections. The proposals failed to attract 
the two-thirds support level needed for amendment to an organic 
law, and the Bill did not advance beyond the second reading stage. 
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Unlike previous occasions, however, the Bill was debated in 
Parliament and thus provides a valuable opportunity to consider the 
arguments for and against preferential voting in the eyes of PNG 
parliamentarians.  
There was considerable support for the Bill amongst senior MPs, 
particularly those who had served in several parliaments . The 
then Minister for Justice, Warren Dutton, who had been elected 
under both voting systems, strongly supported the change, arguing 
that preferential voting resulted in greater identification between 
the electorate and the elected member, saying 'when I was first 
elected to this Parliament in 1968, even the people who had given 
me their sixth and last preference vote considered that they had in 
fact voted for me and therefore, I was their member and I would look 
after all of them rather than just the small group of people who 
gave me their first preferences' (Ha n sa rd,  27 November 1986) . 
Dutton argued that preferential voting would encourage greater 
identification on the part of elected MPs with their constituency .  
The failure to  do this was, he felt, one of  the major weaknesses of 
the first-past-the-post voting system: 
I would state categorically that the reason why we had 
so many Courts of Disputed Returns, why we have had 
instances of violence and other disruptions during 
elections, can be placed squarely on the first-past-the­
post system . . . if we were able to pass these 
amendments I am prepared to guarantee that the 
elections that we will hold in 1987 would be more 
peaceful, more respected, and would return to 
Parliament members who were supported by the 
majority of the people in their electorates (Hansa rd,  
ibid) . 
While numerous members from both sides of the Parliament 
stated their support for the amendment in principle, many went on to 
say that, with a national election due within six months, there was 
not enough time to make such a major change before the 1987 
election. Most speakers pledged to support the bill if it was re­
submitted after the 1987 election. Unfortunately for Siaguru, he lost 
his seat of Moresby North-East after an acrimonious election 
campaign, and the momentum behind the proposed amendments 
disappeared with his political career. 
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In 1987 the Electoral Commissioner also addressed the question 
of the benefits of a return to the OPV system. Stating that previous 
election results had posed the question 'as to whether the nation has 
an efficient democratic process', the Commissioner's election report 
argued that OPV would reduce conflict, and that losers would more 
readily accept the result: 
The question that has to be addressed is whether OPV 
reduces conflict and generates greater acceptance of the 
final result because 'trading off' of preferences between 
candidates will occur. This spreads the sense of the 
winner having relied on more electors than gave 
him/her their first option. In the final count of a 
preferential system the winner is seen as having an 
absolute majority over his nearest opponent. He can, 
therefore, be seen as having been invested with majority 
approval. First-past-the-post is simpler and should 
yield quicker results, but . . .  a small solid block of votes 
from a lain or linguistic group can determine who wins. 
This does not engender responsibility to the whole 
electorate, nor, ultimately, national attitudes 
(Electoral Commission 1987:4) . 
The fact that the Electoral Commissioner joined the debate on 
the electoral system was itself a significant step. With the wisdom 
of historical hindsight, it is possible to make some points regarding 
the abandonment of OPV for plurality. 
First, it is clear that, despite the claims of the Chief Electoral 
Officer in 1973 and the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) in 
197 4, preferences were being exercised by increasing numbers of voters 
in each election prior to 1977. As Table 2.2 details, the use of 
preferences changed the result in five cases for the 1964 election, 1 1  
cases in 1968 and 1 6  cases in 1972. The CPC mistakenly claimed that 
in 1972 'in only 13 electorates was the candidate who led on the first 
count defeated after preferences had been distributed' (CPC 1974: 15-
16) .  The use of the word 'only' appeared to imply that this was a 
relatively small amount. In fact, this is a far higher rate of 
preferences changing results than has ever been achieved in 
Australia. The increasing use of preference victories can be 
interpreted as a sign of the increasing confidence of voters using 
preferences as a means of defeating candidates with strong (but 
localised) support in favour of more widely acceptable candidates. 
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Secondly, the arguments for 'simplicity' put forward by the 
advocates of plurality suggest the question: simplicity for who? The 
structure and layout of the ballot paper and the accepted voting 
method is identical under plurality and OPV-the only difference 
being that electors can, if they wish, mark further preferences after 
their first preference. Admittedly marking of further preferences 
requires literacy and the ability to write numerals. In addition, 
OPV is definitely more complicated than 'plurality in the scrutiny of 
ballot papers. But that is a task performed by electoral officials, 
not voters. While questions remain as to the capacity of the election 
administration to successfully manage a preferential count, the 
possible benefits of a change to OPV, particularly on the 'zero sum' 
attitudes that currently prevail towards electioneering in many 
areas (and the associated factors of campaign violence and 
intimidation) may well have significant benefits for electoral 
administrators as well as voters and candidates. 
First-past-the-post in PNG 
The first-past-the-post or plurality electoral system is the most 
widely disseminated single system in the democratic world , with 
almost a third of all countries using this system (Inter­
Parliamentary Union 1993) . The method of vote counting under this 
system has been seen as simple for both voters and electoral 
officials, easy to understand, and transparent. Its structuring of 
electoral competition into 'winning' and 'losing' candidates is as 
easy to grasp as a horse race: the horse that passes the post first is 
the winner. Whether other horses lose by a nose or ten lengths is 
irrelevant. Plurality elections require no complicated arithmetic, no 
vote transfers or quotas. They do not even require literacy or 
numeracy: choices are marked with a tick or a cross, and 
photographs or par7 symbols on the ballot paper can be used to 
identify candidates. There are no preferences, and there is almost 
always a quick count and a clear winner. 
In PNG, following the influential criticism of OPV noted earlier, 
support for a change from OPV to plurality gained momentum 
following the release of the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer on 
4 Photographs of both candidates and, for the first time, party leaders were 
used on the ballot papers at the 1987 and 1992 elections, in an attempt by 
the Electoral Commission to encourage party identification and possibly 
minimise the informal vote. 
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the 1972 House of Assembly Election in February 1973. Without 
openly supporting a new electoral system, the new Chief Electoral 
Officer, Simon Kaumi, writing under the heading 'Preferential 
System versus First-Past-the-Po&t',  made it clear that the 
complexity of the OPV system was causing difficulties: 
The preferential system is no doubt a fairer system than 
the first-past-the-post system but, while appreciating 
its fairness, it is becoming more and more complicated as 
well as time consuming. Papua New Guinea's electoral 
system must be completely revised with a view to 
making it simple and less complicated so that it is 
easily understood by both polling officials and the 
voters . As the country approaches self-government, 
Papua New Guinea's  electoral system must be 
simplified . . .  In the 1 968 general election 84% of the 
Members were elected first-past-the-post while in the 
1972 general election 85% of the members were also 
elected first-past-the-post. These figures indicate a 
clear swing away from a proper preferential voting 
system and I feel it is time Papua New Guinea looked 
realistically and critically at its voting system and 
made its own decisions as to what is suitable for its 
future democratic needs. The question is not one of 
democracy, rather one of finding a voting system that is 
simple and suitable to the people of this country (Chief 
Electoral Officer 1973:18) .  
These words were quoted approvingly by the CPC in its Final 
Report. Stating that 'we fully agree with this view',  the CPC 
endorsed both the suggestion that OPV was unnecessarily 
complicated, and that plurality would be 'easier to understand, 
easier to run, and the results become known much more quickly. For 
these reasons, we recommend a change to the 'first-past-the-post' 
system' (CPC 1 974 : 15-16 ) .  The post-independence government 
accepted this recommendation, and the resulting Organic Law · on 
Nationa l E lections, which has laid down the framework for all 
elections since 1977, provides for a plurality electoral system. 
The consequences of the new system were immediately apparent 
at the 1977 general election. Setting the pattern for all future 
elections, a disturbingly high number of seats (42-almost half the 
Parliament) were won by candidates with less than 30% of the vote, 
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and the related factor of 'vote splitting' -friendly candidates with 
little hope of winning the seat standing in order to 'split' an 
opposition block vote-first became a factor. Hegarty noted that 
vote-splitting tactics in 1977 'heightened tension between clans and 
groups and in some cases polarized electorates to the point of violent 
conflict . . .  this situation contrasted markedly with campaigning 
styles in previous elections where opposing candidates often toured 
their electorates together urging voters to cast preferences . '  
(Hegarty 1983: 15). Hegarty went on to suggest that 'a continuation 
of such aggressive campaigning in future elections could well weaken 
the credibility of the electoral system' .  It is clear that the 
incidence of such tactics has indeed increased, and that the 
combination of high rates of candidature, vote-splitting tactics and 
the continuance of clan-based voting blocks have progressively 
undermined the representativeness of the elected legislature. 
Even the Electoral Commission, which had championed the 
change, appeared to have doubts about the new system. In his report 
on the 1977 national election, the Electoral Commissioner, J .S. 
Mileng, expressed support for a change to a full preferential system 
as 'a fairer system of voting' and suggested that the problem with 
the old OPV system was that 'the voter is not required to mark 
his/her full support for the running candidates, therefore the voting 
system tends to swing towards that of the 'First Past the Post' 
Voting System'. First-past-the-post was considered to be simpler 
and easier to administer than OPV, but 'the system itself deprives 
the right of an elector to consider placing a second choice for the next 
best candidate. Secondly where there is a strong voting block, it 
always has the chance of electing its candidate outright, whilst 
candidates coming from a minority group would have no chance of 
getting elected' (Electoral Commission 1983:78-9) .  The report also 
detailed the relatively new phenomenon of campaign violence in 
some electorates, and the fact that areas where 'block voting' was 
not a factor were strongly disadvantaged by the new system. 
In fact, changes in the nature of campaigning have been one of 
the most debilitating effects of the plurality system. Previous 
election studies have noted that even under the OPV system, voting 
patterns were largely parochial and clan-based. But they have also 
shown that the winning candidates in many electorates were those 
who cultivated the preferences of those outside their own local 
area. Kuabaal's description of candidates' campaigns in 1972 in the 
Sinasina Open electorate, a Simbu electorate with seven major 
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tribal groups each speaking a different Sinasina dialect, noted that 
the eventual winning candidate concentrated his campaigning in 
areas where he had no traditional alliance or denominational ties, 
and in fact gained 41 % of his primary votes from such areas 
(Kuabaal 1976) .  Such a scenario would be virtually inconceivable 
today, where the risks of campaigning in a 'hostile' area tend to 
overshadow the marginal possibilities of picking up significant 
numbers of votes from rival areas. In fact, in both 1987 and 1992, 
candidates in Simbu were virtually restricted to campaigning only in 
their home base areas . The 1987 elections saw one candidate in 
Kerowagi win with 7.9% of the vote; and this was surpassed in 1992 
where the winning candidate in the Sinasina Yonggamugl Open 
electorate (also a Simbu seat) attracted a bare 6.3% of the vote (a 
new record). As well as undermining the overall legitimacy of both 
the electoral process and the elected legislature (see below), such 
results point to a change in the meaning and nature of a 
'constituency' . For many MPs, their actual constituency is not their 
electorate but the much smaller sub-group within their electorate to 
which they owe their allegiance, and their parliamentary 
positions. 
The trends of increasing candidature and minority support for 
winning candidates have been well covered elsewhere (Griffin 1988; 
Electoral Commissioner 1987) and will be only briefly covered here. 
Table 2.3 shows the continuing increase in the number of candidates 
per electorate since 1964: 
Table 2.3: Candidates per Electorate 1964-1992 
Year No of Electorates No. of Candidates Average per 
Electorate 
1964 54 298 5.5 
1968 84 484 5.8 
1972 100 611 6 . 1  
1977 109 879 8 . 1  
1982 109 1125 10.3 
1987 109 1513 13.9 
1992 109 1655 15.2 
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The factor of increasing candidacy levels is, of course, strongly 
related to the decreasing degree of support for successful members. 
The higher the number of candidates, the smaller the total vote 
needed to gain a plurality and hence win the seat. As Table 2.4 
indicates, the 1992 election continued the trend, apparent since 
Independence, of increasing numbers of successful candidates being 
elected with minority support. 
Table 2.4: Percentage of votes gained by successful candidates 
1977-1992 
Percentage of formal votes gained 
Year No of <10% 10-19% 20-29% 30-39% 40-49% 50% 
seats 
1977 109 11 37 26 16 19 
1982 109 4 20 33 20 14 18 
1987 106 2 39 41 13 4 7 
1992 109 9 45 33 14 3 5 
In a similar distribution to 1987, only five MPs in 1992 gained an 
absolute majority of votes, while those with less than 20% of the 
vote rose from 41 in 1987 to 54, or 50 per cent of the seats in 
Parliament. However, the figure of most immediate concern was the 
nine MPs elected with less than 10% of the vote. As in previous 
elections, most of these candidates were Independents from the 
Highlands area where inter-clan fractionalisation is most 
prevalent and where inclusive or accommodative candidacy is 
nowadays virtually unknown. To have almost one-tenth of a 
Parliament made up of candidates unwanted by over 90 per cent of 
their electorate gives a new twist to the term 'representative 
democracy' .  Their election is invariably based on very high 
candidacy levels (over 40 per electorate in some cases) and clan­
based voting blocks which together make it possible, and often 
inevitable, that successful candidates will be supported by very few 
voters. By way of contrast, the record lowest level of support for a 
successful candidate in the home of first-past-the-post, the United 
Kingdom, at their 1992 elections was 26 per cent of the vote. 
The Effects of the Electoral System in PNG 5 9 
As noted earlier, the Electoral C ommission sponsored 
amendments to the Constitution and the Organic Law on National 
E lections just prior to the 1992 elections aimed at reducing the 
number of candidates contesting seats . The nomination fee for 
prospective candidates, which had remained at KlOO since 1975, 
was increased to KlOOO, making it one of the highest financial 
hurdles to contesting elections in place anywhere in the world.5 (In 
fact, there was considerable pressure to make it higher. The 
Permanent Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Laws and 
Acts, to which the proposed law was referred following its 
introduction in the National Parliament, recommended that the fee 
be raised to K1500 and, in a further attempt to restrict candidature, 
that the minimum age for candidature be raised to 30 years. The 
Government did not support either recommendation.)  A number of 
other restrictive measures were also introduced: only the successful 
candidate would receive a refund of the nomination fee (previously, 
any candidate who polled more than 10 per cent of the votes of the 
winning candidate-which in most seats meant almost everyone­
received their money back); nominating candidates needed to have 
the support of 100 enrolled voters from their electorate; and the 
nomination period was reduced. The Electoral Commission did not 
try to hide the fact that the new provisions were aimed squarely at 
reducing candidate numbers: 
5 
Both national and provincial elections have been 
characterised by a very large number of candidates, and 
the numbers are increasing with each election. 
Many of these candidates have no chance of winning 
whatsoever, as can be seen by the very low amount of 
votes which they poll (in the 1987 general election 
several candidates polled no votes whatsoever) . The 
presence of so may candidates presents a bewildering 
and confusing choice to the voters, as well as adding to 
the expense of the election and complicating its 
administration at all stages. 
The Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional a similar attempt made in 1981 
to restrict candidate numbers by increasing the nomination fee to KlOOO, 
which it held infringed the underlying Constitutional principle of free and 
equal participation by all citizens. 
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While the right to  stand for elective office i s  accepted 
in principle it is contended that the restrictions 
proposed are reasonable and are overall in the public 
interest, in that they w ill only deter the 'no-hope'  
candidates and will reduce the confusion of voters 
(Electoral Commission 1991 :8). 
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As Table 2.3 makes clear, the best that can be said for these 
measures is that they reduced the rate of increase of the number of 
candidates from the previous election. The 1992 elections still 
registered a record number of candidates overall (1655), and a record 
for one seat (48 candidates for Sinasina-Yonggamugl) . The 1992 
results also graphically demonstrate the relationship between the 
number of candidates and the vote share necessary to win the seat­
Sinasina-Yonggamugl Open, with the highest number of candidates, 
required the lowest winning vote share of only 6.3%; while in 
Namatanai Open, with only two candidates , Sir Julius Chan scored 
58.5%. There is no strict causal relationship between candidacy 
levels and a winning candidate's vote share: both tend to encourage 
the other. The understanding that so few votes are needed to gain a 
place in the national parliament itself encourages candidature from 
those who would otherwise not consider standing; the higher 
candidature levels mean that fewer votes than ever are needed to 
gain a plurality, and on it goes . Although high candidacy is one 
indicator of democratic participation, in PNG it is clearly, in the 
words of the Electoral Commissioner, 'excessive and undesirable 
both from the point of view of effective representation and the 
electoral process itself' (Electoral Commission 1987:5). 
Candidacy levels are also strongly linked to electoral violence. 
It is precisely those (usually Highlands) areas where block voting 
and high candidacy are a problem that electoral violence is also a 
factor. Like many aspects of PNG electoral politics, this factor is 
another example of rational (if anti-social) behaviour in the face of 
an inappropriate system: as 10 or 20 votes sometimes separate the 
winner from the second place getter, any action taken to influence 
only a small number of votes can have significant effects. Just as the 
small number of potential second preferences gained under an OPV 
system can be the threshold between victory and defeat, so small 
numbers of votes forcibly gained (or, more often, forcibly withheld) 
can prove crucial. Electoral violence is clearly an 'anti-system' 
behaviour, which affects the legitimacy of the democratic system 
itself. Although in PNG violence is a part of everyday life which 
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cannot be examined in isolation, specific electoral violence is more 
often a response to the internal logic of the electoral system than an 
attack upon it. 
Summary: preferential versus plurality voting 
The disadvantages of first-past-the-post in PNG have now been 
outlined. What, in summary, are the advantages of a change to 
preferential voting for future PNG elections? The arguments put 
forward for preferential voting are that it: 
increases the chance of election of candidates with wider 
appeal, resulting in superior and more representative candidates 
standing; 
encourages accommodation between competing interests, making 
it particularly appropriate in divided or fractionalised societies 
such as PNG's; 
produces incentives for candidates to broaden support bases in 
search of a majority vote, and to collaborate during campaigning, 
thus reducing conflict and changing the nature of election 
campaigns; 
rt:wards reciprocal concessions between competing groups, thus 
encouraging conciliatory positions and moderate policies; 
if it manufactures an absolute majority (which admittedly the 
OPV system does not necessarily achieve) it encourages 
unsuccessful candidates to better accept the result. 
Two related 'negative' advantages of OPV compared to the present 
plurality system-that is, defects in the present system that OPV 
does not suffer from-have also been presented. These are that 
preferential voting: 
negates the advantages of dummy candidates standing to 'split' 
an opposition block vote, thus (presumably) resulting in lower 
levels of overall candidature; 
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results in candidates being elected with a considerably higher 
proportion of the vote than plurality, thus increasing the 
legitimacy of the elected legislature. 
One further argument in favour of OPV can be made. By encouraging 
candidates to pool votes and rely on areas outside their immediate 
clan base for preferences, it assists the development of responsible 
government and nation building by encouraging a less localised focus 
in favour of broader regional or even national considerations. 
The disadvantages of the preferential vote are that it is more 
complicated than plurality, both for voters and electoral officials, 
that it creates difficulties for illiterate or innumerate voters, and 
that the scrutiny takes longer. While these are legitimate 
concerns-particularly considering the overstretched resources and 
administrative difficulties the Electoral Commission faces in 
administering the current system-it would appear that the 
widespread potential benefits of preferential voting are such as to 
warrant serious consideration of a change in electoral system. If 
nothing else, OPV should stymie the benefits of 'vote splitting' and 
serve to reduce the attractions of candidature for those persons 
unlikely to be able to muster support outside their own clan base. Yet 
it is the potential wider benefits-the impact upon election 
campaigning, party behaviour, candidate quality and the overall 
legitimacy of the legislature-that offer the most compelling case 
for change. 
Territorial representation in PNG 
One factor common to all Westminster-style systems is that members 
of parliament represent spatially-defined areas, or 'electorates ' .  In 
PNG, these electorates can be divided into two distinct groups:  the 
89 'open' electorates, defined on the basis of population, and 20 
'regional' electorates, which follow the boundaries of PNG's  19 
provinces and the National Capital District. 
The spatially-defined areas which members represent, both 
open and regional €lectorates, are rarely homogeneous, most being 
made up of numerous overlapping clan and tribal groups, often with 
their own distinct language and territorial base . Voting patterns in 
many areas, particularly the Highlands, tend to be in 'blocks' along 
clan lines, with minimal vote leakage to candidates of rival clans . 
Political loyalties are focussed primarily at the level of personal, 
clan and regional allegiances, rather than along party or 
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ideological lines. Demographically, PNG i s  fractionalised along 
several levels-at the clan, village and immediate region level, but 
also along the over-arching geographical axes of south coast 
(Papua), north coast (New Guinea), Highlands and Islands. PNG 
can thus be classified as one of the most divided nations in the 
Pacific region, albeit without the bi-polar racial, linguistic or 
colonial divisions of other South Pacific polities. As noted above, 
these divisions can be mitigated or accentuated to some degree, 
depending on the choice of voting system. 
But no matter which voting system is used in PNG, there still 
remains an enduring conflict (both in PNG and in other similar 
systems, such as the United Kingdom's) between the principle that 
people are being represented and the principle that places are being 
represented. The most obvious manifestation of this tension in 
tribal-based societies such as PNG is the long-term conflict between 
traditional tribal and linguistic regions and the much larger and 
often arbitrarily-drawn divisions of the state, such as electoral 
boundaries. 
For PNG's  first mass-suffrage elections in 1964, the nascent 
Electoral Boundaries Committee introduced the concept of 'electoral 
zones', made up of autonomous 'Open' and 'Special' electorates, 
'determined on the basis of geographic isolation (as in the cases of 
the island districts), ethnography and communications' (Chief 
Electoral Officer 1964:1) .  The zones agreed upon were the five major 
island groups of Manus, New Ireland, Bougainville and New 
Britain, and a corresponding division of the mainland (into Milne 
Bay, Sepik, South, North-East and Highlands) . Each zone was 
divided into electorates 'on a strictly mathematical basis ' ,  
following the (then) Australian practice of a maximum 20% 
deviation from the mean size of electorates. 'Tribal and linguistic 
affiliations' were to be taken into account where possible, as were 
issues of accessibility in 'sparsely populated areas' (ibid) .  
This initial demarcation and distribution exercise laid the basis 
for the new system of representative government based on territorial 
representation and universal suffrage. Each electorate was based on 
territorial areas to be represented in the national legislature; the 
new Members would have to simultaneously work together (as part 
of the new state) and in competition (for resources, development and 
the like for their electorate) .  Although these new electorates were 
primarily legislated to represent equal numbers of people, they also 
served to represent territory. Furthermore, the ten 'Special' 
64 Reilly 
Electorates represented far larger geographic areas and, although 
initially devised as a means of ensuring expatriate representation 
and expertise in the legislature (and later that of educated Papua 
New Guineans), were also the forerunner of today's 20 provincial 
electorates .  
The first (and last, at  the time of writing) redistribution of 
boundaries under the plurality system took place in 1977 under the 
Organic Law on National Elections. The introduction of national 
electoral boundaries overlaid a potentially more potent division 
upon the tribal and wan tok-based landscape of PNG . But they 
rarely corresponded to tribal divisions (and deliberately so) and 
only recognised the most evident of physical features.6 What then 
explains the almost complete acceptance of the territorial system of 
single-member electorates in PNG, at a time when many of the other 
fundamental characteristics of the electoral system are being 
questioned? 
Regulation of geographical conflict 
For a start, there is the assumed 'naturalness' of the system itself. 
There was virtually no consideration of other systems either for the 
first mass elections, or in the extended consultations in the lead up to 
the Independence Constitution. The CPC's Report does include a 
passing reference to proportional representation (which would 
require multi-member electorates of some sort) only to explicitly 
reject it as 
very complicated and . . .  usually found in countries 
where there are well-developed political parties . On 
both these grounds, proportional representation would 
be unsuitable for Papua New Guinea (CPC 1974:15) .  
In most colonial situations, the hegemony of the colonial empire's 
own institutions and assumptions is generally sufficient to foreclose 
speculation on alternative forms of government structure, especially 
considering the new rules are normally drafted and put in place by 
6 This factor is an almost universal aspect of uninominal district electoral 
boundaries drawn to maintain population panty, however; it is a rare 
community whose natural borders coincide with electoral ones. As 
Michael Steed has noted, " most single-member constituencies are 
thoroughly artificial, ephemeral pieces of territory which have no meaning 
outside the electoral context" (Steed, 1985:282) . 
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members of the metropolitan power rather than indigenously. The 
CPC was unquestionably an indigenous body. But the range of 
options available to it when recommending complex institutional 
devices such as electoral systems was obviously heavily 
circumscribed by the colonial experience. Nevertheless, it is curious 
that some form of proportional representation was not at least 
considered by the CPC, because most scholars have agreed since the 
1960s that single-member 'winner take all' electoral systems are 
unsuited to plural societies. Sir Arthur Lewis's experience of the 
failure of post-colonial democracy in countries such as Ghana, 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone prompted him to write that 'A system 
which suits homogeneous class societies need not be expected to 
function well in non-Marxist plural societies. Where cleavage is a 
problem, one needs a system which will give minorities adequate 
representation, discourage parochialism, and force moderation on 
the political parties ' .  He added: 'The surest way to kill the idea of 
democracy in a plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American 
electoral system of first-past-the-post' (Lewis 1965:73). Thus Lewis 
favoured PR with multi-member constituencies: 
In a plural society, proportional representation with a 
few large several-member constituencies is better than 
elec toral systems with many s ingle-member 
constituencies not only because it gives more satisfaction 
to the minorities, but also because it reduces the 
geographical conflict, and the racial, religious or other 
differences which go with geography ( ib id : 72, 
emphasis added) .  
Vernon Bogdanor reflects the prevailing viewpoint amongst 
scholars when he writes that 'plurality and majority methods will 
work less successfully in deeply divided or plural societies than in 
homogeneous ones' (Bogdanor 1987:195). 
There can be little doubt that single-member electorates do focus 
geographical conflict in a number of ways in PNG, just as they did in 
the West African states which concerned Lewis. The very action of 
dividing territory into smaller political units has implications for 
future geographical conflicts. Where boundaries run along ethnic 
lines, they serve to regulate a pre-existing state of affairs, focussing 
conflict between constituencies and representatives. Under a 
Westminster-style system, this conflict can be expressed at the 
parliamentary level through the elected representatives, and via 
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party groupings based on regional and /  or ethnic lines. Although 
dangerous, particularly for minority groups, this form of division 
does have the advantage of offering a constitutional arena for 
conflicts to be expressed. It also means that major groupings need to 
be included in positions of power to allay potential conflict. In PNG, 
ministries and other government positions are allocated at least 
partly on the basis of region, and the need to strike the right balance 
of Papuans, New Guineans, Highlanders and Islanders. 
Geographical conflict is focussed quite differently where 
electoral boundaries either (i) cross major ethnic groupings, thus 
dividing common interests or (ii) circumscribe numerous small ethnic 
groups within one electorate. In these cases, both of which occur in 
PNG, conflict at the regional level is not faithfully mirrored at the 
parliamentary level. Under the first scenario, similar groups are 
politically divided from their common interests, leading to intra­
group division and dilution of voting power. Under the second 
scenario, which is particularly common in the Highlands, the large 
numbers of small competing groups and 'block' voting along ethnic 
lines lead to MPs being dependent on votes from, and in practice often 
representing, only a small minority of the total electorate. Under 
these circumstances, a representative's 'constituency' is often far less 
than the sum of its voters, and can entail only one small group and/ or 
area within an electorate . As noted earlier, this factor is 
exacerbated by the dynamics of the plurality electoral system. 
PNG's well-documented traditional system of groups conflicting 
along territorial grounds can thus be either reflected or refracted by 
that supposed 'mirror of the nation's mind', the electoral system. It 
remains open to argument whether a system that faithfully reflects 
territorial divisions in the parliamentary sphere (thus providing 
the safety valve of a constitutional arena of verbal and other non­
physical conflict) is superior to a system that refracts or suppresses 
this conflict, or depicts only one small part of it. While long 
experience in Africa and elsewhere has graphically demonstrated 
the dangers of parliamentary majorities and minorities forming 
along ethnic lines (particularly for minorities), PNG's case suggests 
that a failure to reflect conflict at the parliamentary level does not 
suppress the actual conflict on the ground, and can actually 
exacerbate it. 
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Constituency contact 
The standard argument in favour of single-member electorates is 
that they enable the representative to have close contact with the 
constituency he or she represents, which thus makes them far more 
responsive to their electors' wishes than would otherwise be the 
case. Although the 'constituency contact' argument has been largely 
rejected by scholars in relation to larger nation states due to the 
sheer size of most electorates-even the most conscientious local 
member could retain personal contact with only a relatively small 
proportion of the total number of people he or she represents-it has 
retained a strong element of truth in terms of PNG elections, where 
the relentless parish-pump nature of most campaigns encourages a 
high degree of personal contact (and exchange) between 
campaigning politicians and voters. Moreover, a succession of past 
studies (Saffu 1989:19-20) emphasised the need for visibility and 
personal contact when campaigning: the importance of 'seeing the 
face' of a candidate . This factor is probably less strong today, 
however, as increasing conflict in many areas means a lack of contact 
between electors and candidates, many of whom now only campaign 
in safe 'home' areas. 
While 'character' is a predictable determinant of voter choice in 
a polity where all candidates stand on basically the same platform, 
it is also a function of the single-member constituency system of 
electoral organisation. In this way it can be argued that the single­
member system works more authentically in PNG than in party­
based polities such as Australia or the UK, where the party 
affiliation of a local candidate is far more important than 
knowledge of his or her personal characteristics (Crewe 1985). 
Traditional forms 
The single-member system is also analogous to PNG's traditional 
method of leadership vested in what has become known as the 'big 
man' .  In fact, many of the functions of the traditional 'big man' 
have been replicated by elected representatives, as this description 
of the role of the 'big man' from the Introduction to the 1964 election 
study suggests: 
Political leadership was closely linked to the active 
day-to-day control, acquisition and ceremonial disposal 
of community wealth. Authority to control others was 
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legitimized in the first instance by its acceptance 
within the kinship system, but this recognition was 
sharply limited by the office holder's practical ability 
to perform successfully those functions his group 
considered necessary (Bettison et al 1965:3). 
Rei lly 
It is enlightening to read academic accounts of some of the more 
recent provincial and district level campaigns to note just how 
similar the current expectation of leadership duties is to this 
traditional role. Standish's account of the 1982 Chimbu provincial 
campaign, for example, cites the key resources for the use of the 
prospective member as 'parties, beer and brotherhood' and notes 
that 'it was virtually obliptcry for candidates to give very large 
beer parties, to show that the candidate was a good and generous 
man, and to reinforce his position in his own group and beyond. 
Otherwise, open candidates use much the same campaign sty le as 
previously, but with very frequent mention of their political party 
and the name of its leader. They walked and talked their way 
around the men's houses at night, and the markets by day, with a 
fairly standard spiel that they would speak out firmly (tok strong) 
for their people, and try to get more and better roads for their 
electorates' (Standish 1989 :191 ) .  
Thus, i t  can be argued that the single-member electorate system 
fitted naturally onto the pre-existing forms of traditional 
leadership, both in terms of the requirements for successful 
leadership and the solitary (as opposed to group) nature at the apex 
of community representation. As past electoral studies have pointed 
out, the 'counterpoint between traditional and modern bases for 
status-competition' (Strathern 1973:283) defines elections in many 
parts of PNG, with the result that there is a strong two-way 
incentive for a tribal leader seeking election to build up his 
ceremonial exchange links and for others to invest in him. Elections 
provide an arena in which traditional rivalries can be fought out, 
which has severe implications for overall representation when 
campaigning (and hence the elements of personal contact and 
exchange) only take place within the narrow regions of a 
candidates' 'home' area. 
Many of the 'exchange ' obligations of contemporary politicians 
are delivered via the well-known 300,000 kina per annum Electoral 
Development Funds, allocated to each MP for spending at his 
discretion within his electorate. These 'slush funds' can be seen as a 
unique PNG adaptation of the usual budget expenditure of 
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governments which reinforces both exchange links and a strong focus 
on the needs of the constituency. But as an efficient mechanism of 
government fiscal policy they are a questionable instrument. 
Numerous MPs have openly favoured their own clan base (which, as 
noted earlier, can be a small fraction of the total electorate) in the 
distribution of funds; some have openly used the scheme to acquire 
personal wealth (Sherlock 1 992) . The funds were originally 
envisaged as a useful initiative for utilising a sitting member's 
intimate knowledge of local needs to by-pass bureaucratic 
bottlenecks and fund roads, bridges and other basic infrastructure 
where they are most needed in an electorate, thus (presumably) 
increasing overall living standards and cohesion. Instead the 
provision of such direct funding has more often served to reinforce 
fractionalisation at the electorate level, as funding is widely 
expected to be a 'payola' from the winning candidate to reward and 
reinforce clan support. 
Provincial electorates and regional weighting 
Finally, PNG is a geographically, culturally, linguistically and 
ethnically diverse nation. Prior to independence, the Australian 
colonial administration had not produced a coherent sense of 
national identity, and the majority of political activity was 
regional and parochial. The devolution of power to provincial 
governments following independence was a tacit acceptance of 
heterogeneity . The expansive nature of this decentralisation was 
also an acceptance of the special needs and interests of PNG's  
provinces, and their representation in Parliament via  provincial 
electorates was effectively weighted in favour of the smaller 
provinces, and particularly the islands. In 1971, the Second Select 
Committee on Constitutional Development noted that there had 
been some call for the removal of regional electorates, although the 
Committee itself made it clear it did not support this view. But by 
1975 there had been 'a considerable shift in opinion on this matter', 
and the CPC unanimously recommended that regional electorates be 
abolished.  Their report argued that 'the original reasons for 
regional electorates has been largely invalidated by the increasing 
numbers of well educated people returned from open electorates' 
(CPC, Chapter 6 : 1 ) .  Moreover, the constitutional provisions on 
citizenship, and increasing standards of literacy, meant that the 
formal educational qualifications which were the basis of regional 
electorates were no longer necessary. The Government, however, 
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successfully argued for a retention of such electorates 'in order to 
retain greater representation in the Parliament for the less populous 
districts' (Goldring 1978:41-42) . 
The debate on the utility of regional electorates goes on. In 1983, 
the General Constitutional Commission added its voice to those 
calling for the abolition of provincial electorates (General 
Constitutional Commission 1 983: 1 12) .  This was echoed in 1987 by 
the Electoral Commissioner, who claimed that the need for two 
separate lists of candidates causes 'confusion in an electorate where 
voters are still nearly 80 per cent pre literate and provincial 
candidates are necessarily more remote as a rule from the ordinary 
voter' (Electoral Commission 1987:7) .  Other commentators have 
argued that provincial electorates actually serve a useful purpose, 
forcing candidates 'to transcend narrow, localized tribal and clan 
loyalties in reaching out for support in a larger territorial unit', and 
pointing out that a number of PNG's most prominent politicians have 
been elected from provincial electorates (Wijeweera 1989:40) .  
One consequence of regional electorates was that they 
effectively introduced a regional weighting into PNG politics 
which remains today. While such arrangements are not uncommon 
in other diverse federal societies (Australia and the USA are two 
examples of countries which use their Senate to weight 
representation in favour of smaller, less populous States) ,  the 
incorporation of this weighting in a unicameral legislature is quite 
unusual. It is clear from the electoral law that PNG 's open 
electorates are designed to represent people. In the cases of the 
provincial electorates, however, it is explicitly the provinces 
themselves that are being represented, which is why a vote in the 
provincial electorate for Manus ( 11304 electors in 1987) has ten times 
the value of a vote in the Western Highlands ( 1231 19 electors in 
1 987) .  
Some territorially homogeneous but culturally, religiously or 
linguistically divided societies have their Parliament elected from 
a single, nationwide constituency (eg the Netherlands, Israel) 
which gives no acknowledgment to territorial difference. PNG 
stands  with a group of other nations-typically large, 
geographically diverse nations such as Australia, Canada and the 
USA-in which territories and regions demanded, and received, 
disproportionate legislative representation and powers as their 
price for joining the new nation. 
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The effects o f  the single-member system 
Some possible reasons for the almost unquestioned adoption of a 
plurality system of single member (uninomial) territorial 
representation in PNG have been put forward above. But what have 
been the effects, if any, of this system? Many observers would argue 
that institutions like electoral systems have little real effect on 
political behaviour in Western societies, and even less in 
traditional societies, where the decision-making process is not 
focussed at the parliamentary level. The diffusion and formlessness 
of party activity in PNG is widely acknowledged and generally 
attributed to the lack of ideological cleavages in PNG society, as 
well as its very short political history. There has been little 
examination of the institutional factors which may have affected or 
influenced PNG's fluid party system. Some writers emphasise the 
irrelevance of Western institutions such as party, parliament and 
the judicial system in the face of PNG' s regional and clan-based 
decision-making processes. Moreover, institutions such as the first­
past-the-post electoral system have not produced the type of party 
system they were intended to. The Economist has referred to PNG's 
'Italian' political system, while Ghai has noted that results so far 
have been those usually associated with p roportional 
representation: 'multiple parties, large candidature, coalitions, and 
weak governments' (Ghai 1988:77).  
While it  is  easy to over-emphasise the importance or influence 
of political institutions (and particularly of electoral systems) in 
any polity, they should not be consigned to irrelevance. This is 
particularly the case for a polity such as PNG which has been 
engaged in rapid social and cultural change for the past 30 years, 
because it is in periods of rapid change that electoral systems are at 
their most influential. Plurality systems generally work to stifle 
new trends or movements, unless they are regionally based, in which 
case a plurality system will generally serve to over-represent their 
importance (Bogdanor 1983).  
Constituency focus 
PNG politics at a national (ie parliamentary) level actually 
reflects, to a large extent, the inherent and predictable effects of a 
constituency-based system of representation grafted on to a weak­
party system. Most single-member constituency systems are strong 
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party systems, and the internal logic of party, party identification 
amongst the electorate and parliamentary party discipline all serve 
to marginalise a constituency 's  importance.  However, the 
combination of weak parties and uninomial districts, particularly in 
a country with poor communications and a localised, heterogeneous 
population, leads to an almost slavish responsiveness to the 
constituency (which, as noted earlier, is not necessarily the 
electorate, but often the smaller sub-group which voted for the 
member). This relationship holds true whether we are talking 
about USA Congressmen, Irish deputies or PNG parliamentarians. 
While this may be a good thing in terms of some democratic theory, 
it can have very considerable deficiencies from the point of view of 
broader democratic accountability. 
In a rebuttal of Richard Rose's much-quoted contention that the 
difference in electoral systems is more a matter of degree than 
principle (Rose 1984), William Irvine has argued that the form of 
electoral system can have a vast influence in regionally-divided 
polities, and that the plurality system in particular serves to 
encourage regionally-based politics. Irvine contends that politicians 
seeking to maximise their chances of electoral success will 'frame 
their appeals and expend campaign resources of time and money 
(including whatever pre-election patronage they can muster) in 
those regions where they have the best chance of success and to 
ignore regions that are less favourable to their party . . .  as a result of 
these incentives, strongest in a country with a plurality electoral 
system, party support becomes increasingly concentrated in 
particular regions of the country' (Irvine 1988 : 15-16) .  Likewise, in 
severely divided electorates such as those in the PNG Highlands, 
and particularly open electorates, candidates can (and do) ignore 
large sections of unfriendly territory, concentrating instead on 
maximising their vote in their 'home' region(s). Because uninomial 
systems seek to find the 'best' single representative for a 
territorially defined community, it is not in candidates' interests to 
seek to reflect a range of ideologies and policy preferences. Rather, 
as Irvine has shown, they seek to avoid such representation and 
concentrate their efforts away from specific ideological or policy 
platforms. This feature of uninomial representation is amplified by 
the lack of an ideologically coherent party system. The result is 
that rational candidates, responding to career incentives, will 
emphasise both the importance of region and the irrelevance of 
ideology or policy in their platforms. They will also attempt to 
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campaign as efficiently and inexpensively as possible-which, in 
PNG, often means localising their appeal and effort as much as 
possible to secure the (minimum) plurality vote needed for election. 
Regionalism 
Under the uninomial plurality system there is an enormous electoral 
advantage in having an efficiently distributed vote. This does not, 
however, mean an evenly distributed vote. In fact, an even 
distribution of votes across all electorates would almost certainly 
see a party win no seats at all. Most efficient is to concentrate (but 
not over-concentrate) votes according to region. The total size of a 
party's vote is largely irrelevant for this purpose: the spatial 
distribution of the votes between constituencies is all important. 
A party that is regionally-based and assiduously cultivates its 
regional support can achieve a much higher seats-votes ratio than a 
party which spreads its support level too thinly over a wider area. 
Of course, a determined regional focus from a party presumes a 
significant level of party organisation and party identification 
amongst voters-two prerequisites in short supply in PNG. 
Nevertheless, a regional display of electoral results by party, such 
as Richard Natkiel's mapping of the 1982 election, shows a 
significant level of regionalism at the party level in PNG overall 
(Leonard and Natkiel 1987) . 
Similarly, a single candidate within a highly fractionalised 
constituency like those in PNG needs to strike a judicious balance 
between appealing to home areas alone and to campaigning in 
hostile areas which offer few votes. May's analysis of ballot box 
results from Angoram Open in 1987 suggests that campaigning 
patterns appeared to have a more productive effect upon votes 
gained than more superficially attractive explanations such as 
party identification. His conclusion was that 'the most that can be 
said with any certainty is that energetic campaigning and 'being 
known' (both of which parties facilitate) gain votes, but that local 
support factors are still of great importance, especially for minor 
candidates' (May 1989:120).  
Regionalism has received limited attention in past PNG 
electoral studies (Anere 1989), but it is inevitable that the 
overriding importance of region of residence identified by Saffu 
(1989) in his study of voting behaviour at the 1987 election will lead 
to more detailed examination of regional importance. The existing 
electoral structure means that any party-particularly a new 
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party-wishing to gain significant parliamentary representation 
will have to focus, at least initially, at the regional-rather than 
national-level. Even parties hailed as 'ideological', such as the 
Melanesian Alliance, have a strong regional base and in fact rely on 
their regional appeal for their limited electoral success (King 1989) .  
Spatial fractionalisation 
The regional focus of PNG's electoral system is thus an agent of both 
the regional preoccupation of the electorate and their elected 
member, and of PNG's party (and social) structure. Any party which 
aims to maximise its parliamentary representation must reckon 
primarily with two territorial factors: the level of regional support 
for their party and the level of regional support for their anointed 
candidate (often these are not the same 'region'-candidates in 
particular tend to come from a particular village or ethnic power­
base within an electorate) .  This leads to the observation that PNG 
elections are 'territorially fractured' on at least two dimensions :  
between constituencies and within constituencies. The former is, as 
much of this paper has attempted to demonstrate, partly a result of 
uninomial territorial representation. Intra-constituency fraction­
alisation, however, manifests itself in electoral competition 
between different groups within an already-delimited constituency, 
with consequent electoral behaviour such as vote-splitting and 
dummy candidates. As noted earlier, this is primarily an effect of 
the plurality electoral formula, which contains no disincentives to 
candidate multiplication. 
Temporal fractionalisation 
As well as the territorial fractionalisation noted above, PNG 
elections are fractured on another level: that of time. The 1992 
election was spread over a two-week polling period; previous 
elections have lasted four weeks or longer. The spreading-out of 
elections temporally as well as spatially is a feature of elections in 
many developing countries : limited resources and harsh terrain 
mean that a lengthy polling period is often the only way of reaching 
all the electorate . This is especially the case in PNG, where the 
well-established procedure of mobile polling requires a long time­
frame in some of the more inaccessible electorates. As results are not 
announced progressively, it is not clear what the specific effects of 
this added dimension are upon voters, beyond campaign speculation 
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as to the pattern of early results and activity . It  does, however, 
serve to lengthen the time between the opening of polling and the 
declaration of the result, which is a cause for instability in itself. 
As any general would know, a lengthy campaign is a risky 
campaign, because resources cannot be maximised in short, efficient 
bursts. Increased stress and tension on candidates and particularly 
the electoral administration are a result, and indeed the Electoral 
Commission itself has claimed that the length of the polling period 
creates 'tensions and upheavals' (Electoral Commission 1991 :9) .  
Conclusion 
Most of the countries cited above (USA, Australia, Ireland) require 
their budding local member to have established some prior contact 
with the district he or she wants to represent (Australia, for 
example, requires a candidate to be enrolled or entitled to enrol for 
the electorate they are contesting) .  PNG goes further by requiring 
the intending member to have a prior residence-based relationship 
with the constituency: nominating candidates must be at least 25 
years old, a qualified voter for the electorate and be born in that 
electorate or have been continuously resident there for the two years 
prior to nomination or for five years at any time (Constitution, 
section 103) . This takes the legislative requirement for localism 
further than any Western democracy and, when combined with the 
powerful institutional and social forces outlined above, is a further 
pressure towards constituency-focussed politics. 7 
This responsiveness at the level of the individual constituency 
leads to collective irresponsibility at the level of the national 
political system. There is simply not enough incentive for PNG 
parliamentarians to focus on national, as opposed to local and 
regional, interests (even those of the electorate as a whole rather 
than the candidate's 'home' area) .  The parliamentarian has two 
mutually incompatible responsibilities: a focus on the national good, 
and a focus on expressing the interests of his constituency, and 
extracting benefits for them from the nation's government. While 
this conflict is fed by PNG's tribal history and non-ideological, 
7 Such residential qualifications can lead to surreal administrative 
difficulties. Wolfers has noted the celebrated occasion in the late 1960s 
when a star-fix had to be obtained to clarify in which electorate a 
particular candidate, whose home-base straddled two electorates, was 
qualified to stand (Wolfers 1968) . 
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development-based politics, it is pushed along by the clientelist 
nature of localised politics focussed on territorial representation. As 
Bogdanor (1985:300) has noted: 
There is, in fact, a deep-seated conflict between the 
notions of geographical representation and responsible 
party government, between the representation of 
territory and the representation of opinion. In a 
political system dominated by the clash of parties, the 
parliamentarian 's constituency is likely to be of 
subordinate importance for him; while a system in 
which the dominant focus is the constituency will 
probably not articu1'1tc opposing interests and opinions 
very successfully. 
This is particularly true of a country which uses the plurality 
method of electoral formula. It is difficult to escape the conclusion 
that the combination of the plurality formula and single-member 
districts in PNG 's severely divided society has had deleterious 
consequences for PNG' s political system, emphasising territorial 
cleavages at the expense of national goals and rewarding a focus on 
constituency-based concerns rather than national policy interests. 
3 
Violence, Security and the 1992 Election* 
Sinclair Dinnen 
Introduction 
In anticipation of the June 1992 national elections, the Papua New 
Guinean (PNG) Police Commissioner announced that police and 
defence forces would mount a massive joint security operation for the 
duration of the election period. This would be the largest such 
exercise since independence, surpassing that provided for the 1991 
South Pacific Games in Port Moresby and Lae, as well as earlier 
police/ defence force operations on Bougainville (Post-Courier 19 and 
21 /5/92) . Security was to be concentrated in the Highlands Provinces 
which, according to police intelligence reports, were likely to be the 
main trouble spots (The Times 21 /5/ 92). 
The phenomenon of election-related violence is by no means 
confined to PNG. Nor is there any evidence that its incidence in this 
country matches, as yet, the intensity of that experienced in many 
other developing nations (Chandidas 1971 ) .  The comparatively 
short history of elections in PNG nevertheless suggests a 
relationship between violence and political change, whereby 'a 
certain level of violence is expected in conjunction with elections 
(especially after them), whether at national or provincial level' 
(Strathern 1993:51) .  In this respect, the elaborate security operation 
proposed for 1992 caused little surprise. 
Violence occurring in the context of PNG elections must be set 
against the broader context of pervasive concern with what is 
euphemistically referred to as the 'law and order problem' .  A 
crucial dimension of this more diffuse set of concerns (Dinnen 1993) 
* 
Special thanks to Dr Bill Standish, Department of Political and Social 
Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian 
National University. 
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relates to the capacity of the state to respond to escalating levels of 
lawlessness and other perceived challenges to its authority . The 
ongoing Bougainville rebellion, growing violence on the part of 
organised criminal gangs (Harris 1988) ,  militant compensation 
claims against the state by customary landowners, (Strathern 1 993), 
and the waging of tribal warfare in many parts of the Highlands 
provide ample evidence of the extremely tenuous writ of centralised 
authority in PNG and the limited ability of the state to control 
illegal violence . The increasing availability of firearms (home­
made and factory produced ) and rumours of their intended use in the 
elections accentuated these concerns. In 1992, for example, Foreign 
Affairs Minister Sir Michael Somare claimed that police in the 
Highlands had uncovered high powered rifles imported from 
Australia and were concerned that these might be used to intimidate 
voters during the elections (Post-Courier 10 / 2 / 92) . 1 Experience from 
previous elections also confirmed the intense passions aroused on 
such occasions and their potential for generating conflict and 
violence (Iamo et al 1992) . 
In this paper I shall look very general! y at the issue of 
collective violence in the PNG context with particular reference to 
its incidence in the 1992 general elections. The review is nation-wide 
in scope and largely based on newspaper reports, documentation from 
relevant government agencies, and interviews conducted during 
fieldwork in Port Moresby, Southern Highlands and Enga. In the 
first section, I shall look critically at the concept of violence and its 
current usage in PNG. In the second, essentially descriptive section, I 
shall outline the security measures adopted by state authorities 
during the election period and the pattern of violence as reported in 
the media. Drawing on this earlier material, the concluding section 
will provide a broad outline of the principal features and dynamics 
of collective violence in contemporary PNG, within and beyond the 
electoral context. 
1 Bill Standish confirmed that in Simbu Province many such rumours 
accompanied the electiom. One example concerned an MP who alledgedly 
had high-powered automatic Chinese rifles. Those who voted against the 
MP, according to the rumour were likely to be attacked by the weapons, 
which, it was claimed , had been used in a 1990 tribal warfare. The police 
searched but failed to uncover the guns. Such rumours and threats play an 
important role in the mobilisation of votes in the electoral context (Personal 
Communication). 
Violence, Security and the 1992 Election 79 
Violence and elections in Papua New Guinea 
Without becoming entangled in the hermeneutic issues, we can 
tentatively define 'violence' as acts involving the intentional use of 
physical force. Use or threats of physical force, like most other 
forms of social behaviour, usually occur in the furtherance of 
particular objectives. It is the task of the researcher to identify 
these reasons whilst, simultaneously, analysing the perceptions of 
those who challenge the legitimacy of such acts . The labelling of 
behaviour as violent and, hence, illegitimate, will usually be done 
by reference to some preordained code of values or norms. In the 
modern nation state it is usually those definitions contained in state 
law that determine the official legitimacy or otherwise of violent 
behaviour. Legitimacy, in this case, is seen as flowing vertically 
downwards from a central authority. In the case of small-scale 
societies, on the other hand, it has long been recognised that 
legitimacy tends to be widely distributed along horizontal lines. As 
Southall points out: 
Fundamental responsibility for the maintenance of 
society itself is much more widely dispersed throughout 
its varied institutions and its whole population, at 
least, usually, all its adult males, (Southall 1968:167) . 
Whilst the formal status of nation-state was attained in 1975, 
the PNG state remains weak and fragmented. Its lack of internal 
coherence and limited external purchase over the plethora of 
collective entities comprising civil society is widely acknowledged 
(Ashton 1991) and manifests itself in numerous ways. Many of the 
features of the misleadingly termed 'breakdown in law and order' 
are indicative of profound underlying conflicts within and between 
different sources of power dispersed throughout the national 
boundaries.  The extent of this dispersal, particularly of coercive 
power, accentuates the problems of authority for both state and non­
state actors in PNG. Such a situation may be contrasted to the ideal 
of modern statehood, under which the state claims a monopoly over 
coercive powers. 
The phenomenon of tribal fighting in PNG provides a useful 
illustration of behaviour that clearly challenges the state 's  
proclaimed monopoly over violence. In the process, i t  illustrates the 
continuing existence of numerous parochial non-state entities that 
also proclaim a prerogative over coercion. From the viewpoint of the 
state, it is the illegal violence entailed in tribal fighting that 
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constitutes the 'law and order' problem. For the participants, 
however, the fight is perceived as a legitimate mechanism, albeit 
of last resort, for resolving an underlying dispute over land, pigs, an 
earlier killing or whatever (Strathern 1977) . Discussing the results 
of a survey of popular attitudes towards tribal fighting, Mapusia 
found that 'tribal fighting itself was not perceived as an example of 
lawlessness'  but, rather 'was seen as an attempt at solving a 
problem' (Mapusia, 1986:60) . In a similar vein the Clifford Report 
commented: 
Tribal fighting is a response to disorder, to a dispute or a 
breach of a norm not a problem in itself. For participants 
the law and order problem is the offence or dispute, not 
the fighting, (Clifford et al 1984/1:92) .  
Tribal fighting or,  more accurately, tribal warfare (Meggitt 
1977; Reay 1982; Burton 1990) also draws attention to an important 
defining feature of violence in Papua New Guinea-namely, its 
group or collective character. The social organisation of much 
violent crime in western industrialised contexts has led 
criminologists to focus pragmatically on its manifestation in 
individual crimes and criminals and has, consequently, favoured 
behavioural analysis of individual criminal careers (Weiner 1989) . 
This orientation has, to some extent, been reinforced by the 
continuing influence of biological and genetic approaches in the 
study of human behaviour, including violent behaviour (Goldstein 
1986) . In PNG, however, the student of crime is confronted with 
social phenomena that are overwhelmingly collective in character, 
such as those involving tribal warriors or 'rascal' gangs. Whilst the 
line between individual and collective violence remains 
conceptually and operationally ambiguous, these two forms of 
violence generally suggest quite different lines of causal inquiry and 
interactional dynamics.  
There is general agreement that escalating levels of collective 
violence and, in particular, the revival of tribal fighting (Gordon 
1983; Paney 1973),  accompanied the gradual dismantling of the 
former colonial sy stem of decentralised administration and its 
replacement with a highly centralised system of government. In 
social control terms, several observers identify the demise of the 
colonial system of district-level administration as responsible for 
generating a social control vacuum at local level which has, in turn, 
facilitated increasing levels of violence and lawlessness. It is in this 
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context that popular demands are often heard for the return of the 
kiap (district officer) (Post-Courier 13 /8/91) .  
The claim that decentralised state controls were exclusively 
responsible for the temporary colonial peace, however, tends to 
over-emphasise the purchase of the former at the expense of 
informal customary controls. Pax Australiana-which lasted less 
than thirty years in most parts of the Highlands-was not achieved 
through the displacement of informal authority. Given the severely 
limited resources of the colonial administration and the short time 
periods involved, pacification could only have been achieved 
through the active cooperation of customary authorities (Gordon 
and Meggitt 1985) .  How long this peace might have endured had 
independence not arrived in 1975 remains an open question. As the 
Clifford Report said of the colonial period: 
Customary law held sway and only when it failed was 
the kiap involved . .  Papua New Guineans accepted this 
odd system with its ritual and irrelevant sanctions only 
as long as they had to (Clifford et al 1984:112) . 
By the late 1960's and early 1970's an increasing propensity to 
challenge state authority was becoming apparent. The immediate 
context of the contemporary law and order situation is relatively 
well known. The removal of discriminatory legislation (in 
particular, that concerning freedom of movement and alcohol 
consumption), urbanisation, rapid population growth, and a growing 
constituency of marginalised youth provided important  
preconditions for crime and delinquency. Added to this, slow and 
uneven economic development, increasing social disparities, limited 
employment opportunities, and a deteriorating system of 
infrastructural support and delivery of government services have all 
contributed to growing levels of social unrest manifested in, amongst 
other things, escalating lawlessness. 
At another level, tensions between central and local sites of 
power have contributed to the emergence of what some writers 
(Gordon and Meggitt 1985; Strathern 1993) identify as a deepening 
crisis of internal legitimacy in post-colonial Papua New Guinea. 
The weakness of state authority in Papua New Guinea 
simultaneously facilitates violence by and between both non-state 
and state actors (Amnesty International 1990; Robie 1993) .  In the 
former case, the tenuous purchase of centralised authority enhances 
the already considerable autonomy of more parochial sites. In the 
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latter, violence may result from frustrations experienced by state 
actors charged with controlling challenges to state authority but 
who, in practice, lack the necessary operational capacity to do so. 
Similar frustrations may arise from the tensions and contradictions 
inherent in the workings of the different components of the criminal 
justice system. Thus, many PNG police believe their work is 
constantly undermined by the perceived leniency of court sentences, 
as well as by the manifest failure of the Correctional Institutions 
Service (CIS) to provide secure custody. The ineffectiveness of the 
internal police disciplinary procedures, in turn, ensures that officers 
who succumb to the temptation to dispense 'summary justice '  to 
suspects have little fear of official reprisals. 
The problematic character of 'violence' in general, and its 
application within the Melanesian context, is particularly evident 
in the case of election-related violence. Under state law there is no 
criminal offence of 'election violence' per se. Insofar as violent 
behaviour occurring during an election attracts legal sanctions these 
will be for standard criminal offences such as assault, inter-group 
fighting, carrying a weapon and so on. Particular electoral offences 
provided for under the Criminal Code (Chapter 262, Revised Laws) 
and the Organic Law on National Elections tend to deal with non­
violent attempts to subvert the electoral process, although some of 
these might also involve the use or threat of violence, such as Undue 
Influence (S. 102 of the Criminal Code); Interference at Elections 
(S.108 of the Criminal Code); Disorderly Behaviour at Meeting 
(S. 198 of the Organic Law on National Elections) .  As with other 
forms of violent behaviour, an understanding of that occurring in the 
course of elections needs to be situated within its encompassing social 
and cultural contexts (Riches, 1986:vii) .  
First introduced in 1964, the electoral process in Papua New 
Guinea and its host political system have had a relatively short 
period of gestation. The flurry of recent electoral debate and reform 
demonstrates growing official recognition of the need to modify and 
adapt the system as more unforseen difficulties become apparent. As 
with other contemporary state institutions and processes in PNG 
(Larmour, 1992), the social embeddedness of the electoral system 
remains tenuous and its operation susceptible to contention and 
dispute. Far from being displaced or neutralised by the downward 
thrust of central authority, local political traditions have proved 
remarkably resilient and, in many respects, have successfully 
penetrated the state in a reverse process of 'upward colonization'  
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(Gordon and Meggitt 1985:181) .  Standish has recently documented 
the same process in Chimbu Province (Standish 1992). 
Complex processes of socio-cultural integration'can be seen in a 
number of features of contemporary Melanesian political culture. 
Local expectations of the role of political leadership, to take an 
obvious example, diverge in significant respects from those 
embodied in the introduced system. Standish has commented that in 
the Highlands ' [a] Member is expected to be a delegate, rather than 
a representative with freedom of political judgement' and, further, 
that 'local kinship loyalties preclude the transfer of much trust to 
the member of a potentially (or actually) hostile lain' (Standish 
1983 :117) .  Whereas a strong party system is a defining feature of the 
Westminster model, it is well established that party affiliation 
plays little part in the decisions of the vast majority of voters in 
Papua New Guinea (Oliver 1989) .  The persistence of tribal and clan 
allegiances as factors influencing voter behaviour has also been 
noted by many commentators. In the study cited above, Standish 
remarked that 'elections are contests between the clans and tribes, a 
poorly sublimated manifestation of traditional rivalries' (Standish 
1983:1 17) .  Strathem (1993) has argued further that the local power 
bases of Highlands politicians have, in fact, become progressively 
more tribalised in recent years.  According to May, a maj or 
consequence of this form of electoral loyalties is that: 
It ensures the interplay of traditional and modern 
politics, with the implications this has for the 
accumulation and distribution of wealth and influence 
for political purposes, the manipulation of kastom to 
political ends, and occasionally the use of violence. 
(May 1982:645) 
The intensely competitive character of PNG elections is 
evidence of the high levels of expectation on the part of both 
candidates and supporters and the vital stakes at issue in the 
electoral contest. This, in turn, is evidence of the more general 
processes of interaction referred to above. Membership of the 
National Parliament provides access to the funds and resources 
essential for securing and promoting a member's local power base, as 
well as advancing his own material position. Even more spectacular 
powers of patronage and opportunities for self-enrichment are 
associated with ministerial office .  Thus, the p ost-election 
competition for ministries has become as intense as, if not more than, 
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the initial election contest itself. As well as structuring the 
relationship between national parliamentarians and their electoral 
constituents, patronage has increasingly come to shape relations 
between politicians at national and provincial levels .  Where 
conflicts and disputes arise in this context, they are likely to be 
reproduced at different levels of the political system, thereby 
adding to their overall intensity and propensity to violence. 
In practice, a member's local power base bears little relation to 
constituency boundaries and is more likely to be built around 
extensive kinship and patronage networks. As some early observers 
of PNG's elections put it: 
In many electorates nearly all the people linked by 
village residence, clan or language voted for one 
candidate . . .  The election was then basically a test of the 
size of inter-electorate groups and not concerned with 
comparing the policies or qualities of the different 
candidates. (Griffin, Nelson and Firth 1979: 133) 
The enduring practice of granting national parliamentarians 
access to a variety of discretionary funds (the so-called 'slush 
funds'), for sponsoring local development projects, reinforces the 
politics of patronage. The observations of Gordon and Meggitt in 
Enga appear to have resonance throughout the Highlands: 
Government is seen not as a mechanism for development 
but as an instrument to be used to establish and extend 
patronage ties (Gordon and Meggitt 1985 :158) .  
The highly localised orientation of national politicians 
inevitably departs from official perceptions of the government 
process and is also likely to generate considerable tension at the 
local level. As Strathern points out, this modus operandi undermines 
official processes of government, whilst simultaneously encouraging 
'the factionalization of relationships between groups within local 
electorates'  (Strathern 1 993:46) which may, in turn, facilitate 
conflict and violence. Where the constituency units are smallest, as 
in the case of provincial assembly elections, competition between 
candidates and their supporters tends to be in the form of head-on 
clan and tribal confrontations . In larger constituency units, as in 
national elections, deliberate (or believed to be deliberate) 'vote 
splitting' within tribes and clans inevitably results . This process of 
intra-group fragmentation has been identified by several observers 
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a s  a major precipitating factor underlying contemporary patterns of 
collective violence in the electoral context. 2 
These processes shaping competition for political office are 
illustrated in a number of familiar features of post-independence 
elections and parliamentary politics in Papua New Guinea.  They 
include: the high number of candidates contesting seats, the small 
margin of votes polled by successful candidates, 3 the frequency of 
disputed returns, the absence of election issues, the growing number 
of Independents, and the willingness of elected members to switch 
party allegiances in order to secure access to power (Oliver 1989) .  In 
his review of the 1987 elections, Saffu quotes approvingly from the 
work of another political scientist who said that in many 
contemporary post-colonial situations 'elections have become the 
alchemy that turns base metal into gold' (Saffu 1988:255) .  Such an 
analogy is particularly apt in PNG at a time of intensive and 
lucrative mineral exploitation which, in turn, amplifies 
opportunities for political patronage. Given the spiralling levels of 
expectation raised in the electoral context, it is hardly surprising 
that the disappointment of losing candidates and their supporters 
can quickly turn to conflict and violence. 
How we perceive the dynamics and direction of the evolving 
political process in Papua New Guinea will clearly influence the 
way we view and respond to the phenomenon of election-related 
violence. For some, the disorderly struggle for political power is 
indicative of the lack of local understanding of the introduced 
p olitical system and the inadequacy of administrative and 
logistical support (Smith 1960) . For others it illustrates the absence 
of alternative means of material advancement. Some even see it as 
signalling the vigour of the democratic process itself. Thus, the 
claim in a local newspaper that: 
The potential threat of election violence, according to 
authorities, is an indication that the people of PNG 
have made great progress since independence and are 
2 Standish claims that this process of ' splitting' has been the cause of most 
post-election violence in Simbu Province in recent years. In this situation, 
people are blaming members of their own tribe/clan for the loss of their 
own preferred candidate (Personal Communication) . 
3 52 members with less than 20 percent of the vote and only seven gaining 
over 50 percent. 
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conscious of their political rights, (P o s t - C o u r i e r  
19/5/92). 
The weight of evidence reviewed in this paper suggests a more 
complex diagnosis. At one level, many cases of contemporary 
election-related violence in PNG stem from the continuation of long­
standing forms of inter-group (sometimes intra-group) competition 
whose genesis lies beyond the electoral context .  From this ' 
viewpoint, it is not the election process per se that generates conflict 
and violence and our focus turns, instead, to the political and socio­
cultural configurations of Melanesian social organisations . The 
election, in such a situation, serves essentially to accentuate 
underlying competition and tensions existing within and between 
such entities. At a more general level, such conflicts are 
symptomatic of the deeply contested character of ongoing processes 
of integration between local-level political organisation and more 
encompassing national, regional and provincial p olitie s .  
Ultimately, our study o f  contemporary conflicts in Papua New 
Guinea, whether election-related or otherwise, must be able to 
accommodate ' fine-grained analysis of local cultural and 
sociological processes, on the one hand, and critical analysis of 
regional and state-level sociopolitical and economic processes, on 
the other (Knauft, 1990:291) .  
The 1992 elections 
Before looking at the data from the 1992 elections, it is useful to 
distinguish between incidents occurring at different stages of the 
electoral process. Conflict may occur prior or subsequent to voting, as 
well as during the voting process itself. For the purpose of the 
following review, we shall distinguish between three broad stages : 
Violence occurring in the lead up to the election, ie . in the 
nomination period and during pre-polling electioneering; 
Violence occurring during the election period, ie. during 
polling and counting; 
Violence occurring after polling, ie. in the context of 
disputed returns, failure to pay electoral officials and so on. 
In this context, it is also useful to distinguish between two broad 
categories of factors that mC"�Y precipitate election-related violence. 
First, there are those which relate to ongoing local power struggles 
that may manifest themselves in election-related violence but 
whose causes lie beyond the immediate electoral context. Examples 
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would include tribal and ethnic disputes that pre-date, and may 
well post-date, the immediate election period. Second, there are 
those precipitating factors relating directly to the administrative 
conduct of the election. Examples here include violence related to 
failure to supply sufficient numbers of ballot papers, deficiencies in 
the common and supplementary rolls, allegations of malpractice 
against electoral officials4 inadequate security etc. In practice there 
will inevitably be overlap between categories-as in the case of 
conflict generated by allegations of malpractice against officials on 
the grounds of their tribal or clan allegiances. The distinction may 
nevertheless be of use in contemplating reforms. Thus, problems in 
the administration of elections that contribute to violent responses 
may be relatively straightforward to resolve through more rigorous 
preparation, planning, resourcing or procedural reform. Precipitating 
factors related to more profound issues of local social and political 
organisation will clearly require quite different courses of remedial 
action. 
( i) Security arrangements 
Security arrangements for the 1 992 elections were elaborate, 
involving large numbers of police and defence force personnel, and 
planning began many months prior to the actual conduct of the 
election between 13 and 27 June. In order to reduce the prospect of 
disruptions it was decided to hold one-day polling in all Highlands 
provinces, except Eastern Highlands, as well as in the Lae 
Metropolitan area and the National Capital District. Such an 
operation required a high degree of planning, mobility and 
coordination between electoral officials and security personnel. An 
initial planning meeting in 1991 between the police and Electoral 
Commission was followed by regular meetings between the principal 
institutional actors in different parts of the country. Thus, in 
February 1992 a team of senior defence force officers visited Western 
Highlands, Enga and Southern Highlands and were briefed by the 
respective provincial secretaries on their preparations and about 
potential trouble spots (Post-Courier 24/2/92). In the same month 
regional police commanders, senior defence force officers and 
4 Standish advances the view that there is often a convenient scapegoating 
mechanism at work in this respect. It is easier to blame and harass a small 
group of electoral officials than to fight a tribal/ clan enemy or precipitate 
a fight within the tribe/ clan. In a sense blaming officials constitutes a face­
saving safety value (Personal Communication) .  
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officials from the Electoral Commission met in Goroka to discuss 
preparations for the June elections (ibid) .  In March the Police 
Minister announced the establishment of a police intelligence unit to 
gather and collate information on individuals, including candidates, 
expected to cause problems during the election (Po s t- C o u rier  
1 1 /3/92). Provincial police commanders, senior defence force officers 
and provincial returning officers from the Highlands region met 
with the Acting Police Commissioner in Mount Hagen in May to 
finalise operational plans for the elections (Pos t-Cou rier 5 I 5 /92) .  
Similar meetings were held in the other three regions. 
Preparatory actions included pre-emptive police operations 
designed to detect and confiscate illegally held weapons and close 
down black market liquor outlets, as well as the announcement of 
liquor bans for the duration of the elections in different provinces. In 
the National Capital District, for example, police raided a number 
of settlements in May confiscating a wide range of weapons, 
including home-made and factory-made guns, as well as suspected 
stolen property (Post-Courier 8/5 /92).  Some Highlands Provincial 
Police Commanders authorised pre-emptive raids against suspect 
villages (as in Enga) whereas others did not (as in the Southern 
Highlands), preferring roadblocks as a means for detecting and 
confiscating weapons and alcohol. In June, for example, it was 
reported that police manning roadblocks in the Southern Highlands 
had confiscated 10 factory-made guns, as well as home-made guns 
and ammunition (Pos t-Courier 1 7  /6/92) . The same report said that 
police in the Western Highlands had confiscated three pistols from 
two intending candidates at a roadblock, whilst in Enga police raids 
had netted seven factory-made guns, many home-made guns and a 
large quantity of ammunition. 
In April, Electoral Commissioner Mr. Reuben Kaiulo told all 
provincial secretaries that a liquor ban was essential in order to 
minimise disruptions at the forthcoming elections. In his view: 
The increase in the number of home-made and factory­
made firearms, some of which are high powered 
automatics, as well as the fact that the Constabulary's 
police strength will be taxed to the limit, should be 
seriously considered. (Post-Courier 22/ 4/92) 
Whilst some Highlands provinces such as Enga and Chimbu 
already had liquor bans in force, other provinces subsequently 
introduced controls, either bans or restrictions on trading, for the 
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duration o f  the election period (Post-Courier 3 / 6 /  and 5 /6/92). The 
association between alcohol and violence also led to restrictions 
being imposed by provincial authorities in other regions, including 
Morobe (Post-Courier 10/6/92), Central, Gulf (Post-Courier 16/6/92) 
and the National Capital District (Pos t-Courier 17 /6/92). 
Concern with tribal fighting led to the declaration of the entire 
Simbu Province as a fighting zone under the Inter-Group Fighting 
Act (Chapter No. 344 of the Revised Laws). Explaining this action, 
the Provincial Secretary said the decision was made 'in 
anticipation of any election-related violence ' .  (Pos t - C o u r ier  
10/6/92) .  The Simbu Provincial Government presented the police 
with 24 pump action shotguns and four 22 calibre pistols worth a 
total of K7,000 to assist in policing the election (ibid) .  Bans were 
placed on the holding of political rallies and other forms of 
campaigning within the boundaries of Kundiawa town. Similar 
restrictions-with or without legal authority-were introduced 
elsewhere in the Highlands Region. The Provincial Police 
Commander in the Southern Highlands, for example, spoke of a 
successful 'voluntary' curfew applied in Mendi during polling 
between 28-30 June whereby people were told to stay off the streets 
between 6pm and and 6am (Interview - 6/7 /92).5 Public displays of 
strength by police and defence force personnel were carefully staged 
to ensure maximum public awareness of the state's intention to deal 
promptly with electoral disruptions, using force where necessary. 
Thus, on Saturday June 13 more than 1,300 policeman paraded at the 
Pope John Paul Oval in Mount Hagen and were joined by 50 soldiers 
who had marched from Kimininga police barracks (Pos t-Courier 
16/6/ 1992). 
Resort to public displays of strength by the security forces and 
the subsequent scale and character of the joint security operation 
should be understood against the background of severely depleted 
police resources throughout the country. For many years the police 
have been calling for an expanded force to meet the demands of a 
growing population and other factors seen as contributing to rising 
crime rates. In July 1991, for example, Police Commissioner Ila Geno 
revealed that whereas at Independence in 1975 the ratio of police to 
public was 1 :520, it had since fallen to 1 :800 (Pos t - C o u r i e r  
1 1 / 7  / 1991 ) .  Current police data suggests a particular manpower 
5 According to Standish, a similar 'unofficial curfew' was imposed by police 
in Kundiawa, simbu Province (Personal Communication) .  
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shortage in the Highlands region, where concern with violence has 
been especially high. 
On May 20 the Police Commissioner publicly announced details 
of the massive nation-wide security operation, code-named Natel 
92, planned for the elections (Times 2 1 / 5 / 1992; Pos t -Cou r ier  
21 /5/92). Over 2,500 personnel from both police and defence force 
were to be involved. Of these 2,000 would be police of whom 1,500 
would be deployed in the Highlands Region where most trouble was 
anticipated. Subsequent reports indicated that the number of police 
actually deployed in the Highlands was between 1 ,300 (Pos t ­
Courier 17 /6/92) and 1,400 (Police Debrief Document dated August 
19, 1992). In addition, 75 members of a Police Rapid Response Unit 
were already on the ground guarding strategic resource developments 
including those at Yagifu, South East Gobe, Porgera, Mount Kare, 
and the Hides gas fields (Post-Courier 17 / 6/92) .  The objectives of 
the police operation were to ensure 'a smooth and trouble free 
election' and involved: 
(a) the guarding of polling stations; 
(b) the security of ballot boxes; 
(c) the security of polling officials; 
( d) the controlling of traffic; 
(e) assisting polling teams; 
(f) the prevention and detection of election offences; and 
(g) the general maintenance of law and order. 
Mr. Geno put the estimated cost of the police involvement at K2 
million. The highly centralised character of the security operation 
was evident in the operational arrangements. Overall Commander 
for Operation Natel 92 was Deputy Commissioner and Chief of 
Operations Bob Nenta, assisted by Chief Superintendent Albert 
Mula in his capacity as Police/ Electoral Commission Co-ordinator 
for the election. The five Divisional Commanders (Border, Central, 
Highlands, Coastal, and Islands) were in charge of all police 
operations in their divisions and were to report daily to the overall 
commander. The operation was to be conducted in two phases. Phase 
one covered the polling period from Saturday 13 June to Saturday 27 
June 1992. Phase two covered the counting period from Saturday 27 
June to Saturday 4 July 1992. 
The role of the Defence F1rce was authorised under Section 23 of 
the Defence Act (Chapter 74 of the Revised Laws) which provides 
for the force to assist in 'Service to the Public' under the following 
circumstances: 
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( 1 )  If the Minister thinks that it is in the public interest 
to do so, he may authorize any part of the Defence Force 
to perform any public service within or outside the 
country that is capable of being performed by the 
Defence Force on such conditions (including conditions as 
to payment) as he determines .  
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I t  was envisaged that the Defence Force would perform a 
supporting role to the police in maintaining law and order during the 
election. The latter would provide the frontline security whereas 
the former would: 
( a )  assist police in enforcing curfews; 
(b) provide backup for police in maintaining control points such 
as road blocks; 
( c) show a PNGDF presence by conducting highway patrols and 
moving around different districts; 
( e) provide radio communication for polling teams in remote 
areas .  
The auxiliary and deterrent character of  the defence force 
involvement was stressed in discussions with both the Provincial 
Police Commander for the Southern Highlands (Interview - 6 / 7  /92) 
and the Wabag Station Commander in Enga (Interview - 7 /7 /92). 
High mobility was an essential component of the display of strength 
given the relatively small number of defence force personnel 
involved. The defence force Commander announced in June that only 
40 soldiers would be deployed in each of the four Highlands 
provinces (Post-Courier 10/6/92). A further 200 would be on standby 
at Taurama barracks in Port Moresby to be deployed if required .  
Throughout the operation control of  the soldiers remained with the 
defence command (Pos t-Courier 22/ 4 / 92) .  Traditional rivalries 
between the two principal security agencies-the police and defence 
force-emerged in the former' s post-election debriefing document. 
Speaking about the involvement of the defence force, the Deputy 
Police Commissioner claimed that ' their role was not clearly 
defined'  and 'at times they operated in isolation' (Police Debrief 
1992: 12) .  He recommended against any future joint operations (ibid) .  
( i i )  Pre-polling violence 
In general, there were few reported incidents of violence occurring 
prior to polling. An election rally in Mendi, Southern Highlands 
Province, where three candidates simultaneously nominated for the 
Imbonggu seat, degenerated into fighting as rival supporters clashed 
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(Times 23/4/92; Post-Courier 23/4/92) . The Post-Courier reported a 
'riot' involving 15,000 supporters. The Times estimated the crowd at 
a more conservative, but still substantial, 9,000. The former also 
reported hospital authorities in Mendi confirming that nine people 
were treated for injuries sustained in the disturbance . The latter 
reported one casualty and said that damage to property was limited 
to a shop owned by one of the nominating candidates. The situation 
appears to have been inflamed by some abusive verbal exchanges 
between the candidates-a not uncommon feature of political rallies 
in the Highlands (Standish, 1983)-and the proximity of large 
numbers of excited rival supporters. In addition, the number of police 
responding from the adjoining Mendi police station was extremely 
small-estimated by The Times as 12. The riot squad, which would 
normally have dealt with such a situation, was in Mount Hagen 
undergoing training. The Pos t-Courier reported Highlands Division 
Commander Bunu Katusele as saying that similar fighting had 
occurred in Kundiawa, Chimbu Province, on April 21 .6 
In May, just over a month prior to polling, supporters of former 
M.P.  Gerard Sigulogo threatened disruptions in Kavieng, New 
Ireland Province, if their candidate was not allowed to contest the 
June elections (Pos t-Courier 5 I 5 /92) .  Mr. Sigulogo had previously 
been found guilty of misconduct in office by a Leadership Tribunal in 
1990 and was subsequently dismissed from his Kavieng seat and 
barred from holding office for a three-year period expiring in March 
1993. Despite this, he nominated for the 1992 elections in April . The 
Chief Justice of Papua New Guinea, Sir Buri Kidu, made clear that a 
person barred from public office after a Leadership Tribunal hearing 
was ineligible to seek public office d uring the period of the ban 
(Pos t-Courier 1 / 5 / 92) .  Subsequently the Electoral Commission 
removed Mr. Sigulogo 's  name from the list of candidates .  The 
circumstances in which this decision was belatedly taken 
immediately aroused the wrath of the latter's supporters . In a letter 
to the Electoral Commissioner, the New Ireland Administrative 
Secretary wrote that: 
Our (electoral) officials are being targeted as well as 
being implicated as having conspired with the sitting 
6 According to Standish there was violence in Kundiawa on 3/6/92 arising 
from street campaigning and a candidate's vehicle was stoned in a village 
on 5/6 /92. These incidents were cited as the reason for the subsequent ban 
on campaigning within Kundiawa (Personal Communication). 
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Member and other intending candidates resulting in Mr. 
Sigulogo's termination from contesting .  Both the 
provincial returning officer and the returning officer for 
Kavieng Open are in fear for their safety as they have 
been told in no uncertain terms that if Sigulogo is not 
allowed to contest the supporters will attack the 
officials. (Pos t-Courier 5/5/92) 
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The threats o f  violence d o  not appear to have been fulfilled in 
this instance but once again attest to the intensity of local rivalries 
aroused by the electoral process. 
A few days prior to polling the media reported clashes between 
rival supporters in New Ireland. Nineteen people were reportedly 
arrested for an earlier fight between supporters of the People 's 
Progress Party (PPP) and Pangu Party on June 6. Of the 14 people 
arrested, ten were charged with fighting and creating disturbances 
and four with assault. A later incident involved rival supporters 
attending a rally at Sohun village in the Namatanai district and 
the Post-Courier reported 12 serious injuries and claimed that police 
reinforcements had to be brought in from Kavieng (Post-Courier 
10/6/92) . The same report mentioned a fight between two opposing 
groups of supporters on the Duke of York Islands in the Kokopo 
electorate in East New Britain province. Again, high emotions, the 
proximity of opposing supporters and, initially at any rate, the 
absence of security personnel appear to have contributed to these 
incidents. 
(iii) Polling violence 
The first formally reported incident of polling-related violence 
occurred in the Western Highlands, when a candidate for the 
Tambul-Nebilyer seat and some of his scrutineers allegedly 
smashed open four ballot boxes scattering the enclosed ballot papers 
(Post-Courier 19 /6/92). The police had not established any grounds 
for the suspicions of the candidate and his scrutineers in respect of 
the particular boxes . The candidate and two others were 
subsequently charged with unlawfully opening and destroying ballot 
boxes (Pos t-Courier 22/ 6 / 92) .  The Chimbu police commander 
reported that three candidates had been charged in connection with 
alleged threatening behaviour and assault. At the same time the 
Enga police were investigating an incident in which an armed gang 
held up security guards at Kandep and made off with more than 
8000 unmarked ballot papers. 
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On June 22, eighteen ballot boxes containing votes from the 
Lumusa area in Western Highlands were burnt by villagers 
allegedly protesting over official failure to meet their demands for 
an electoral b oundary change (Pos t - C o u r i e r  23 / 6 / 92) . In 
Wapenamanda, Enga province, disgruntled supporters of one 
candidate smashed open three ballot boxes and emptied their 
contents in front of the Wapenamanda government station (ibid) .  
According to the Enga Provincial Police Commander the boxes had 
just arrived after polling was completed when a truck full of 
supporters arrived and broke three open. The same report mentioned 
the arrest of the sitting member for Kompiam-Ambum in Enga for 
allegedly breaking open four ballot boxes from his own electorate. 
An assault on a policeman accompanying polling officials was also 
reported at Buna village in the West Sepik province, while fighting 
between supporters at a polling booth was reported in the Kubalia 
area of the East Sepik. According to police, who claimed fourteen 
arrests, the Buna villagers were apparently angry over the arrest of 
a fellow villager for another election-related incident. In Kubalia a 
further eleven people were arrested and charged with fighting 
( ib id ) .  
The first reported fatality occurred on June 29  after a man was 
shot in a confrontation between supporters and police at the Walium 
government station in Madang province (Pos t-Courier 1 / 7  / 92) .  
According to a subsequent report by the Police Commissioner, the 
incident began when scrutineers questioned the presiding officer as to 
why the seal on one of the uncounted ballot boxes appeared to have 
been tampered with (Pos t-Courier 3 / 7  /92). Initial discontent spread 
when the Electoral Commission refused to suspend counting and led 
to the fatal confrontation between police reinforcements and angry 
supporters armed with sticks and iron bars . Commissioner Geno said 
that 'police were forced to use tear gas and gunfire to control the 
situation and to protect themselves, officials and property' (ibid) .  In 
addition to the deceased, two other supporters reportedly required 
medical treatment. 
Perhaps the most spectacular reported incident of poll related 
violence was the hijacking of ballot boxes containing votes cast from 
the Komo-Margarima seat in the Southern Highlands (Pos t-Courier 
1 / 7  /92) . According to newspaper reports, 28 boxes being transported 
under escort from Tari to Mendi on June 26 were intercepted by an 
armed gang near Nipa. Twenty one of the boxes were totally 
destroyed, while seven were returned after having been tampered 
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with. In their report t o  the Electoral Commission the Komo­
Margarima returning officer and his assistant claimed that the 
incident was 'politically motivated'  and made allegations of 
improper conduct against the security forces. On the latter charge, 
the electoral officials said that it had been previously arranged to 
airlift the boxes from Tari to Mendi. Instead they were transported 
by road 'in absolute defiance of explicit instructions from both the 
District Co-ordinator . . .  and acting police station commander (Tari) 
at the relevant time' (ibid). They further claimed that the police 
escort from Mount Hagen broke into the Plant and Transport Board 
yard in Tari and removed the truck with the boxes to drive it to 
Mendi .  Further criticism was directed at the police role in this 
incident by the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Local Government 
and District Administration Branch of the Department of the 
Southern Highlands Province who commented that :  ' (i)t is 
unbelievable when you see people removing 28 ballot boxes in front 
of 16 policemen' (Report to the Electoral Commissioner, 8 / 7  /92). 
(iv) Pos t-polling violence 
Shortly after polling was completed fighting was reported between 
supporters of different candidates at the Kohan plantation on the 
border of the Dei and North Waghi Open Electorates in the Western 
Highlands (Pos t-Courier 1 / 7  /92). At about the same time, it was 
reported that part of a village outside Kundiawa in Chimbu 
province had been set on fire in an election related incident? A 
senior government official in Kundiawa was quoted as claiming that 
the arson was the work of supporters of a number of candidates for 
the Sinasina/Yonggamugl electorate who were angry that villagers 
had supported ano ther candidate (Pos t -Cou rier  2 / 7  / 92) .  A 
newspaper report claimed that two tea factories and several bridges 
along the Hagen-Baiyer road in the Western Highlands had been 
destroyed by supporters of losing candidates (Post-Courier 3/7  /92) 
but this was subsequently denied in a later report (Post-Courier 
6/7 /92) which confined the damage to an office complex and two 
vehicles belonging to one of the tea estates. 
Threats of violence by losing candidates and their supporters 
consumed much police time in the immediate post-polling period. 
The Coastal Divisional commander reported that rumours of 
7 Standish reported a number of instances in Simbu where police/defence 
force deliberately burnt houses to punish, or 'teach a lesson' ('mekim save') 
to, angry supporters of losing candidates (Personal Communication). 
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possible trouble were rife in Lae and that police were stepping up 
security measures in anticipation (Post-Courier 6/7  /92) . At the same 
time, police in Wewak, East Sepik, were guarding key installations 
and increasing patrols after threats by losing candidates to 
telephone services, water and power supplies (ibid ) .  In Madang, 
police responded to threats by guarding commercial property 
belonging to the newly elected members for the provincial and open 
seats respectively. Three further fatalities were reported in the 
Western Highlands ( Po s t - C o u r i e r  7 / 7  / 92) .  In the Western 
Highlands, two men were apparently killed in election related 
group fights-one in the Nebilyer area and the other in the Dei 
Council area-while a third was reportedly killed in a drunken 
brawl at Kudjip in what police believed was a celebration of an 
election win. 
Discontent with the conduct of the election in the National 
Capital District (NCO) (Pos t -Courier 26 /6/92) led to initial calls 
by some candidates for a recount (Post-Courier 1 / 7  /92) followed by 
more strident demands for fresh elections (Post-Courier 3 / 7  / 92) .  
Police issued a general warning against public demonstrations 
following information that losing candidates and their supporters in 
the NCO were planning to stage mass demonstrations against 
alleged electoral malpractice (Pos t-Courier 8 / 7  / 92; Times 9 / 7  / 92) .  
As this warning was issued, police reinforcements moved into the 
Dei area of the Western Highlands amidst fears of a major fight 
between opposing clans following earlier election related violence in 
the area (ibid) .  In Mount Hagen in the Western Highlands threats 
of violence by losing candidates and supporters resulted in restricted 
trading hours over a two week period and the business community 
complained of significant loss of revenue (ibid) .  According to the 
Western Highlands Chamber of Commerce over K200,000 in lost 
sales was attributable to closures resulting from threats of violence. 
The senior judiciary reiterated earlier statements by the police and 
others that disgruntled candidates should resort to the courts for 
redress. The Chief Justice told the press that: 
Those who are aggrieved by the conduct or the outcome 
of the 1992 national elections in any way may petition 
the National Court for remedy. (ibid) 
The Enga Provincial Police Commander's vehicle was damaged 
when he drove into a fight between supporters of two rival 
candidates at Wapenamanda (Pos t-Courier 9 /7 /92) .  Meanwhile 
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another senior Enga police officer described the post-polling 
atmosphere in Wabag as 'explosive' owing to the Electoral 
Commission's failure to pay election officials, adding that 'each 
day we are almost having a riot here in Wabag town (sic)' (ibid). At 
the same time reports reaching the Western Highlands Provincial 
Office in Mount Hagen revealed that many teachers who had 
assisted with polling had been threatened and prevented from going 
to work (Pos t-Courier 10/ 7 /92). As a result several community 
schools had yet to resume their third term classes. Group fighting 
was reported in the Southern Highlands after the announcement of 
the election results (Times 16/ 7  /92). 
During the frenetic 'numbers game' in the immediate post­
election process of government formation, the Police Commissioner 
warned of threats against newly elected independent members to 
'persuade' them to join particular factions or parties (Pos t-Courier 
13/7 /92). Former Attorney-General Bernard Narokobi subsequently 
called for a commission of inquiry into such threats (Pos t-Courier 
4/8/92). When it was eventually announced on July 15 that Paias 
Wingti would be the new prime minister, boisterous crowd behaviour 
occurred in both Mount Hagen and Mendi. Although business 
premises were closed all day in both towns, little actual violence 
appears to have taken place (Post-Courier 17 /7 /92) . 
On 27 July a peace agreement was signed by four warring clans in 
the Dei Council area in Western Highlands (Post-Courier 28/ 7  /92). 
The agreement followed an election-related incident in which three 
men were killed during fighting between the four clans (ibid) .  A 
spokesperson for the Department of Western Highlands said that if 
the agreement was breached, the Department would recommend 
that Dei be declared a fighting zone for an indefinite period and 
that all government services be withdrawn. In August it was 
reported that no government services had actually been delivered in 
the Kol district of the Jimi area of Western Highlands since the end 
of vote counting in June (Post-Courier 28/8/92). Most government 
workers had apparently fled because of continuing threats by 
disgruntled supporters of losing candidates (ibid). A revival of the 
previously mentioned group fight that originated in a drunken 
celebration of the election results in the Kudjip area of the Western 
Highlands was reported in September (Pos t-Courier 1 /9 / 92) .  
According to the report, two further fatalities occurred in late 
August in the fight between the two clans (ibid) . The same report 
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referred to tension persisting between Baiyer river clans in the 
Western Highlands over an earlier election related shooting. 
Election-related violence was still being reported as late as 
October, almost four months after polling was completed. The 
Highlands Divisional Police Commander claimed that the Kagua 
district of the Southern Highlands had turned into 'wild west' 
country since trouble flared in the aftermath of the June elections 
(Pos t -Cou rier 7 / 1 0/ 92) .  He said that the problem began with 
violence between supporters of both the winning and losing 
candidates but that criminals had since taken advantage of the 
general breakdown in law and order. The new member for the Kagua 
Erave seat contended, in turn, that the police were themselves 
partly to blame (Post-Courier 8/10/92) . He claimed that destruction 
of property during special police operations in several villages and 
the very small number of police currently stationed in the area 
contributed to lawlessness (ibid) . The police had the final word in 
the newspapers when the Southern Highlands Provincial Police 
Commander blamed the new member for not having done anything to 
resolve the conflicts he and his opponents created during the 
election (Post-Courier 20/ 10/92). 
Problems associated with the non-payment of electoral officials 
and other administrative matters continued to surface many months 
after the election had been declared. In December, for example, the 
Provincial Electoral Officer in Wewak, East Sepik Province, was 
reported as saying that disgruntled candidates and electoral 
officials had threatened him and his officers over the issue of 
payment and reimbursement of nomination fees (Pos t-Courier 
21 / 12/92). These difficulties, in fact, continued into 1993 with many 
angry scenes outside the Electoral Commission HQ in Boroko, Port 
Moresby. 
Discussion 
Official post-election evaluations emphasised the peaceful manner 
in which the 1992 national elections were conducted. Whilst it is not 
possible to quantify the actual extent of violence with any degree of 
accuracy, secondary evidence suggests an altogether less tranquil 
picture. Associated acts of interpersonal violence (ranging from 
verbal threats to actual killings) and extensive damage to property 
were reported at various times in different locations before, during 
and after the 1992 elections. As anticipated, most reported incidents 
occurred in the five Highlands Provinces. The majority of these took 
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place after polling had been completed, although some serious 
incidents-such as the alleged hijacking of ballot boxes in the 
Komo-Margarima seat-also occurred during the polling phase. 
Reports of election-related violence continued to be heard for many 
months after the formal electoral process had been completed. 
The seemingly complacent tone of official evaluations appears 
to be a result of genuine surprise (and relief) that the scale of 
disorder was not worse, rather than a deliberate attempt to 
mislead.  National elections inevitably attract considerable 
international interest and their peaceful conduct provides important 
'signs of good conduct to the outside world' (Hermet et al, 1978: 15) .  
Government sensitivity over PNG's overseas image and, in 
particular, its impact on potential investors has become a recurring 
theme in official law and order discourse. The conduct of peaceful 
elections has become an important test of government control, as well 
as providing broader confirmation of the legitimacy of the 
government process. 
The deterrent impact of the massive security operation is 
difficult to evaluate. Its highly transient character and the 
circumstances of some reported incidents (ie. the Mendi 'riots' and 
Komo-Margarima case) suggest that it may have been less decisive 
in practice than its architects would concede.  The carefully 
orchestrated displays of (essentially militaristic ) strength by 
security forces and warnings of swift retribution for disruptive 
elements belie the actual capacity of the PNG state to deal with 
lawlessness on any significant scale. In the absence of actual 
capacity, the appearance of such capacity would, hopefully, 
achieve the same result. As G riffin has remarked in the 
Bougainville context, ' (t)he Papua New Guinea state is too weak for 
successful coercion' (Griffin, 1990:14) . In this respect, the weakness of 
state authority has contributed to the notable gap between rhetoric 
and reality characterising official law and order discourse in the 
post-Independence period. 
The continuing jostling for position between (and within) state 
authorities and the array of more parochial sites of power provides 
the broader context of such representations. The derogatory remarks 
of the Highlands Divisional Commander comparing the Kagua 
district of the Southern Highlands with the American 'wild west' 
may provide a more appropriate analogy than their initial 
delivery suggests. The frontier experience in both the United States 
and Australia was similarly marked by the fragmentation of 
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authority, relative autonomy of actors (state and non-state) and 
high levels of inter-personal violence (Reynolds, 1987). 
Resort to collective violence as a means of resolving grievances 
remains deeply embedded within the socio-cultural traditions of 
many Melanesian societies .  This is particularly so in the 
Highlands, although it should also be noted that other forms of 
violence played a significant role in many lowland communities 
(Knauft, 1985) .  In their 1985 report on 'law and order' in Enga, 
Wormsley and Toke remarked that 'Violence is often a conscious 
political strategy for achieving traditional political goals '  
(Wormsley and Toke, 1985:Appendix 1 : 18) .  Reconstructions of  pre­
colonial history attest to the prevalence of violence as a political 
tactic in these societies ( Berndt, 1962; Hallpike, 1977; Meggitt, 
1977) . Likewise, whilst popular acceptance of the rule of the kiap 
appears to have contributed to the suppression of much violence 
during the short colonial history, the resurgence of tribal fighting 
and 'payback' since the early 1970s indicates the persistence of such 
traditions (Gordon, 1983; Gordon and Meggitt, 1985) .  That is not, of 
course, to suggest that the explanation of group violence in the 
Highlands-whether in the context of elections or otherwise-can 
be reduced to one of cultural predisposition. 
Twenty years ago Standish analysed the resurgence of tribal 
fighting during self-government in terms of the convergence of 
traditions of collective violence, freed from the suppressive effects 
of colonial rule, and the social and political insecurity generated by 
a rapid and traumatic process of decolonisation (Standish, 1973). In 
the nineteen years since independence the social and economic 
stresses that have contributed to the emergence of serious ' law and 
order problems' in the late 1960's and early 1970's-ranging from 
urb an 'rascalism ' to trib al  fighting-have multiplied and 
intensified. The precipitating factors identified earlier have added 
to the already considerable pressures upon both formal and informal 
processes of social control. 
For purposes of this paper, the significance of contemporary 
elections is their potential for magnifying conflicts associated with 
ongoing processes of political change. These processes, in turn, 
involve the, at times volatile, interaction between introduced and 
indigenous political traditions . As Standish and others have 
argued, introduced insti tutions and processes have become 
increasingly appropriated and transformed by existing local 
political cultures. The inherently competitive social organisation of 
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Highlands societies, for instance, as embodied in patterns o f  socio­
political leadership, competitive exchange practices, and intense 
status rivalries (Feil, 1987), provides the cultural milieu into which 
the introduced processes have been absorbed and transformed. The 
continuing role of violence illustrates the highly aggressive nature 
of much of this competition. It is, thus, hardly surprising that the 
ritualised competition of the formal electoral process takes on an 
additional, often explosive, intensity . Moreover, it is simply not 
possible in this context of integral plurality to separate out 
' traditional' and 'modern' spheres of activity . As Strathern 
remarks: 
Highlanders have both avidly sought wealth through 
cash cropping and business activity, and at the same 
time quite tenaciously held on to certain indigenous 
ways of behaviour, particularly in the sphere of 
prestige-seeking and exchange but also in terms of 
exercising violence to resist, or per contra to effect, 
political changes. (Strathem 1993:45) 
Strathern, noting the rising trend in militant compensation 
claims by customary landowners against the state, suggests that 
clans treat the state as another clan as, indeed, they do most 
external entities (Strathem, 1993:54) .  Given the patent success of 
such belligerent strategies (against both state and other collective 
actors) and, conversely, the deficiencies of more formal bureaucratic 
processes, violence appears to be a rational strategy. By 
demonstrating the rewards of violence, such actions further 
undermine state legitimacy. 
Just as the prospect of election victory induces growing levels of 
monetary investment on the part of candidates (Saffu, 1988:255) and 
inflated expectations on the part of supporters, the prospect (or 
realisation) of defeat is likely to arouse passions of similar 
intensity. Mangi has recently argued that many incidents of post­
election violence in the Highlands are carried out by supporters of 
defeated sitting members. He contends that such supporters target 
properties erected by the former member on the grounds that these 
should disappear with the demise of their original political 
patron: 
The supporters usually argue that their candidate was 
responsible for the construction or improvements made to 
the station or school. However, now that he has lost the 
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election they have every right to destroy all the things 
that he did and that the newly elected member can 
'start fresh' and build up his own from scratch. (Mangi, 
1993:42) 
The number of incidents that occurred in the post-polling phase 
of the 1992 elections attests to the levels of disappointment, 
frustration and anger among defeated candidates and their 
supporters, and, more particularly, their reluctance to accept defeat. 
They also attest to a more general reluctance to accept as 'final' the 
results of the electoral process, or any other formal process of 
adjudication for that matter. In the electoral context, violence is 
viewed by many defeated supporters as the only mechanism they 
have to blame and attack others . They simply cannot accept that 
their own tribal/ clan group was divided, that they did not deserve 
the vote, or that their group is relatively small in numerical terms. 
Figures released by the Electoral Commission revealed that by 
December 1992 a total of 61 election petitions disputing the returns 
had been received. Of these, 33 had either been withdrawn or 
dismissed, leaving an outstanding total of 28. The 61 petitions 
covered 52 of the 109 electorates or, in other words, 48 per cent of all 
electorates.  Even where the formal legal process is exhausted, a 
wide range of informal channels of contention remain open. When 
the stakes are perceived as being so high, election defeat can easily 
lead to prolonged process of violent protest and reprisal. 
To the more profound issues concerning the capacity and 
legitimacy of state authority and the ongoing struggle for economic 
and political ascendancy in contemporary Melanesia can be added 
the aggravating factor of organisational shortcomings on the part of 
the Electoral Commission and other 'bits of state' involved in the 
administration of the election. Allegations of shortage of ballot 
papers, deficiencies in the common and supplementary rolls, 
multiple voting, procedural irregularities during polling and 
counting, inadequate security provision and so on, were frequently 
made and issued from most parts of the country. Polling periods that 
had been deliberately shortened in order to reduce the possibility of 
trouble had to be extended because of administrative problems (Post­
Courier 26/6/92). Major communication problems between provincial 
electoral officials and the Electoral Commission in Port Moresby 
added to the impression of chaos in some areas (Times 25/6/92) .  
Moreover, lack of familiarity with electoral procedures on the part 
of voters, candidates and officials added to the confusion in many 
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places .  Where difficult decisions had t o  b e  made i n  such 
circumstances, as in the case of Mr. Sigulogo, electoral officials 
would inevitably be accused of bias and manipulation. Such is the 
lot of most umpires .  Without wishing to underestimate the 
magnitude of the logistical problems involved in mounting a 
national election in such difficult terrain, the administrative 
failings evident in the conduct of the 1992 elections undoubtedly 
contributed to overall tension. Whether understood as a 'face-saving 
safety valve', as suggested by Standish (fn. 4 above) or as an 
expression of genuine grievance, dissatisfaction with the 
administration of elections in PNG remains a recurring source of 
dispute. 
It should be clear by this stage that the factors contributing to 
many of the actions labelled 'election-related violence' extend well 
beyond the immediate electoral context. Consequently, the 
explanatory value of a narrow election focus is extremely limited. 
Insofar as rewards and tolerance of violence remain high, we can 
expect its incidence and gravity to continue and increase . This is 
particularly the case in the highly charged context of elections . As 
we have seen, resort to violence as an acceptable strategy for the 
pursuit of collective interests has a respectable pedigree in 
Highlands societies and one that significantly pre-dates 
contemporary notions of the rule of law. Moreover, whether in the 
context of sophisticated bank heists, land disputes, or elections, the 
rewards of violence are abundantly clear. The intensive flow of 
rhetoric from official sources and symbolic deployment of security 
forces do little to disguise the underlying problems of legitimacy and 
capacity confronting centralised authority in Papua New Guinea. 
In the electoral and formal political arena, we are witnessing 
the appropriation and transformation of introduced political 
processes by local level interests. This is what is meant by the 
process of 'upward colonization' . Rather than a unidirectional 
process of top-down government, we see a more dynamic and volatile 
process of interpenetration. Violence plays a significant role in this 
process as the elections, amongst other things, illustrate . Rather 
than a monolithic process of disintegration, as the weak state 
collapses from within, we see the active colonisation of state 
processes and their selective deployment for local, essentially 
tribalised, power struggles.  The outcome is not the wholesale 
degeneration into anarchy predicted by the more extreme proponents 
of disintegration. Instead, we are witnessing the emergence of a new 
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hybrid form of Melanesian politics conducted through a mix of 
cultural traditions. In this sense, it is more appropriate to describe 
these developments as part of a broader process of 'disintegrative 
integration' (Strathern, 1993:54). 
4 
Women in the Election: Casualties of PNG 
Political Culture 
Orovu Sepoe 
Introduction 
Lack of participation, or limited participation, by women is a 
crucial development issue. This is particularly true in developing 
countries (Jahan, 1984) .  Papua New Guinea (PNG) illustrates the 
difficulties that women have in achieving leadership positions in 
what is otherwise on open political system. There is an increasing 
acknowledgement of the fact that in a comparatively short space of 
time a very tiny proportion of PNG women have 'made it' in various 
formal spheres of contemporary life, such as education and the 
social services, both in the state bureaucracy and in the private 
business sector. However, in politics, in PNG the number of women 
who have entered leadership positions is virtually zero. Indeed, as 
of the 1992 election, there is no woman in any elective political 
position in the country. It appears that in politics, particularly at 
the national level, women have to struggle even harder than in 
other spheres to break the barrier of male dominance. Unlike 
bureaucratic positions where jobs are offered largely through formal 
qualifications and merit, access to the seats of political power is 
through competition in the open political field and it is evidently a 
much more difficult task for women. 
The gross underrepresentation of women in top political positions 
is clearly a global phenomenon. Women all around the world have 
discovered that politics is a no woman's land. Even among the 
exceptional cases of women who have made it to the political top, it 
is amazing what proportion have made it as a stand-in for their 
slain or departed husbands and fathers. Why have women not been 
as successful in entering the highest political decision-making 
arena? No doubt the answers to this simple yet difficult question 
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would be numerous.  However, a helpful hypothesis is that women, 
compared to men, possess fewer strategic political resources, those 
which determine or at least support success in politics such as 
wealth or money spinning enterprises, property, or access to bank 
loans, and, above all, helpful beliefs embedded in the political 
culture . With the dice heavily loaded against them, only a tiny 
minority of women have braved these obstacles and entered 
electoral politics .  
This chapter discusses women candidates in the 1992 election. 
These women were singularly unsuccessful in their attempt to become 
national legislators . Who were this tiny band of women who 
entered electoral political fray and are there any characteristics 
that distinguish them from other women? A brief account of the 
role of women in the traditional context and a similar brief 
historical background of women in modern PNG politics will 
probably help in an understanding of the issues involved. 
Women in traditional Papua New Guinean society 
In the context of traditional PNG societies, it is difficult to 
generalize about the political role of women. Given its diversity, 
one can only speak of a number of models. From scholarly studies 
done by anthropologists to observations by ordinary Papua New 
Guineans, there appears to be a range of views about the political 
role of women. The predominantly patrilineal societies in PNG 
were male dominated in decision-making. Most Melanesian 
societies ' . . .  associate political power with exchange of prestige 
goods and control over garden land' which are typically the domain 
of men (Macintyre, 1985 :209). Therefore, to speak of the traditional 
political role of women in PNG, generally, men dominated decision­
making. Nagari ( 1982) observed that in public meetings in 
traditional PNG women were not allowed to speak. Strathern 
(1972) argued that because clans are male dominated institutions in 
PNG, women are not dominant in terms of decision-making and 
religious ceremonies. 
However, it appears that in the few matrilineal society in pre­
colonial PNG, women had a more elevated role in politics. Weiner 
had this to say about a matrilineal society, the Trobriand Islands. 
'The fact of matrilineality gives women a domain of control that 
men can neither emulate successfully nor infiltrate without any 
degree of lasting power' (Weiner 1976:234) .  Macintyre gave the 
following account of another matrilineal society: 
Women in the Election 
When women enter the political arena it is exclusively 
as representatives of their own lineages, that is as 
mothers or sisters, not as wives.  Women who take part 
in political activities are skilled orators and their 
manner of self-presentation is substantially similar to 
that of articulate men. Here . . .  political leadership is 
not simply a matter of prestige or wealth, but has to be 
demonstrated in forceful talk and the capacity to 
convince or persuade others with words (1985:210). 
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Although the above differences in the political role of women in 
traditional societies have been observed by anthropologists it is not 
at all clear that any such differences can be observed now, since the 
beginning of modern representative institutions in PNG. 
A brief history of women in national politics 
In the pre-national elections period of Legislative Councils, the 
colonial government appointed Alice Wedega to the legislature in 
1961 .  Miss Wedega, from Milne Bay Province, was born in 1905 and 
was educated up to the elementary school leaving level by the 
London Missionary Society (LMS) .  Influenced heavily by her 
educators, she became a teacher and an evangelist among the head 
hunters of inland areas bordering the Central and Milne Bay 
provinces. As an educator she also initiated grass-roots schemes to 
help women and girls in villages in her province with home 
economics. As a result of her work amongst women, she was a first in 
many things. In January 1952, she was appointed the first Papuan 
woman delegate to the Pan-Pacific Women's Conference in New 
Zealand. At this conference, she spoke of the situation of Papua 
New Guinean women in education. She also became the first Papuan 
Girl Guide Commissioner, the first indigenous woman to be 
appointed a member of the Legislative Council, and the first 
national woman to receive the honour of MBE. Her experiences from 
travelling abroad on many occasions for missionary work widened 
her horizon. 
The 1964 House of Assembly election drew three women 
candidates. One, Ana Frank, was a national while two, Shirley Ann 
Mckellar and Kay Aschcroft-Smith, were expatriates. Mrs Frank, 
47 at the time, a Motuan from Pari Village, Central Province, was a 
mother of seven children. She had been educated up to Standard 5 
by the LMS. Her father and grandfather served as LMS pastors 
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while she became an LMS teacher and worked for five years . In 
1954, she was appointed to the District Advisory Council, but 
resigned a year later due to family obligations. Mrs Frank was 
encouraged to stand by a group of European women whom she had 
contact with through her involvement with the Girl Guides and 
Women's Club Movement. With only 240 votes, she came eleventh 
out of a total of 12 candidates in the Moresby open electorate 
(Hughes, 1965:248) . Hughes (1965:366) reported that Mrs Frank 
received only 5 votes from her own village, Pari. She competed 
against three other Motuans, all males, from her village. Mrs 
McKellar, wife of an Assistant District Officer in Madang, contested 
the Madang Open Electorate. Active in the Girl Guides Movement, 
she was placed third with 3,226 votes, after two indigenous male 
candidates. Mrs Aschcroft-Smith, wife of a public servant in Port 
Moresby, stood for the Central Special Electorate. Throughout the 
fourteen years she had lived in the territory, she had actively 
engaged in various activities including the RSL, Women' s  
Auxiliary, YWCA, Country Women's Association and the Girl 
Guides. Mrs Aschcroft-Smith came last with 405 votes out of a total 
of six candidates who contested. 
All three women candidates lost. Pondering the failure, Hughes 
and van der Veur (1965 :129) concluded:  'The failure of women 
candidates is not surprising, considering that even in the Native 
Local Government field, only three of 4,473 councillors were 
women-two in Mekeo and one in Rigo. It may well be a very long 
time before the House of Assembly seats its first elected woman 
member. '  In 1968 there was only one woman candidate . Mrs J. 
Wilkinson, a 43 year old wife of an Australian planter trader, stood 
for the Esa'ala Open Seat in Milne Bay and lost. A commentator on 
the 1968 election observed: 
'Very few people indeed, including women, were very 
sympathetic to the idea of a female representative in 
the House of Assembly . . .  lt not only went against the 
grain of traditional culture for a woman to stand and 
talk as an equal in the councils of men, but it was almost 
unthinkable that she would be able to achieve anything 
that a man could not' (Epstein et.al. 1971 :103). 
It seems clear that at that point in PNG 's political history 
women were unacceptable as candidates for elective public offices. 
Even the existence of traditional matrilineal societies evidently 
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could not help women rise to the highest echelons of decision­
making structures in the modem context. 
In 1972, four women contested: Josephine Abaijah (Central 
Regional); Therese Daera (Moresby Coastal); Patricia Wilson (Gulf 
Regional); and Debra Waya (Hagen Open). Only one of the four, 
(now Dame) Josephine Abaijah, was elected for the Central 
Regional seat. Although her election could be seen as a very 
significant break-through for women participants in electoral 
politics in PNG, Abaijah's presence was insignificant in terms of 
influencing decision-making for women's advancement. Secessionist 
politics interested her more than women's advancement (Griffin, 
et .al 1 979) .  Her Papua Besena Movement, which originally 
demanded a separate independence for Papua, was the vehicle for 
her electoral success. 
There have been four national elections since 1972, all in the 
post-independence era. Only three women have won seats in those 
national elections . In the first post-independence election of 1977, 
ten out of the 879 candidates were women. They included Dame 
Josephine Abaijah who won again. Only two others, Waliyato 
Clowes (for Middle Fly Open) and Nahau Rooney, (for Manus Open) 
won seats. In the 1982 election, all three, Abaijah, Clowes and 
Rooney, stood with fourteen other women. Nahau Rooney was the 
sole female winner, but only after a successful appeal to the Court of 
Disputed Returns. In 1987, Rooney and seventeen other women, 
including once again Abaijah, contested. All the women candidates 
were defeated. 
Table 4. 1 :  Female Candidates and MPS 1972-92 
Year Total Female Female Female 
Candidates Candidates Candidates MPs 
(Number) ( % )  
1972 608 4 0 .66 1 
1977 879 10 1 . 14 3 
1982 1124 17 1 .51 1 
1987 1515 18 1 .25 0 
1992 1655 16 0.97 0 
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Female candidates in the 1992 election 
Of a total of 1655 candidates who contested the 1992 election, 
sixteen were women. 1 Thirteen of them stood for open seats, the 
geographically smaller and less populous seats, and two stood in the 
National Capital District (NCD) provincial / regional electorate . 
With its better developed communication/ transport network, and 
relatively compact, geographically, the National Capital District 
provincial/regional seat has had at least one woman candidate in 
previous elections since 1977. The two female candidates there in 
1992 made it an exceptional provincial/regional seat. In other parts 
of the country, only veteran Abaijah considered vying for one of the 
larger and more populous provincial seats, the Milne Bay 
provincial/ regional seat. As Table 4 .2 shows, by far the largest 
number of women stood for seats in the National Capital District, 
continuing the trend from previous elections. 
Table 4.2: Women Candidates in 1992 
Electorate Name of Candidate Party 
Abau Open Zelma Ani Gagari IND 
Kairuku Hiri Open Louise A. Ai tsi IND 
Sinasina Yonggomugl Open Tamo Printa Engui IND 
Wewak Open Laura Martin IND 
Henganofi Open Yamis Sanap Gigimat IND 
Lufa Open Ellen Hama Hamena IND 
Milne Bay Provincial Josephine M Abaijah IND 
Huon Gulf Enny Mapu Moaitz IND 
National Capital District Margaret Loko IND 
National Capital District Mabel Gavera IND 
Moresby North East Open Elizabeth Diya Yama IND 
Moresby North West Open Maria Thai Hayes IND 
Moresby North West Open Diana Debessa IND 
Moresby South Open Winnis Tua IND 
Nipa Kutubu Open Hosta Tai IND 
Baiyer Mul Open Rose N aginel U aiang IND 
1 A by-election for Sumkar Open, in December 1992 after the death of Galen 
Lang, drew one more woman candidate. 
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All the female candidates stood as independents. What does this 
mean for the women candidates or the overall disappointing 
election outcome? Studies of previous elections indicated that party 
affiliation is not a primary determinant of success or failure of 
candidates. However, parties still do matter in PNG politics :  
' . . .  parties endorse candidates who are going to win . . .  parties provide 
money, posters, balloons, T-shirts, transportation, the material base 
for an active campaign' (Oliver, 1989:7) .  Formation of coalition 
government in PNG is a game played largely by parties. Hence, 
access to political power is enhanced by political parties.  In this 
context, as all the women candidates stood as independents , they 
lost whatever little advantage party sponsorship might have given 
them. 
The outcome of the election was disappointing for those who 
had hoped to see women succeed at the polls. All the women 
candidates were unsuccessful. Just one candidate, the veteran and 
former member of the House of Assembly (1972-77) and member of 
Parliament (1977-82) Josephine Abaijah, came second to the winning 
candidate, but her tally was 14,700 votes behind the winner. The 
second best performance among the women candidates, that of Enny 
Moaitz, was fourth out of a total of nineteen candidates in the Huon 
Gulf Open. Enny Moaitz was a well-known provincial politician in 
her own right, having been the first and only female Premier in the 
history of Provincial Governments in PNG, when she was elected 
Premier of Morobe, 1988-1989. In the NCD, the female candidate 
who did best, Margaret Loko, came fifth out of a total of eighteen 
candidates. Loko's total votes, however, were approximately only 
half of those of the winning candidate's .  In general, the women 
candidates polled well below half the total votes of their 
respective winning candidates. Most scored below five percent of the 
total votes in their respective electorates. If, in the context of very 
large numbers of candidates in PNG elections, we define a serious 
candidate as one who polls more than five per cent of the votes, then 
only four of the sixteen female candidates in 1992 (or 25 per cent) can 
be so classified. 
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Table 4.3: Women Candidates' Votes, Position and Percentage 
Name of Candidate Total Percentage Position/Total No 
of Candidates 
Zelma Ani Gagari 418 3 .03 12th / 21 
Louise A Ai tsi 275 1 .21 18th/20 
Tamo Printa Engui 17 0.07 48th/48 
Laura Martin 1185 7. 74 4th/6  
Yamis S Gigimat 427 1 .98 18th / 21 
Ellen H Hamena 979 4.57 9th/24 
Josephine M Abaijah 9044 15.76 2nd/9 
Enny M Moaitz 1130 8.06 4th / 19 
Margaret Loko 3785 7.86 5th / 18 
Mabel Gavera 1906 3.96 8th/18  
Elizabeth D Yama 409 3 . 11  12th/27 
Maria I Hayes 665 3.42 lOth/41 
Diana Debessa 101 0 .52 34th/41 
Winnis Tua 164 1 .05 22nd/26 
Hosta Tai 405 1 . 17 lOth / 12 
Rose N. U aiang 5 0 .02 15th / 16 
Analysis of outcomes: past and present 
As in 1987, the 1992 election turned out to be an election without a 
successful bid for a seat in the national parliament by a woman. A 
second consecutive electoral defeat for all women candidates raises a 
certain amount of anxiety among women activists and advocates. 
What do women have to do to be accepted by the voters as capable 
of representing them in the national legislature? What factors 
account for the poor performance by female candidates? 
I offer two hypotheses .  First, the nature of PNG politics 
seriously diminishes the chances of women occupying elective 
positions in the land . More specifically, the political culture of 
PNG overtly leaves women aside as casualties in electoral politics. 
The p olitical culture systematically and thus, in a sense, 
unconstitutionally, denies women equal participation in positions of 
power. There are certain notable features of PNG politics which, 
irrespective of the formal constitutional guarantees, adversely 
affect the chances of women being elected. Second, women are not a 
homogeneous category. Differences abound amongst women. There 
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are obvious socio-economic or class differences such as level of 
educational attainment, occupation and income, and there are 
cultural, ethnic, religious, and other social cleavages which make 
women just as heterogeneous as men. But whereas men, irrespective 
of where they stand in the divisions, regard other men as capable of 
presenting an electorate, this is not so with women. It is only a very 
small minority of women who belong to the elite in society-those 
with relatively high levels of income, who are educated, and who 
have often held relatively high positions of power in the modern, 
formal sector and who are likely to want to stand for election-who 
believe that women are also capable of representing an electorate. 
The overwhelmingly large proportion of women, the rural, less­
ed ucated, low income earners, evidently do not share the elite 
women's belief in, or desire for, female participation at the highest 
political levels . 
Regarding the consequences of the dominant PNG political 
culture, it is clear that the National Goals and Directive Principles 
have remained largely 'pen on paper' and politicians' 'word of 
mouth' because of the style of politics which has developed and 
persists in PNG today. A bargaining process characterizes the 
political style in PNG. The bargaining process is essentially 
pragmatic and opportunistic (Saffu, 1982). Actors or participants in 
the process do not set much store by principles if these do not gain 
them access to the centre of political power. Among participants, 
political parties are particularly interesting because of the 
significant impact they could have on other actors, be these women 
candidates or male candidates, and on the political process in 
general. In PNG, political parties are immensely fragile and range 
from no-ideology to a nearly non-ideological grouping. This is one 
reason why PNG has always had coalition governments, usually 
formed by loosely allied political parties, since 1972. The parties 
here also lack firm policy commitments. If political parties were a 
more formidable force in electoral politics, and showed some 
commitment to advancing women in politics, women MPs would not 
be as rare as they have been. 
Issues are not important in PNG electoral politics (Oliver, 1989). 
But in the event that women's issues are raised, this in itself does 
not pose an unsurmountable challenge to any groups competing for 
votes. In the context of PNG politics, women's issues usually play a 
marginal role in catching votes and are often trivialized.  The 
generally disadvantaged position of women in society, despite 
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formal constitutional guarantees, is a clear indication of this 
situation. In the absence of firm policy stands by political parties, if 
there were votes to be won on specifically women's issues, any actor 
in the electoral process could voice appealing policy stands on these 
issues and make use of the opportunity to win votes . Women 
candidates cannot, however, promote women's issues in order to win 
votes because the support is unlikely to be forthcoming from voters. 
Inferiority complex amongst women themselves and unhelpful 
societal attitudes towards women make it most unlikely for women 
to gain politically from raising women's issues. In fact, male 
candidates who raise women's issues would stand a better chance of 
obtaining votes from those who are sympathetic to women's causes. 
Thus, opportunism, falsely claiming concern for women's interests 
and needs, if that should appear promising for votes, is another 
aspect of the pragmatic political style in PNG. The development of 
such a political culture has significantly contributed towards 
making women candidates casualties in the electoral politics of 
PNG. Numbers matter more than policy issues in PNG politics. 
Whether or not women candidates voice women's issues, those who 
contest elections are themselves manifestations of women's issues. 
Their participation in the electoral process is a women's challenge 
in what is already a firmly established male domain. Unless the 
population at large is sensitive to policy issues, women's issues are 
unlikely to have much impact in electoral politics. 
Political parties have over the years voiced concern and 
included women in their party platforms but concrete support has 
been very shallow indeed. The 1992 election was a stark revelation 
of this point. As it was pointed out earlier, none of the women 
candidates were party affiliates .  All the women candidates stood 
as Independents in fourteen electorates. In the electorates they 
contested, only four of the winners were Independents. The rest were 
won by candidates who were supported by the major parties 
operating in PNG, namely, Pangu, Papua Action Party, Melanesian 
Alliance, National Party, and People's Democratic Party. 
It seems clear that calculations for a possible coalition begin 
prior to the election. A pragmatic process considers potential women 
candidates as liabilities because of prevalent attitudes in PNG's 
male dominated society. Political survival matters most so that 
national ideals or goals, such as 'equal participation by women', can 
easily be sacrificed. Political parties do all they can to avoid the 
risk of losing political power, or not gaining access to it. Thus women 
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are left out of party sponsorship because general beliefs in the male 
dominated society are not helpful to their chances of winning. As 
long as PNG politics is a numbers game, another resultant feature of 
a bargaining political style, women are likely to be left out from the 
very beginning of the lengthy and intricate path towards the 
formation of a coalition. 
With regards to the second hypothesis, the irony of the 
historical record of women as national politicians is that the 
highest number of women in parliament, three, was witnessed in the 
first national parliament whereas none have been elected after the 
second post-independence poll. One would expect there to be more 
female MPs now. Why are there no women MPs in the current 
parliament, seventeen years after independence? The context of the 
political environment in 1977 is significant here. PNG had just 
gained independence two years earlier. The system was fresh and 
fluid. It was relatively free of entrenched interests, whether 
economic, social, intellectual or political. The economic factor had 
not yet entered .  Politics as  an avenue to rapid wealth had not 
become so obvious then. But neither was the need for a strong 
economic backing, the need for money and investment to even enter 
politics. Women then were able to enter politics on an even economic 
base of competition with men. The notable absence of women in the 
nation's highest decision-making forum today is an indication that 
previously subdued and undeveloped economic interests have become 
predominant in the politics of PNG. Economic interests have become 
more clearly defined as the motor of PNG politics. 
Elites, whether they be political, economic, social or 
intellectual, have a critical role to play in developing countries.  
These people-only a tiny fraction of the population-take on the 
leadership role. Although their nature and actual size may differ 
from one political system to another, the fact remains that elites are 
crucial and a factor to be reckoned with. PNG is no exception.  
Politics, particularly at  the national level, is elite business. The 
parliamentary institutions along with the electoral system are all 
colonial transplantations. It is thus not surprising that only those 
with some formal education and the knowledge of the formal 
system can be expected to assume leadership roles in them. 
Why should this favour men more than women? The majority of 
participants in electoral politics have been men because 
'development' and 'modernization' have initially been male biased. 
In terms of participation in formal education, employment, business, 
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and so on, the male population in the world has advanced further 
than the iemale population. Compared with men, women are 
newcomers to the modem formal sector so that, to-date, only a very 
small minority of women have received the same level of modem 
and formal qualifications and experiences as men. Turner aptly 
makes the point from a historical perspective . 
It was men who acquired the steel axes to lighten their 
workload, who travelled, who acquired knowledge and 
skills, and who negotiated with the white men of the 
colonial administration. Even when 'development' 
came along, this was taken to be the exclusive business 
of men. (Turner, 1990:86). 
Elitism, as far as women in politics is concerned, is also promoted 
by socio-cultural factors. Papua New Guinean society still considers 
domestic duties such as household maintenance and rearing of 
children as exclusively women's work and responsibility . These 
activities are both time and energy consuming. Consequently they 
deprive women of the time and energy for activities outside the 
home. Political activity then becomes, at best, only a spare time 
activity even for the highly educated women. For the majority of 
women, who reside in largely rural, lower social and economic levels 
of society, there is often no spare time available. Also, public 
support is usually very low, or completely lacking. 
An observation of the Costa Rican situation should be equally 
applicable to the PNG's scene: 
Culturally speaking, a misbelief persists that women 
are unable to take decisions, particularly of a political 
nature, and as a result a woman's role should be limited 
to her reproductive function and to the private sphere. 
Both men and women perceive as natural phenomena 
that women are not equipped for participating; it does 
not interest them to do so and they fear taking decisions. 
Such beliefs are linked to problems of self-respect, self­
esteem and the marginalization of women, which limit 
their power to act and prevent them from regarding 
themselves as qualified for, and deserving of, 
managerial posts and decision-making functions . The 
effect of this is felt acutely when women have to oppose 
men in an attempt to implement arrangements because 
the woman has to struggle not only against the mistaken 
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beliefs of men but also against her own beliefs (United 
Nations, 1991:41) .  
What this means for women in PNG politics is that because only 
a minority of elite women are conscious of the gap in the political 
life of the country, only they make special efforts to be involved in 
electoral politics. These are the women who are able to verse 
themselves with the processes and structures of the formal sector. 
These are the women who decide to contest elections with the hope 
that their presence would reflect a broader image of women as 
active participants in politics. Rural women are, hence, effectively 
left out of the decision to participate as candidates themselves or to 
lend support to these elite women who contest. The potentially 
greatest support base-the rural and non-elite women-is sawn off, so 
to speak. 
Table 4.4: Background of Women Candidates 
Name of Candidate 
Zelma Ani Gagari 
Louise A Aitsi 
Tamo P Engui 
Laura Martin 
Yamis Gigimat 
Ellen H Hamena 
Enny M Moaitz 
Margaret Loko 
Mabel Gavera 
Brief Background 
Accounts Clerk and Auditor; Director of own 
business 
School teacher; Executive officer - National 
Council of women; Tutor - UPNG; Women's 
Programme Officer - South Pacific 
Commission; Private Consultant - Women in 
Development 
Youth worker; Leader of Women's group in 
the electorate 
Businesswoman (Naturalized citizen) 
Welfare and Liaison Officer 
Accountant 
Provincial Politician, Premier of Morobe -
1987/88 
Former Hospital Secretary; Organiser of 
Women' s  C ouncil,  National C apital  
District. 
Former employee of Reserve Bank of 
Australia; Organiser, Papua Regional 
Women's Council 
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Elizabeth Yama General Secretary - Girl Guides Association; 
company secretary with Yama Security 
Teacher; Manageress of Private firm; 
Executive Officer, Sir Michael Somare 's  
Opposition Office and Ministerial Staff to 
other Ministers; Secretary to PNG Family 
Planning Association; President of Women 
in Politics 
Maria I Hayes 
Diana Debessa 
Winnis Tua 
Hosta Tai 
Rose Uaiang 
Office Secretary, Electricity Commissioner; 
Agriculture Bank and Shell Company 
Teacher 
Teacher 
High School teacher 
In the 1992 election, the elite bias of women's advancement in PNG 
became more pronounced. What is evident from the background of 
the female candidates is that all had been through the formal 
educational system. All had been educated at high school level or 
beyond. At least three, Gagari, Aitsi and Gavera, had received 
university level education. 
Education is universally perceived as a major vehicle 
for women's advancement, and in Papua New Guinea it 
has been educated women who have been its staunchest 
advocates . . .  Education allows women to participate in 
the modern world . . .  When women acquire education 
they begin to understand and gain access to modern 
institutions . Jobs, cash income, status, power, new 
technology and material possessions all come into reach 
with education. (Turner, 1989:87-88) . 
In the political arena, education has certainly become an unofficial 
criterion for candidacy (Turner & Hegarty, 1990: 17) .  
The recent election and women's advancement in general have 
been elite biased because, in PNG as elsewhere, improvements to the 
situation of  women have initially s tarted from the top . 
Increasingly, in PNG as elsewhere, women have become polarized as 
a group. For instance, Jahan notes that in Asia any generalisation 
about women must take into account the immense diversity and vast 
contrasts both between countries and within each country. The 
continent has women holding very powerful political positions such 
as (the late) Indira Gandhi and (desposed) Imelda Marcos and 
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thousands of well-educated and professional women, but at the same 
time one finds millions of the world's most oppressed women there 
(Jahan 1994:59). The top layer of women are atypical in that they 
can be easily differentiated from the rest by their educational 
attainment, labour force participation in previously 'male' fields, 
income, etc, while the majority have remained where they have 
always been, left behind. They live a subsistence lifestyle and still 
await their share of the benefits of modernization. 
In a Third World context such as PNG, the decision to become 
involved in electoral politics is largely made by the elite women 
because they can claim to play the leadership role in a modern 
context. Involvement in electoral politics is seen by the elite women 
as a means for improving the condition of women as a group in a 
modern society. But access to power is also an end in itself. In 
essence, for these women along with their male counterparts, ' . . .  
winning a national parliamentary seat i s  . . .  the most coveted 
political prize' (Turner & Hegarty, 1987:2) because with it comes 
status, extra resources and a host of personal benefits and privileges. 
Along with professional women, the lives of the few women who 
have made it as politicians stand in great contrast to the rural 
majority and the less-privileged. Aspiring politicians, male or 
female, are mostly motivated by the ends of political power, the 
benefits and privileges that flow from being in the corridors of 
power. 
The failure of women to win any seats in the National 
Parliament in 1 992 resulted from the fact that the women 
candidates were mostly operating in a vacuum. Non-elite women are 
not interested in electoral politics even as voters. As voters, it is 
unlikely that they would vote for women candidates because they 
also share the dominant political culture with its anti-female 
leadership bias and they might also act on the specific instructions 
of the male head of household or clan. In other words, female 
candidates are not products of a consultative process amongst the 
women folk. The need to endorse candidates by women's groups is 
now beginning to be recognised. The efforts now made by the Women 
in Politics group to assist aspiring female politicians is one such 
attempt. Furthermore, it is understood that women voters often do 
not vote independently of their spouses or escape male intimidation. 
This concern has been raised since 1982. 'In May 1982, the Police 
Minister, Warren Dutton, had proposed separate women's election 
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booths to stop women being pressured by their husbands or harassed 
by unknown men . . .  ' (Wormald 1989:91) .  
Political education of women to act collectively has not even 
started in PNG. Even elite participation in politics is not a 
collective choice. The decision to participate and the choice of 
electoral strategy are personal or individual. Significantly, the 
elite women are a divided group in itself. Divisions in the ranks of 
the elite women have contributed to apparent dissipation of effort.2 
In the NCO, for example, two women-Loko and Gavera, contested 
the NCO regional seat, while another two, Hayes and Debessa, 
stood for the Moresby North West Open. 
Conclusion 
The fact that all the women contesting were defeated does not 
necessarily mean a failure on the part of the women candidates. It is 
once again the politics of PNG which has failed them. It is 
necessary to recognise the fact that not all women in PNG share the 
view that women must gain political power at the national level, or 
at the lower levels of government, for that matter. As for the men, 
perhaps an even smaller proportion do. Perceptions, attitudes and 
behaviours differ between and within sections of our society due to 
differences in custom, religion, economic and educational status, and 
so on. We must acknowledge this diversity. Societal differences are 
difficult to overcome. Thus the struggle for equality must be 
understood as a long term and a continuous one. 
More women with high formal education and more women in 
business are likely to ensure increased level of participation by 
women. This is not meant to applaud elite politics. Realistically it 
is the only way a greater number of Papua New Guinean women will 
become engaged in the political process. The more women who are 
educated and the more they participate in spheres of modern life, 
the more the leap to political decision making offices will appear 
normal and perhaps the less the difference will become between the 
elite and non-elite women in PNG. What is important is the need 
for an awareness and education programme which should penetrate 
all sectors of the society, aimed at both the male and female 
population. This may help to re-shape the more conservative 
conscience and perceptions of the population at large. This is 
2 Occasional 'collisions' amongst the elite women illustrate the point: Post 
Courier - 18/9 /91 and Post Courier 1 0 I 1 2 / 92 .  
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essential, but b y  n o  means sufficient, t o  enhance equality in the 
political sphere. Organisation and forward planning are also 
essential. Women themselves must take on these tasks, but with the 
support of the state and of the men. 
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Manus: Reign of Subtlety over Deception 
of Hospitality 
Stephen P Pokawin and Nahau Rooney 
Elections in Manus have developed a character. The title of this 
chapter is meant to capture an aspect of this character. Candidates 
and their supporters would be welcomed and receive enthusiastic 
reception everywhere they go. People would turn out to listen to 
them. They would be given food to eat and beds to sleep on. A 
candidate who is unfamiliar with this nature of the Manus 
electorate will end his or her campaign convinced that (s)he had 
overwhelming support wherever (s)he went. But, frequently, the 
results would tum out to be different and surprising to him or her. 
In Manus as elsewhere in PNG, people nominate as election 
candidates for a variety of reasons. These include a trial run, a wish 
to signal one's intention to begin a political career; a desire merely to 
frustrate the efforts of a candidate one dislikes; in the case of a 
minority of candidates, a well-founded belief that they can win and 
are to be taken as serious contestants for leadership . Not all 
candidates are confident that they can win. Yet they nominate and 
invest money, time and energy campaigning. Why do they contest in 
the first place when they know they cannot win the election? The 
answer perhaps lies in the principle of 'chance' and in the 
characteristics of PNG electoral politics which tend to turn election 
outcomes into something of a Russian roulette. 
In this chapter, we shall analyse the 1992 national election in 
Manus, highlight the factors that influenced the outcome of the 
election and, in the process of offering our interpretation of the 
results, introduce the reader to an aspect of Manus political culture. 
The provincial and open electorates in Manus are coterminous. 
Although in the minds of some voters and some candidates the 
provincial seat carries a higher status, there is in fact no difference 
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in the quality or qualification of candidates. The study looks at the 
two electorates together. 
Background 
Since 1964 the people of Manus have been going to the polls to elect 
leaders to represent them in the national parliament. From 1964 to 
1972, elections to the then House of Assembly were held every four 
years. During the third House of Assembly, the term was extended 
to five years, 1972-1977, and five years it has remained since. There 
have been four elections since independence, beginning with the 
fourth nationwide election in 1977. Thus, if regularity of elections to 
a country's legislature testifies to the health of its parliamentary 
democracy, then it is in good health in PNG. 
In Manus as elsewhere in the country, the electoral process was 
introduced with the local government council. The Baluan Council 
was established in 1951 and the North Coast Council in 1963. The 
two councils combined to form the Manus Local Government Cormcil 
in 1964 .  It was abolished in 1981 and replaced with sixteen 
community governments. From 1993, the term of the community 
government coincides with that of the provincial government. Since 
1979, Manus people have elected leaders to the provincial 
government. Initially, the term of a provincial government was 
three years but it was extended to four years in 1983. With this 
history, then, election and electioneering were already part of 
Manus political life by the 1992 elections. 
Since the 1982 national election, Manus has experienced twists in 
its parliamentary representation. James Pokasui was declared 
winner for Manus Open by one vote ahead of the incumbent, Nahau 
Rooney. Nahau Rooney's challenge in the Court of Disputed Returns 
resulted in the Court over-turning the results and declaring her the 
winner with a 1 1  vote margin. The Regional Member, Michael 
Pondros, was dismissed in 1983 for a breach of the leadership code. 
A by-election was conducted and Arnold Marsipal was elected to 
complete the term. Brian Campbell, who ran second to Marsipal in 
the by-election, also challenged the results in the Court of Disputed 
Returns. The Court ruled against him and upheld Marsipal's 
election. In the 1987 election, Pokasui won Manus Open. The result 
was challenged by a candidate, Martin Thompson. Pokasui was 
found to have breached the electoral laws and a by-election was 
ordered in 1989. Memel Pohei was elected. The result was again 
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challenged by Martin Thompson. Towards the end of 1991, the Court 
declared the petitioner, Martin Thompson, as winner by one vote.  
The frequent court challenges meant that instead of a normal 
five year term of office, Manus was represented intermittently, from 
1987 to 1992, by three different members-James Pokasui: July 1987 
to July 1989; Memel Pohei: August 1989 to November 1991;  and 
Martin Thompson: November 1991 to July 1992. These electoral 
challenges were part of the background to the 1992 national election 
in Manus. 
Table 5. 1 :  Manus representatives to the national parliament 
Term Open Origin Regional Origin 
1 964-68 P. Maloat Balopa J .  Cross New Ireland 
1 968-72 P. Maloat Bal op a W. Lussick New Ireland 
1 9 72-77 M. Pondros Sopomu-MB P. Kasau Ere-Kele 
1 977-82 N. Rooney Nali M. Pondros Sopomu Malai 
Bay 
1 982-87 J .  Pokasui Lelemasih M. Pondras Sopomu Malai 
Bay 
N. Rooney Nali A. Marsipal Rapatona 
1 987-92 J .  Pokasui Lelemasih A. Marsipal Rapatona 
M. Pohei Ere-Kele 
M. Thompson Bal op a 
1 992-97 M. Thompson Bal op a A. Marsipal Rapatona 
By the 1992 election, Manusians had begun to identify very strongly 
with the sixteen electorates which returned members to the 
provincial assembly. To a very large extent, these electorates 
brought together people of the same linguistic and cultural heritage. 
Since 1979 these electorates have been moulded into political units. 
The establishment of community governments in 1982/83 to coincide 
with the boundaries of the provincial government electorates 
further consolidated the political, cultural and administrative 
significance of the electorates. The 1993 provincial election further 
strengthened this when members of the provincial assembly also 
became presidents of their respective community governments. 
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The electorates 
The 1990 national population census placed the population of Manus 
at 32,830. Of this 16,806 were male and 16,024 were female. Under 
the laws determining representation in the national parliament, 
Manus has two representatives, one for Manus Open, and the other 
for Manus Provincial. Manus is the only province in the country 
where the open electorate and the provincial electorate coincide. 
This situation has existed since the 1972 election. Prior to that 
Manus was an Open electorate only. Manus and New Ireland 
constituted one Regional electorate. 
Manus as a single political constituency at the national level is 
further subdivided into sixteen constituencies at the provincial 
government level . 1 From 1979 to 1989, Manus had fifteen 
constituencies, the minimum allowed for under the Organic Law on 
Provincial Government (OLPG).  The number of constitutencies was 
increased for the 1989 election by one constituency when the Western 
Islands electorate was split, due to vast geographical distances 
between the islands, to form the North Western and South Western 
electorates. These provincial government constituencies are 
important political and administrative units. They are used by the 
1 The Provincial Government constituencies are as follows: 
1 .  North Western Electorate 
2. Kali-Bipi 
3 .  Soparibeu 
4 .  Tulu-Ponam 
5 .  Kurti 
6 .  Bupi-Chupeu 
7.  Lelemasih 
8. Lorengau 
9. Los Negros 
1 0 .  Nali 
1 1 .  Pere-MBunai 
12 .  Ere-Kele 
1 3 .  Sopomu-Malai Bay 
14 . Balopa 
1 5 .  Rapatona 
1 6 .  South Western 
From 1979 to 1989, constituencies 1 and 16 made up the Western Islands 
Constituency. They were split into two in 1989 by the Provincial 
Electoral Boundaries Commission because of distance. 
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Electoral Commission to administer national elections and 
politicians use them as the basic political units to plan their vote 
winning strategies. 
Administration of the election 
The conduct of the 1992 national election in Manus was efficient. A 
total of 250 polling officials, organized into 56 polling teams, 
covered the entire province . Sixteen Assistant Returning Officers 
were appointed, one for each community government/provincial 
government electorate. Fifty-six teams were allocated under the 
immediate administrative responsibility of the respective 
Assistant Returning Officers. The overall responsibility for the 
election fell to Joe Hilarai, the Provincial Returning Officer, and 
Simon Sinai, the Returning Officer for the Manus Open Electorate. 
Three training sessions were conducted for the Returning Officers 
in Rabaul and Kimbe. Within the province, the two Returning 
Officers conducted three separate training sessions for the Assistant 
Returning Officers on the conduct and administration of the election. 
The Assistant Returning Officers in turn conducted two separate 
training sessions for the polling teams under them [Hilarai and 
Sinai 1 992] . Since the 1989 Provincial Government election, elections 
in Manus have been conducted in a single day. The 1992 National 
Election was also conducted in a single day, on 17 June. Polling 
stations opened at 8 am and closed at 6 pm. The ballot boxes were 
taken to Lorengau within 24 hours and held in police custody until 
counting started at 2 pm on 26 June. The results were declared soon 
after 10:30 am on 27 June. Radio Manus covered the counting live 
from 5 pm 26 June to 8 am 27 June. The smooth conduct of the election 
was not surprising because voters had been well educated through 
Radio Manus, election pamphlets and extensive campaign by the 
candidates .  
The only concern arose when voters were surprised to  find that 
their names were not on the Electoral Roll. Some voters who had 
voted in the past could not vote because the Electoral Roll excluded 
them. Since this was the first time that the amendment to Section 
1 52(a) of the Organ ic Law on Na tional E lect ion was being 
implemented, disallowing voters whose names do not appear on the 
Electoral Roll from voting, many people could not vote. The 
Electoral Roll was not properly compiled. It had names of those 
long deceased; names were recorded more than once; and some names 
were recorded in different villages or electorates than those from 
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which they came. Thus the Electoral Roll and Supplementary Roll 
registered a total of 20,833 eligible voters, about two thirds of the 
entire Manus population of which children under 18 would be clearly 
more than a third. 12,960 voters cast their votes, which is consistent 
with the total votes cast in previous elections in Manus. 
Candidates 
A total of 14 candidates contested the two Manus seats, eight for the 
provincial seat and six for the open seat. This represents a smaller 
number of candidates compared to the past elections since 
independence. Table 5.2 shows the number of candidates contesting 
the two seats since the two electorates were created. For the first 
time, fewer candidates contested the Open electorate than the 
Provincial electorate. 
Table 5.2: Number of Candidates 1972 - 1992 
Year Provincial Open Total 
1972 4 6 10 
1977 6 10 16 
1982 9 10 20 
1987 9 14 23 
1992 8 6 14 
Table 5.3 below shows where the 1992 candidates originated from 
and whether they were endorsed by a political party or contested as 
independents. 
Of the fourteen candidates, four had no previous experience in 
politics, either at the national or provincial government level. Four 
had been, or were, members of the Provincial Government Assembly. 
Three, plus the two incumbents, had been members of the National 
Parliament. Six had previously contested national elections. Eight 
were contesting the national election for the first time. Of those 
who were contesting the national election for the first time, only 
four candidates-Vincent Tonam, Paliau Bernard, Charles Kanamon 
and Nali James-were contesting any election for the first time. 
T. Kasou and M. Kuweh were members of the provincial assembly; 
1 28 Pokawin and Rooney 
Bernard Kaspou and Mark Hosea had contested provincial 
government election in the past. 
Table 5.3: The Origins and Affiliations of Candidates 
Candidate Electorate Endorsement 
MANUS PROVINCIAL 
1 .  James Pokasui Lelemasih PDM 
2. Roy P Pogat Nali Independent 
3. Andyson B Kaspou Lelemasih Independent 
4.  Vincent Tonam North Western Independent 
5 .  Paliau Bernard Sopomu-Malai Bay Independent 
6. Arnold Marsipal Rapatona Pangu 
7. T arcisi us Ka sou Kali-Bi pi MA 
8. Michael Pondros Sopomu-Malai Bay Independent 
MANUS OPEN 
1 .  Martin P Thompson Balopa LNA 
2. Mark Hosea Sopomu-Malai Bay PDM 
3. Michael Kuweh Kurti Pangu 
4. Charles S Kanamon Sopomu-Malai Bay PSP 
5 .  James Nali Sopomu-Malai Bay Independent 
6. Memel Pohei Lorengau/ Ere-Kele MA 
Manus: Reign of Subtlety over Deception of Hospitality 1 29 
Table 5.4: Electoral Experiences of Candidates 
Incumbent Contestants of Past Members Past and First time 
Past National of Parliament Present Contestants 
Elections Provincial 
Assembly 
Members 
PROVINCIAL 
A. Marsipal A.Marsipal J. Pokasui R.P.Pogat B. Kaspou* 
J .  Pokasui M. Pondros T. Kasou V. Tonam 
R. P. Pogat P. Bernard 
M. Pondros T. Kasou* 
OPEN 
M. Thompson M. Thompson J. Pokasui M. Pohei M. Hosea* 
M. Pohei M. Pohei M. Kuweh M. Kuweh* 
C. Kanamon 
N. James 
*First time contestants at the national level only 
Political parties 
Political parties play a somewhat ambiguous role in Manus politics 
and its electoral process. Apart from a handful of party supporters, 
everyone else who expresses an interest in standing for elections is a 
potential member of any political party. People's choices of which 
party to join depend on numerous factors including what they hope to 
get out of membership; the views of relatives; which party is 
prepared to support their candidacy; their rejection by another 
political party; the party of their keenest rival; appeal of the 
leadership of the political party. In the 1992 elections, the Peoples 
Democratic Movement (PDM), Pangu and the Melanesian Alliance 
(MA) endorsed candidates for both seats. The People's Solidarity 
Party (PSP) and The League for National Advancement (LNA) 
endorsed one candidate each for the open electorate. Five 
candidates contested as independents in the provincial seat and one 
contested as an independent in the open seat. An independent 
candidate for the provincial seat, Paliau Bernard, was said to be 
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supported by the Peoples Progress Party (PPP), having been 
associated with Sir Julius Chan and PPP for a long time. 
The political parties supported the candidates with nomination 
fees, posters, funds and campaign speeches by party leaders. The 
level of support varied from party to party. The then Opposition , 
Leader, Paias Wingti, visited Manus on a chartered plane and 
campaigned for PDM candidates. The then Prime Minister, Rabbie 
Namaliu and Pangu Pati team flew into Manus and to several parts 
of Manus by helicopter to campaign for Pangu candidates. On the 
other hand, the PSP and the LNA were only labels on the 
candidates; the candidates virtually stood on their own. 
The provincial government campaigned against p olitical 
parties. The voters were urged to carefully consider the candidates 
and vote for the one they believed would be the best Manus leader. 
A candidate's membership in a political party should be 
immaterial according to the provincial government. This sentiment 
arose from the fact that party policies do not seem to matter very 
much once a person is elected. After the election, political party 
organisations tend to withdraw from the scene to await the next 
election when they re-emerge to woo support. Also, by the time of 
the next election, membership of the core group spearheading the 
political party would have changed. A candidate who previously 
contested under a political party could be now either endorsed by 
another political party or contest as an independent candidate, 
depending on his or her calculation of what was best in the 
situation. 
The strength of political parties in Manus depends to a large 
extent on the leadership . Thus, in 1992, Pangu Pati had the 
influence of the then Minister, Arnold Marsipal; Pikah Kasau, the 
President of the Manus branch; and Provincial Minister, Michael 
Kuweh. MA organisation centered around the former Open Member, 
Memel Pohei. The PDM had no organizational base in Manus. Its 
presence was by sponsorship of James Pokasui and Mark Hosea. A 
similar description applied to the LNA and Martin Thompson and 
to the PSP and Charles Kanamon. 
Out of the eight candidates for the provincial seat, five 
contested as independent candidates.  Some had sought party 
sponsorship but were not successful. Either the party they sought 
endorsement from opted for another candidate or the party saw the 
candidate's chances of winning as negligible and thus decided not to 
commit itself. One candidate, Paliau Bernard, who stood as an 
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independent candidate, would almost certainly have teamed up 
with PPP if he had won. 
For the Open seat, only one out of the six candidates contested as 
an independent candidate. Nali James, a graduate of the University 
of Technology, had been in the village over the past few years and 
had been actively involved in a small scale forestry project. Of the 
candidates who received political party endorsements, only Arnold 
Marsipal (Pangu), Martin Thompson (LNA) and Memel Pohei (MA) 
had long associations with their respective political parties .  All 
three had been MPs. Others associated themselves with political 
parties clearly only for the purpose of the election. 
Party policies did not have much effect in influencing the 
manner in which people voted. Policies, like other promises during 
campaigns, have taken on a negative character. Experience has 
shown that promises made during elections are often not carried out 
after the election. Rather than by their intrinsic merit, policies 
appear to be assessed in terms of the influence of the candidates 
espousing them and their standing in the communities in which they 
campaign. When the candidate has the support, the policies he 
propounds are given significance by his supporters and taken 
seriously by the voters.  Otherwise policies are dismissed as 'em 
kempein tasol !  ' .  
Pangu Pati has an active branch in Manus. A senior member, 
Pikah Kasau, is also one of the Vice Presidents of the Pati in the 
country. The branch's strength has been due to the election of Arnold 
Marsipal to the National Parliament. Marsipal's electoral office 
has also been Pangu Pati's office. Pangu was prepared for the 
election. It worked closely with the Provincial Government, 
organised meetings, issued press releases, and sent out teams to 
campaign for its candidates. 
The Pati Leader and Prime Minister, Rabbie Namaliu, and the 
veteran Pangu Campaigner, Sir Pita Lus, visited Manus and 
campaigned for their candidates. They used a helicopter to visit 
and campaign in Lopahan (where the President of the Manus branch 
comes from), Kari (the home of the party's candidate for the Open 
seat), Baluan, and Pam (from whence the Chief of Staff in 
Namaliu's office comes) . In Lorengau, the Prime Minister launched 
the Manus Small Business Association and spoke at the Lorengau 
market. Interestingly, he was accompanied not only by Arnold 
Marsipal and Michael Kuweh, but also by Martin Thompson. The 
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LNA, to which Martin Thompson belonged, was at that time a 
member of Namaliu's coalition. 
The PDM has no presence in Manus . Officially, the party 
endorsed James Pokasui and Mark Hosea for the provincial and open 
seats, respectively. The leader of the party and then Opposition 
Leader, Paias Wingti, visited Manus and addressed the people at 
Lorengau market. He also visited Loniu Village, the home of one of 
his staff, Jacob Jumogot. The two candidates campaigned 
separately, not as PDM candidates, but as individuals. They even 
dissociated themselves from certain party policies, particularly on 
free education. The Manus provincial government publicly 
campaigned against the hand-out mentality including free 
education. It is interesting to note that Paias Wingti avoided the 
issue of free education when he visited Manus. In his speech at 
Lorengau Market, he made no reference to free education. Instead, 
he emphasized education as a right of every citizen. Everywhere 
else, free education had been a central plank in Wingti's platform. 
The MA branch was led by the former Open Member and 
candidate for Manus Open, Memel Pohei. During his time as Open 
Member, he had set up committees in every electorate . The 
committees were responsible for receiving, screening and deciding 
who received his Electoral Development Fund. The same 
committees were also seen and used as branches of MA. When the 
Court of Disputed Returns declared his election void in November 
1991,  the system also crumbled. The 1992 election revived the 
committees, turning them and the MA organisation into the Memel 
Pohei election machine. The two MA candidates, Memel Pohei for 
the open seat and Tarcisius Kasou for the provincial seat, 
campaigned separately. 
The PSP existed only on the nomination form of the candidate for 
the open seat, Charles Saleu Kanamon. Similarly, the LNA existed 
only on Martin Thompson's nomination form and his poster. No LNA 
organisation existed in the province. Martin Thompson's association 
with the Win Neisen, formerly Makasol Movement, formed his 
organisational base in the province. 
Campaigning 
Campaigning in Manus involved visits to the villages by the 
candidates and their supporters, (by cars and speed boats, helicopter 
and chartered planes) use of recorded songs and jingles, especially on 
Radio Manus, feasts and ceremonies, posters, use of traditional 
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symbols of 'Katim buai', showing of video films and campaign 
rallies addressed by party leaders. 
For the most part, candidates identified who their serious 
opponents were and concentrated their campaigns against them in an 
attempt to attract votes away from those candidates.  For the 
provincial seat, the incumbent, Arnold Marsipal, was clearly the 
target of most of the candidates, particularly James Pokasui and 
Michael Pondros. All three had represented Manus in Parliament. 
Some candidates conducted clean campaigns right through. Vincent 
Tonam and Paliau Bernard conducted the cleanest campaigns. 
Campaigning for the open seat was different. The incumbent, 
Martin Thompson, had only been a Member of Parliament since 
November 1991, and so was not a target of a 'sheer campaign'. Each 
candidate quietly moved about the province to make himself known 
and attract support. The only heated exchanges were between 
Michael Kuweh and Memel Pohei. They used Radio Manus 
extensively to attack and counter-attack each other. They had both 
been MA supporters, and both had sought MA sponsorship. When 
the MA leadership in the province, dominated by Memel Pohei's 
supporters, endorsed him to contest the open seat, Michael Kuweh 
defected to Pangu Pati and immediately received its endorsement. 
This further intensified animosities between the two candidates and 
their supporters. 
The candidates and their supporters were free to campaign 
anywhere in the province. No disruptions or election related 
violence occurred during the campaign period. Peaceful campaigning 
has been a feature of the Manus electoral experience. The Report of 
the Chief Electoral Officer on the 1972 House of Assembly General 
Election reported that Manus was " one of the quietest districts free 
from threats of any sort" (p .23).2 Manus being a small place, 
information about the activities and campaign strategies of the 
candidates easily passed on to their rivals. Changes in campaign 
strategies by candidates who thought they had b ecome 
disadvantaged by such knowledge were continuous. 
The Provincial Government permitted school grounds to be used 
for campaigning by candidates so long as normal operations of the 
schools were not disrupted. This was allowed because the election 
process would result in a leader who would be required to support 
2 See, in addition, Rooney, W. 'Island Politics: The Elections in Manus' in 
Hegarty, D. (ed), 1983. 
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and assist the community, including the schools . Church buildings 
and areas were also used by candidates to campaign. 
Most candidates campaigned as individuals, including those 
sponsored by political parties. This is evident in the results, in the 
localised support for candidates. The only political party which 
was truly organised was Pangu Pati . It had two teams which 
campaigned for its candidates. At one stage, supporters of other 
candidates expressed their opposition to such strategy on Radio 
Manus. They argued that the candidates themselves should 
campaign instead of the committees. Supporters of candidates 
would campaign for them wherever they found themselves, in kamls 
(the men's houses), at village gatherings among family members, 
and in other villages when the opportunity arose. This level of 
campaigning either consolidated the support generated by the 
candidates or lessened the impact of other candidates. 
Throughout the province, members of the family or village were 
often divided in their support for candidates. In the extreme case, 
the father might support one candidate, the mother a different 
candidate, and the children support someone else. There was also 
the situation where, because a candidate gave a member of the 
family something, it was agreed that he would vote for that 
candidate whilst the rest of the family vote for someone else. 
Results 
The two sitting members were returned. Arnold Marsipal won with 
2,547 votes (out of 12,960) against James Pokasui with 2,434, while 
Martin Thompson received 4,759 votes to secure the Open seat 
against Memel Pohei with 4,408 votes. Arnold Marsipal was the 
sitting member for Manus Provincial and Minister for Labour and 
Employment. He had also been Minister for Defence and actively 
involved in Parliamentary Committees. Personally, he did not 
campaign extensively during this election. The Pangu campaign 
committees did the campaigning in selected areas. He spent a few 
days in the province and visited selected areas. He used Radio 
Manus effectively. He spoke directly to the people on issues . His 
views and statements were highlighted on the news programme, and 
he used the 'Toksave' programme well. He stood on his record . 
According to him, his two terms in office as Provincial Member for 
Manus had exposed him to the Manus people. The people knew him 
and could decide whether to return him or go for a new leader. He 
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believed he had served Manus well as an MP. It was now up to the 
people to either vote him back or withdraw their support from him. 
During his terms in office, he had worked closely with the 
Provincial Government, allocated funds from the Electoral 
Development Fund to many groups and individuals, and supported 
and stood by families who suffered misfortunes. He took part in 
traditional ceremonies, maintained communication with Manus 
people through his Electoral Office in Lorengau and used Radio 
Manus to maintain his presence in the minds of the Manus people. 
His very colourful and impressive posters maintained his presence in 
the villages during the campaign period. When the results came 
out, a few candidates and their supporters were surprised that he 
won because he had not personally done much campaigning. 
Table 5.5: Distribution of Votes in Manus Open 
Names of Candidates 
Thompson Sinai Kuweh Kanarnon Nali Pohei lnfor Total 
Area 
North Western 138 19 25 06 168 40 03 399 
Kali-Bipi 291 87 83 04 2245 69 09 767 
Soparibeu 89 99 93 87 166 227 04 757 
Tulu-Ponam 54 193 138 01 50 139 05 580 
Kurti 1 14 13 448 01 14 357 08 955 
Bupi-Chepeu 116  16 89 1 1  09 291 01 533 
Lelemasih 434 109 68 07 29 813 09 1469 
Lorengau 414 49 122 45 41 516 02 1203 
Los Negros 271 44 75 07 08 374 1 1  790 
Nali 161 38 39 01 1 1  175 02 430 
Pere-MBunai 343 16 16 03 05 183 0 566 
Ere-Kele 213 03 08 01 08 511 02 746 
Sopomu-Malai 558 257 18  15  376 256 08 1488 
Ba lop a 785 04 07 04 27 79 03 909 
Rapatona 528 14 101 41 21 271 04 980 
South Western 250 13 06 01 10 107 01 388 
TOTAL 4 759 974 1 337 227 1 167 4 408 88 12 960 
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Table 5.6: Distribution of Votes in Manus Provincial 
Names of Candidates 
P'sui Pogat K'pou Tonam Benard M'pal Ka sou P'dros Info Total 
Area 
NW 7 3  8 8  0 1  1 4 7 1 3  4 6  2 0  0 5  0 6  399  
K-B 6 4  0 9  0 3  2 7  1 7  3 6  5 2 2  5 3  0 6  7 3 7  
S'beu 1 1 7  1 0  1 3  1 64 2 9  2 1  1 7 7 222  0 4  7 5 7  
T-P 1 99 0 4  5 6  1 00 3 8  5 8  3 4  8 6  0 5  5 8 0  
Kurti 1 74 76  2 9  4 8  6 3  376  142  32  1 5  955  
B-C 1 74 7 6  2 9  4 8  6 3  376  142  32  1 5  955  
L'sih 5 4 7  8 5  2 4 7  64 35 1 4 0  2 4  3 1 3  1 4  1 469  
L'gau 1 66 1 2 6  8 2  29  77  244  2 1 8  2 2 6  3 4  1 20 3  
L-N 226  2 1  3 5  1 6  4 4  1 0 3  1 8 7  1 34 2 4  7 9 0  
Nali 7 8  1 7 6  3 7  0 8  0 7  6 7  0 8  0 6  0 3  3 9 0  
P-M 1 27 6 7  5 3  4 1  3 7  1 6 3  3 9  3 5  0 4  5 6 6  
E-K 1 1 2 5 4  5 3  2 1  1 8  1 4 3  2 3  3 1 7  0 5  746 
S-M 9 6  7 2  3 0  3 7  3 2 6  2 3 5  1 64 5 1 4  1 4  1 488 
B'pa 1 65 1 5 8  4 3 5  1 3 7 390  1 2  9 1  0 7  999  
R'tona 1 65 1 5 8  4 35  1 3 7  390  32  50  0 9  9 8 0  
SW 3 4  9 1 6 0 9  5 1  2 7 2  0 4  0 2  3 8 8  
TOTAL 2 517 1 190 668 782 1 021 2 623 1 905 2 120 154 12 980 
Martin Thompson, the Member for Manus Open since November 
1991, conducted a very effective but quiet campaign. He was very 
selective about where he campaigned. His reputation as a successful 
lawyer, having won two cases at the Court of Disputed Returns, and 
his leadership of the Win Neisen Movement, helped his campaign. 
He made good use of the Electoral Development Fund. Just before 
the writs were issued and Parliament was dissolved he publicly 
announced that he would cease the distribution of his Electoral 
Development Fund, even though decisions had already been made. 
The Funds would be distributed after the election. Thompson 
introduced the use of recorded songs into the campaign. With the 
help of Kenny Lucas, a campaign song was written and sung on 
cassette tapes in the Titan language and in tok pisin . The Titan 
version appealed to the Titans to stand together to elect Thompson 
whilst the tok pisin version placed emphasis on good leadership. 
Copies were produced and distributed. 
The tables above, extracted from Hilarai and Sinai [ 1992] , 
summarise the votes each candidate received from each electorate 
in Manus. 
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Interpretation of the results 
While the 1992 election results confirmed the traditional voting 
behaviour of the Manus voters, they also appeared to present a few 
new trends. 
Firstly, as always, reputable and serious candidates received 
majority votes from their home area. This is known in Manus as the 
'base vote' or 'has blong basket' . A serious candidate is expected to 
secure the votes in his own area before he can expect support from 
other areas. Votes from other areas depend on whether they have 
their own home candidates and, if so, whether they are serious 
candidates. If they are, they would be expected to secure the 'base 
votes' there while other candidates compete for the rest of the 
votes. Serious candidates in this election secured a majority or a 
good percentage of votes from their respective home areas or from 
areas with which they were associated. Thus both Michael Pondros 
and Memel Pohei secured a very high percentage of votes in 
Lelemasih, with which they have been associated by circumstances 
and choice, even though they are from the Sopomu-Malai Bay and 
Ere-Kele electorates respectively. Memel Pohei secured 813 votes 
out of 1,469 from Lelemasih, which was the highest number of votes 
secured by any candidate in any one electorate. 
A corollary of the first point is that where an area has no home 
candidate, all candidates compete energetically for votes. In such 
situations, candidates with traditional relations, previous political 
support, or a reputation that mobilizes the voters have an 
advantage over others. It is in such situations that achievements 
and proven performance of candidates count for most. 
Depending on the number and calibre of candidates, those who 
secure three digit votes in at least two thirds of the electorates are 
the likely winners. The contest in the provincial seat was between 
Marsipal and Pokasui. In the open seat, it was between Thompson 
and Pohei. All four candidates received a substantial number of 
votes in over two thirds of the electorates.  A clear win by a 
candidate in his home base is only effective if he can comfortably 
secure a similar expression of support in seven to ten other 
electorates. This factor naturally makes election in Manus 
democratic. The smallness of the communities requires candidates to 
widen their appeal throughout the province if they want to be 
elected as leaders representing Manus in the National Parliament. 
A candidate who is regionalistic or throws around extremely 
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partisan or sectionally narrow-minded vote-winning slogans would 
win in his territory but not overall in the election. Marsipal and 
Thompson and their runners-up, Pokasui and Pohei respectively, 
demonstrated this point. 
Thirdly, voting is not on party lines. The role of political 
parties in mobilizing votes for their respective candidates is very 
negligible. Pangu endorsed Arnold Marsipal and Michael Kuweh 
for the provincial and open seats, respectively. Marsipal won with 
2,547. Michael Kuweh received only 1,337 votes . PDM endorsed 
James Pokasui and Mark Hosea Sinai for the provincial and open 
seats, respectively. Pokasui received 2,434 votes whilst Sinai 
received only 974.  Tarcisius Kasou, MA's provincial candidate, 
received only 44 per cent of the votes received by his running mate, 
Memel Pohei, who came second in the open seat. The results suggest 
that other factors were more influential than association with 
political parties .  
Fourthly, in the 1992 national election no woman contested 
either of the two Manus electorates.  In the 1987 Election, Nahau 
Rooney, the then incumbent Open Member unsuccessfully re-contested 
the seat. Since 1964, when elections for the National Parliament 
were first held, only two women have contested the leadership of 
Manus. Nahau Rooney successfully contested the Open Seat in 1977 
and 1982 and Elizabeth Buara unsuccessfully contested the Open 
Seat in 1982. 
Of the 12,960 voters in the 1992 election, about 50 per cent were 
women. Of the eight polling areas which recorded the number of 
male and female voters, 3,085 were male and 3,039 were female 
voters. Women in Manus have not voted as a group. There was no 
indication in the 1992 election that women voted as a group. 
Candidates did not raise issues peculiar to women to appeal 
specifically to women voters.  The role of the family, church 
membership and successful campaigning by the candidates were the 
influential factors. As awareness among women increases and male­
dominated leadership exposes its own weaknesses, women as a group 
of voters in Manus should emerge as a group to be reckoned with in 
the making and unmaking of Manus leaders in future elections. 
Many factors combine to influence the way people vote .  
Origination or  association with a particular area is  one important 
factor. For example, Tarcisius Kasou, a candidate for the provincial 
seat, secured 522 votes in Kali-Bipi from where he originates. His 
MA running mate for the open seat only secured 69 from Kali-Bipi. 
Manus: Reign of Subtlety over Deception of Hospitality 1 3 9 
Similarly, Memel Pohei received 813 from Lelemasih with which 
he has associated himself whilst Tarcisius Kasou received only 24 
votes. Other examples include Arnold Marsipal, who received 390 
votes from Rapatona, his home base, while his Pangu running mate 
for the open seat, Michael Kuweh, received only 101 from Rapatona. 
On the other hand, Michael Kuweh received 448 votes from Kurti, 
his home base, whilst Arnold Marsipal received 376 votes from 
there. (See Table 5 .7) . The votes Marsipal received were not 
necessarily because of Michael Kuweh; he has traditionally 
received good support from Kurti since he began contesting national 
elections . 
The weaknesses of political parties in Manus make candidate 
evaluation the key factor in the election. A person with greater 
appeal stands a greater chance of succeeding whether he contests as 
an independent, is endorsed by a very obscure political party or is 
endorsed by a major political party. 
Table 5 .7: Role of Political Parties 
Pangu Pati Melanesian 
Alliance 
People's Democatic 
Movement 
ELECTORATES Marsipal Kuweh Kasou Pohei Pokasui Sinai 
N/Western 4 6  2 5  20  4 0  7 3  1 9  
Kali-Bi pi  36  83 522 69  64 8 7  
Soparibeu 2 1  94 1 77 227 1 1 7  9 9  
Tulu-Ponam 5 8  1 38 34 1 39 1 99 1 9 3  
Kurti 3 76 448 1 42 357 74 1 3  
Bupi-Chupeu 1 60 8 9  3 1  291  174 1 6  
Lelemasih 1 4 0  6 8  24 8 1 3  547 1 09 
Lorengau 244 1 22 2 1 8  5 1 6  166 4 9  
Los Negros 1 0 3  75  1 87 374 226 44 
Nali 6 7  3 9  8 1 75 7 8  3 8  
Pere-MBunai 1 63 1 6  3 9  1 83 1 2 7  1 6  
Ere-Kele 1 43 8 2 3  5 1 1  1 1 2 3 
Sopomu-Mala 235  1 8  1 64 256 96 257 
Balopa 3 1 4  7 1 2  79 82 4 
Rapatona 390  1 0 1  3 2  2 7 1  165 1 4  
S/Western 5 1  6 2 72 1 0 7  3 4  1 3  
TOTAL 2 547 1 337 1 935 4 408 2 434 9 74 
1 40 Pokawin and Rooney 
Some observations about the performance of candidates might throw 
further light on the elections. Generally, first time candidates did 
better than expected. Vincent Tonam secured the second lowest 
number of votes, but he received majority votes in North Western 
where he comes from and came third in Soparibeu. Paliau Bernard 
came second to Michael Pondros in Sopomu-Malai Bay where they 
both come from, but he did well in Balopa and Rapatona, where he 
has traditional ties. Nali James secured a substantial number of 
votes in North Western, Kali-Bipi, Soparibeu and Sopomu-Malai 
B a y  . .  
Michael Pondros, who came in a strong third with 2,160 votes 
behind Arnold Marsipal and James Pokasui, reversed his dismal 
1987 performance. 1987 was clearly too close in time to his dismissal 
from parliament in 1983 for leadership code offences . Out of the 
sixteen electorates, he secured a good proportion of the votes in six. 
He received majority votes in three: Soparibeu, Ere-Kele, and 
Sopomu-Malai Bay. He came in second in Lelemasih, Lorengau, and 
Los Negros. 
Andyson Bernard Kaspou, a candidate for the provincial seat, 
came home last with 684 votes. This is worth mentioning in light of 
his having spent a lot of time moving around the province under the 
guise of doing research for the Office of the Prime Minister. He was 
also the most educated of the candidates. In 1989, he contested for 
the Premiership but was not successful. His efforts between 1989 and 
1 992 to systematically understand the voting behaviour of the 
Manus voter and establish himself failed to support his bid for a 
seat in the National Parliament. 
Tarcisius Kasou's candidacy for the provincial seat is also worth 
mentioning. He had been the Member for Kali-Bipi in the 
Provincial Assembly since 1985. From 1985 to 1989, he was the 
Deputy Premier and Minister for Community Government. He 
secured 68 per cent of the votes in his electorate and secured three 
digit votes in six other electorates. His performance in the South 
Western electorate was outstanding. He received 70 per cent of the 
votes from South Western even though he did not go there to 
campaign. He out-performed Arnold Marsipal, the sitting member, 
who received only 13 per cent of the votes. His success could be 
attributed to the support he received from the Provincial Assembly 
Member for South Western and the efforts by the Provincial 
Government, within which he was Deputy Premier, in effectively 
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incorporating Aua and Wuvulu into the administration o f  Manus 
Province. 
For the first time since the 1964 election to the House of 
Assembly, the voters elected simultaneously two persons from the 
southern islands of the province to represent Manus in the National 
Parliament. Arnold Marsipal hails from Nauna Island in the 
Rapatona electorate and Martin Thompson is a Mouk from Baluan 
Island in the Balopa electorate. This fact raised apprehensions 
among the inhabitants of the main island, while the inhabitants of 
the south islands and Titan communities on the south coast 
celebrated the success. But both groups were restrained and. sensitive 
to each other's situation. 
The political undercurrent of Manus society introduces 
distinctions based on seafarers versus landowners, north versus 
south, Christians versus Paliau followers and, recently, east versus 
west, as significant political divisions. In this election Tarcisius 
Kasou, Mark Hosea and Vincent Tonam used the last distinction to 
gain support. They all originated from the western end of the 
province and no person from that region of Manus has ever 
represented the province in Parliament. At the Provincial 
Government level, they have assumed the post of Deputy Premier 
but not Premier. This led to the three candidates and their 
supporters calling for a change to allow a west coast person to be 
elected to Parliament in this election. They were successful in 
appealing to west coast but not to the province as a whole. Since the 
western end of Manus does not have the population, support from the 
wider Manus community is needed for a candidate from there to 
succeed. 
Similarly, Martin Thompson subtly used the seafarers /Titan 
and Paliau followers well in consolidating his votes. Such 
dichotomies will continue to impact upon future elections. This 
confirms Rooney's observations on the 1977 national election where 
he noted the dichotomy between the seafarers and the landbased 
people: 
The state of tension between the seafarers and gardeners 
is a major political force in the province even today, and 
had its effect on the election even though the more 
modern dichotomy between north coast and south coast 
appeared to be more significant [Rooney 1983:273] . 
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In the 1992 national election, we observed the introduction of the 
east-west dichotomy. This has emerged because of increasing 
political consciousness of the west coast people and the effect of the 
logging operations in the area, resulting in increased contribution of 
the region to the country's economy. 
Martin Thompson's victory was seen as victory for Makasol or 
Win Neisen, the politico-religious group which emanated from the 
Paliau Movement. Thompson was an active member, leader and 
advisor to the group . However, the results clearly showed that 
Thompson received a substantial number of votes from non-Win 
Neisen areas throughout the province. His reputation as a Lawyer 
and his earlier unsuccessful bids for the National Parliament seat 
had elevated his stature in the province. 
The aftermath and conclusion 
Except for a minor post-election dissatisfaction in the camp of 
candidate Memel Pohei, the election results were accepted by the 
candidates and the Manus people with their usual equanimity. 
Memel Pohei ran second to Martin Thompson, only 351 votes behind. 
Michael Kuweh received 1 ,337 votes which Pohei' s supporters 
thought would have gone to Pohei if Kuweh had not contested the 
election. Pohei and his supporters saw his failure to win as the 
result of Kuweh's candidacy. As we have noted above, Memel Pohei 
and Michael Kuweh have had political differences for some time. 
They have exchanged letters and commentaries over Radio Manus. 
Differences are rooted in their style of politics, genuine 
disagreements about adherence to MA principles and competition for 
MA sponsorship. Had Kuweh not contested, Pohei would probably 
have won the election. The tension manifested itself in the stopping 
of vehicles travelling through Buyang (Pohei's village) from Kari 
in the Kurti electorate where Kuweh comes from and which he 
represents in the Provincial Assembly. The situation spread into 
Lorengau, but the momentum dissipated as quickly as it had risen. 
The general situation after the election was to wait and see 
what the newly elected leaders would do. The two elected leaders 
immediately left the province to take part in the process of electing 
the new government of Papua New Guinea. And, this time, the 
conduct of the election left no room for court challenges. 
The 1 992 national election highlighted tolerance and 
unintended deception as characteristics of Manus political 
behaviour. Wherever the candidates went to campaign, they were 
Manus: Reign of Subtlety over Deception of Hospitality 1 43 
received and looked after by the leaders, and villagers turned out to 
listen to them, even though they might well have decided who 
their candidates were. Speeches were made to support their bids to 
win the election. So, while the candidates usually left the villages 
satisfied that they had support there and moved on confident that 
they would win the election, they discovered that when the votes 
were counted, their expectations were far from reality. The outcome 
of the 1992 national election in Manus for both the Provincial and 
Open seats affirms the reign of subtlety over the deception of 
hospitality. Candidates who do not fully appreciate the dynamics 
of Manus electoral politics would easily be misled by the easygoing 
tolerance and hospitality that characterise Manus political culture. 
6 
State Ritual: Ethnographic Notes on 
Voting in the Namatanai Electorate 
Robert /. Foster 
. . .  one of the important aspects of the existence of a 
modern s tate, precisely as a complex of social 
interaction of individual persons, consists in the fact 
that the action of various individuals is oriented to the 
belief that it exists or should exist, thus that its acts 
and laws are valid in the legal sense . 
Max Weber 
The state is not the reality that stands behind the mask 
of political practice. It is itself the mask that prevents 
our seeing political practice as it is . . .  My suggestion is 
that we should recognize that cogency of the idea of the 
state as an ideological power and treat that as a 
compelling object of analysis. But the very reasons that 
require us to do that also require us not to believe in the 
idea of the state, not to concede, even as an abstract 
formal object, the existence of the state. 
Philip Abrams 
In a footnote toward the end of The Savage Mind, Claude Levi­
Strauss elucidates his famous claim that 'there is no such thing as 
the real totem' by citing the observation of an old Indian chief 
(1966:239) .  According to the story, recounted by Diamond Jenness in a 
1929 lecture on the Indians of Eastern Canada, the chief used a 
simile to describe the 'bosses' of animal and plant species. Now and 
then the Indians see and kill these 'bosses,' but for the most part the 
'bosses' remain out of view of the Indians: 
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Voting in the Namatanai Electorate 
They ['the bosses'] are like the government in Ottawa . . .  
An ordinary Indian can never see the 'government. '  He 
is sent from one office to another, is introduced to this 
man and to that, each of whom sometimes claims to be 
the 'boss', but he never sees the real government, who 
keeps himself hidden. 
1 4 5  
I remembered this story while thinking about the comments that 
Anton Neof, a middle aged Tangan man, made during a conversation 
with me and another Tangan friend, Somanil Funil. It was the 
evening of June 23, just before the close of the polling period of the 
1992 national election. The topic of our conversation was government 
corruption. Neof informed me that local supporters of the People's 
Progress Party (PPP), of which he was one, had challenged local 
Pangu Pati supporters with the charge that the current government 
was corrupt. The Pangu supporters, he continued, replied that it was 
not the government that was corrupt, but rather certain individual 
people. Neof countered, he said, with a pair of rhetorical questions: 
'What is the government if not these people? If I went to see the 
government what would I see but them?' 
I take Neof's remarks as one small piece of evidence that 
Tangans, perhaps like most citizens of Papua New Guinea, do not 
imagine the state as a reified entity or transcendent abstraction­
something that exists independently of the flesh and blood public 
servants who operate (or not) in its name. Neof's identification of 
Pangu Pati with ' the government' suggests an alternative and 
unfetishized conception of the state as the particular people who 
actually comprise it. It is a corollary of this conception that state 
officials relate to 'the people' much as patrons to clients, that is, as 
dispensers of largesse and guardians of well being (see Clark n.d.) . 
In other words, the idea of a state as an autonomous institution, let 
alone belief in The State, commands no more self-evident recognition 
by ordinary Papua New Guineans than it does by political 
commentators (see, e.g., Filer 1992 on 'bits of state'). It is very much 
to the point of political analysis, then, to ask: what are the means 
by which the idea of the state is communicated? What are the 
means by which this idea is made experientially real, naturalized 
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as a taken for granted feature of everyday affairs? Or, what are the 
means by which 'the state' becomes visible in the course of events?l 
In this chapter I propose to address these questions through a 
brief ethnographic description of voting in the Tanga Islands, 
Namatanai Electorate, New Ireland Province. My aim is to suggest 
how the concrete act of casting a vote in the national election 
assumes the form of a secular ritual that, in the structure and 
symbolism of its performance, enjoins upon participants a particular 
definition of community, on the one hand, and of personhood, on the 
other.  That is, the act of voting performatively demonstrates 
membership in a community of voters (the nation) whose 
relationship to each other is mediated, expressed, and guaranteed 
by the state. In so doing, the act of voting presumes and promotes 
definitions of community and person that are different from those 
that conventionally organize local social life . At the same time, 
the act of voting constitutes 'the state' as an experiential reality­
however temporary-for people who otherwise rarely encounter 
state agents or agencies (military, legal, or administrative) as a 
salient aspect of their everyday lives. 
Before turning to the ethnographic details of voting in the Tanga 
Islands, I first report the overall results of voting in the Namatanai 
Open. I discuss these results with reference to Norman MacQueen' s 
analysis of the 1987 election in his article, 'Faltering Progress:  
Namatanai Open, New Ireland' (1989). As will become evident, the 
results of the 1992 election dramatically reversed the trend that 
MacQueen saw of an 'erosion in the PPP position'. On the basis of my 
observations of the election in the Tanga Islands, I want to suggest 
two reasons that might account for this reversal: the local level 
organization of Sir Julius Chan's campaign, and the diffuse 
perception of a need for change in national level government. 
PPP returns to power 
The story of the 1992 elections in New Ireland Province was the 
complete and convincing victory of the candidates of the People's 
Progress Party. PPP won all three seats in New Ireland, reclaiming 
both the Provincial seat and the Kavieng Open seat it had lost in 
the 1987 election (table 6 .1 ) .  Former Police Commissioner Paul 
1 For related discussions of belief in the idea of the state see Abrams 1988; 
Cohn and Dirks 1988; Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Geertz 1980; Taussig 
1992; Weber 1978. 
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Tohian defeated Pangu Environment and Conservation Minister 
Michael Singan, and Ben Micah Allan ousted sitting member 
Lapaseng Meli of the Melanesian Alliance. PPP's impressive 
showing in New Ireland Province thus magnified its more modest 
resurgence on the national scene after a dismal performance in the 
1987 elections. At the end of polling, PPP had won six new members 
in addition to the two new members from New Ireland. 
Table 6. 1 :  New Ireland Province election results, 1992 
Candidate Party Vote Percent 
Namatanai Open 
Sir Julius Chan PPP 11,567 60.07 
Ezekiel Tomon Pangu 7,686 39.92 
New Ireland Provincial 
Paul Tohian PPP 16,563 50.37 
Michael Singan Pangu 11,886 36. 14 
Miskus Maraleu Ind 3,351 10.19 
Ilias Kasiki t Ind 1,081 3.28 
Kavieng Open 
Ben Micah Allan PPP 5,391 38.24 
Lapaseng Meli MA 3,332 23.63 
Sition Gion Ind 1,976 14.01 
Tokau Kamalu Pangu 1,598 1 1 .33 
Mesulam Aisoli Ind 1,052 7.46 
Kevin Patio Ind 747 5.29 
But it was Sir Julius Chan himself, founder and long time leader of 
the PPP, whose victory in the Namatanai Open most dramatically 
reversed the apparent decline in the fortunes of his party. Chan 
won 60.07 per cent of the votes in Namatanai, the highest per cent 
since the first post-independence national election when he took 64.5 
per cent of the votes cast. In other words, his share of the total vote 
increased by about 12 per cent over the previous election when he 
won 8,246 of 1 7,081 votes (48.25%). Perhaps even more significant 
than the scale of the victory was its nature: Chan won in a head to 
head race with Ezekiel Tomon, the Pangu candidate, thus 
distinguishing Namatanai as the only seat in the country contested 
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by just two candidates (plate 1 ) .  There could be no accusations of 
'vote splitting' made against PPP; that is, there was no evidence to 
excite speculation about PPP supporting so-called independent 
candidates in order to siphon off anti-PPP votes. Suspicions of this 
sort of strategy had surfaced in the previous two elections and had 
prompted MacQueen (1989:223) to wonder if the 1992 election would 
see 'a much more elaborate and ruthless set of tactics including 
perhaps the sponsorship of 'splitters' and 'syphons' by each side . . .  ' 
Chan's support was well distributed throughout the electorate. He 
won a majority in nine of the eleven divisions (see map), losing 
narrowly only in Lihir and in the traditionally anti-PPP East Coast 
Central (see table 6.2) . 
Table 6.2: Breakdown by division of voting in the Namatanai Open 
Chan Tomon 
Tabar Island 957 394 
East Coast Central 813 922 
East Coast Central 543 547 
West Coast Central 787 646 
East Coast Namatanai 1854 801 
West Coast Namatanai 1036 452 
Susurunga/Tanglamet 1249 1093 
Kand as 723 334 
Lak 500 423 
Lihir  1322 1362 
Tanga 1214 651 
Anir 559 161 
His victory thus reversed losses in the previous election in both the 
southern mainland divisions of Lak and Kandas. Chan also 
maintained strong support from the offshore islands of Tabar, Anir 
and Tanga, as well as from east and west coast Namatanai. He won 
his home division of Susurunga/Tanglamet by a small majority. As 
far as can be roughly determined by correlating ballot boxes and 
polling places, Chan appear::) to have won the 'home area' of both 
himself and Tomon, the villages of Huris and Hialon. Chan's 
strongest support within the Susurunga / Tanglamet division, 
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however, appears to have come from the Tanglamet villages of 
Muliama, Warangansau, and Sena. 
Chan won 22 of the 29 ballot boxes counted in the total vote for 
Namatanai. Nonetheless, close inspection of the ballot counts 
indicates that even in divisions where Chan won large majorities, 
some villages or village clusters supported Tomon. For example, in 
Sir Julius's own birthplace, the Tanga Islands, significant support for 
Tomon could be found in certain locales (see map) .  While the 
majority of voters on the main island of Boang, home to 75% of the 
Tangan population, supported Chan, residents of western Boang 
(Fonli and Taonsip) gave Tomon 106 more of the 718 votes cast 
(57.38%) than they gave to Chan (table 6.3). By contrast, residents 
of eastern Boang and the less populous islands of Lif, Tefa and 
Malendok gave Chan 908 of 1147 total votes (79. 16%). 
Table 6.3: Estimated correlation of ballot box counts and polling 
villages in the Tanga constituency 
Ballot Box No. Votes 
84 Chan: 438 
Tomon: 78 
85 Chan: 306 
Tomon:412 
86 Chan: 470 
Tomon: 161 
Polling Villages 
Tefa, Kitkita, Balamfal, 
C /School, Malesak C /School, 
Put, Put Plantation, Put Health 
Ctr., Fangwel, Sinaudo, 
Balanwaransau, Gargaris, 
Minmale C/School, Nonu 
Ansawe, Taubie, Fonli, 
Fonli C /School, Taonsip, 
Taonsip C/School, Luanke, 
Tiriwan 
Sasa, Amfar, Amfar Catholic 
Mission, Bil, Kamunaseo, 
Ambaba, Tanga Station, Sunkin, 
Ambisune 
Similar examples of the opposite kind can also be adduced. For 
instance, strong support for Chan could be found in some locales 
within the two divisions that Chan lost, East Coast Central and 
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Lihir. This pattern suggests that highly local factors inflected the 
trend of province-wide support for Chan in this election. In the 
Tanga case, which is most familiar to me, support for the Pangu 
slate in western Boang derived in part from strong support for 
Michael Singan. I was told that Singan had rendered material 
assistance to the operations of Tanga Trading, a locally owned 
network of small trade stores headquartered in western Boang and 
run by men with relatives in the Taonsip and Fonli areas. In other 
parts of New Ireland, different local factors might have modified 
the tendency of the overall vote. For example, significant numbers 
of non-native New Irelanders in the East Coast Central division, 
especially plantation workers and settlers originally from the 
Sepik, might have voted their traditional allegiance to Pangu Pati 
(see MacQueen 1989). Similarly, in the Lihir Islands, the only one 
of the three ballot boxes that gave Tomon a majority of the votes 
(633 to 453 for Chan) was probably used in polling places located in 
the vicinity of the Ladolam Mining Camp on the western side of 
Lihir Island (Niolam or Big Lihir) .  It is possible that Chan's clear 
defeat in these villages registered the dissatisfaction of voters with 
his role in negotiations surrounding the development of the Lihir 
gold mine. 
Local factors aside, how can the manifest decisiveness of Chan' s 
victory be explained? My answers to this question are based solely 
on observations made and information gathered by myself during a 
brief visit to the Tanga Islands for the second week of the June 
polling period. The applicability of these answers to other parts of 
the electorate must be treated more as a hypothesis than as a claim. 
I offer them in response to the hypotheses formulated by MacQueen 
in accounting for what seemed to be in 1987 a trend of 'faltering 
progress' for the PPP. 
First of all, as table 6.3 illustrates, support for Chan' s candidacy 
throughout Tanga was not 'a given,' that is, neither Tanga nor the 
other island divisions ought to be regarded as 'official' PPP 
reserves. (Recall in this regard that Chan had won Lihir in the 
previous two elections, even when running against a Lihir candidate 
in 1987.) MacQueen (1989:223) reported that the anti-Chan camp 
drew this same conclusion from the results of the 1987 election and 
vowed 'that the next campaign must pay much more attention to the 
island districts . '  In retrospect, however, it seems that Chan and his 
party also shared this conviction and altered their campaign 
methods accordingly. The Post Courier, for instance, reported that: 
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In his victory statement, Sir Julius said he and the other 
two PPP candidates had w on because they had 
conducted 'grass roots' campaigning. They had educated 
voters and not swayed them with political promises and 
'gimmicks' (Yadi 1992). 
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Similarly, PPP Chairman Zebang Zurenouoc said of his party's 
campaign that 'We did this at the grass roots level and we did it at 
a comparatively low cost. PPP owes no favours to anyone' 
(Hriehwazi and Bengi 1992) . 
What did this 'grass roots' campaigning look like in Tanga, and 
how did it differ from the Pangu campaign there? Someone like 
myself arriving on Boang Island the day before polling began there 
would notice immediately the numerous bright yellow and red Pangu 
campaign posters (plate 2). These posters covered the exterior walls 
of many of the houses along the vehicular road from Amfar to 
Taonsip, even though some of these houses were in areas that in the 
event voted overwhelmingly for Chan. By contrast, no posters for 
Chan or the other PPP candidate, Paul Tohian, could be seen. The 
executive in charge of the PPP campaign in Tanga, Sipien Severin, 
told me that no funds were available for posters which, in any case, 
he considered a poor investment. Indeed, I heard reports of how 
Pangu posters on the islands of Lif, Tefa, and Malendok (where 85% 
of the residents voted for Chan) had been defaced. 
On the other hand, the PPP campaign put in the hands of 
several key supporters photocopies of 'Namatanai Electorate Nius, ' 
a booklet produced by 'the Office of the Member for Namatanai . '  
The booklet contained anti-Pangu and pro-PPP /Chan articles taken 
from the Post Courier, a copy of Chan' s curriculum vitae, pictures of 
specimen ballots, and photographs of PPP rallies held throughout 
New Ireland Province. Men who visited the house and lineage men's 
house of my host and PPP supporter, Partui Bonaventura, would 
leisurely peruse the booklet, paying greatest attention to the 
photographs of the rallies.  These photographs included several 
snapshots of Sir Julius's visit in March to Tanga, one of two trips 
made by Chan to Tanga in the closing phase of the campaign. In the 
context of the other similar photographs, these pictures struck me as 
pleasing the Tangan men who examined them by conveying a sense of 
the place of Tanga in New Ireland Province as a whole. That is, 
these pictures, unlike the Pangu campaign posters, did not make a 
direct appeal for support to individual voters, but rather evoked for 
Tangans a sense of their belonging to a larger community of PPP 
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supporters, a community that extended beyond the boundaries of 
their own island home. 
I was told that neither Ezekiel Tomon nor Michael Singan 
personally visited Tanga during the election campaign, although 
Sir Pita Lus was said to have visited in order to speak on behalf of 
Pangu Pati and to criticize Chan's political career. The absence of 
the Pangu candidates was perhaps due to a lack of financial 
resources, a problem that hampered Tomon's campaign in 1987 
(MacQueen 1989: 218). Sir Julius, by contrast, enjoyed access to the 
resources of his family's airline company, Islands Aviation, which 
since 1991 has serviced all of the offshore islands on a regular basis 
(e.g. ,  scheduled flights from Boang to Rabaul five days a week) . 
His visits to Tanga, as to other locales in the electorate, 'tended 
towards the regal' (MacQueen 1989:217), brief but spectacular 
appearances at the major community centres on Boang: Fonli, 
Taonsip, and Amfar. Chan was not seated on a throne or borne aloft 
on a litter, newly invented traditions of Papua New Guinea 
political campaigns, but he was presented with numerous cooked 
pigs and honoured as the big man whose coming occasions an 
elaborate feast. Sir Julius, I was told by one man, apparently 
performed his part of this drama, using the opportunity of his 
March visit to dispense small monetary gifts to several senior men in 
poor health (one of whom ardently supported the Pangu slate), thus 
'shaking hands' with them one last time in recognition of past 
assistance they had given. 
I was not present to observe the festivities associated with Sir 
Julius's visits, but I was present at one PPP rally / feast held during 
the polling period . On the eve of voting at each of the three polling 
places on Boang, PPP supporters staged rallies at which speeches 
were made by Tangan PPP campaign executives-most of whom were 
relatively educated men in their thirties and forties-and other 
prominent local residents. The crowd was encouraged to get out and 
vote, informed of voting procedures, and shown the location of 
Chan's and Tohian's pictures on specimen ballots. Copious amounts 
of food, drinking coconuts, and betel nut were contributed, 
redistributed, and consumed on each of these occasions by the largely 
pro-PPP crowds that attended. 
The scale of the feast I observed at the Taonsip polling place 
was much smaller than that of the feasts held in honour of Chan's 
visit-pigs were not eaten, for example-but its organization was 
broadly similar. On the day prior to the feast, local women 
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Plate 1 .  Specimen ballot for the Namatanai Open Electorate posted on the 
outside wall of the men's house (bia) at Mokatilistunglo. 
Plate 2. Pangu Pati posters displayed on the outside wall of the Tanga Trading 
tradestore in Taunsip. 

Plate 3. Setting up the polling area at Mokatilistunglo. Men's house in the 
background 
Plate 4. Voting at Mokatilistunglo 
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prepared mangat, scraped yams mixed with shredded coconut meat 
and wrapped for baking in a leaf packet. Local men meanwhile 
constructed a bamboo platform on which to pile and display food 
brought to the feast. These activities were loosely coordinated by 
Partui Bonaventura, a senior man recognized as the leader of his 
matrilineage (ma tambia ), that is, as the principal organizer of the 
mortuary rites undertaken to commemorate deceased matrilineage 
members (see Foster 1995).  In doing so, Partui followed procedures 
commonly used in organizing and performing mortuary feasts. For 
example, he distributed rice to various individual households 
which assumed responsibility for cooking it and bringing it to the 
feast for redistribution. The rice was purchased with funds supplied 
by PPP campaign executives, but the labour for preparing it was 
supplied by households mobilized for the purpose by Partui. 
Similarly, these households provided the mostly female labour 
involved in sweeping the site clean, serving the food, and washing 
up afterwards. 
The rally I feast at Taonsip was attended by scores of local men, 
women and children as well as PPP supporters from other parts of 
Boang. A truck load of guests arrived from Amfar, featuring a chorus 
of young men singing a PPP theme song that, I was told, had been 
composed by a Tangan stringband, recorded on cassettes, and 
circulated throughout the province. The dignitaries included not 
only the lieutenants in charge of the PPP campaign in Tanga, but 
also several senior lineage leaders, counterparts of Partui who 
likewise used their customary authority and skills in organizing 
PPP-related events . In short, the rally /feast made it appear as if 
the PPP campaign had successfully linked an organization of 
younger, educated executives to the networks of support focussed on 
more senior PPP 'committee men,' customary lineage leaders or 'big 
men' (kaltu dok) .  In this way, the campaign generated public 
support for Chan among both senior and junior generations of men, 
and among voters with very different degrees of exposure to 
schooling and to issues of provincial and national significance. 
It would be misleading to imply that this inter-generational 
linkage of organizations was without problems. On several 
occasions, for instance, I heard older committee men complain that 
the younger executives were not equitably sharing PPP resources, 
namely, cash and store bought food. But the linkage is notable in 
light of MacQueen's claim that the dominant cleavage between 
supporters of Chan and Tomon in 1987 could be described in terms of 
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an 'age/ education' nexus (1989:214). According to MacQueen, Chan's 
support derived mainly from an older, less educated age group 
familiar with Sir Julius's career since before independence. Areas in 
which this age group retained its customary authority over younger 
voters could therefore be expected to support Chan. However, given 
the declining influence of the senior generation, on the one hand, and 
the growing population of younger, more educated voters, on the 
other, the prospects of continued support for Chan would seem dim. 
The split between PPP and Pangu supporters in Taonsip could not 
easily be characterized in terms of an opposition between senior and 
junior generations. Indeed, one PPP supporter, a man in his thirties, 
claimed that older, uneducated Taonsip men preferred to support 
Pangu in the mistaken belief that Michael Singan, if elected, would 
financially reward loyal followers on a lineage by lineage basis . In 
any case, it is clear from the magnitude of Chan' s victory in most 
Tangan locales that a sizeable percentage of the younger, more 
educated voters supported PPP.2 I surmise that this outcome 
resulted at least partially from a campaign that used young male 
executives to appeal to young male voters as well as older lineage 
heads to deploy their customary authority and organizational 
skills .  I should also add that many of the younger and more 
educated Tangan women voted for Chan explicitly on the grounds of 
his support for Tangan women's groups (or mama groups) .  One 
Taonsip woman active in these groups, closely associated with the 
Catholic Mission, affirmed this sentiment to me at the pre-voting 
PPP rally. Chan's support apparently took the form of passing on a 
request for funds from Sister Gerhildis to Niugini Mining Ltd 
(NGM) . According to Colin Filer (personal communication, 
10/ 13/93), a monetary gift was made by NGM in 1990 or early 1991 
as part of a nationwide public relations strategy, although many of 
the Tangans with whom I spoke associated the gift specifically 
with NGM's participation in the Lihir Joint Venture.3 Sir Julius, 
along with NGM's exploration manager, Gavin Thomas, made a 
2 I note in this regard that Karen Sykes, an anthropologist conducting 
educational research in the Lelet plateau during the election, told me about 
one senior man and Pangu supporter who expressed anger over his young 
nephew's open support for Chan and the PPP (personal communication, 
June 30th, 1992) . 
3 I am uncertain as to the exact size of the gift, but several Tangans reported 
it to me as K20,000. 
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public presentation of the gift t o  the Tangan mama groups a t  Amfar 
on Boang Island. Filer (personal communication, 10/ 13/93) reports 
that according to Thomas, 'Chan was present in his capacity as 
part-owner of the helicopter' that brought Thomas to Tanga for the 
presentation. 
The speeches made at the Taonsip rally were self-consciously 
non-confrontational. Speakers urged their audience to make 
considered and independent choices, that is, to vote for a candidate 
on the basis of his merits and not on the basis of who else appeared 
to support the candidate. Speakers neither criticized Pangu policies 
or Tomon (in fact, Tomon's and Singan's names were never mentioned) 
nor praised PPP policies and Chan. But two speakers unambiguously 
called for a change in national government and reiterated Sir Julius's 
desire to lead such a change. One speaker thus carefully pointed out 
that although Sir Julius had been involved in national politics for a 
long time, most of his career was spent as a member of the 
opposition. These remarks made it clear that at least for some 
voters, national level issues ('antap' versus 'grass roots' issues) were 
relevant to the campaign in Namatanai. Of these issues, by far the 
most important was Bougainville. 
Although only one speaker at the Taonsip rally alluded to 
Bougainville (along with the shutdown of UPNG) as circumstances 
indicative of the need for wise leadership, the effects of the 
Bougainville crisis were beginning to make themselves felt in Tanga. 
These effects went beyond those of outrage caused by the serious 
gunshot wounds inflicted upon one Taonsip police officer wounded in 
an ambush by BRA soldiers. Tangan men who had held well paying 
jobs on Bougainville, either at Panguna or elsewhere, had been 
forced to return home to Boang, some with families. Their presence 
put a double strain on local resources. First, returnees required land 
for making gardens and building materials for houses, extremely 
scarce resources on the overcrowded coral island of Boang (see Foster 
1995 for more detail) . Second, the returnees were no longer able to 
remit wage income to their relatives in Tanga. This loss of 
remittance income came at a time of severe depression in the price 
paid for smoked copra, the only other major source of cash income for 
Tangans. Accordingly, many Tangans expressed frustration over the 
prolonged nature of the Bougainville crisis .  Generally 
unsympathetic to the BRA cause, the Tangans with whom I spoke 
were critical of the Namaliu government's handling of the crisis; 
some openly advocated a quick, military solution. 
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Another national level debate that surfaced in the local 
campaign was official corruption, but this issue was present more as 
an idiom than as a specific issue. In his address (delivered in tok 
pisin) at the Taonsip rally, Sipien Severin specifically asked about 
the meaning of the English word 'corrupt. ' He himself confessed to 
not having a clear explanation to offer, but nonetheless claimed that 
PPP would have nothing to do with 'corrupt' groups .  By the same 
token, however, 'corruption' functioned for Pangu supporters as an 
idiom for criticizing Chan's campaign tactics. For example, Karen 
Sykes (personal communication 6/20 /92) reported hearing comments 
of one D.P.I .  officer on the Lelet Plateau to the effect that Chan's 
'loose use' of money in the campaign amounted to bribery. The 
officer claimed that 'Chan is 'Asian' in his business and his 
political style' and that Australians would not tolerate his gift 
giving.4 Nonetheless, the election result suggests that this criticism 
did not hurt Chan. On the contrary, it appears that Chan was able 
to mobilize the well known sentiment of anti-incumbency in Papua 
New Guinea by presenting himself as an anti-corruption candidate 
in opposition to the Pangu led government, despite the fact that he 
was one of the longest sitting members of parliament in all of the 
country. 
In addition to 'corruption', a second idiom that shaped the 
campaign in Tanga was that of party politics .  As MacQueen 
(1989:223) observed about the 1987 election, the head to head nature 
of the contest focussed attention on party identity unusual in PNG 
politics. This focus was even more intense in 1992, and, I suspect, it 
was the resulting polarization that precipitated the violent clash 
between PPP and Pangu supporters at Sohun village, Namatanai, 
during a PPP rally (Yadi 1992). In Tanga, both Pangu and PPP 
4 Even in Tanga, where Chan was born on his father Chin Pak's plantation 
in 1939, Chan's Asian ancestry was sometimes held against him by his 
detractors. I heard Pangu supporters allege, for example, that 'Chan's 
party' is a white man's party while Pangu is for black skinned people. One 
Taonsip man told me that Chan was from Tanga, true enough, but that his 
ideas were those of white skinned people. This same man also likened the 
PPP strategy of rallying on the evening before voting as a procedure for 
buying votes--for treating voters as if they were chickens. Karen Sykes 
(personal communication, June 30th 1992) reports similar comments from a 
senior Lelet man who compared Chan's gifts to the laplaps once distributed 
as charity by condescending Australians: 'You see,' the man explained, 
'Chan is a masta just the same.' 
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supporters made it clear that there was no middle or neutral ground 
on which to stand: one was either for or against PPP or Pangu. Party 
affiliation very much counted in voters' minds (cf. Oliver 1989: 7-8); 
saying so, however, leaves open the question of what is to be 
understood by 'party affiliation. '  I conclude this report on the 
election in Namatanai by briefly considering this question. 
In Tanga, party affiliation did not mean the endorsement of 
individual voters for the programmes and policies of either Pangu or 
PPP. That is, people did not vote for Sir Julius Chan because he 
represented PPP (if anything, it would be the other way around) or 
for Michael Singan because he represented Pangu. This is not to say 
that there was no awareness of the parties as nationwide 
organizations of prime significance in the formation of government, 
the distribution of ministries, and so forth. It is, however, to say 
that party affiliation took shape locally as the assertion­
temporary and tentative-of a novel social identity. PPP supporters 
would often playfully address members in the opposite camp by 
calling out 'Hey, Pangu! '  Pangu supporters would likewise refer in a 
heavily ironic way to an opponent as 'kwila bilong PPP' ( 'ironwood 
of PPP') .  Pickup trucks would rush through the dark Boang night 
carrying young men shouting in mock seriousness, 'PPP, PPP, PPP! 
Pangu, Pangu, Pangu! ', a jocular deflation of the rivalry between the 
two political parties. Indeed, playfulness and irony very much 
characterized the ethos of trying on party identities in Tanga.5 As 
Anton Neof once put it, politics is a game; it has its own time, but 
when it's over, it's over. 
In retrospect, the election campaign arguably allowed Tangans 
to experiment with their social relations along lines other than the 
familiar ones of kinship, affinity, ceremonial exchange, locality, 
and generation (none of which wholly defines the PPP /Pangu split). 
For a time, two brothers or a father and son might go their separate 
ways; they might spend their days with different cliques in 
different men's houses. But when the election was over, they would 
reunite and cooperate on the basis of a shared matrilineal or 
familial identity . Political identities would recede into the 
background once more, and other social identities-such as those 
appropriate to mortuary rites or property relations-would come to 
the fore. The transience of the campaign, and hence of the social 
5 Another droll piece of campaign humour was the acronymic reading of PPP 
as 'papa paulim pikinini' ('father abuses child') .  
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identities it brought into being, thus enabled Tangans to stand at 
some critical distance from what they were doing as they were doing 
it-as if they were self-consciously performing roles in a play. For 
no matter how vigorous the public show of support for Pangu or PPP, 
the campaign context in which such demonstrations acquired 
significance was ultimately ephemeral. As soon as the election 
results were announced, as soon as 'the game' ended, the relevance of 
party affiliation to everyday Tangan social life would become less 
obvious and less compelling. 
Voting as ritual 
To think of politics as an activity that unfolds in its own time, an 
activity that temporarily posits unconventional social identities 
and enables people to assume these identities as if they were 
performing a role, is to think of politics in terms of ritual. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I will treat voting in Tanga as a rite that 
promotes a non-conventional definition of personhood, that is, as a 
set of procedures that defines persons as separate individuals and 
reconnects them directly to a community of similar individuals, the 
guardian of which is the state. I want to focus on the details of 
actually casting a vote, the particular way in which people 
assemble, observe, and participate in polling during a national 
election. Again, I base my argument on the events I observed in 
Tanga during the 1992 national election; their applicability to 
situations elsewhere in PNG requires further investigation. My 
main aim is to highlight the process of individuation enacted in 
casting a vote: the process of 'singling out' or disconnecting a person 
from the nexus of social relations that defines his or her identity 
and positing for that person a new identity as a discrete and 
autonomous individual, in short, a citizen. 
Polling in the Namatanai Open began on the morning of 
Saturday, June 13th and continued in some divisions until the 
afternoon of Friday, June 26th. One polling team was assigned to 
each of ten divisions; two teams were assigned to the East Coast 
Central division. Each team moved from polling station to polling 
station throughout the division, holding elections in morning, 
afternoon, or all day sessions . In Tanga, the movements of the 
polling teams were widely known in advance; schedules and updates 
on the progress of the teams were broadcast by Radio New Ireland to 
listeners eager for election news. Voters who were unable to vote 
when the team visited their area of residence could vote at other 
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polling stations; similarly, voters from other parts of the electorate 
who were visiting Tanga (e.g., visitors from Anir) could vote at any 
polling station, provided their names appeared on the common roll. 
I arrived on Boang Island on Friday, June 19th. Voting was 
scheduled to begin there the following day in the Fonli area. I 
observed the voting in Fonli as well as in the Taonsip area, where I 
had lived previously, on Monday, June 22. It is on the basis of these 
observations that I offer the following description. 
In the Taonsip area of Boang, the polling station was set up in 
the hamlet of Mokatilistunglo in the shade of a large grapefruit 
tree . This hamlet, and the men's house located there, is the site 
where many Taonsip residents gather for purposes associated with 
community government: Monday 'line' meetings, elections of Local 
Government Council representatives, censuses, visits from health 
workers, and so forth. Partui Bonaventura, the current leader (kaltu 
dok or 'big man') of Solsol matrilineage (matambia)  of clan (junmat) 
Korofi resided in this hamlet. Previous leaders of this clan, some of 
this particular lineage, had occupied the office of lu luai since its 
institution by the German colonial state, and consequently their 
residential hamlets ('camps') had been used for assembling people 
on the occasion of a patrol officer's visit. This habit has persisted 
into the post-independence era. 
Partui, as I have already mentioned, was a well known 
supporter of PPP. When Sir Julius visited Boang in March, he was 
received at a feast made on exactly the same spot as the polling 
station. Similarly, the evening before the voting, local PPP 
organizers held their rally and feast at this same location. 
Accordingly, the site of the polling station was hardly neutral 
space. (By contrast, polling two days earlier was held at the Fonli 
Community School since rain prevented its being held at the old 
'camp' at Taubie. People who had congregated at the school in order 
to vote were thus able to shelter in the classrooms that were not 
being used on the weekend.) Pangu supporters who shunned the 
previous evening's rally would have no choice but to come to 
Mokatilistunglo to cast their votes. 
Given the close association of the Taonsip voting site with a 
particular lineage and its leader, and through him, with a 
particular party and candidate, the first actions undertaken by the 
polling team had the effect of demarcating a public space that 
rendered these associations irrelevant . Upon arrival at  
Mokatilistunglo on the appointed morning, the team of four polling 
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officials and two policemen immediately began to rope off an area 
within which to conduct the voting. Team members traced a large, 
waist high rectangle with a ball of twine, wrapping the twine at 
each corner around a makeshift post or a convenient palm tree. They 
thus separated the voting area from the rest of the hamlet, 
including the Solsol men's house where many men expecting to vote 
had begun to gather, and created a stage on which to display the 
nation-state of Papua New Guinea. For inside the rectangle, people 
acted ideally as representatives of the state or as citizens of the 
nation in whose name the state legitimates itself. No other 
identities, personal or collective, were in principle relevant (plates 
3 and 4). 
Inside the demarcated space sat two kinds of state 
representatives:  the polling officials, all outfitted in identical 
white tee shirts with red lettering, and the policemen, likewise 
outfitted in identical blue uniforms. Admission to the 'inside' was 
carefully regulated and granted to only three categories of people: 
scrutineers, local kom i t i  ( 'village aldermen') ,  and individual 
voters. The scrutineers-all men, mostly young-were delegates of 
the two rival factions in Taunsip who were responsible for observing 
the voting and making sure that no irregularities occurred. Each 
scrutineer wore a small identification tag displaying the word 
'scrutineer'; some scrutineers sat inside the rectangle but away from 
the polling boxes. Kom i t i ,  one from each of the three polling 
villages in Taonsip, entered the polling area in order to assist the 
polling officer in identifying the names of recently deceased 
residents and calling names of voters from the komiti's village (see 
below). Individual voters also entered the polling area, but one by 
one, and only after their being publicly 'singled out. ' 
Outside the demarcated polling space stood clusters of men, 
women and children, observing the proceedings or otherwise 
occupying themselves in conversation or child care until their names 
were called. Many of the men milled around the men's house, the 
exterior walls of which were posted with notices of the laws 
concerning electioneering; many of the women sat in and around the 
nearby cookhouse (jelungkur) of Partui's wife. The names of voters 
were read aloud by a polling official from the electoral roll; the 
names were grouped by census domicile (or village) and ordered 
alphabetically within each domicile. When a name was read, the 
person would separate himself or herself from the crowd and move 
toward the entrance to the polling area.  People would walk 
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forward, sometimes swaggering, sometimes demurring. Women in 
particular would often raise their hands to their mouths in a 
characteristic gesture of discomfort, but men too were highly self 
conscious of the concentrated gaze of the assembled onlookers. 
As prospective voters approached the polling area, they would 
be reinstructed if necessary not to bring their purses or baskets inside. 
People would accordingly deposit their purses at the entrance way. 
Similarly, prospective voters were instructed not to come inside 
with any clothing (tee shirts, caps, laplaps ) or paraphernalia 
(buttons, pamphlets, signs) that bore the name, picture or logo of any 
candidate or party. I understood this regulation to apply only to 
electoral officers and scrutineers, but the polling officials in Tanga 
applied the regulation to the voters as well. Voters would then 
report to one of the polling officials who checked the voter's name 
against the common roll. Another official would then mark the nail 
of one of the voter's pinky fingers with a stripe of indelible ink-a 
preventive measure against multiple voting. Yet another official 
would distribute the ballot papers to the voter and direct the voter 
to one of two cardboard polling booths, where the voter would mark 
the ballot papers. 
At Fonli, the polling booths were set up so that a voter's back 
was turned toward the crowd (plate 3). That is, the actual act of 
voting took place with the crowd-scrutineers, miscellaneous 
spectators, electoral officials, and policemen-looking from a 
distance over the shoulder of the voter. At Taonsip, the polling 
booths were arranged so that the crowd could not see directly into 
the booth; the voters' backs were turned toward the bush. After 
completing the ballot papers, the voter folded his or her papers 
several times, and then stepped out of the booth to deposit the 
papers in the locked metal ballot box near the exit of the polling 
area. One of the policemen, who kept casual watch over the box, 
would assist the voter whenever more space in the box was needed to 
accommodate the ballot papers . The voter would then exit the 
roped off area, retrieve his or her purse, and melt back into the 
crowd. 
How can we understand the actions involved in voting as 
elements of a ritual? I suggest we begin by considering the symbolic 
transformation in personal identity that the process of 'singling out' 
ideally effects. To be singled out is to be constituted as a discrete, 
autonomous individual-a person with an intrinsic rather than 
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relational identity .6 This constitutive process begins in earnest 
with the public calling of a voter's name. Although people were 
called to vote village by village, anyone whose name was on the 
common roll could vote anywhere in the electorate at anytime during 
the polling period; the identity of voters was thus disconnected from 
their identity as residents of particular villages.  Furthermore, 
within each village voters were called in alphabetical order. That 
is, voters' names were not ordered by family units, as they were in 
census counts I have previously observed, but rather by a logic that 
did not evince any relations or connections among the names called. 
This procedure produced one especially odd effect. Given that many 
female names in Tanga are prefixed with Tin-, it appeared that 
women voted in a single bloc after a long parade of men whose names 
began with the letters A through s? 
The voter must enter the polling area stripped of his or her 
relational identity, that is, his or identity as a nephew, mother, 
affine or consanguine. This effect was achieved and epitomized, 
perhaps unintentionally, by requiring voters to leave their baskets 
outside the polling area. In Tanga, one's personal basket is the 
material locus of one's relational identity, the site of the small 
tokens that people give and take in the continuous enactment of 
everyday sociality-betel nut, lime, tobacco, rolling paper, 
matches, combs, spoons, coins. On the one hand, certain categories of 
people, such as a man's sister or his brother in law, ought never to 
touch or inspect each other's baskets; on the other hand, other 
categories of people, such as a man's female cross-cousins, are 
enjoined to invade and play with each other's baskets . A quick fix 
on someone's relational identity can be secured by determining who 
does or does not have access to his or her basket. Accordingly, the 
requirement to divest oneself of one's basket effectively made voters 
shed the material sign of their relational identity before entering 
the polling area. This requirement, moreover, tacitly recalled the 
6 For more discussion of the contrast between intrinsic individuals and 
relational persons (or 'dividuals') see Strathern 1988. 
7 It is important to note that simply calling names in alphabetical order was 
not enough to eclipse completely the relational identities of the people so 
called. Many Tangan names, for example, combine personal names with the 
name of one's father or husband. It was the names of older men and women 
that were the most individuated-combinations of a personal 'place name' 
and a personal Christian name (e.g., Partui Bonaventura) .  
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customary procedure followed in constructing a new men's house, 
when the sponsors of the men's house and its associated feasts 
require male guests to leave their baskets outside the structure until 
it has been properly dedicated. Tangans explain such a requirement 
as a sign of deference or respect (ninatke) that must be shown by the 
guests for their hosts and the deceased big men commemorated by 
the hosts. I have elsewhere (Foster 1995) interpreted this practice 
as part of the procedures by which feast organizers assert their own 
autonomy by temporarily eclipsing the relational identities of both 
their guests and themselves. 
Similarly, the requirement that voters not enter the polling area 
displaying any signs of support for a candidate or party divested 
voters of their collective identity as members of a political group. 
Voters thus entered the arena as individuals whose actions must be 
made to appear as autonomous, that is, as individuals acting 
uncoerced, of their own free will rather than out of loyalty to a 
group . 8 The public appearance of the vote thus conformed to an 
ideal that was articulated in Severin's speech the evening before, 
namely, that one's vote must be one's free personal choice; one must 
not support a particular candidate merely because some other friend 
or relative is doing so. 
If the voter must be freed and individuated, detached from a 
nexus of relational identities, before entering the polling area, then 
the voter's presence inside the area makes visible membership in a 
new community, and hence a new identity. The public verification of 
one's name on the electoral rolls announces one's membership in the 
community of eligible voters. More tangibly, the indelible ink stripe 
drawn on one's finger signifies membership in the community of 
active voters . By the end of the day, the adult population of 
Taonsip would be classified into two categories: voters and non­
voters, the former recognizable by their marked fingers.9 By the end 
of the polling period, between one and two million people in Papua 
8 It is worth noting in this regard that individual voters are made to appear 
in the indigenous image of 'big men,' people whose autonomous action is at 
once the cause and consequence of their power (see Clay 1992). 
9 I note in this regard that several people responded to the news that they 
would not be able to vote because their names were not on the common roll 
with shame as well as anger. The problem of unrecorded names on the 
common roll was relatively minor in Tanga compared with situations 
elsewhere in PNG. 
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New Guinea would be walking around with striped fingers . This 
population forms the large, translocal community into which one is 
recruited by the act of voting: the community of voters who have 
made their marks for the nation. In this community, one's identity is 
not relational, defined in terms of age, gender or kinship differences; 
for one's identity in this community is precisely the same as every 
other member's-that of a free and equal citizen. 
It would be wrong, however, to imply that the ritual process of 
singling out voters unfolds automatically or that the ideal of 
autonomous individualism is realized unproblematically. For if the 
script of the ritual pushes in one direction, the actual performance of 
the ritual often pulls in another, namely, toward the local 
convention of relational identity. Take, for example, the gaze of the 
people outside the polling area, including that of people who had 
already voted themselves. These spectators peered intently into the 
ballot boxes, trying to determine by the angle at which the voter 
marked the ballot the candidates that the voter supported . At 
Taonsip, a group of PPP committee men sat just outside the bounded 
area, watching the proceedings closely. At times they would begin 
to edge along the backside of the polling area in order to get a better 
view into the boxes. Polling officers would instruct them to move 
back. The group would obey, but soon start creeping back again. 
These men were not only trying to produce an estimate of the votes 
for their party, they were also trying to determine if people voted 
according to their publicly stated intentions. (Recall that because of 
the two party nature of the race, such intentions were unavoidably 
indicated by one's presence or absence at a party rally. )  
In other words, the ideal of a pr iva te vote, an important 
corollary of the voter's identity as a discrete individual, was 
hardly accepted without question in Tanga. In one of the speeches 
made at the PPP rally, a party executive made it plain that people 
would be watched during the election. Yes, he said, people were 
free to choose whomever they wished; but, he cautioned, if people 
voted for Pangu (kalap long Pangu), then they would not be given 
access to PPP resources. Scrutineers, he claimed, would report 
whomever lies. And, in fact, scrutineers did seem to keep as close an 
eye as possible on who might be voting for whom. In addition, many 
men remarked to me of their happiness about the 'new' regulation 
that allowed non-literate voters to enter the polling area with an 
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assistant of their own choice. 1 0  Formerly, I was told, polling 
officials themselves rendered assistance to voters in need, thereby 
preserving the confidentiality of the vote. In 1992, many senior men 
and women voted with the assistance of their sons, daughters, 
nephews or nieces, thereby subverting the twin ideals of the 
individuated voter and the private ballot. 
In short, the twine demarcating the polling area not only 
separated two different physical spaces, but also defined a 
contested interface between competing ideals of community and 
personhood. Movement from outside the polling area to inside the 
area enacted a transition from a world defined in terms of relational 
identities to one defined in terms of essential individuals. Inside 
the polling area, voters joined an imagined community of Papua 
New Guinea citizens, a 'deep horizontal comradeship' of equal and 
alike individuals (Anderson 1983). Outside the polling area, one 
assumed one's place in a community of persons defined in terms of 
their particular and dissimilar relations to each other, relations 
organized (sometimes hierarchically) in terms of age, gender, 
residence and kinship. While polling officials and policemen 
inspected the proceedings from within the polling area in order to 
enforce one definition of personhood, spectators and scrutineers along 
and outside the polling boundaries witnessed the proceedings in 
order to enforce a competing definition of personhood. Thus 
although I find it useful to think of voting in Tanga in terms of 
ritual, I do so only by emphasizing at the same time the uneasy and 
contradictory nature of the ritual process. 
Concluding remarks: imagining the state 
I began this chapter by asking how the idea of the state makes 
itself visible and real in the lives of rural Papua New Guineans. I 
have chosen to focus not on practices of coercive violence or routine 
administration, though certainly such practices make this idea 
visible and real. Instead, I have directed attention to the concrete 
act of voting, the way in which its structure and symbolism promote 
a particular definition of personhood and community. That 
definition of personhood is one of citizenship; that definition of 
10 Yaw Saffu (personal communication, October 18, 1993) points out that, in 
practice, in many parts of the country where he had observed elections 
since 1982, this provision for an independently chosen assistant had been 
available whatever the Organic Law on Elections actually provided. 
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community is one of nationhood. I want now to conclude simply by 
pointing out how the promotion of these definitions of citizenship 
and nationhood entails the constitution of the state. 
In voting, one engages in a double act of inscription. A voter 
indeed makes his or her mark for the nation, as the slogan of the 
PNG Electoral Commission, printed boldly on the election booths, 
exhorted (plate 4) .  But at the same time, the voter himself or 
herself-and not only his or her pinky-is marked upon, his or her 
identity constituted and validated by the state. This marking takes 
shape as the ritual transformation I have tentatively described 
above. Put differently, the condition on which one registers one's 
choice as a citizen of the national community is that one acquiesces 
in the authority and the reality of the state to safeguard this 
choice. In the ritual of voting, there is an undeniable saliency to the 
idea of the state. The state appears very concretely in the guise of 
polling officials and policemen, computer generated electoral rolls 
and metal ballot boxes. The state appears as that which makes it 
possible to be a citizen of the nation, that which safeguards and 
facilitates the capacity of the nation to express its political will. 
To the extent that one acquiesces in the ritual procedures of voting, 
one acquiesces in the reality of the state and in the force of the 
definitions of personhood and community upon which the state is 
predicated. 
In Tanga, state ritual was contested in rather small acts of 
resistance such as intrusive spectating, the smallness of the contest 
perhaps indicating the degree to which the idea of The State has 
become taken for granted. In other parts of Papua New Guinea, the 
contest was large, overt, and violent-a manifest demonstration of 
an incapacity or unwillingness to imagine the state as the guardian 
of the nation and its citizens (see Clark n.d . ) .  One might equally 
read this rejection of state ritual as a rejection of the ideals of 
personhood and community the ritual promotes. There is perhaps no 
more potent symbol of resistance to the ideal of autonomous 
individuals united in a solidary community, and thus to the foreign 
ideal of a nation-state, than a ballot box hacked to bits or dumped 
unceremoniously in the Waigani swamp. 
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'Steak and Grease': A Short History of 
Political Competition in Nuku 
Colin Filer 
Steak and grease 
I was out campaigning in Wilwil village, and the 
people there wanted to know why Chris and Stack were 
standing together. I said that if you want to fry a piece 
of steak, you have to put some grease in the pan as well, 
and the result will be delicious. ' 
The man who told me this little story had been actively 
c ampaigning for the political alliance between Karl Stack 
( 'Steak'),  sitting member and candidate for the West Sepik 
Provincial electorate, and Christopher Sambre ( 'Grease'),  sitting 
member and candidate for the Nuku Open electorate. It was June 17, 
1987, about half-way through the voting period in the national 
election of that year, and we were sitting outside Sambre's house in 
Nuku station. I was about to return to Port Moresby, having decided 
that it was quite obvious who was going to win the election in this 
particular corner of the nation, and already looking for an 
explanation of this predictable result. To me, the story was 
memorable because the piece of tok bokis which it contained, the 
image of 'steak and grease', offered a clue to one such explanation­
one which certainly contained an element of truth, but which I found 
particularly interesting for the questions of political morality 
which it involved. 
Images of meat and its consumption generally carry a powerful 
resonance in Melanesian village discourse. The image of 'steak and 
grease' was not simply an image of difference and complementarity; 
it also bore the connotation of particular political values. To put the 
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matter very simply, the speaker seemed to imply that Karl Stack's 
'value' was contained in the material benefits which he placed at 
the disposal of his constituents, while Christopher Sambre's 'value' 
was to be found on the opposite side of this political coin, in the 
moral quality of his leadership. 
Stack's political support was drawn from local admiration for 
his toughness and his wealth. He was perceived to be an 'action 
man', the former kiap who once drove bulldozers, and now flew 
helicopters, from one end of the province to the other, an abrasive 
and impulsive character, but one who could afford to 'rubbish' his 
political opponents because his lavish generosity could always be 
relied upon to compensate for rumours of irregularity attached to his 
financial dealings. Stack's supporters were persuaded by his bluster 
to believe that he was like a lucky hunter in the capitalist 
wilderness which lay beyond the understanding of the village 
people, purchasing their loyalty with shares of his accumulated 
wealth, no questions asked. 
Sambre' s reputation was entirely different . Here was the 
humble Christian man of modest means, who did not gamble, smoke, 
chew betelnut, drink alcohol, had still not learnt to drive a car and 
(unlike many politicians) was apparently untainted by rumours of 
sexual misconduct or financial malpractice . His life-style still 
testified to the vow of poverty which he had once taken when he 
joined the local order of Franciscan missionary monks. His style of 
generosity was not remarkable for the amount of goods or money 
which he gave away, which could not beat the minimum available 
to any national MP, but for the fact that he kept nothing for 
himself. Ostentation played no part in what he offered his 
constituents, but he secured the loyalty of an extensive network of 
supporters in the villages of his electorate by flattering them with 
his trust in their capacity to follow his example. 
If we ask how and why these two men managed to dominate the 
politics of the Nuku area, in a sequence of election triumphs which 
stretched from 1977, the first answer is already contained in the 
image of ' steak and grease' : the contrast in their styles of 
leadership was such that they had all the angles covered in the 
business of appealing to the floating voter. In which case the 
problem, which has sometimes puzzled their supporters and their 
critics simultaneously, is to understand how two such individuals, so 
different in every way, could manage to sustain their double act for 
such a length of time. The most plausible solution to this problem is 
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to recognise that each man had such a different conception of the 
basis of his own power that each could see the other as the 
instrument of his own designs, perhaps even as a nuisance or a 
necessary evil, without beginning to suspect how he was represented 
in the other's scheme. 
Stack would certainly have taken the remark about 'steak and 
grease' to mean that Sambre' s moral postures have merely been the 
icing on a cake baked by himself or Michael Somare. When the 
chips were down, Sambre was nothing more nor less than the Pangu 
Party's Nuku bagman. In this sense, Stack's understanding of the 
local political situation was perfectly consistent with the orthodox 
academic analysis of electoral politics in any part of Papua New 
Guinea. From this point of view, electoral success is based on the 
reproduction of a 'parochial handout mentality' which combines the 
value of primary group loyalty (parochialism) and the distribution 
of material benefits (handouts) in a circle of instrumental 
rationality where each is seen as a means to the other. Where this 
mentality predominates, communities cast their votes for the 
candidate who offers the greatest material reward and candidates 
normally offer the greatest material reward to their own 
communities .  In that case, the only form of genuine political choice 
is that which arises when people cannot vote for one of their own, 
and are therefore open to persuasion by the promise of rewards from 
relative strangers. Stack's strategy was therefore twofold: 
to present himself as the most plausible source of material 
benefits to those groups whose members or leaders were 
unwilling or unable to identify themselves with any of the 
other candidates for the provincial seat; and 
to maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with 
running mates in the open electorates from whom he could 
acquire the maximum amount of local support without 
damaging his own reputation as the provincial candidate 
whose handouts reached the parts which his opponents 
would not touch. 
And so long as Stack could also maintain a mutually beneficial 
relationship with the leadership of the Pangu Party, Sambre's 
personal loyalty to Michael Somare had the additional advantage 
of reducing his own 'price' as a political client in the national arena, 
even at the same time that it may have added to his value as a 
small-time political patron in his own backyard. Sambre was 
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apparently willing and able to deliver the electorate of Nuku 
without demanding ministries or other major prizes as his just 
desert. 
If Stack ever paused to compare different parts of his own 
provincial constituency with each other or with other parts of rural 
PNG, he might have wondered how Sambre managed to consolidate 
his own position through three successive national elections in an 
electorate which contains something in the order of sixty tribal 
communities whose members speak approximately thirty local 
languages. Linguistic evidence alone does seem to indicate a degree 
of ethnic or cultural fragmentation in the Nuku area which is fairly 
remarkable, even by Melanesian standards . From Stack's point of 
view, an excessive degree of cultural fragmentation might be taken 
to reduce the relative value of primordial group loyalties in the 
organisation of electoral support, and thus to increase the relative 
value of any material benefits promised or delivered by candidates 
to relative strangers. In that case, the mix of ethnic fragmentation 
and economic backwardness throughout his own provincial 
electorate could be said to have reduced the price which Stack was 
obliged to pay for his own political support because the opposition 
would invariably be divided and impoverished to an unusual 
degree. On the other hand, the evidence suggests that circumstances 
such as these have made it very difficult indeed for sitting members 
to retain their open seats when they are men like Sambre-men of 
modest means and small ambitions whose communities account for 
less than five per cent of an electorate which is inclined to think the 
'wantok system' is the major obstacle to its 'development'. 
Sambre has always seen his own political success, with or 
without Stack's material support, as one aspect of his own position 
within his own tribal community, the Namblo community, and also 
as one aspect of that group's historic mission to establish its 
hegemony amidst the sixty-odd communities which make up the 
electorate. From his and their point of view, the multiciplicity and 
cultural diversity of local groups has turned the ethnic contest into a 
form of moral competition, a 'level playing field' where victory is 
not awarded to the group which has the largest population or the 
most conspicuous success in business, but the one whose style of 
leadership presents the most convincing image of what leadership 
should be. From this point of view, white outsiders like Karl Stack, 
the Franciscan priests, or even an ethnographer like me, are seen as 
assets or instruments attracted to the Namblo cause by this same 
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style of leadership . The partnership of 'steak and grease ' is thus 
configured in a way which no longer seems to fit the orthodox 
analysis of rural politics in PNG, because the 'parochial handout 
mentality' would now have to be seen as an obstacle, and not the 
key, to any valid explanation of Sambre's political success . 
Political space 
It would, of course, be pointless to deny the continuing significance of 
local communities and localised relationships in determining the 
way that Sambre's constituents cast their votes. In order to grasp the 
quality of local political relations, it is first necessary to describe 
the complex internal structure, and the variety of external linkages, 
which define this slice of political space. The Nuku Open electorate 
stretches south from the peaks of the Torricelli mountain range to 
the margins of the Sepik River floodplain, covering an area of about 
3,543 square kilometres . To the south and east it borders the 
Ambunti-Dreikikir electorate, which is part of East Sepik Province, 
while to the north and west it borders the Aitape-Lumi electorate. 
The Sepik Highway traverses the northern part of the electorate, 
having first penetrated Nuku District in 1972, reaching Yangkok 
station by 1980, and now (in theory at least) providing permanent 
access from Lumi station to the coastal town of Wewak (see Map 1) .  
Nuku station and many of the villages in the southern part of the 
electorate are connected to the highway by a network of feeder 
roads whose condition varies with the weather and the work which 
is (or is not) done to maintain them. A great deal of time and money 
has been spent on the construction of another road which would link 
Nuku (and Lumi) to the coastal town of Aitape, but the last and most 
difficult section across the peaks of the Torricelli range has never 
quite been completed. 
The Nuku Open electorate contains eight census divisions, with 
a combined resident population of 35,219 including 35 non-citizens­
mostly missionaries. Six of these census divisions constitute Nuku 
District, which is administered from Nuku station and represented 
in the Nuku Local Government Council, itself formed in 1965. The 
two Lumi census divisions (East and West Au) constitute the 
Yangkok Sub-District of Lumi District, which is administered from 
Yangkok station and represented in the Yangkok Local Government 
Council, which broke away from the Wapei (Lumi) Local 
Government Council in 1977, when the electorate was first created. 
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Table 7. 1 :  Area and population of census divisions within Nuku 
Open electorate. 
Census Area Resident population Intercensal 1 990 
division (km2) 1 980 1 990  growth density 
Maimmai-Namblo 411 3365 3883 +15.4% 9.4 
Wanwan 1172 2805 3272 +16.6% 2.8 
Makru-KlapleiA 211 5194 6345 +22.2% 30. 1  
Seim 126 3703 4320 +16.7% 34.3 
East Palei 451 3208 3655 +13.9% 8.1 
West Palai 421 3298 4135 +25.4% 9.8 
East Au 361 4920 5481 +11 .4% 15.2 
West Au 390 3727 4128 +10.8% 10.6 
Total 3543 30220 35219 +16.5% 9.9 
Insofar as voters subscribe to the idea that residents of a single 
district or council area share certain political interests, then one 
would have to infer that the boundary separating Nuku District 
from the Yangkok area has placed Yangkok candidates at a 
considerable disadvantage in elections for the Nuku Open seat, 
simply because of the gross imbalance in their respective 
populations. On the other hand, Nuku District itself contains a 
number of spatial sub-divisions, deriving partly from the realm of 
'custom', and partly from recent historical experience, which have 
at least as much political significance as the Nuku-Yangkok 
boundary. And insofar as villagers within the electorate have 
become increasingly disillusioned with the capacity of the state 
apparatus to deliver 'development', they may have modified or lost 
their inclination to accept the official division of space as a useful 
or genuine guide to the spatial distribution of electoral support. 
Within Nuku District, there is a long history of mutual 
antagonism between the people of the 'Maimai' region, which 
comprises the four southern census divisions, and the 'Palai' people 
who inhabit the East and West Palei census divisions in the north. 
The origin of this antagonism can be traced back to the manner in 
which the District was initially colonised. The Palai1 people were 
1 Nowadays people normally pronounce the name as 'Palai', possibly 
because of the fact that this is also a word in Tok Pisin, and the meaning of 
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the first to be contacted by alien bird-of paradise traders (in the 
German period) and labour recruiters (in the 1930s), and also the 
first to be brought under Australian administration, because they 
were more accessible to the old Sepik District headquarters at 
Aitape (Marshall 1938) .  The 'Maimai' people,2 whose name is 
taken from that of the small tribal community which had the 
honour of hosting a police post established in 1939, had barely begun 
to experience the impact of colonial administration before the 
process was interrupted by the Japanese invasion. When Maimai 
was re-established as a patrol post in 1948, and the small number of 
Maimai labourers recruited in the pre-war years returned to join 
their families, their Palai counterparts could still regard them as 
'bushkanakas'. But this disparity was soon removed once the first 
Catholic mission stations were constructed at Wati, overlooking 
what is now Nuku station, and Andapa, in the midst of the Seim 
villages. Nuku patrol post was constructed in 1957, replacing the old 
Maimai station, and administration of the Palai region was 
simultaneously transferred from Aitape to Nuku, thus inaugurating 
the boundaries of what eventually became Nuku District. By then 
the steady flow of migrants to and from plantations had closed the 
gap between Palai experience and Maimai innocence, but it had also 
reinforced the sense of separate identity. 
If the Palai-Maimai contest has been an important factor in the 
electoral arena, it would seem to have been a rather one-sided 
affair, because Maimai people outnumber Palai people by more than 
two to one (see Table 7. 1) .  But if the Yangkok (Au) people are 
brought in on the side of their Palai neighbours, the result is a fairly 
equal split between North and South. The Yangkok people were 
previously part of the wider category of 'Wapi' people, whose 
regional identity was created at the same time as that of the Palai 
people (by the use of a different route across the Torricelli 
2 
this word ('lizard') is one which seems to be associated with the name 
itself-at least in the minds of the Maimai people. The official spelling 
'Palei' may either represent the original indigenous pronounciation of a 
particular community or an erroneous stroke of some kiap' s pen. 
The Maimai community is actually an offshoot or 'colony' of Sambre' s 
larger Namblo community to the east (See Map 1 ), and the census division 
to which they belong has thus been named after this pair of related 
communities. 
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Mountains from Aitape), and who now make up the great majority of 
the population of Lumi District. On the whole, I think it would be 
true to say that the local candidates in national elections have 
normally been seen as 'Maimai', 'Palai', 'Wapi' or (since 1977) 
'Yangkok' candidates, even if a few of them have made considerable 
efforts to overcome the regional limitation of their political 
support. In this sense, the North appears to suffer an indelible 
weakness which results from its internal division at the same level 
at which it is opposed to the South, but I think that it would also be 
true to say that local voters have now grown more accustomed to the 
idea that their electorate is split between two 'moieties' of roughly 
equal size, and the most appropriate names for these would now be 
the 'Nuku-Maimai' and 'Palai-Yangkok' regions. 
Each half of the electorate is structurally identical, not only in 
the sense that it contains four census divisions, but also because it 
contains three provincial government electorates as well. In each 
case, the two most populous census divisions have their own elected 
representative in the Sandaun Provincial Assembly, while the 
other two have been combined to form a single constituency. If we 
then apply the standard measures of social and economic 
development to the different parts of the electorate, we can also say 
that each of the two halves is split between a 'central' and a 
'peripheral' zone, where the density of population is closely 
associated with levels of economic prosperity and access to 
government services. From this point of view, the Seim and Makru­
Klaplei census divisions, each with its own MP A, together make up 
the central zone of the Nuku-Maimai region, while the two Au 
census divisions make up the central zone of the Palai-Yangkok 
region-and it is no coincidence that a government station is located 
in each of these two regional centres. 
I have used this division of the electorate into four parts, each 
containing a pair of census divisions, to summarise the spatial 
distribution of votes cast in the various elections which are the 
subject of my subsequent analysis. The convenience of this procedure 
is obviously related to the fact that polling teams and census patrols 
alike have normally operated within the boundaries of particular 
census divisions, and this unit of analysis therefore presents itself as 
the most obvious way to analyse and compare the data produced by 
both forms of bureaucratic activity. However, the spatial 
configuration of the electorate has other characteristics which are 
certainly obscured by this fourfold partition. 
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There is a much greater contrast between central and peripheral 
zones in the southern half of the electorate than in the northern 
half, and there are other measures of development-most notably 
the volume of cash crop production, the nutritional standards of 
young children, and the level of school attendance amongst the 
economically active population-which tend to show that the 
Yangkok zone is even more 'backward' than the Palai and Maimai­
Wanwan zones.3 Yangkok government station and the neighbouring 
headquarters of the Christian Mission of Many Lands constitute a 
small enclave or island of 'development' in a sea of backwardness 
which embraces most of the villages in the two Au census divisions, 
as well as neighbouring parts of Nuku and Lumi districts. The 
construction of the Sepik Highway through the northern half of the 
electorate has created an alternative criterion for distinguishing 
between central and peripheral zones within it, since villages in all 
four census divisions may now be said to be divided by their 
proximity to the main road. But the road itself does not seem to 
have stimulated a level of commercial agricultural activity which 
is in any way comparable to that which has developed in parts of 
the Nuku-Maimai region. 
Karl Stack's bulldozing efforts back in 1972, and the subsequent 
construction of the present access road linking Nuku station to the 
Sepik Highway, were both partly motivated by the large volumes 
of cash crops-especially rice and robusta coffee-which local 
villagers had begun to cultivate in the 1960s in response to the 
efforts of colonial agricultural extension officers who had no similar 
success in other parts of what was then Lumi Sub-District. The 
epicentre of this development was not the government station itself, 
but the densely populated Seim Census Division, whose inhabitants 
have traditionally cultivated yams and other root crops with an 
intensity which sets them apart from most other communities in the 
electorate (Bourke et al 1993) . It is also possible to distinguish a 
3 In 1980 it was estimated that the value of cash crops exported from the 
Yangkok zone was only K2,900, barely 5 per cent of the total for the 
electorate, suggesting that people in this area earned an average of only 30 
toea per capita from this source-less than the average for Lumi District as 
a whole (WSIDS 1982:102-3) . Statistics on nutritional standards are taken 
from Kelly et al 1982, and those on school attendance from the 1980 
national census. Tracer ( 1991)  has recently produced a detailed study of 
the relationship between nutritional standards and subsistence agriculture 
in this area. 
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larger geographical area, which embraces the greater part of the 
Makru-Klaplei Census Division and some other areas within the 
Nuku-Maimai region, perhaps even extending into the southern 
parts of the Palai region, as well as the Seim villages, where a 
combination of favourable environmental factors-relatively low 
rainfall, moderately hilly terrain, with only limited patches of 
barren grassland-are clearly associated with a higher level of 
agricultural intensity, greater population density, and higher 
standards of health and nutrition. The contrast between this central 
agricultural zone and the remaining parts of the electorate is one 
which has traditionally been conceived as a contrast between 'yam 
people' and 'sago people' .  
Unlike most other parts of the Maimai-Wanwan zone, there is 
no doubt that Sambre' s Namblo community belongs to the central 
agricultural zone which is defined in this way. If any doubt 
surrounded their traditional status as 'yam people', they have 
consistently acted to remove it by their pursuit of all available 
opportunities for 'development' . The five Namblo villages are the 
only villages in the Maimai-Wanwan zone which have had 
reasonable road access to Nuku station and the outside world for any 
length of time, and which have therefore been in a position to 
participate in successive waves of cash cropping on any significant 
scale. Having used their own labour to build and maintain the road 
in the 1960s, they then pooled part of the proceeds from their first 
sales of cash crops to build their own community school, thus 
'forcing' the Catholic mission to supply them with teachers to run it. 
In this and other ways they raised their own level of social and 
economic development to the point where their removal from the 
'periphery' to the 'centre' of the Nuku-Maimai can only serve to 
accentuate the contrast between these two zones.4 
The central agricultural zone includes within its borders the 
largest traditional political communities in the electorate-that is 
to say, the largest groups which were named as such by their own 
members, and whose members shared a single set of institutions for 
resolving their internal disputes, while recognising the need or duty 
4 For example, the 100 per cent of Namblo children who lived within one 
hour's walk of a community school in 1982 were part of the larger 
population of Maimai-Wanwan children of whom only 41 per cent had 
this level of access. In the Wanwan Census Division alone, the proportion 
was 24 per cent (WSIDS 1982:352) .  
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to support each other in times of war with neighbouring 
communities. By these criteria, it can be argued that there were­
and still are-five communities of 'yarn people' who occupy the 
agricultural centre of the electorate . In order of their current size, 
these are: the Seim community (with 4,290 resident members in 
1990), the Makru community (2,776 members), the Kafle community 
(1 ,663 members), the Arkosarne community ( 1 ,351 members), and 
finally the Narnblo community ( 1 , 1 23 members ) .  These five 
communities together account for almost one third of the traditional 
population of the electorate, while the rest of this population is 
distributed between a much larger number of political cornrnunities­
perhaps fifty in all, with an average membership of less than 500 
people. The only other traditional political community with a 
population of more than 1 ,000 is the Wanirn group, whose 2,001 
members form a majority of the population in the Wanwan Census 
Division, who have close linguistic and cultural affinities with the 
Narnblo community, and even seem to regard themselves as 'yarn 
people', but whose internal solidarity has always been questionable 
precisely because of their exceptionally scattered ( 'one-by-one ') 
pattern of settlement. 
Of course, there is no reason to assume that the 'tribal 
solidarity' of traditional political communities, whatever their 
relative size, has now been translated into the modern electoral 
arena. Like other Melanesian communities, those in the Nuku 
electorate have exhibited a familiar tendency to segment and 
divide as their populations have expanded and their members have 
experienced the many novelties of colonialism and its aftermath. 
Nevertheless, the critical thresholds of political unity are still 
obviously linked to the size and density of tribal populations, and 
while it is true that all local communities normally manifest some 
internal factional conflict over the distribution of their political 
loyalties, the locally uneven process of economic and infrastructural 
development has also facilitated a greater density or complexity of 
social and political relationships between those groups which 
occupy the central agricultural zone. This is the contest within 
which some Narnblo leaders have been able to formulate the 
argument that their own community, despite its relatively small 
size and peripheral position within the central agricultural zone, 
evinces the optimal combination of internal political solidarity and 
external political alliances . 
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The value placed on the means of communication between local 
communities may also be said to reflect the unusual extent of 
linguistic diversity within this electorate-one of the few cultural 
phenomena which very obviously serves to distinguish it from other 
areas with a comparable size and density of population. According 
to Laycock (1975), there are no less than twenty-eight vernacular 
languages spoken in this electorate, and some of these contain 
significant variations of dialect. This means that the average 
' language group ' contains only two traditional p olitical  
communities, and even now has barely more than a thousand native 
speakers. And yet the political significance of such diversity is not 
so clear. It could certainly be held to portend the excessive political 
fragmentation of the electorate, but it could also be said to reduce 
the potential significance of primordial group loyalties in electoral 
contests, precisely because the only ethnic groups in evidence are 
much too small to make an impact on their own account-even if 
they were internally united. 
The twenty-eight languages of the electorate can themselves be 
classified in ways which partly correlate with those regional 
distinctions already made by reference to various measures of social 
and economic development, and which may have some further 
bearing on current political behaviour because they point to 
prehistoric population movements through the area. Four of the 
twenty-eight languages belong to what linguists now call the 
'Sepik-Ramu phylum', while the other twenty-four belong to the so­
called 'Torricelli phylum', and there is no discernible relationship 
between these two groups of languages beyond the existence of an 
occasional loan-word. The geographical boundary between these 
two groups of languages appears to follow the boundary between the 
'yam people' and the 'sago people' except that the Namblo and 
Wanim communities speak Torricelli phylum languages, while a 
few scattered groups of 'sago people' around the margins of Wanwan 
Census Division speak Sepik-Ramu phylum languages. So this 
linguistic boundary approximates, without exactly matching, the 
administrative separation of the Makru-Seim and Maimai­
Wanwan zones within the southern half of the electorate. 
In order to understand the way that people in this area have 
traditionally conceived the unequal distribution of power between 
different points in political space, it is first necessary to abandon 
the idea that 'cultures' are the properties of local groups, and then 
to reconstruct the cultural identity of each traditional community as 
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the intersection of several ancient pathways, each passing through 
the space now occupied by several neighbouring groups, along which 
sundry 'culture heroes' are understood to have created a wide 
variety of unrelated cultural distinctions during the course of their 
mythical travels. From this point of view, the unusual extent of 
linguistic and cultural diversity in this electorate is no longer to be 
seen as the effect of a corresponding degree of mutual isolation 
between traditional political communities, most of which appear to 
be diverse collections of smaller groups with different migration 
histories, often speaking unrelated languages, but as the outcome of 
a 'culture of diversity ' which occupies the space between 
communities (Filer 1990) .  
Local variations in the perception of cultural difference reflect 
the practical or material relationships which used to exist between 
the members of neighbouring communities . There really were (and 
still are) paths leading from each community to the borders which 
it shares with maybe five or six neighbouring groups, and each of 
these paths was likely to have a special practical quality of its 
own. Thus, for example, Namblo people distinguish between the 
type of distant enmity, bordering on mutual avoidance, which they 
encountered on the path leading towards the villages clustered 
around the present site of Mukili mission station and the much 
closer, almost intensely reciprocal type of hostility which they 
found amongst their Wanim neighbours to the south, with whom 
they knew they had a wide range of close cultural affinities. They 
make comparable distinctions between the different forms of 
alliance, exchange or cooperation which used to be found in their 
relationships with other neighbours-ranging from the idiom of 
kinship with their 'country cousins' in the Maimai community to the 
more distant and formal manner in which men traded secrets with 
their partners in the Makru villages. 
Although this constellation of relationships created chains of 
alliance and enmity which cut right across the zonal boundaries 
discussed above, and this traditional pattern of p olitical 
relationships still has some resonance today, it is no longer possible 
to say whether the position of the Namblo community within this 
constellation of mythical and practical 'roads' is one which 
actually facilitated the acquisition of some additional power during 
the period following European contact. What can be said is that the 
generation of young Namblo men who eagerly signed up as foot­
soldiers of the Catholic church during the 1950s and early 1960s, and 
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who were then dispatched t o  all corners o f  what i s  now Nuku 
District, practised their own style of ethnology in their various 
postings, and were subsequently able to convince themselves-and 
possibly their 'converts'- that Namblo was somehow destined for a 
hegemonic role by virtue of its customary charter. 
When I first came to know this cohort of former catechists in the 
early 1970s, I found that they were well able to articulate a vision 
of their collective political destiny in which their 'traditional' role 
and reputation as mediators or peace-makers had created a lasting 
condition of mutual attraction between themselves and the colonial 
authorities which now gave them the privilege of representing or 
imposing 'the law' throughout the network of political alliances 
which they had reconstructed with their bibles and their talent for 
ethnology. Within a year or so, the acknowledged leader of these 
'middle men', Ferdinand Guam of Wambiu village, had been elected 
Chairman of the Nuku Local Government Council-a position which 
he held until his resignation in 1987-and 'Brother Cosmas', the 
young Namblo boy who had been 'given' to the Church when the 
first priests arrived in the area, returned (or was redeemed) to 
function in the thoroughly appropriate position of Council Rules 
Inspector. In this capacity, and with the former catechists as his 
campaign team, Sambre was ideally positioned to contest the Nuku 
Open seat. 
The 1977 and 1982 elections 
In 1977 'Steak and Grease' confronted and defeated a pair of sitting 
members who had represented that fear of Independence which was 
organised around the banner of the United Party. Paul Langro had 
held the West Sepik Regional seat, while Jacob Talis had held the 
Wapei-Nuku Open seat, since 1968. Both men claimed to have been 
born about 1940, though they were probably somewhat older, and 
both had been schooled by the Franciscan missionaries who based 
themselves at Aitape in the years following the Second World War. 
Paul Langro was born in a village near Vanimo, had spent some time 
in a Catholic seminary in Rabaul, then matriculated at the 
Adminstrative College in Port Moresby before being appointed as a 
Local Court Magistrate in 1967-an appointment which subsequently 
justified his membership of the Constitutional Planning Committee 
in the second House of Assembly. Jacob ( 'Jack') Talis came from 
Ningil village, near the boundary between Lumi and Nuku Districts, 
had received six years of primary schooling, taught in a mission 
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school and became a founder member of the Wapei Local Government 
Council before making his entrance on the national political stage. 
In 1977 Karl Kitchens (as he then still was) polled 23,260 
(almost 55 per cent) of the 42,419 votes cast for the West Sepik 
Provincial seat, defeating Paul Langro by 6,403 votes .5 The only 
other candidate for the seat was one Gordon Campbell, a 
naturalised citizen of New Zealand parentage who had once worked 
as an odd job man for the Franciscan fathers, then built and operated 
a hotel in Vanimo, and finally acquired an interest in earthmoving 
equipment which strangely matched Stack's erstwhile feats as an 
amateur bulldozer driver. But Campbell was no match for Stack 
when it came to piling up votes, for he collected only 2,012, less than 
5 per cent of the total. 
In the same election Chris Sambre polled 5,489 votes (almost 42 
per cent) of the 13,150 votes cast for the Nuku Open seat, defeating 
Jack Talis by 718 votes . Three other candidates contested the Nuku 
Open seat in 1977. 
Unlike the other four candidates, Yirwei was not a Catholic but 
a follower of the Christian Mission of Many Lands, which had 
established its local headquarters on the territory of his own 
village, and it is likely that most of his votes were collected from 
other followers of the same sect. Yirwei and Talis shared most of 
the votes cast in the northern (Palai-Yangkok) part of the 
constituency, while Sambre and the other two candidates shared 
most of the votes cast in the southern (Nuku-Maimai) part. 
In 1982 'Steak and Grease' were both returned to parliament 
with convincing victories which reflected the widespread success of 
Pangu Party candidates in challenging the legitimacy of the Chan­
Okuk government which had displaced Michael Somare 's regime in 
1980. Karl Kitchens Stack (as he had now become) polled 19,686 
(almost 45 per cent) of the 43,863 votes cast for the West Sepik 
Provincial seat, defeating his old rival Paul Langro by 6,199 votes. 
In the wake of his earlier defeat, Langro had spent some time in 
pursuit of a law degree at the University of Papua New Guinea and 
had then been appointed Secretary to the Sandaun Provincial 
Government, but neither of these achievements enabled him to make 
any significant reduction in his margin of defeat. Stack and Langro 
both suffered a similar dedine in their share of the total vote 
5 Throughout this chapter, it is assumed that votes 'cast' are those allowed 
as 'formal votes' by the electoral authorities. 
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because they were competing with five other candidates who jointly 
secured almost one quarter of the total votes cast for the seat, though 
none of the five got more than 10 per cent of the total.6 
Chris Sambre also faced an increase, from four to six, in the 
number of rival candidates contesting his seat, but still managed to 
secure 5,466 (more than 46 per cent) of the 11 ,794 votes cast for the 
Nuku Open seat, which meant that his personal share of the total 
had increased by more than ten per cent. This improvement is partly 
explained by the lower level of turnout in the 1982 election, but this 
in tum reflects the fact that no one candidate was able to replace 
Jack Talis (who did not stand) as the champion of the Palai­
Yangkok region. James Yirwei, who had abandoned his teaching 
career for some unspecified form of 'business', was able to quadruple 
his own level of support, securing 2,302 (almost 20 per cent) of the 
votes cast, but this only brought him third place in the result. The 
runner-up was John Wotong, who secured 3,038 (almost 26 per cent) of 
the votes cast, while another 988 votes (less than 9 per cent of the 
total) were shared between the remaining four candidates, all of 
whom were based in the northern part of the constituency.7 
John Wotong was born in Yemereba village, which lies to the 
west of Nuku Station, in the same census division and the same 
provincial constituency as Sambre's home village of Imbiyip. He 
had graduated from the Administrative College in 1973, spent some 
years as a District Officer in West New Britain, and somehow found 
his way on to Sir Julius Chan's personal staff during the latter's 
reign as Prime Minister from 1980 to 1 982. Unlike the other 
candidates opposing Sambre in 1982, Wotong was clearly a party 
man, albeit in an area where his party (PPP) had no previous record 
of serious political activity. Wotong's electoral strategy was partly 
6 
7 
The five were: James Kanaiok (4,172 votes), Stephen Sio (2,444 votes), 
Peter Gall (2,321 votes), Melchior Peaka (1 ,008 votes), and Jonah 
Warwein (745 votes). None had any specific connection with Nuku except 
for Stephen Sio, who had once been the headmaster at the Namblo 
community school, had gone on to win the Aitape-Lumi Open seat in the 
1977 national election, and then decided to abandon this seat in his 
fruitless quest for the provincial prize. 
The four were: Luke Tom from Asier village (410 votes), Pian Kawa from 
Ningil village (283 votes),  Joe Worongat from Yadagaro village (220 
votes), and Herman Kaukau from Mai village (75 votes) . Asier, Yadagaro 
and Mai are all Palai villages. Luke Tom and Pian (Joe) Kawa both stood 
again in subsequent elections (see below). 
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based on the larger political wisdom of the People's Progress Party 
and its leader, but also reflected the geographical position of his 
home village, which lay close to the border between the northern 
and southern halves of the constituency. The result suggests that he 
alone of Sambre's rivals was able to collect a reasonable number of 
votes in the Maimai region, though most of these probably came 
from members of his own language group in the villages around 
Mukili Catholic Mission. The rest of his votes, 2,000 or more, were 
almost certainly obtained in the two Palai census divisions, whose 
own candidates scored only 705 votes between them, but he was 
unable to muster any serious support in the Yangkok area, so could 
not hope to match the massive block of votes which Sambre 
garnered from the Nuku-Maimai region. Perhaps his most signal 
achievement in this election was to win the support of two 
prominent leaders within Sambre's own Namblo community-the 
provincial MPA for the Maimai-Wanwan constituency and the local 
government councillor in Sambre' s own village of Imbiyip-both of 
whom were soon to lose their offices as a result. 
The 1987 election 
The 1987 election is the first national election for which I have been 
able to analyse the geographical distribution of electoral support by 
the voters of Nuku Open electorate for candidates contesting the 
Nuku Open and West Sepik Provincial seats. It has not been possible 
to analyse the distribution of votes between specific local 
communities within the electorate, but the zonal p attern is 
accurately represented in Tables 7.2 and 7.3. 
In 1987 Chris Sambre seems to have lost about 1,000 of the votes 
which he had won in 1982, and thus lost almost 20 per cent of his 
previous share of the total votes cast for the Nuku Open seat. On the 
other hand, there was only a slight reduction, from 2,428 to 2,365 
votes, in the margin of Sambre's victory over his nearest rival, the 
persistent James Yirwei, who had also lost an equivalent proportion 
of the votes which he won five years previously. Although the 
number of candidates contesting the seat had increased from seven to 
nine, this had rather less to do with Sambre's own loss of support 
than the fact that three of his opponents in 1987, as against one in 
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1982, were able to secure a reasonable proportion of the votes cast in 
the southern half of the constituency.8 
Table 7.2: Distribution of votes for the Nuku Open seat in the 1987 
election. 
Name of candidate Maimai- Makru E&W Yangkok Total 
for open seat Wanwan -Seim Palai (Au) votes (%) 
Christoper Sambre 1354 1968 713 420 4555 (37. 1 )  
James Yirwei 199 22 140 1729 2090 ( 17.4) 
Peter Wauwau 62 714 862 32 1670 (13.9) 
Andrew Komboni 102 986 48 36 1175 (9.8) 
Luke Tom 6 67 836 69 978 (8. 1 )  
Carolus Kalang 23 32 43 733 831 (6.9) 
Paul Wanur 493 142 89 13 659 (5.5) 
Joe Aflatawa 6 89 7 3 105 (0.9) 
Peter Masinbai 2 28 1 16 47 (0.4) 
Total votes 2247 4051 2661 3051 12010(100.0) 
8 The Namblo Pangu supporters predicted that Sambre would obtain 70-80% 
of the vote in the Maimai-Wanwan area, 45-55% of the vote in the Makru­
Seim area, less than 10% of the vote in the Palai area and the East Au 
census division, but a much higher percentage in the West Au census 
division. These predictions proved to be a great deal more accurate than 
those made by his opponents. 
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Table 7.3: Distribution of Nuku Open Votes for the West Sepik 
Provincial seat in 1987. 
Name of candidate Maimai- Makru E&W Yangkok Total 
for open seat Wanwan -Seim Palai (Au) votes (%) 
Karl Stack 1258 2415 934 1193 5800 (48.4) 
Ignas Wunum 908 1345 1550 229 4032 (33.7) 
Robert Hayaku 11 28 22 962 1023 (8 .5 )  
James Makain 13 121 79 296 509 (4 .2)  
Anthony Mawei 19 11 17 151 198 ( 1 .6 )  
Dorothy Tekwie 9 35 14 117 175 ( 1 .5 )  
Mamis Ninesieng 4 88 28 39 159 ( 1 .3 )  
John Sanawe 6 32 22 21 81 (0.7) 
Total votes 2228 4075 2666 3008 1 1977 ( 100.0) 
In 1987 Karl Stack secured 20,813 of the votes cast for the West 
Sepik Provincial seat, over 1 ,000 more than he had won in 1982, 
though his share of the total provincial vote, which had itself 
increased from 43,863 to 50,286, fell by almost eight per cent. This 
might seem to be a fairly predictable result when one considers that 
the number of candidates contesting the seat had only risen by one, 
but seems rather more remarkable when one realises that Stack was 
no longer the official candidate of the Pangu Party and this was the 
first time in three elections that he had been opposed by candidates 
who might reasonably be expected to make significant inroads into 
his earlier monopoly of the votes cast in Sambre' s constituency. 
There were two such candidates: 
Ignas Wunum from Nuku village, having failed in his 
attempt to win the Nuku Open seat in 1977, had continued 
in his career as a provincial public servant, most recently as 
Provincial Non-Formal Education Officer. 
Robert Hayaku, though not a local man, was a long-serving 
employee of the Christian Mission of Many Lands, most 
recently acting as its Education Secretary, and, being 
stationed at Anguganak, should have been able to secure 
part of the sectarian vote which formed the core of James 
Yirwei's support in his successive efforts to win the Nuku 
Open seat. 
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Oddly enough, both men were endorsed by Father John Momis, 
and thus purported to be members of the Melanesian Alliance Party, 
thinking perhaps to garner some of the grassroots Christian 
sympathies on which Chris Sambre seemed to thrive. In the event, 
Wunum ran second to Stack, though he only won 7,263 votes, less 
than 15 per cent of the provincial total, while Hayaku ran fifth 
with 3,922 votes, less than 8 per cent of the total votes cast.9 Table 
7.3 shows that Wunum won more than half his votes in Nuku 
District, while Hayaku got nearly 25 per cent of his in the Yangkok 
area alone, and the two men between them were able to collect more 
than 42 per cent of the votes cast in Sambre's constituency, even 
though Stack himself got more than 48 per cent of these votes. And 
although Stack got 30 per cent more votes than Sambre in Sambre' s 
own backyard, these were still less than 28 per cent of Stack's 
provincial total, suggesting that the Nuku vote was rather less 
important to his success than it had been in previous elections. In the 
absence of his old rival Paul Langro, the most obvious explanation of 
Stack's resounding triumph in 1987 is that none of his opponents-not 
even the Provincial Non-Formal Education Officer-had the fame 
or notoriety required to collect a significant number of votes in 
several different parts of the province. 
Within the Nuku Open constituency the strategic alliance 
between 'Steak and Grease' lost nothing of its previous significance 
to either of its principals, despite the novel threats deployed by 
their opponents. From my own observation of  the polling period, it 
was clear that the Pangu 'party machine' -if such it can be called­
had been geared to support both candidates as if they occupied a 
common platform, and thus to play down the many questions which 
had arisen concerning Stack's involvement in the formation of the 
break-away League for National Advancement in 1986. Indeed, a 
cynical observer might even be forgiven for thinking that the utility 
of this connection had encouraged Sir Michael Somare to endorse an 
official Pangu candidate for the provincial seat who had precious 
little chance of purloining any votes from the sitting member, let 
9 The other five candidates were: James Makain from Lumi District (5,989 
votes), Mamis Ninesieng from Telefomin District (4,468 votes), Anthony 
Mawei from Amanab District (3,253 votes), Dorothy Tekwie from Vanimo 
District (2,803 votes), and John Sanawe from Aitape District (1,775 votes) . 
Makain's father, Makain Mo, held the Lumi-Nuku Open seat in the first 
House of Assembly, from 1964 to 1968. 
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alone winning. Dorothy Tekwie, a 29-year old social work graduate 
who had been absent from the province since completing Grade 10 at 
Vanimo High School, came seventh in the field of eight, polling 
2,803 votes, less than 6 per cent of the total cast. Ms Tekwie's gender 
may have done her an additional disservice, but Pangu stalwarts in 
the Nuku area were not obliged to adopt a sexist position since they 
had the better argument that people will not vote for someone they 
have never seen. 
Table 7.4 compares the number of votes obtained by 'Steak and 
Grease' in each of the twenty-three rounds of counting in Sambre' s 
constituency. This table seems to confirm the belief of Sambre's own 
campaign team that people who voted for Sambre should normally 
also vote for Stack. There were at least 155 voters in the Makru­
Seim area (MS5-MS7) who failed to live up to this expectation, 
mostly members of Ignas Wunum's own Makru community who might 
be forgiven for supporting their own 'wantok', and at least 108 voters 
scattered around Sambre's own Maimai-Wanwan area, whose 
failure to follow Sambre' s instruction on this score might be taken to 
confirm my own impression that some of his most active supporters 
were not entirely happy with his political marriage of convenience. 
Elsewhere, most notably in the Palai area and amongst members of 
the Seim language group, Stack was able to attract the votes of 
people who simultaneously voted for one of Sambre's opponents. 10 
But in the Yangkok area, Stack's total in each of the five counts was 
similar in magnitude to Sambre's vote plus that collected by another 
Open candidate described by Sambre's men as 'one of us' .  
The 'pro-Pangu independent' was Carolus Kalang, a former 
soldier from Wublakil village, northwest of Yangkok Station, 
whose special function was to take votes away from Sambre's 
persistent rival, James Yirwei, in the latter's own stronghold. Table 
7.2 shows that Kalang performed his part quite well, though it also 
reveals that Sambre himself was able to collect almost 14 per cent of 
the votes cast in the Yangkok area, largely because a group of 
1 0  Stack's popularity in the Seim villages dated back to his days as the kiap in 
charge of Nuku Patrol Post, when he used his earthmoving skills to create 
the road link between Seim and Dreikikir. Since the Seim people have 
always been the most prolific cash croppers in Nuku District, they had 
good reason to be grateful to the man who first gave them road access to the 
export market, and Stack's technique for collecting the Seim vote in 
national election was simply to drive back there on a rented bulldozer in 
order to remind people of his former exploits. 
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village leaders in West A u  Census Division decided t o  join his 
network of personal supporters in the final phase of the campaign 
period. 
Table 7.4: Relative popularity of Karl Stack and Chris Sambre 
amongst Nuku Open voters in 1987. 
Count Karl Stack Chris Sambre 
number votes percent rank votes percent rank 
MW l 24 7.9 2 36 11.5 3 
MW 2 231 35.6 2 237 36.0 2 
MW 3 202 58.2 1 228 64.0 1 
MW 4 229 48.2 2 243 51.2 1 
MW 5 460 90.7 1 501 98.6 1 
MW 6 136 54.4 1 145 58.2 1 
MS l 416 60.0 1 262 37.5 2 
MS 2 163 26.5 2 100 16.l 2 
MS 3 454 88.2 1 347 68.2 1 
MS 4 528 69.7 1 250 32.8 2 
MS 5 411 66.2 1 450 73.1 1 
MS 6 305 54.3 1 409 75.7 1 
MS 7 138 44.4 2 150 49.3 1 
PL l 192 40.7 2 80 17.0 2 
PL l 192 40.7 2 80 17.0 2 
PL 2 12 3.2 3 12 3.2 3 
PL 3 176 30.8 2 170 29.l 2 
PL 4 369 66.5 1 263 50.8 1 
PL 5 161 41.2 2 152 37.8 2 
YA l 228 58.8 1 5 0.9 5 
YA 2  351 8.4 1 7 1 .2 3 
YA 3 68 63.5 3 35 4.3 3 
YA 4 226 45.9 1 124 33.8 2 
YA 5 320 45.9 1 249 34.5 2 
Total 5800 48.4 1 4455 37.1 1 
And thus it came about that Sambre's votes in Yirwei's own base 
area exceeded Yirwei's votes outside it. But the runner-up's defeat 
was more predictable and less significant than some other aspects of 
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the final outcome, precisely because the bulk of his support was still 
locked in the Yangkok area, just as it had been in two previous 
elections, and his own relative success proved the failure of an 
oppositional strategy in which he played a relatively minor role. 
Given the local triumphs of 'Steak and Grease' in 1977 and 1982, 
it was by now quite obvious that their defeat would need an 
opposition with a strategy which could unite or combine the 
personal loyalties of village leaders in all four zones of the 
electorate. And the man who set himself up as the architect of this 
strategy in 1987 was the man whom Sambre had beaten into second 
place five years previously-John Wotong. Wotong had gained some 
compensation for his loss by winning the Maimai-Wanwan seat in 
the Sandaun Provincial Assembly at the provincial elections of 
1984. 
From his vantage point in Vanimo, Wotong seems to have 
decided that the best (and perhaps the only) way to undermine 
Sambre's political machinery was to construct a set of countervailing 
alliances :  
between himself and the other five MPAs who represented 
Sambre's electorate in Vanimo; 
between the Sandaun Provincial Government and the Nuku 
Local Government Council; and 
between his own People 's  Progress Party and the 
Melanesian Alliance. 
For reasons which I have not been able to discover, Wotong 
decided against a repetition of his own candidacy for the open seat, 
and opted instead to act as Campaign Manager for the PPP' s new 
candidate, Andrew Komboni. 
At fifty years of age, Komboni was the oldest candidate, at least 
by his own reckoning, to have contested the Nuku Open seat since its 
creation. His age explains his lack of formal education, but he had 
spent many years as a Catholic mission teacher and catechist, and 
was the local councillor in his own village of Kafle #1 when he was 
appointed as Interim Member and Speaker of the new Sandaun 
Provincial Assembly in 1978.  He had since been elected and re­
elected as MPA for the Makru-Kafle constituency, and had even 
scaled the heights of the premiership for a year or so, until he and 
his fellow members were left to ponder their political futures by the 
suspension of the Sandaun Provincial Government in 1986. 
Political Competition in Nuku 1 9 1  
One o f  these fellow members inserted a large hole in the first 
plank of Wotong's electoral strategy by throwing his own hat into 
the Nuku Open ring as an independent candidate. Peter Wauwau 
from Yambil village had been a community school teacher for 
fifteen years before his election as MPA for the Palai constituency, a 
fact which helps to explain his subsequent appointment as Minister 
for Education in the Provincial Government. Wauwau's candidacy 
made it hard for Wotong to bequeath Komboni many of the votes 
which he had won in Wauwau's area in 1982, and harder still 
because another Palai candidate, Luke Tom, had managed to 
consolidate his own electoral support in part of Palai area where 
Wauwau's influence was weak. Tom was the most highly educated 
candidate to contest the Nuku Open seat, having completed twelve 
years of formal schooling, and he now carried the endorsement of 
Paias Wingti, whom he apparently mistook for the leader of the 
National Party. 1 1  After a varied career as a social worker and sales 
representative, he had settled down to become a 'subsistence farmer' 
in his mother's village of Asier, just north of the CMML station at 
Sibilanga, where he had reason to hope that his good works as a 
Presbyterian might win him more votes than the 410 he had scored 
in the previous national election. 
It was perhaps the prospect of losing the Palai area which 
encouraged Wotong and Komboni to sponsor two additional 
candidates, Paul Wanur and Joe Aflatawa, in order to break 
Sambre' s usual monopoly of votes cast in the Wan wan and Makru 
areas. W anur had spent the previous six years teaching the children 
of his own political community at Wulbowe Community School, 
while Aflatawa, from the Makru village of Ifkindu, had been 
employed for eight years as Executive Officer for the Nuku Local 
Government Council. Sambre's acolytes insisted that these two had 
walked the campaign trail in tandem, openly acknowledging their 
role as spoilers for the PPP. In the event, the votes they won between 
them almost matched the number gained by Sambre's own spoiler, 
Carolus Kalang, but were barely more than one fifth the number 
1 1  Tom filled in a questionnaire distributed by the UPNG Department of 
Political and Administrative Studies in which he described himself as a 
'sympathizer of the National Party'. In the same document, he made the 
revealing statement that 'Nuku has been the slave for Pangu for the last 10-
15 years [and] somebody have to loose their chains and make them free'. 
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which Sambre himself scored in the southern half of his 
constituency (see Table 7.2). 
At the same time, Komboni was unable to obtain any significant 
number of votes outside his own provincial constituency, and even 
there his share of the vote was at least 10 per cent lower than the 46 
per cent which he had won in the 1984 provincial election. Wotong' s 
sponsorship of Joe Aflatawa was itself evidence of Komboni's 
inability to 'unlock' the support which Sambre had persistently 
gained from the Makru villages, despite their close linguistic and 
cultural affinities with his own Kafle community. There were no 
such affinities with the Seim people, whose MPA Peter Ukwando 
made a rather weak demonstration of support for the PPP campaign 
but was unable to deliver more than 10 per cent of his own 
constituents. Most of the voters in the Seim villages ignored both 
Komboni and their own ethnic candidate, the deluded Peter 
Masinbai, and either voted for Chris Sambre because he was the 
ally of their patron Karl Stack, or else voted for Peter Wauwau 
because he had recently taken a Seim woman as his second wife . 1 2  
At the same time, Wotong was only able to persuade 102 of his own 
provincial constituents to vote for Komboni, barely half the number 
that voted for James Yirwei, and barely a quarter the number that 
voted for Chris Sambre in the Mukili area alone. Indeed, Sambre's 
majority amongst his 'traditional tribal enemies' in Wotong's own 
backyard was much the same as his majority throughout the 
Maimai-Wanwan zone. 
It is difficult to say whether or how the results of this election 
might have been affected by the 'unholy alliance ' which Wotong 
thought he had forged between the PPP and MA candidates. On the 
final d ay of the campaign period, Komboni' s team packed 
themselves into a couple of trucks and motored off to Yangkok 
Station in order to engage in some confabulation with James Yirwei, 
but I was unable to record Yirwei's own opinion of this visitation or 
his understanding of the role which he had been assigned in 
Wotong's larger strategy. Nor can I say what value Ignas Wunum 
placed on the support of Wotong, Komboni, and other members of the 
1 2  Masinbai was a former plantation labourer, with no formal education, 
who became a CMML pastor in his home village of Usitamo before 
resigning to contest the election on God's personal instructions. He had no 
scrutineers or other visible supporters, and none of the other candidates 
took him seriously. 
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suspended Provincial Assembly, though i t  seems quite likely that 
his experience as a provincial public servant would have left him 
with some fairly strong views on their individual merits. Wunum 
certainly knew that he was the only feasible alternative to Karl 
Stack in the minds of most Nuku District voters, and he shared 
Wotong's belief that disgruntled local councillors would play a 
major role in mobilising anti-Pangu sentiment, but he might have 
paused to wonder if he had anything to gain from an explicit 
association with a provincial government whose own misdeeds were 
all too clearly signalled by the fact of its suspension. 
The 1992 election 
In 1992 there was a further increase in the number of candidates in 
both the Nuku Open and West Sepik Provincial seats, reflecting a 
nationwide proliferation of political ambitions and a corresponding 
fragmentation of political loyalties in each local arena. At the 
provincial level, this trend was magnified by Karl Stack's own 
stated reluctance to nominate for a fourth term in the national 
parliament, which must surely have raised the hopes of many 
would-be contenders, and his subsequent refusal to devote any serious 
time or money to his own campaign. Without Stack's rhetorical and 
material assistance, Chris Sambre's grip on the Nuku Open seat was 
also seen to be vulnerable, despite his own determination to retain 
it, so this election became, in effect, a test of his own ability to 
survive the loss of this longstanding strategic alliance. 
In the event, Stack polled only 4,825 (less than 8 per cent) of the 
60,916 votes cast for the West Sepik Provincial seat, but this was 
s till more than half the 9,310 votes polled by the winner, John 
Tekwie, in a field which now boasted a total of thirteen candidates. 
The winner, an economics graduate and erstwhile public servant, 
was the younger brother of the luckless Dorothy who had received 
Michael Somare's lukewarm support in 1987, but had swapped his 
sister's political allegiance for a notional alignment with Ted Diro's 
People's Action Party. The Pangu ticket was picked up by the 
egregious Paul Langro, who came back for a third and final tilt at 
his old foe, while Sambre's arch-rival John Wotong was also lured 
into the fray by the prospect of Stack's demise, though now without 
the patronage of Julius Chan. 1 3  Six of the thirteen candidates 
1 3 Sambre' s supporters maintained that Wotong had been ousted from the PPP 
because of his previous misuse of party funds. 
1 94 Filer 
(including Stack) were based in the Aitape-Lumi Open electorate, 
and these six candidates between them won almost 37 per cent of the 
total votes cast for the provincial seat. Another four candidates 
(including Tekwie and Langro) were based in the Vanimo-Green 
River electorate, and they won almost 42 per cent of the total votes. 
The one candidate based in the Telefomin Open electorate scored just 
over 10 per cent of the total, while the two based in Sambre's Nuku 
Open electorate scored just over 11 per cent between them. Apart 
from the winner, who got just over 15 per cent of the total, only two 
other candidates scored more than 10 per cent on their own account­
Rex Namah from Vanimo, another denizen of the Sandaun 
Provincial Government, who ran second with 6,761 votes, and the 
Telefomin candidate Jeffrey Atiksep, formerly a training officer 
with Ok Tedi Mining Ltd, who ran third with 6,161 .  Karl Stack still 
beat Paul Langro, the latter collecting only 4,291 votes, but John 
Wotong beat both of them with his own total of 5,032. 
Meanwhile, Chris Sambre lost more than half his previous 
share of the votes cast for the Nuku Open seat, but his 2,930 votes 
(barely 18 per cent of the total) were still enough to get him past the 
winning post, since only one of the fourteen candidates opposing him 
was able to secure more than 10 per cent of the total, and this one 
candidate, Andrew Kumbakor, could only muster 2,359 votes (less 
than 15 per cent of the total). And yet Sambre's fourth victory was 
not simply the result of continuing political fragmentation 
throughout his electorate. If anything, it was achieved despite the 
fact that Sambre's own community was more divided than the rest. 
In the three elections from 1977 to 1987, Sambre had always been the 
only Namblo man standing in a field which grew from five to seven 
to nine candidates in all. What happened in 1992 was that three 
Namblo candidates stood in a field of fifteen, and although the 
Namblo community itself only delivered 564 (3.5 per cent) of the 
16,002 votes which counted for the Nuku Open seat, these three 
candidates between them still scored over 28 per cent of the total 
vote, and Sambre himself was still re-elected. So the problem is not 
so much to explain Sambre's own personal loss of popularity as to 
explain the continuing preeminence of the Namblo community 
despite the glaring evidence of internal divisions in its leadership. 
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 show how the votes of Sambre's constituents 
were distributed among the candidates for both the open and 
provincial seats in 1992. These tables show that John Wotong could 
at last claim some sort of victory over his arch-rival, for he 
Political Competition in Nuku 1 95 
managed to coJlect 213 more votes amongst Sambre's constituents 
than Sambre himself. Sambre's own supporters had little doubt that 
Wotong was the man behind the challenge now posed to their 
candidate by Andrew Kumbakor, a 32-year old 'plantation manager' 
from the Seim village of Yiriwandi. Kumbakor certainly posed more 
of a threat than Andrew Komboni had posed in 1987, or might pose 
again in 1992, because the Seim people accounted for more than 12 
per cent of  the electorate's population in 1990, and delivered more 
than 15 per cent of the votes cast in 1992, whereas Komboni's Kafle 
community, though somewhat larger than the Namblo group, 
accounted for less than 5 per cent of the population and delivered 
only 4.6 per cent of the votes. Even in 1987 Komboni had struggled to 
collect more than 600 votes outside his own community, but now, 
having already lost his Makru-Kafle seat in the provincial 
assembly, he not only fell short of collecting 100 votes outside the 
three Kafle villages but barely managed to command a majority 
within them. 
The contraction of Komboni's support was partly achieved, and 
certainly underlined, by the relative success of Melchior Mokul, the 
leader of a break-away sect of the South Seas Evangelical Mission 
whose followers were largely confined to the community of 
Arkosame and some of the Wanwan settlements immediately west 
of it. Mokul was widely described as the 'brother-in-law' of Jimmy 
Akuli, the man who had beaten Komboni in the 1988 provincial 
elections and thus became the Makru-Kafle MPA, but it seems that 
the Arkosame block vote which was cornered by both men was little 
more than the political reflection of a strictly localised millenarian 
movement. If the Arkosame and Kafle candidates were both unable 
to gamer any significant number of votes amongst the more numerous 
Makru group, which accounted for almost 8 per cent of the 
electorate's population in 1990, then Makru voters, who had no 
candidate of their own, were bound to play a major role in deciding 
the outcome of a contest between the remaining candidates from the 
south of the electorate-all of whom were either Seim or Namblo 
men. 
Now if it is true that Wotong had abandoned his former 
promotion of Komboni, which he never seems to have taken too 
seriously, it is not so clear that he had switched his patronage to 
Kumbakor, and even less likely that Kumbakor had come to see 
himself as Wotong's client, since Wotong collected only 1 10 (less 
than 5 per cent) of the Seim votes cast for the provincial seat in 1992, 
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while Kumbakor collected almost fifteen times as many in the open 
contest. Most of the Seim people who voted for Kumbakor, along 
with a substantial number of people in the Makru-Kafle area who 
did not vote for Kumbakor, cast their second votes for Rex Namah, 
either because he was Paias Wingti's candidate for the provincial 
seat or else (more likely) because he had established some personal 
connections with a number of leading individuals in the Makru-Seim 
zone, including Kumbakor himself. 
The reason why Sambre's supporters perceived a deeper or more 
devious connection between Kumbakor and Wotong was that a second 
Namblo candidate for the open seat, Simon Wama, was seen to be 
the willing instrument of both these men's designs. Wama was a 
former soldier from Wambiu village, whose rivalry with Sambre's 
home village of Imbiyip has continually threatened the political 
solidarity of the Namblo community as a whole . There is little 
doubt that most of Wama's voters cast their second votes for Wotong, 
while Wotong' s support of Wama' s campaign in the Mukili and 
Wanwan areas was clearly critical to Wama's momentous defeat of 
Sambre in the Maimai-Wanwan zone as a whole . In this respect, 
W ama was obviously far more useful to Kumbakor' s campaign than 
Komboni's two 'spoilers' (Wanur and Aflatawa) had been in 1987. 
Anticipating the substance of this threat, Sambre and his own 
supporters seem to have colluded in a counter-spoiling operation 
which saw Gregory Ambasi stand as a second Seim candidate, and 
Primus Hari stand as a third Namblo candidate, in the contest for 
Sambre's seat. 14 
Gregory Ambasi, a humble catechist from Hambasamba village, 
had been the most prominent Pangu 'supporter' in the Seim area 
during the 1987 election, and in this capacity had probably helped 
to deliver some 400 of the votes which Sambre finally accumulated. 
With Sambre's reciprocal support, Ambasi was then able to enter 
the provincial assembly as Member for Seim, having defeated the 
incumbent, Peter Ukwando, in the provincial elections of 1988. In 
1992 he won 480 Seim votes, slightly more than the 471 which had 
secured his place in the provincial assembly, but nowhere near the 
1,618 won by Kumbakor. On the other hand, he won more than 500 
1 4  I have not been able to establish the chronological order in which the 
relevant nominations were submitted, but this would make little difference 
to the popular perception of the process which had come to prevail by the 
end of the campaign period . 
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votes in the Makru villages, considerably more than Kumbakor, and 
even managed to pick up 135 votes in the Mukili area from people 
who must have been dismayed or disinterested by the political 
disintegration of their Namblo neighbours. 
Table 7.6: Distribution of the Nuku Open votes for the West Sepik 
Provincial seat in 1992. 
Name of candidate Maimai- Makru E & W  Yangkok Total 
for open seat Wanwan -Seim Palai (Au) votes (%) 
John Wotong 1305 524 961 353 3143 (19.7) 
Rex Namah 287 1916 245 96 2544 (16.0) 
Clement Tumana 108 502 681 961 2252 (14.1 )  
Harry Wunum 242 936 110 207 1495 (9.4) 
Paul Langro 97 327 479 583 1486 (9.3) 
Martin Enda 87 210 380 241 918 (5.8) 
John Moipu 13 297 146 417 873 (5.5) 
Alex Nonwo 17 240 39 575 871 (5.5) 
John Tekwei 144 207 103 401 855 (5.4) 
Karl Stack 263 239 140 34 676 (4.2) 
Peter Saroya 195 187 44 132 560 (3.5) 
Hank Yakai 12 20 18 168 218 (1 .4) 
Jeffrey Atiksep 6 7 12 26 51 (0.3) 
Total vote 2776 5614 3358 4194 15942 (100.0) 
Primus Hari, like Peter Wauwau, was a former schoolteacher 
and sometime Minister for Education in the Sandaun Provincial 
Government. In 1982, when he was still the Maimai-Wanwan MPA, 
he had made the unfortunate mistake of supporting W otong' s 
campaign against Sambre in the national election, partly because of 
the same village rivalries which now brought Simon Wama to 
conduct a similar campaign with Wotong's backing. When Wotong 
successfully challenged Hari's occupation of the Maimai-Wanwan 
seat in 1984, Sambre took the opportunity to treat Hari as a sort of 
prodigal Pangu son in the hope that Hari's influence in his own 
village of Wambiu would help to limit the escalation of conflicts 
between the 'youth' of Wambiu and Imbiyip. If Hari's intervention 
in this latest election had any significant effect, it was to show that 
Sambre could still split the Wambiu vote, if any Wambiu candidate 
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chose to oppose him, without losing any of his own support in 
Imbiyip. Even if Wama had obtained the 300-odd votes which Hari 
managed to collect throughout the electorate, this would only have 
shown that two Namblo candidates could place first and third in 
the same contest, without making any other difference to the 
overall result. 
There is no reason to doubt Sambre's own belief that the outcome 
of this contest for the open seat was bound to tum on the bitter and 
twisted construction of political relationships between the Seim and 
Namblo candidates-not only in the southern half of the electorate, 
where all of them were based, but in the northern half as well, 
where all the local candidates invariably neutralise each other. As 
in 1987, Peter Wauwau and Luke Tom were the only candidates 
based in the Palai zone, but Wauwau, like Komboni, had already 
lost his seat in the provincial assembly and could no longer mobilise 
his affinal connections in Seim, while Tom's share of the vote fell 
back below the level he had gained in 1982, thus confirming the old 
adage that two-time losers should never stand again. 
The Yangkok zone boasted a total of six candidates, all of whom 
were based in the central part of East Au Census Division. These 
were: 
Carolus Kalang, whose function as a Pangu spoiler was now 
somewhat redundant, was probably encouraged to stand by 
his acquisition of the East Au seat in the provincial 
assembly, but he still failed to retain the 7 per cent share 
of the vote which he had won in 1987; 
Nimbaken Situk of Wulukum village, the man whom 
Kalang had defeated in the last round of provincial 
elections, who was still unable to match Kalang's share of 
the vote on this occasion; 
Mauri Nemantu, a nursing officer from Anguganak village, 
who replaced Andrew Komboni as the official candidate of 
the People's Progress Party, but could not improve on 
Komboni's  fourth place in the 1 987 poll,  despite his 
acquisition of 370 votes in the Palai zone; and 
Joe Kawa, yet another former schoolteacher, who was even 
more successful in gathering votes outside of the Yangkok 
zone, and thus able to gain third place in the poll, possibly 
because his base in Ningil village enabled him to trade on 
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the network of political alliances previously set up by Jack 
Talis . 
The last two Yangkok candidates were Tom Yuankou, a 
former medical orderly from Anguganak village, and Nick 
Kauni, a former local councillor and youth group leader 
from Yangkok village. 
Although these six candidates between them won more than 95 
per cent of the votes cast in the Yangkok zone, the simple fact that 
there were six of them was enough to ensure that none could win even 
10  per cent of the votes cast by the whole electorate, despite the 
moderate success which two enjoyed in the Palai political vacuum. 
Of course, if six candidates based within a five-mile radius of 
Yangkok station were able to win nearly 33 per cent of the votes cast 
for the Nuku Open seat in 1992, it might plausibly be argued that 
they were doing rather better than the three Namblo candidates 
who won less than 29 per cent of these votes, and a Y angkok-based 
candidate might yet hope to break the Namblo grip on political 
power in some future contest. On the other hand, it must be 
remembered that these six Yangkok candidates do not speak a single 
vernacular language and do not, by any stretch of the imagination, 
belong to a single traditional political community, whereas the 
Namblo group, regardless of the ancient rivalry between its two 
largest villages, has been a single linguistic and political unit for as 
long as anyone can remember. Bearing this point in mind, it is still 
instructive to compare the combined performances of candidates from 
different parts of the electorate in each of the local areas where 
votes were combined for the count in 1992. 
If it is true that the Namblo community exercises a form of 
political domination in its own right, then Table 7.7 shows that this 
influence is remarkably widespread within the confines of Nuku 
District, however tenuous it might be in the Yangkok area. It may 
not seem surprising that the Namblo candidates secured more than 
50 per cent of the votes cast in all four parts of the Maimai-Wanwan 
zone, since there were no candidates from other local communities to 
compete with them, and John Wotong, the sitting MPA, was himself 
sponsoring one of the three. But the Namblo candidates achieved 
the same result in the area around Nuku station, which contains the 
speakers of at least three local languages, none closely related to 
the Namblo language, as well as a motley collection of government 
workers . The three Namblo candidates scored more votes in the 
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Makru-Kafle area than the two Seim candidates, they almost 
certainly won more than half the total votes cast in the Makru 
villages themselves, and obtained 15-30 per cent of the votes cast in 
each of three Palai areas. Even in the Seim villages, the three 
Namblo candidates almost scored 10 per cent of the votes cast, 
whereas the two Seim candidates could not even achieve 1 per cent 
of the votes cast in the Namblo villages and adjacent Wanim 
villages which make up the 'Namblo' area shown in Table 7.7. 
Table 7.7: Relative popularity (% vote share) of Nuku Open 
candidates from different parts of the electorate in 
each of fourteen counting units in 1992. 
Counting Candidates' Place of Origin 
Unit 3 Namblo 2 Seim 2 M-K 2 Palai 6 Yangkok 
Mukili 55.6 23.5 2.2 2.7 16.1 
Namblo 93.9 0.9 4.7 0.0 0.4 
W Wanwan 87.5 2.3 0.3 0.8 9.2 
E Wanwan 59.1 11 .0 25.2 0.2 4.5 
Mak-Kaf 30.7 28.9 34.1 1.7 4.7 
Seim 9.7 87.2 1.8 1.0 0.3 
Nuku 51.5 20.4 0.7 23.9 3.4 
S Palai 27.9 15.5 1 .1 40.5 15.0 
NE Palai 15.0 8.9 0.2 40.7 35. 1  
NW Palai 28.1 12.3 0.7 19.0 40.0 
NE Au 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 99.0 
SE Au 1.8 0.2 0.5 1 .2 96.2 
SW Au 2.2 1 .5 1 .1 0.4 94.8 
SW Au 14.0 0.6 0.4 0.6 84.5 
Total 28.3 23.4 7.3 8.3 32. 7 
If we compare the proportions of votes won by the three Namblo 
candidates in each of the four main zones in 1992 with those won by 
Sambre alone in 1987 (see Tables 7.2 and 7.5), we find that: 
the proportion fell only slightly in the Palai zone, from 27 
per cent to just over 25 per cent; 
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i t  fell substantially in the Yangkok zone, from almost 14  
per cent to  only 3 per cent, and also in the Makru-Seim zone, 
from almost 49 per cent to less than 27 per cent; but 
it actually increased in the Maimai-Wanwan zone, from 
just over 60 per cent to nearly 74 per cent. 
These changes can largely be explained by the number of serious 
contenders from each zone who were contesting the two elections. 
The number (and even the identity) of the Palai candidates 
remained constant, while the number of Yangkok candidates rose 
from two to six. Andrew Komboni was the only serious contender from 
the Makru-Seim zone in 1987, because the other two (Joe Aflatawa 
and Peter Masinbai) could barely muster 150 votes between them. On 
the other hand, Paul Wanur, a Wanwan candidate, took almost 500 
votes in 1987, whereas the Namblo candidates faced no equivalent 
challenge in 1992. 
If it is true that the three Namblo candidates in 1992 were 
competing for a sort of 'N amblo block vote', one might go on to infer 
that the total size of that vote had been diminished by local 
perceptions that the Namblo community could no longer present a 
united political front. On the other hand, the recognition of this fact 
should also alert us to the possibility that Sambre's victory in 1992 
owed rather less to his membership of the Namblo community than 
it owed to his retention of a significant rump of personal 'Pangu' 
supporters throughout the length and breadth of the electorate. For 
if we consider the spatial distribution of votes among the three 
Namblo candidates, we find that Sambre scored more than 83 per 
cent of the 2,468 votes which the Namblo candidates obtained 
outside his own Maimai-Wanwan zone, but less than 43 per cent of 
the 2,059 votes which they obtained within it. And even if we 
consider Primus Hari to be one of Sambre's own supporters, thus 
raising the 'Pangu' share of the Maimai-Wanwan vote, we must 
still recall that many of Simon Wama's votes, both inside and 
outside the Maimai-Wanwan zone, were delivered by the influence 
of Sambre's old enemy John Wotong, the only man who has matched 
Sambre's own capacity to create and maintain an enduring network 
of political alliances throughout the electorate . And in two 
successive provincial elections ( 1984 and 1988) John Wotong had 
secured more votes in the Maimai-Wanwan constituency than the 
combination of Namblo candidates who opposed him, which also 
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seems to imply that it is Sambre's personal authority which has 
created the impression of a field of Namblo domination, and not the 
enduring fact of Namblo hegemony which has promoted Sambre's 
own political career. 
If we then focus our attention on the spatial distribution of 
support for Sambre and his individual opponents, we find that, in 
1987, Sambre got more than 30 per cent of the vote in fifteen of the 
twenty-three counting areas distinguished in that election, and 
scored a simple majority over all other candidates (more than 50 per 
cent of the total vote) in eight of them. Amongst his rivals, James 
Yirwei had only six counts over 30 per cent, Peter Wauwau had only 
five, and none of the other candidates achieved this percentage in 
more than three of the counting areas. In 1992, when the number of 
counting areas was reduced,  and their size correspondingly 
increased, Sambre scored more than 20 per cent of the votes cast in 
seven of the fourteen, Simon Wama and Mauri Nemantu each 
managed the same feat in three, while five other candidates 
(Ambasi, Wauwau, Kalang, Kawa and Yuankou) could only manage 
it in two of them. Interestingly enough, Sambre's nearest rival, 
Andrew Kumbakor, only managed to achieve this percentage in the 
single counting area which was equivalent to Seim Census Division, 
where he got slightly more than two-thirds of the 2,405 votes cast 
by members of his own political community. It  therefore seems 
reasonable to conclude that Sambre's superior capacity to garner 
votes outside the immediate vicinity of his own home area was as 
much the explanation of his victory in 1992 as it had been in 1987, 
and perhaps even more so, now that his own political community 
had been so thoroughly divided. 
If we can also finally say that Sambre's earlier triumphs owed 
more to his own personal authority than they did to the patronage 
of Karl Stack, it is much harder to say what, if anything, has 
replaced the force of their former alliance . In 1 992, Nuku Open 
voters gave Stack only 14 per cent of the votes which brought him 
seventh place in the election for the West Sepik Provincial seat, 
and this dismal performance testifies to a serious lack of enthusiasm 
from Sambre's Pangu network. On the other hand, it is not clear 
whether the mere fact of Stack's candidacy was enough to dissuade 
Sambre from promoting any of the alternative candidates, perhaps 
because he feared some accusation of disloyalty, or whether his 
evident failure to form an alternative alliance was based on the 
pragmatic observation that none (apart from an unthinkable 
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relationship with John Wotong) could serve to expand his existing 
network of political support within the electorate. Although it is 
true that Wotong was able to accumulate a certain amount of 
political capital out of Stack's removal from the local arena, Table 
7.6 shows that the only other local candidate for Stack's seat, 
Harry Wunum from Mansuku village, was unable to make any 
significant impression outside his own Makru community, and so 
challengers based in other parts of the province were able to collect 
more than two thirds of the votes cast by Sambre' s constituents. 
This pattern of voting for the provincial seat marks a dramatic 
departure from that which had been evident in earlier elections. In 
1987, the 'outside challengers' for Stack's seat could not even muster 
10 per cent of the Nuku Open votes, and Harry Wunum's namesake 
Ignas (to whom he is not directly related) was able to collect more 
than a third of them when Stack himself collected almost half. 
This semblance of parochialism evaporated in 1992. 
W otong did manage to score more than 20 per cent of the 
votes cast in eight of the fourteen counting areas (one more 
than Sambre), but only achieved an overall majority in two 
of them-his own area of Mukili and the lightly 
populated West Wanwan area to the south of it; 
Despite his university degree in education, Harry Wunum 
still scored slightly less than 30 per cent of the votes cast in 
his own Makru-Kafle area, and could not obtain even 20 per 
cent in any of the other counts. 
Rex Namah scored slightly more than 30 per cent of the 
votes cast in the Makru-Kafle area, and more than 45 per 
cent of the votes cast in the populous Seim area, but could 
only pass the 20 per cent mark in two other counts. 
Clement Tumana, an agriculture graduate based in Aitape, 
matched Namah's performance by scoring more than 20 per 
cent of the votes cast in four of the counts, and even Paul 
Langro managed this achievement in two of them, despite 
the apparent lack of support from his Pangu 'running mate' 
Sambre. 
Apart from Wunum, there were three other challengers­
Martin Enda (a law graduate from Amanab District), Alex 
Nonwo (an arts graduate from Lumi District) and John 
Tekwie (the economics graduate from Vanimo who actually 
204 Filer 
won the seat)-who scored more than 20 per cent of the 
votes cast in one of the Nuku Open counts. 
In this respect the five university graduates all matched or 
surpassed the sitting member's performance, because Stack 
only passed the 20 per cent mark (though he could not reach 
25 per cent) in Sambre's Namblo area, despite the 
lukewarm backing of his former ally. 
The two remaining candidates based in Aitape District­
Peter Saroya and John Moipu-both scored more than 10 per 
cent of the votes cast in two of the Nuku Open counting 
areas, and in Saroya's case, this achievement included 17 
per cent of the votes cast in the Namblo area, where more 
than 50 per cent of the voters refused to cast their votes for 
either the sitting member, Karl Stack, or their local MP A, 
John Wotong. 
The uneven spatial distribution of support for candidates in this 
particular contest is also revealed by the fact that three or more of 
them each scored more than 10 per cent of the votes cast in all but 
two of the fourteen counting areas-the two exceptions being the 
Mukili area, where Wotong alone took 69 per cent of the votes, and 
the Seim area, where Namah took nearly 47 per cent, Tumana took 
nearly 18 per cent, and six other candidates (Nonwo, Saroya, Moipu, 
Wunum, Wotong and Tekwie, in that order) shared more than 32 per 
cent of the total. 
Furthermore, a comparison of the votes cast for the open and 
provincial seats in each of the fourteen counting areas reveals a 
singular absence of correlations in the distribution of support for 
pairs of open and provincial candidates-apart from the match 
between votes cast for John Wotong and Simon W ama in the 
Maimai-Wanwan zone, where both men shared a common interest in 
the erosion of Sambre' s own power base. Otherwise the evidence 
suggests that candidates for the open seat were normally unwilling 
or unable to make a consistent delivery of their own political 
support to one of the candidates standing in the provincial contest­
even within the boundaries of their own political communities­
while most of the candidates standing for the provincial seat were 
able to win several small blocks of votes in various parts of Sambre' s 
constituency through a variety of deals or appeals mediated by a 
large number of village and clan leaders-including the candidates 
for the open seat and their own key supporters-without thereby 
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creating anything which might be compared with Sambre's Pangu 
network. 
In 1982 and 1987, the central fact of political life in Nuku Open 
electorate was a coin with two sides-the alliance of 'Steak and 
Grease' on the one side, and the bitter feud between John Wotong and 
Chris Sambre on the other. In 1992 the feud remained without the 
alliance, and was still central to the outcome of both local contests, 
but its principals both lost ground in a political field where local 
and personal loyalties are both more specific and less durable than 
they have been in the past. 
Political morality 
Let me now return to the problem posed at the beginning of this 
paper-the problem of how to account for the specific form of 
Sambre' s political success over the period since independence, 
including the nature and extent of his own dependence upon the 
alliance of 'Steak and Grease' .  Psephological analysis appears to 
confirm the persistence of locality and local ethnicity as essential 
factors in the determination of electoral outcomes in Sambre's 
electorate, even if these factors operate within a complex and 
sometimes mysterious construction of political space. On the other 
hand, it is hardly possible to maintain that the process of economic 
development or the condition of economic backwardness is simply 
irrelevant to the local political process, since questions of political 
economy do constitute the basic substance of political talk. And 
while it might be true to say that Sambre's local version of the 
Pangu Party does not correspond to Western or Weberian conceptions 
of the role which parties play in 'modern' politics, it is neither the 
figment of his own political imagination nor the organisational form 
of some local or ethnic entity. It might be construed as the 
organisational expression of a 'handout mentality' whose operation 
is not strictly parochial, but it also exhibits some moral qualities 
which are difficult to reconcile with standard models of political 
patronage, and which seem to form an essential part of Sambre' s own 
political authority. 
Most of Sambre's opponents in four successive elections have 
obtained the great majority of their votes from members of their own 
traditional political community and one or more of the communities 
with which it shares a common border. And that is why they have 
lost. Even the largest of these traditional political communities 
(Seim) does not have the numbers to guarantee the election of a 
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single candidate-unless perhaps that candidate could corner its 
unanimous support. But that is never likely to happen, firstly 
because the probability of communal unanimity has always been 
inversely related to the size of the political community, secondly 
because the number of candidates (and therefore the range of 
electoral options) has been steadily increasing, and finally because 
the partial or complete abandonment of 'custom' has eroded the 
political cohesion of communities both large and small. It is true 
that candidates have normally won a higher proportion of the votes 
cast in their own community than they have won in any other, 
provided that they have not been in competition with other 
members of their own group (as Sambre was in 1992), but it would not 
be true to say that members of communities which do not have a 
candidate of their own have normally cast their votes for one who is 
a member of the nearest neighbouring community. Sambre himself 
did gain the unanimous support of the Namblo community in 1977, 
lost it in 1982, regained it in 1987, and lost it again in 1992, when he 
faced two other Namblo candidates. I cannot say which other 
communities have given all or nearly all their votes to one 
candidate, but I think it could be argued that a candidate is no more 
likely to monopolise the votes of his own community than some 
other community with which he has established a special 
relationship. It might even be argued that those communities which 
produce candidates are rather less likely to show a united front than 
those which do not. In other words, we need to treat the relative 
political solidarity of local communities as an independent 
variable, and one which is almost certainly beyond the control of 
any individual candidate, even when he is at home. And if the last 
election destroyed the original (perhaps now mythical) association 
between the solidarity of the Namblo community and Sambre's own 
personal authority, Stack's withdrawal seems to have revealed, in 
the high proportion of votes cast for candidates based in other 
electorates, that 'Nuku-ness' has also lost the force of its appeal as 
a focus of parochial loyalty within West Sepik Province-possibly 
because it designates an area whose artificiality is now associated 
with the failure of the state to keep its promise of 'development' .  
If perceptions of physical distance between voters and 
candidates are insufficient to explain the overall distribution of 
votes in this electorate, and even less able to explain the dimensions 
of Sambre's successive victories, can the balance of the explanation 
lie with the identity and interests of social strata which transect 
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the local barriers between political communities? Three types of 
sectional division have some plausible capacity to fill this gap: 
the class distinction between peasants and workers, which 
in this case largely matches the popular contrast between 
'grassroots' and 'elites'; 
the sectarian divisions between Christian denominations, 
whose potential significance has grown with the declining 
influence of the Catholic church; and 
the social construction of generation gaps between sections 
of the adult population which have been educated or 
initiated under different political and economic 
circumstances. 
But it is hard to weigh the relative significance of these three 
factors in the local distribution of political power because of the 
linkages between them. Although the 'class structure' of the 
electorate can best be understood in terms of the triangular 
relationship between a state apparatus, a 'political' or 'leadership' 
apparatus, and a mass of villagers (or 'peasants') ,  most full-time 
government employees were born in the electorate, and are therefore 
members of local political communities, and most of the local 
candidates in national and provincial elections are themselves 
former government employees, even if they have hitherto been 
working outside the electorate . Furthermore, since the great 
majority of candidates have been trained or employed in the 
delivery of social services of one kind or another, and the greater 
part of this work has been organised by church agencies functioning 
in association with particular government departments, members of 
the political apparatus have normally been closely identified with 
specific denominations before they begin their political careers. And 
the local 'elites ' who thus tend to oscillate between the state 
apparatus and the political apparatus are themselves likely to be 
the sons or nephews of men who have occupied the sundry offices of 
community leadership-as local councillors, village court officials, 
aid post orderlies, school board members, catechists or pastors­
which have been, and are still, engaged to mobilise electoral 
support . 15 The irony of this is that the quality of government is 
1 5  The masculine gender is used deliberately here because there is still no sign 
that this electorate is likely to produce a female candidate, or even female 
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perceived to have declined in proportion as the state apparatus has 
come to be seen as the only viable route to political power, and the 
value of 'politics' has likewise declined with the growing intensity 
of competition for political office amongst the occupants of this same 
state apparatus. Hence the appearance of a vicious circle which can 
only be squared by the intervention of some force which is external 
both to politics and to the state, which people are now far more 
likely to identify with some species of Christianity than with the 
production, distribution or redistribution of material wealth. 
Since the whole state apparatus tends to appear, in the eyes of 
the local population, as nothing more nor less than a pool of 
potential candidates, its remaining members seem to feel that they 
cannot afford to be seen as the supporters of any one candidate, and 
do in fact go to some lengths to keep their support to themselves, 
even while they harbour their own private political ambitions. 
'Connections to the state' do not appear to be especially important 
even as a source of authority within each local community, 
especially because those members of the community who also have 
positions in the state apparatus are generally not living at or near 
their natal homes. If these same individuals do go out of their way 
(or make their way home) in order to engage more directly with the 
masses, they would quickly be accused of losing their professed 
impartiality, and the nature of the services which most of them 
distribute has always made it difficult to disprove such accusations. 
The result of this situation is that public servants have no obvious 
impact on electoral outcomes, either as voters or as subjects of 
political talk. There may now be 300 households in this electorate 
which contain a school-teacher, health worker, or some other 
species of public servant. Taken together, these households would 
not account for more than 700 of the votes cast in the last national 
election, which is less than 2 per cent of the total. The method of 
polling does not permit any precise analysis of the votes cast by 
'supporters' who play an active role in electoral campaigns. The political 
situation of women is rather neatly portrayed in one Namblo anecdote 
which tells how a man told his wife to vote for a candidate other than the 
one he would vote for himself, and then beat her when he discovered that 
she had disobeyed him and done what wives are normally expected to do. 
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these individuals, but the distribution of votes cast at  Nuku station, 
which must include a substantial proportion of votes cast by 
'educated elites', appears to confirm my general impression that 
their loyalties have been no less divided than those of the masses. 
Insofar as candidates are themselves normally drawn from the ranks 
of this class, we may suppose that kinship, friendship and 
occupational alignments all play some part in the division of their 
votes, but these are not matters on which candidates or their 
supporters care to speculate, presumably because they make so little 
difference to the result. 
But if local public servants lack the wealth, status, or social 
distance which might cause them to be represented as the class 
enemies of ordinary villagers, the same cannot be said of Karl Stack, 
whose very conspicuous wealth, commonly framed by accusations of 
'corruption', has not only attracted the outspoken antagonism of 
many candidates over the years, but has also prompted many local 
public servants to reveal their sympathy for this antagonism. In 
which case, it may be argued that class is relevant to politics in this 
area, not because of any conflict between the two classes which are 
actually represented here, but rather because of their differential 
perception and evaluation of the 'missing' class of capitalists. When 
Stack was in his prime, the mass of village voters all agreed that 
'business' was the key to 'development', and if the more educated 
members of the electorate were inclined to dispute Karl Stack's 
manner of wielding this key, they found it much harder to convince 
the ordinary villagers that they knew how to wield it in a more 
effective way. In class terms, then, the combination of 'Steak and 
Grease' won votes because it was seen to represent the alliance of 'big 
business' and the 'middle peasantry', and the very low level of 
'peasant differentiation' in this area may serve to explain the 
relative popularity of naked capitalist values, since local villagers 
(unlike the local public servants) had not come to think of 'business' 
as a game that they could never win. 
In retrospect, Stack's failure to deliver the promise of 
'development' before he left the local political arena has either 
encouraged or confirmed the recent transformation of these attitudes. 
From my brief observations of the 1992 election, I would say that 
there is now much wider acceptance of the idea that 'business' and 
'corruption' are not only two sides of the same coin, but are equally 
incompatible with 'true Christian values' .  If 'Steak and Grease' 
once represented the belief that Capital and Christianity were 
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partners in 'development' ,  Sambre's position on one side of this 
equation may not only be threatened by the loss of his former ally, 
but also by the spread of radical or evangelical varieties of 
Christianity which tend to feed on the perceived 'corruption' of the 
Catholic variety with which he is identified. Given Sambre's own 
background as a member of the Franciscan order, and the role of 
former Namblo catechists in founding his political 'machine', it 
would seem quite natural to suppose that the spatial and temporal 
distribution of his electoral support have both reflected the local 
popularity of the Catholic church. I do not have the statistical 
evidence required to test this hypothesis, but my conversations with 
candidates and supporters suggest that Christian leadership, as a 
generic concept, carries far more weight with voters than the 
conflict of sectarian theologies.  What this means, in practice, is 
that candidates naturally use their membership of a particular 
church to mobilise their own electoral support, but neither they nor 
their supporters castigate opposing candidates for being members of 
another one. There are some exceptional cases in which a 
candidate's religious standing is widely seen to be the sole basis for 
his political endeavours, as with Melchior Mokul' s challenge for 
the Open seat in 1992, but candidates like these are not taken too 
seriously by anyone outside their own denomination, and it is more 
common to find that a candidate's sectarian affiliations are not even 
known to his opponents. The allocation of political support depends 
more crucially on a distinction between 'real' Christians and 
'superficial' (skin) Christians, which cuts across sectarian lines to 
evoke a common image of virtuous leadership which is at odds with 
the 'hand-out mentality', the ' (wantok) system', and other images 
of corruption, and if the alliance with Stack has sometimes been 
taken to detract from Sambre's reputation on this score, his 
membership of the Catholic church has not. 
On the other hand, it could more plausibly be argued that the 
style and substance of Sambre's political authority, along with 
other aspects of his own community's political hegemony, have been 
so  intimately linked with the colonial social order that their 
appeal cannot transcend that generation of village leaders whose 
own political initiation took place under the rule of the kiap. The 
most tangible evidence in support of this argument was the T-shirt 
designed and supplied by Karl Stack for distribution by Sambre's 
supporters during the 1987 election campaign, which bore the telling 
slogan lapun i-gat save ('old folks know what's what') . 
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There is a good deal of evidence from various parts of Melanesia 
to suggest that different forms of authority are associated with 
different generations of men, each of which has grown up with a 
different experience and expectation of the political system. Within 
the Namblo community, men formerly acquired positions of 
ceremonial leadership or ritual authority through the conduct of an 
initiation cycle which generally divided them into 'half­
generations', in which the distinction between the grade of 'older 
brothers' and the grade of 'younger brothers' was no less important 
than the distinction between fathers and sons. Local communities 
were distinguished from each other by their possession of 
independent initiation cycles, which were themselves a major 
ingredient in the formation of communal or 'tribal' identities. These 
initiation cycles have withered away with the advent and 
development of state and church institutions. But the period of 
colonial and post-colonial development, which now stretches back 
about sixty years, has been divided by a series of events and 
experiences which can be interpreted as new forms of initiation, and 
which do seem to divide the male population of the electorate into 
generations which are separated by intervals of approximately 
fifteen years. My own observations of the Namblo community have 
led me to conclude that this succession of new generations can be 
defined by the overlapping periods from 1930 to 1950, 1945 to 1965, 
1960 to 1980, and the period of Independence from 1975 to the 
present. Within the five-year phases of transition, it is possible to 
identify events which can be seen, with the benefit of hindsight, to 
have 'initiated' a new phase in the development of the community 
itself and much of the surrounding area. This periodisation of local 
history may seem unnaturally neat, but it corresponds with the 
manner in which Namblo men talk about the transfer of political 
authority from one generation to the next. 
Sambre' s position of leadership within his own community is one 
which partly hinges on his ability to mobilise the support of two 
generations-the generation of 'middle-men' (born between 1930 and 
1950), in which he is one of the youngest members, and a succeeding 
generation of younger men (born between 1945 and 1965), in which he 
is one of the oldest members. It was the 'middle-men' who gained 
their political ascendancy during the 1960s, first in the Namblo 
community itself, then in other parts of the electorate, and we have 
seen that Sambre's 'Pangu network' was constructed from foundations 
laid by Namblo catechists who were the representatives and 
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instruments of this ascendancy, whose slogan was the rule of 'law', 
as represented by colonial authority . But these men have now 
largely retired from active political life, and once 'the law had 
broken down' (to quote one Namblo middle-man), the way was clear 
for younger men to say that Sambre's backing of the former kiap was 
the action of an Uncle Tom. 
From my own observations of the 1992 election, I should say that 
this kind of accusation had indeed become the common refrain of 
many young men born in the period since 1960, who had never bought 
into the colonial political system, and who now evince a volatile 
mixture of disillusionment and frustration. But the fact that Sambre 
still won that election, even without Stack's support, and lacking 
the active involvement of supporters older than himself, shows that 
he has retained a crucial following in several communities amongst 
the generation born from 1945 to 1965. Sambre and his many 
challengers agree that this is something called the Pangu Party . 
The point of which they differ is the question whether it survives 
entirely the instrument by which the sitting member buys political 
support with 'slush funds ' helpfully supplied by Parliament (if not 
by Stack or by Somare), or whether it embodies other values which, 
if not exactly policies or ideologies, are not reducible to crude 
material incentives. 
In some national electorates, there is no sign of any party 
organisation except in the period immediately preceding an 
election. But this is not the case in Nuku. Ever since his days as a 
Council Rules Inspector (1974-77), Sambre has worked hard to 
establish and sustain a scattered network of 'committee-men' 
(komiti) and other (active) 'supporters' (sapota) throughout the 
electorate, and there is little doubt that his success in this respect 
has played a major part in the perpetuation of his personal 
supremacy. The Pangu network is a distinctive and enduring element 
in the local political apparatus, and one which has expanded in 
significance as Nuku Local Government Council and the Sandaun 
Provincial Government have fallen into disrepute-as if it were, in 
practice, an alternative to both. The Nuku Pangu Party is not an 
organised political machine but a nebulous social organism. Sambre 
may be the head or the heart of this organism, but even he is not 
entirely certain of its membership or constitution. I call it a 
'network' because it is a series of optional, personal and horizontal 
relationships between a fluctuating number of village leaders, 
including Sambre himself in his role as the undisputed leader of 
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lmbiyip village (if not the whole Namblo community) .  The shape of 
this network is determined by the location and reliability of the 
various Pangu komiti. Like the Council ward komiti, the community 
school board komiti, and the Catholic parish komiti, each of these 
individuals is primarily responsible for the people (and in this case 
the votes) of a single village. But villages are not uniformly 
attached to the Pangu network, and the role of the komiti varies 
accordingly. In some villages there is no Pangu komiti, either 
because there is no leader willing to assume this position, or else 
because its former occupant has crossed the floor. At the other end of 
the scale, there are villages where Sambre has such solid support 
that there is no real need for a komiti, and several leaders may 
alternate or combine their occupation of this role with no particular 
deliberation. The choice of a komiti becomes a critical issue in those 
villages where the leadership is divided in its political allegiance. 
The most valuable of the komiti are those who lead minority 
factions within their own villages, but can still deliver the support 
they promise, and make accurate assessments of the choices being 
made by other leaders in their neighbourhood. The Pangu network 
could thus be described as an organic component of a locally uneven 
and chronically unstable pattern of village leadership, which 
features a fluctuating mixture of consensus and competition within 
each generation of authority. 
It is only in his own home village of lmbiyip that Sambre has 
succeeded in creating or promoting an effective specialisation of 
political functions between individual members of different 
political generations. During the 1980s, one of his classificatory sons 
specialised in driving, damaging and mending motor vehicles, after 
Sambre had personally arranged for him to be trained in these arts 
by the Franciscan fraternity at Aitape. This young man spent most of 
his time ferrying passengers and messages from one end of the 
electorate to another, consuming an average of one second-hand 
Toyota Landcruiser per annum, but boosting the name of Pangu by 
providing free lifts to actual and potential supporters . Having 
helped to establish a cash-crop purchasing agency in the mid­
eighties, Sambre likewise made arrangements for two of his 
'nephews' to gain some training in business management, thinking 
that either or both would then be able to accomplish the unlikely 
task of running this organisation at a profit. Meanwhile, a third 
'nephew' acquired a university degree in agriculture-a subject 
which Chris certainly encouraged him to study, thinking that this 
2 1 4  Filer 
would provide his village and his party with the knowledge 
necessary to expand the production of agricultural commodities. And 
this nephew had another vital role to play, as leader of the 
Imbiyip Electric Band, the best equipped and most accomplished 
band in the electorate, regularly hired to perform at nocturnal 
village 'parties' during the dry season, and thus, in one sense, 
Sambre's own ambassador to youth. 
The band, the cars, the business arm-this patchwork of 
activities should not be seen as a concerted instrument for gathering 
political support, but as the 'modern' strands in thicker ropes of 
reciprocity which bind the leaders of successive generations and 
distinct communities . Bands and cars and business groups are the 
material with which the younger generation weaves alliances .  
Older generations, including Sambre and the majority of  his komiti, 
construct their mutual relationships with more 'traditional ' 
commodities. Pigs, cows, chickens, dogs, tobacco, betelnut-the 
Pangu network also functions as a means of redistributing the surplus 
of such items from one village to another. And the way that Sambre 
apportions his share of the so-called 'slush fund'-and much if not 
most of his personal income-is only another strand in this complex 
web of material transactions. 
No-one sees this simply as a way of buying votes. The purpose of 
the exercise is to maintain a sense of justice in the ranks of the 
komiti, so each perceives that different degrees of loyalty and 
treachery are adequately measured in the total balance of 
transactions governed by the norm of reciprocity. Treachery is born of 
jealousy, so the judicious use of 'handouts' to control the incidence of 
jealousy is vital for the reproduction of 'support' throughout the 
network as a whole. But here there is a real dilemma. Every 
handout to an individual komiti risks as much support as it obtains, 
because there will be someone else who asks 'Why him, not me?', but 
Sambre cannot afford to hold the money back in case the jealousy is 
then directed at himself. Each election is a time for individuals 
affiliated to the Pangu network to reassess each other's credit 
ratings. Sambre makes these assessments through the agency of his 
'campaign teams' .  Despite their title, these small groups of tried 
and trusted men are not primarily engaged in making speeches or 
persuading people how to vote. Their main role is to go around 
collecting promises from less reliable supporters, and then lay their 
own judgement on the line by telling Sambre how much they think 
these promises are worth. 
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In this electorate, a s  elsewhere, political rhetoric, in the 
conventional sense associated with the use of loudspeakers, has 
much less significance than rumour and gossip as the oral expression 
of political values, but these 'hidden' forms of conversation are such 
as to militate against the listing or classification of 'campaign 
issues', because the issues tend to be embedded in specific, and even 
idiosyncratic, approaches to the question of why someone might or 
might not be inclined to vote for a particular candidate, and general 
statements of value can only be derived by adding up the reasons 
offered by several people, in a variety of situations, or in respect of 
several candidates. From my own first-hand observations of fireside 
political talk in the dying days of the 1987 campaign period, mostly 
amongst individuals who were at least pretending to be Pangu 
supporters or agents, I can supply the following examples: 
One komiti recounted his receipt of K300 from Sambre and 
the same amount from Stack (to help his 'business'), but 
then went on to complain that some individuals got KSOO 
when they provided a lower level of 'support' in return. It 
is notable that this man regarded his receipts as proof that 
the donors were not playing the 'system', because the 
'system' entails broken promises to people who are not 
'wantoks'. 
In another context, local support for Stack was explained by 
the proposition that white men like him could have no 
interest in playing the 'system' precisely because they had 
no 'wantoks' .  'White men have no wantok system-when 
they want to distribute something, everyone gets a share. '  
This point was made on top o f  the argument that the 
'system' is especially prevalent amongst the indigenous 
leadership of West Sepik Province because it is amongst 
the most backward provinces in the country. 
It was said that all members of the Seim community would 
vote for Stack because he had given them material 
assistance when their gardens were damaged by flood 
waters, and it was implied that members of other 
communities could not resent such assistance because it could 
not have been motivated by a desire to harm them at the 
same time. And if it should be thought that Stack's 
generosity was still motivated by nothing more than a 
desire to collect the maximum number of votes in the area, 
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the point was also made that Stack had promised to pay 
local children's school fees out of the income generated by 
the Stack West Sepik Trust even if he were to lose his seat. 
I was told that the 'Christians' in a community (Arkosame) 
which contained no Catholics would vote for Sambre 
because they had previously 'promised ' to do so-the 
implication being that Christians ( including Sambre but 
perhaps not Stack) were people who kept their promises 
and whose relationships ultimately rested on trust, and not 
on the distribution of material goods. 
Likewise the fuss made about the last-minute inspection of 
Sambre's lifestyle by a small deputation from the Yangkok 
area, where it was well-known that his overall level of 
support would not be very high, because it was held up as 
proof that Sambre was the only candidate capable of 
capturing the 'moral minority' of voters in the Electorate 
whose values had given them the capacity to overcome the 
primordial loyalties of kinship and residence. 
By contrast, it was said that the people of one Seim village 
(Awes) had 'betrayed' the Pangu cause by deciding to vote 
for their new tambu Peter Wauwau after Sambre had done 
all that was necessary to ensure their loyalty by making a 
timely donation to their newly established business group. 
But this last statement is not simply a statement about the 
'fundamental material realities' of political patronage. 
For it hinges around the suggestion that the would-be 
'clients' had not only breached the norm of reciprocity by 
soliciting and then renouncing a gift from their Member, but 
had done so in pursuit of an affinal relationship which was 
itself morally flawed-in ways which it would not be fair 
for me to detail here, but which provided Sambre' s men 
with many homilies related to the proposition that their 
candidate was 'not a man who messes around with women'. 
If opposing candidates could not be criticised for their 
sexual misdemeanours, nailed down with this particular 
type of faithlessnes-;, it was not too hard to discover other 
forms of irresponsibility which could be represented as 
evidence of broken moral contracts. Thus the PPP 'spoiler' 
Paul Wanur may not have betrayed his wife, but was said 
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to have betrayed his own (Wanim) community by resigning 
his j ob as headmaster of a local community school (at 
Wulbowe) in order to contest the election. The argument in 
this case was that his own people had a special need for 
him to remain in his position at the school because he was 
the first of their number to be trained as a teacher, and 
what made matters worse was that his own role as a 
spoiler for another, less educated candidate (Andrew 
Komboni) implied a recognition on his part that he could 
never hope to win the contest for himself, and his actions 
therefore had no more merit than the dubious content of his 
deal with the PPP. 
Komboni himself was said to stand little chance of 
collecting any votes from the Seim community because he 
had taken sides with his own (Kafle) community in a major 
land dispute between the two groups. But Pangu supporters 
normally preferred to portray the PPP candidate as a man 
who did not have the brains to realise that he was the 
puppet of a campaign manager (John Wotong) whose own 
moral failings were bound to undermine his chances.  One 
Pangu supporter conveyed this idea by comparing Komboni 
to a small tree which is knocked over when a storm blows 
down the much larger (and presumably rotten) tree which 
stands next to it. 
From these examples I think it can be seen that the general tenor 
of 'political talk' is the moral quality, and frequent moral 
ambiguity, of political relationships which inevitably have some 
material content, but which cannot be evaluated simply by the size 
of what is promised or delivered. Although I would not wish to deny 
that images of corruption or misappropriation on the part of 
'political elites' have a well-established place in the discussion of 
politics, and may well contain substantial grains of truth, it is 
important to remember that 'grassroots opinion' in places like Nuku 
may be much less concerned with misappropriation than with 
maldistribution, and the foundation of complaints about 'the system' 
is therefore not to be found in a distinction between public and 
private property which has barely entered the popular 
consciousness, but rather in a version of the proverb that 
'familiarity breeds contempt'. On the one hand, a candidate must 
come close enough to be seen, and even scrutinised, before he can hope 
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to win votes.  On the other hand, the purpose of that scrutiny is the 
production of malicious gossip, and the assumption behind it is that 
all candidates (or perhaps all of 'us' Papua New Guineans) have a 
natural tendency to abuse positions of power by using them to 
frustrate the promise of 'development'. 
In 1987 Karl Stack told the voters of Nuku Open electorate that 
he had quit the Pangu Party because its leader insisted on giving the 
meat of 'development' to people in other parts of the country, 
leaving only the bare bones for the two Sepik provinces. This was 
indeed one of the very few things which anyone could remember any 
candidate saying in a public speech. In that year, there is little 
doubt that Sambre's vote was fattened by the bits of meat which 
Stack himself was able to supply, despite the rumours put about by 
some of his detractors that he had been bribed by Stack to leave 
Somare once his victory had been secured, or, if he failed to do so, 
then he must be foolish to maintain a loyalty which Stack himself 
had said was fruitless. Sambre survived in 1992, despite the fact 
that it was very hard, if not impossible, for him to show that his 
electorate was more 'developed' than it had been five years earlier, 
and also in the absence of the lavish promises and bombast of his 
former ally. Life after Stack was possible because the local Pangu 
Party's  bones were still in place-or else, if Sambre's challengers 
were right, because he had resorted to a form of sorcery (called 
'alpha-power') to twist the outcome in his favour. Next time the 
feast will still have been postponed, the bones will be a little older, 
and the challengers will have concocted new designs on Sambre's  
moral reputation. And if  he loses or retires, the question then is 
whether his community can come up with another candidate­
perhaps the leader of the Imbiyip Electric Band-to prove that 
there was always something more to Sambre's leadership than 
either Stack or Pangu could bestow. 
Sir Michael Somare on the campaign trail (Photos: R.J. May) 

Police at a polling booth (Photo courtesy Times of PNG) 
Raising money for nomination fees (Photo courtesy Times of PNG) 

Members of the security forces looking after the polling in the 
Eastern Highlands province (Photo courtesy Times of PNG) 

Voting in Manus (Photo courtesy Times of PNG) 
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Election in the East Sepik: Mit na Bun 
R./. May 
The election of 1992 was the fifth national election I have observed 
in the East Sepik Province, over a span of twenty years . Like 
previous national elections in the province it lacked much of the 
drama which characterised contests in many other parts of the 
country, and turnover in the province's seven constituencies was 
relatively low. Nevertheless, in greater or lesser degree, it mirrored 
tendencies in electoral politics elsewhere and highlighted some of 
the changes, and continuities, in politics in East Sepik. In particular 
it raised questions about the extent to which political parties have 
penetrated the political system in Papua New Guinea and about the 
future of Pangu Pati in East Sepik. Under successive Pangu 
administrations, Pangu's opponents argued, other provinces had 
prospered ( 'oZ i bin kisim mit'), but the Sepik had been left with the 
scraps ( 'mipela i gat bun tasol'); it was, they said, time for change. 
Parties 
East Sepik has been a traditional stronghold of the Pangu Pati. Sir 
Michael Somare, for a long time the party's leader, has held the 
regional seat since 1 968, guiding the country through self­
government and independence as chief minister and then prime 
minister before his coalition government split and he lost a vote of 
no confidence in 1980. The parliament's longest serving member, Sir 
Pita Lus, a Pangu stalwart, has been returned from Maprik since 
1964. Ambunti-Dreikikir, Angoram, Wewak and Wosera-Gaui have 
also mostly been in Pangu hands. Yangoru-Saussia has been the 
maverick, but following the victory of Pangu's John Wauwia in a by­
election in Yangoru-Saussia in 1983 (after the sitting member, John 
Jaminan, had been convicted on a rape charge following his election 
in 1982), Pangu held all seven seats in East Sepik. In the elections of 
1977 and 1982 most candidates in East Sepik, indeed, described 
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themselves as 'pro-Pangu', though the party discouraged this in 
1987 and 1992. 
Since the early 1980s the Melanesian Alliance (MA) has been a 
significant presence in the province, largely through the efforts of 
the party's parliamentary deputy leader, Bernard Narokobi, and 
the party's perceived association with the Roman Catholic Church, 
whose influence in the province is strong . Having stood 
unsuccessfully against Somare in 1982, Narokobi became the member 
for Wewak in 1987, defeating Pangu's Tony Bais and breaking the 
Pangu monopoly of East Sepik seats . In the lead-up to the 1987 
elections there was talk of a national electoral pact between Pangu 
and the MA to avoid contests between candidates from the coalition 
partners, but this did not eventuate. The MA stood against Pangu in 
all but one (Angoram) of the East Sepik seats-without conspicuous 
success, apart from Narokobi. There was again talk of an electoral 
pact prior to the 1992 elections . But in early April, Narokobi 
announced to a meeting in Wewak that the MA would contest all 
seven seats and he endorsed the opposition slogan then circulating in 
the province: 'Kilim Pangu . Senisim Iida now' . 
Other parties have contested the national elections in East 
Sepik. But their presence in the province has been generally tenuous, 
with little in the way of machinery or finance, little involvement 
by national party leaders, and for the most part seemingly only 
weak commitment on the part of candidates.  In 1982 Jaminan, 
standing as a United Party (UP) candidate, was elected in Yangoru­
Saussia. He subsequently split with the UP and joined Iambakey 
Okuk's Peoples United Front, later drifting back to the struggling 
UP. In 1987 Jaminan was again associated with Okuk, standing 
unsuccessfully as a National Party candidate . ln early April 1992 
opposition leader Wingti visited East Sepik and announced that his 
Peoples Democratic Movement (PDM) party planned to contest all 
seven seats in the province. Wingti endorsed PDM candidates for 
Ambunti-Dreikikir (Yapi) , Maprik (Dopi) and Yangoru-Saussia 
Oaminan). Subsequently, Teddy Sane emerged as PDM candidate for 
the provincial seat (though he was said to have had 'discussions' 
with other parties and was listed officially as 'independent'), along 
with Ben Gene (Wewak). (Sane had previously contested the 
Angoram seat unsuccessfully, in 1977 as a PPP candidate, in 1982 as a 
National Party candidate, and in 1987 as an independent, before 
being elected to the provincial assembly) .  
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In 1982 there was some suggestion that parties were becoming 
more salient in Papua New Guinea politics (see, for example, Jackson 
and Hegarty 1983) . There was some evidence of this in East Sepik in 
1982 (see the qualified assessment in May 1989a: 221-27) but in 1987 
party organisation and party competition seemed to be, if anything, 
weaker (May 1989b: 114). This was even more so in 1992. Pangu, as 
usual, had a fairly strong presence. Operating, as in previous years, 
from an office at the back of the Provincial Assembly building, the 
party had an efficient campaign director (James Winare, a former 
Papua New Guinea High Commissioner to Australia) and a budget 
of K200,000, most of which went on transportation (each endorsed 
Pangu candidate had a Toyota Landcruiser, the candidates in 
Angoram and Wosera-Gaui were provided with outboard motors, 
and Somare made frequent use of a helicopter) and the production of 
multi-coloured posters. All sitting members were endorsed: Baran 
Sori, a former school teacher, was chosen to stand against Bernard 
Narokobi in Wewak Open. Some 'pro-Pangu' candidates received 
assistance in at least two electorates, though, as noted above, the 
party discouraged people from standing as 'pro-Pangu'. 
The Melanesian Alliance also ran a well organized campaign, 
from a derelict building, owned by the Catholic Church, down by 
the ocean front at Boram, but it appeared to have meagre funding. It 
ran candidates in all seven electorates .  Although it had a 
'campaign coordinator' (Jim Simatab, a local businessman who had 
directed the National Party campaign in 1982) the MA's campaign 
once again centred on, and derived much of its energy from, Bernard 
Narokobi. Despite Wingti's early enthusiasm, the PDM seemed to 
have little in the way of party organisation in the province, its 
campaign apparently being directed by Sane from a house in the 
Wirui settlement in Wewak. The official list of candidates showed 
three as PPP. Massimbor (Ambunti-Dreikikir), Manwau (Wewak) 
and Marasembi (Yangoru-Saussia). Endorsement had been offered to 
former premier, Jonathan Sengi, who, however, stood as an 
Independent. It was also generally believed that Schultze had PPP 
backing in Angoram (although Schultze was listed as Independent. 
Ali (Angoram) and Hombomia (Yangoru-Saussia) were listed as 
LNA. But during the campaign PPP and LNA organization was 
conspicuous by its absence. 
In casual discussions with people in Wewak, along the Sepik 
Highway, and in villages in the Angoram, Wewak and Maprik 
districts in 1992, there seemed to be a growing cynicism about politics 
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generally and about political parties in particular. There was still 
some loyalty to Pangu, which people tended to identify with East 
Sepik and with the 'father of independent Papua New Guinea', Sir 
Michael Somare, and some attachment to the MA, which many saw 
as occupying the moral high ground in politics. But my impression 
was that in 1992 there was little interest in parties among both 
candidates and voters, especially since parties other than Pangu and 
MA were not well known and had little to offer · materially . 
Attitudes towards politics were also coloured by the province's 
recent experience of provincial government. 
The experience of provincial politics 
East Sepik had been one of the first provinces to press for 
decentralization and in its early years the provincial government 
had been generally regarded as one of the more successful (see May 
1 995). In these early years the provincial government had, overtly, 
eschewed party politics, which its leaders saw as potentially 
divisive, though the first two governments (1979-83, 1983-87) were 
widely seen as 'Pangu governments' .  Relations with national 
politicians, though certainly not well developed, were generally 
cordial. Over the years there has been some interchange between 
national and provincial politics. Cultic figure, Matias Yaliwan, 
represented Yangoru, briefly, in both the national and provincial 
parliaments (May 1982; Winnett and May 1983; Gesch 1985). Bill 
Eichorn (Angoram) and Matias Yambumpe (Wosera-Gaui) both 
became provincial members after failing to gain re-election to the 
National Parliament in 1982. Eichorn was succeeded in Angoram by 
former provincial assembly member Philip Laki Yua, and in 1987 
Laki survived a challenge from Leo Unumba, who resigned as deputy 
premier of the province to contest the national election. Several 
candidates have unsuccessfully contested both provincial and 
national elections and at least three (Sane, Anisi and Malenki) 
have become provincial members after failing to gain election 
nationally. 
In 1986 tensions developed in relations between the provincial 
government and the seven Pangu national MPs for East Sepik, which 
culminated in the latter's calling for the suspension of the 
provincial government. Relations further deteriorated in 1987 when 
a 'non-partisan', but predominantly MA, government was elected to 
the provincial government, and after a falling out between the 
premier, Bruce Samban, and the MA, which withdrew its support 
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from the premier. From around 1987 provincial politics became 
particularly fractious and, after further demands from the East 
Sepik's national MPs, in March 1991 the provincial government was 
suspended. Subsequently part of the provincial government 
headquarters was burned down and Samban and several others, 
including another provincial minister, were arrested and later 
convicted on charges of arson and misappropriation. 
During the 1992 national election campaign the electorate's 
memories of these events were very fresh; indeed Samban and others 
were convicted and gaoled in April 1992 while the campaign was in 
progress. This contributed both to a general distrust of 'politics' and 
politicians and to a widely-held specific view that those 
associated with the suspended provincial government had brought 
shame on the province and should not contest the national elections. 
(In the event, three members of the suspended provincial government 
stood-Sane (provincial), Alois Anmokm (Angoram) and Greg Mais 
(Yangoru-Saussia). Sane and Anmokm polled poorly; Mais finished 
fourth out of twenty-two candidates.) 
The candidates 
With the candidate's deposit having been raised to KlOOO in 1992, it 
was generally anticipated that there would be fewer candidates 
than in the previous election. This was not so nationally. More 
surprisingly, perhaps, given East Sepik's relatively low cash 
income levels and the devastating effect of floods in the Sepik River 
basin in 1992, more candidates nominated in 1992 than in any 
previous election, the number increasing between 1987 and 1992 by 
over 40 per cent (see table 8.1) .  Oddly, the number of candidates 
increased in the provincial and Maprik electorates, where the 
chances of unseating either Somare or Lus seemed very slim. The 
main increase, however, came in Yangoru-Saussia, where judgements 
about W auwia' s vulnerability attracted twenty-two candidates. 
Apart from the seven sitting candidates, 10 candidates who had 
contested in 1987 stood again in 1992, though two shifted from open 
seats to the provincial, and Bais stood not in Wewak but in Yangoru­
Saussia, the electorate of his birthplace. 
The average age of candidates was fractionally higher-40.2 
years compared with 39.4 in 1 987-and education levels, 
predictably, rose. In 1992, 12 of the 74 candidates had university 
degrees (4 out of 52 in 1987) and 13 had other tertiary qualifications 
(11 in 1987); the number educated to grade 10 rose from 19 to 31 and 
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the number educated to below grade 8 fell from 13 to 4.  Only one 
woman contested in 1992, Australian-born Laura Martin, who stood 
(as she had in 1 982) as an independent in Wewak. Martin was 
supported by the influential East Sepik Council of Women. (In the 
event she came fourth but subsequently secured a seat in the 
reinstated East Sepik provincial government.)  
Table 8.1 :  Number of candidates standing 
Year 1977 1982 1987 1992 
East Sepik Province 3 3 4 6 
Ambunti-Dreikikir 6 10 9 8 
Angoram 8 9 12 13  
Maprik 7 8 5 10 
Wewak 11 10 5 6 
Wosera-Gaui 12 11 5 9 
Y angoru-Saussia 9 6 12 22 
Total 56 57 52 74 
An interesting feature of the 1992 elections was the number of 
Sepiks in government service or business elsewhere in Papua New 
Guinea who returned to the province to stand for election. Widely 
referred to as 'foreign Sepiks', they polled poorly. 
Organising the election 
When I arrived in Wewak towards the end of May, an electoral 
education campaign had been completed (with assistance from an 
East Sepik Political Awareness Task Force, apparently linked to 
the MA), supplementary rolls had been finalised, and ballot papers 
were being delivered-a task made difficult in parts of Angoram 
and Wosera-Gaui by floods along the Sepik River. A total of 79 
teams had been put together to carry out the polling, each 
accompanied by two policemen (another twenty police had been 
seconded from East Sepik to the highlands). 
The provincial electoral officer chaired several meetings of a 
provincial committee which included the Provincial Police 
Commander, a liaison officer from the Papua New Guinea Defence 
Force barracks in Wewak, and representatives from the provincial 
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administration and the Electoral Commission. At a meeting I 
attended there were reports of alleged threats of violence if certain 
candidates lost, and some expressions of concern over possible 
disturbances as a result of 'Yumi Yet' activities (see below) and over 
the abolition of the Section 141 provisions. It was also anticipated 
that there would be 'numerous disputes ' after the votes were 
counted. But, generally, electoral arrangements were well in hand 
and officials expected a fairly quiet election. 
The campaign 
Formal campaigning commenced in early April. Pangu's campaign 
was launched by Somare and Prime Minister Namaliu who visited 
the province for two days at the beginning of April . The prime 
minister, travelling by helicopter, addressed well-attended rallies 
in Wewak and in several villages in the populous Maprik district. 
He returned for a further visit three weeks later. 
The MA campaign was launched a few days later with a church 
service, a parade, and a low-key visit by MA leader John Momis. In 
a nomination speech, Narokobi (who was at the time Attorney 
General in the Pangu-led coalition government) spoke of a 
groundswell of opposition to Pangu in the Sepik, expressed in the 
slogan 'Kilim Pangu ' ( 'defeat Pangu') .  He promised 'humble and 
honest leadership'; 'Somare can spend a million kina to campaign', 
N arokobi said, 
.. .I will spend a billion betelnut, a billion coconuts and a 
billion sugarcane to beat them . . . . We are appealing to 
the people. If they want good honest government, they 
vote us; if they want this country to be run by 
multinational corporations they vote the other parties 
. . . . We are not promising big things, just the basics of 
life (Post-Courier 6/4/92). 
Somare responded by calling on Narokobi 'not to fool voters' :  
Elections are expensive and we have to raise money to 
pay for posters, T-shirts and all sorts of election 
gimmicks. You don't pay for those with unsold betelnut, 
coconuts and sugarcane (Post-Courier 8/4/92). 
And from the highlands National Party leader Michael Mel 
called on Narokobi to clarify his statement (Pos t-Courier 9 I 4 / 92). 
Opposition leader Wingti also embarked on a two-day tour of the 
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province in early April, reportedly addressing ' large and 
enthusiastic crowds, numbering in the thousands' in Wewak, 
Maprik, Dreikikir, Ambunti, Yangoru and Kubalia. Wingti 
described his tour as 'very successful' . 'I have been to the East Sepik 
many times before but never seen reactions like this before', Wingti 
told reporter Wally Hiambohn. The people have a strong desire for 
change (Pos t -Courier 6 /  4/92) .  Wingti told those attending the 
rallies that a PDM government would pursue vigorous agricultural 
development, including subsidizing the tree-crop industry; provide 
free and compulsory education to grade 10; reduce income tax by 50 
per cent, and encourage downstream and secondary processing 
industry. He also referred to the growing threat of corruption ( 'This 
country is going to the dogs, it is going down in the hands of corrupt 
people', ibid.), and promised that a PDM government would address 
this. (The previous week a former Pangu minister had resigned from 
the National Parliament to avoid sentencing after a Leadership 
Tribunal had found him guilty of forty-three counts of misconduct in 
office .  The same tribunal recommended that Prime Minister 
Namaliu and Finance and Planning Minister Pora be investigated 
[both were subsequently cleared], while the Ombudsman Commission 
had shortly before this referred four former Pangu ministers to the 
public prosecutor on charges of alleged misconduct in office.)  
Following this comparatively high-profile launching, however, 
the campaign in East Sepik in 1992 was generally fairly quiet. 
Although there were more candidates in 1992, the aspiring 
politicians seemed to be less conspicuous than in any election I have 
witnessed in East Sepik. Many candidates, short of funds, seem to 
have concentrated their efforts in the villages where they expected 
to gain votes, sometimes relying on contacts to distribute their 
posters more widely . Electoral posters were well in evidence­
village trade stores and meeting places often displayed almost as 
many posters as there were candidates-but village people seemed 
to have more difficulty identifying the candidates in their 
electorate than in previous national elections and, as noted, were 
generally dismissive of the several 'foreign Sepik' candidates . T­
shirts and other trappings of election campaigning were not much in 
evidence. 
There were of course variations. The Pangu machine, with its 
numerous komiti, worked fairly smoothly, and the endorsed Pangu 
candidates (most of them sitting members) covered most of their 
electorates. Somare, campaigning for the first time without the 
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responsibility of being prime minister or opposition leader, spent 
more time in the province, campaigning on his own behalf and in 
support of the open candidates. I accompanied him on several 
occasions when he attended pre-arranged village meetings, flying in 
by helicopter. At Moiem, on the Sepik River, the helicopter landed 
on the far side of the river and Somare and his party were escorted 
across on a raft by a group of traditional dancers and led to a raised 
dais from whence several village leaders (including representatives 
from women's and youth groups) made formal speeches, listing their 
grievances and demands. Somare then made his presentation to an 
audience of about eighty people, criticizing the record of the former 
Wingti government and reminding voters of Pangu's past record, and 
fielded questions. 
Questions tended to be demanding, though not aggressive. They 
covered such topics as the need for development, funding of the 
village school and aidpost, the status of provincial government (it 
was then planned to elect a new provincial government after the 
national election, though people were aware that the future of the 
provincial government system was under review), and policies 
concerning women. People had also heard stories of the Somare 
Foundation (a foundation, which had attracted overseas funding, 
intended, in Somare's words, to carry on the work of Pangu) and of 
the multistorey office building, Somare Haus, which the foundation 
was building in Waigani. Somare was quizzed about the purpose of 
the foundation and about the sources of funding for Somare Haus 
(which some believed was to be a hotel) . He answered that the 
foundation was to be his legacy to the people of Papua New Guinea 
and East Sepik, that it would help assure the future of Pangu Pati, 
and that his ability to draw in overseas funding for such a project 
reflected his status as a leader. This answer was generally accepted 
approvingly. Following the speeches food was presented and after 
about three hours Somare flew on to his next meeting. 
Another day, Somare visited several villages including 
Kaboibus (where the helicopter pilot had some difficulty finding a 
place to land-to the annoyance of villagers who had cleared a 
small patch of kunai and could not understand why the helicopter 
would not land there) .  There, villagers in traditional dress chaired 
Somare to a prepared enclosure where he was joined by the local 
Pangu member, John Wauwia, the local Pangu komiti, and the local 
headmaster. The group was then issued with the traditional 
challenge by a group of ageing spearmen, who, in the customary 
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fashion, railed against the visitors, who were accused of being late 
arriving (villagers · had gathered several hours before the 
helicopter landed) and generally having neglected the village and 
ignored the demands of the 'bus kanaka' .  This was followed by a 
series of traditional dances and a re-enactment of the election of the 
area's first national member, Beibi Yambanda. Somare was then 
presented with a bird of paradise skin and welcomed by an official 
spokesman before he and Wauwia were invited to speak. 
Kaboibus is the home place of John Jaminan and feelings towards 
Pangu were mixed, but Somare was well received as 'the father of 
the nation'. Again, Somare and W auwia were subjected to some quite 
penetrating questions, covering such topics as local development 
needs, funding for the local school and aid post, the sealing of the 
Sepik Highway (stalled because of demands for compensation 
where the new road cut a few corners across village land), and the 
future of the provincial government. There were also questions about 
Somare Haus, and about corruption in government. Again, the 
meeting, which took around two hours and was attended by about 
one hundred people, was followed by a small feast before Somare 
flew off to his next engagement at Wingei. 
In contrast I also spent several days travelling in a small utility 
with Jonathan Sengi, former provincial premier and an independent 
(pro-Pangu) candidate for Yangoru-Saussia. Sengi, accompanied by 
two young supporters, travelled from village to village, meeting 
with his komiti and distributing posters, and talking with (mostly 
small) groups of village people. I accompanied Sengi to one formal 
village rally but since people are mostly out in their gardens during 
the days, most of the talking was done at night, around the evening 
fire, and in the early morning. The questions asked during meetings 
covered much the same ground as those raised during the more 
formal rallies attended by Somare, though they tended to be more 
specific and focused on what Sengi could offer it elected. Given the 
nature of the meetings, there was more genuine discussion, which 
often ranged quite widely. Again, provincial government was a topic 
of particular concern (most people showing little support for 
provincial government, which they suggested had declined after 
Sengi's premiership), as were local development issues. Sengi was 
asked about other candidates, and handled such questions with 
modest discretion. He advised people, when asked, to support 
Somare for the provincial seat. 
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From his headquarters in Wewak, Teddy Sane attempted to 
coordinate the opposition to Pangu, under the banner 'Mit na Bun . '  
(The slogan harked back to an incident in the 1987 election campaign 
when, while campaigning in his Lower Sepik home base, Somare 
had been shown some bones by a hostile village spokesman and told 
that that was all the Sepik had received from the Pangu members; 
where, the villager asked, was the meat?) But Sane was never given 
much chance of personally unsettling Pangu, especially since, as the 
former provincial Forests minister, he had been tainted by the 
demise of the provincial government (indeed he was one of several 
provincial members facing misappropriation charges). 
Elsewhere in the province the long-serving Pita Lus cut his 
familiar dashing figure at pre-arranged village meetings and 
roadside stops; Bernard Narokobi undertook his usual well­
organized 'grassroots' campaign, and other candidates came and 
went. People with whom I spoke were less willing than in previous 
years to predict the outcomes of the election and seemingly less 
interested in and more cynical about the whole process. 
There were, inevitably, a few incidents. In April it was reported 
to the provincial electoral officer that a quasi-religious, 'cultic' 
movement, the 'Yumi Yet Asosiesin', was active in the Ambunti­
Dreikikir, Maprik and Yangoru-Saussia electorates, and was 
campaigning with its own ballot papers . After a rally near 
Dreikikir one man was said to have been killed and village houses 
burned. 'Yumi Yet' (which is the slogan of the Melanesian Alliance) 
had links to the former Peli Association and the New Apostolic 
Church (see May 1982; Gesch 1985) and was said to be supporting MA 
candidates . (There had been similar MA support from former Peli 
supporters in the 1982 and 1987 elections-see May 1989a; 1989b) .  
But despite fears that this might disrupt the election in some 
polling places the association had very limited impact. Similarly 
an 'Operation Jesus-Election '92', organized by Evangelical Church 
elements in Wewak in early June, had little visible impact. 
In May Narokobi accused Somare of vote-buying after Somare's 
office had paid out money and presented two boats to Wewak 
islands communities using Electoral Development Fund finance. 
Narokobi said he had asked police to conduct investigations with a 
view to pursuing corruption charges.  Narokobi also threatened legal 
action against Wewak candidate, Dr Moses Manwau, whom he 
accused of spreading a false rumour that Somare and Narokobi had 
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stolen money to build a 'hotel' in Port Moresby (a reference, 
presumably, to Somare Haus). 
In other incidents, local campaigning was interrupted when the 
campaign vehicle of provincial candidate Tobias Kuelik Sakra 
collided with another, killing one person, and when Sari Wimban's 
vehicle overturned in Angoram, injuring several occupants. In 
Wewak Sir Michael Somare attracted publicity when he punched 
an off-duty policeman whom he accused of campaigning for a rival 
candidate. Several candidates were reported to have received 
hostile receptions when they attempted to campaign in 
unsympathetic villages, and there were several minor altercations 
between rival candidates and their supporters. 
The results 
As noted above, there was comparatively little turnover of members 
in East Sepik in 1992. In the provincial seat Somare was again 
returned, with a decisive 54.3 per cent of the vote (54,714 votes to his 
nearest rival's 17,774).  There was some criticism of Somare during 
the campaign but most voters were prepared to show him the respect 
which, as the nation's founding father, they felt was due to him. In 
Wewak, Narokobi was reelected to the seat he had won in 1987, 
with a healthy 40.8 per cent of the vote, defeating the endorsed 
Pangu candidate, Sori, by 6107 votes to '3786. And in Ambunti­
Dreikikir, Angoram, Maprik and Wosera-Gaui the sitting Pangu 
members were returned, Akesim with 33.5 per cent of the vote, Laki 
with 24.9 per cent of the vote, Lus with 34. 1  per cent and Wanjik 
with 32.7 per cent. For Lus this was a seventh term in office; for Laki 
and W anjk a third term. 
Yangoru-Saussia was again the odd case. In 1972 cult leader 
Matias Yaliwan was elected from Yangoru-Saussia, with 87 per cent 
of the vote (see Winnett and May 1983). In 1973 he was forced to 
resign from the National Parliament for non-attendance at sittings. 
In the ensuing by-election Yaliwan's offsider Lainus Hepau was 
elected. In 1977 rivalry between two Pangu candidates allowed John 
Jaminan, the sole Pukia ( 'Mountain Arapesh') speaking candidate to 
slip through . Poor electoral strategy on Pangu's part allowed 
Jaminan to win again in 1982 but he was subsequently convicted on a 
rape charge and in 1983 his vacant seat was filled in a by-election 
by John Wauwia (who had stood in 1977 and 1982). In 1987 Jaminan 
was again a candidate, having received a pardon after the alleged 
rape victim had retrospectively withdrawn her complaint; but he 
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was defeated by Wauwia. Between 1987 and 1992 Jaminan had faced 
several more charges arising from traffic offences and failure to 
appear in court, and eventually murder. However, on the latter 
charge the state's case appears to have been inadequate and in 1992 
Jaminan was again a candidate, albeit a fairly low-key one. 
Twenty-two candidates stood in Yangoru-Saussia in 1992. In 
addition to Wauwia and Jaminan they included: Tony Bais, the 
member for Wewak from 1977 to 1987 and a former East Sepik 
District Commissioner who, prior to the election, had been 
appointed Administrator of the suspended provincial government; a 
former Premier (Jonathan Sengi), a former Deputy Premier (Greg 
Mais) and former Speaker of the Provincial Assembly (Petrus 
Wafi) .  Surprisingly, to many people, Jaminan emerged the winner, 
with 13 .7 per cent of the vote, ahead of Wauwia (10.9 per cent) .  
Mais was placed fourth, Bais fifth, Wafi tenth and Sengi last. 
Wauwia was not seen generally as a very dynamic member, but 
Jaminan's victory again seems to have reflected his ability to pull in 
the 'ethnic' vote. Unfortunately, at the time of writing the result in 
Yangoru-Saussia was still under appeal, an intended study of the 
vote was not possible. 
In terms of party performance, Pangu' s endorsed candidates came 
second, in the two seats Pangu did not win and this was probably in 
part a reflection of the value of Pangu endorsement. MA candidates 
came second in Wosera-Gaui, third in the provincial seat and in 
Ambunti-Dreikikir, fourth in Angoram (the same position which 
the MA candidate, Terenfop, had achieved in 1987 when standing as 
an independent), and well down in Maprik and Yangoru-Saussia. 
Apart from Jaminan (a former UP, NP and PUF member) the PDM 
did poorly as did the candidates associated with the PPP (except 
for Massimbor who was runner up in Ambunti-Dreikikir). Especially 
considering that political parties normally do not support 
candidates who seem likely to be losers, the conclusion has to be 
that, apart from Pangu, party endorsement was worth little in terms 
of votes received. 
Following the count there were challenges to the results in 
Angoram, Ambunti-Dreikikir, Wosera-Gaui and Yangoru-Saussia, 
but none was pursued successfully. 
Angoram revisited 
In 1987 I carried out an analysis of the vote, by ballot box, in the 
Angoram open electorate (May 1989b).  Since ballot box data was 
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available for Angoram in 1992 I have repeated the exercise to see 
what, if anything, changed. In 1982 Philip Laki Yua, a member of 
the provincial government from 1979 until his resignation to contest 
the national election, stood as a pro-Pangu candidate, against the 
sitting member and endorsed Pangu candidate, Bill Eichorn, and 
won. Eichorn came in third behind another pro-Pangu candidate 
John Maiben, whom many had seen as Eichorn's likely successor as 
Pangu candidate. The three Pangu candidates together won 73 per 
cent of the vote. The endorsed National Party candidate, Teddy 
Sane, came fourth, with 12 per cent of the vote . Eichorn was 
subsequently elected to the provincial assembly and did not contest 
another national election. 
In 1987 Laki stood as the endorsed Pangu candidate in a field of 
twelve. Maiben did not stand in 1987 and Laki's main contenders 
were Sane (who stood in 1987 as an independent, though he had 
links to the PDM) and Leo Unumba, who had resigned as provincial 
deputy premier to contest the national seat. Of the twelve standing 
Laki was the only party-endorsed candidate though one claimed 
affiliation with the PPP and one with the Melanesian Alliance, 
two were believed to have links with the PDM and two were 
regarded as pro-Pangu (though Pangu Pati had officially refused to 
recognize 'pro-Pangu' labels) .  In 1987 I commented that in over a 
decade of election-watching in Papua New Guinea I had never 
witnessed a campaign as quiet as that in Angoram; few candidates 
appeared to have moved much beyond their group of villages 
(ibid . : 117-118) .  In the event Laki was returned with 32 per cent of 
the vote, defeating Sane (21 per cent) and Unumba (13 per cent). 
In the 1987 study I undertook an analysis of ballot box figures 
(there were 38 ballot boxes) to see how votes were spread. Laki 
predictably achieved the best spread of votes (though he derived 
quite a high 31 per cent of his vote from only four ballot boxes), Sane, 
surprisingly, achieved a comparable spread. For Unumba and the 
other candidates the vote was more highly concentrated: Unumba 
received 42 per cent of his vote from four boxes; the fourth placed 
candidate more than half his vote from two boxes, and the sixth 
placed (Tamoane) a high 74 per cent from two boxes and no votes at 
all in nineteen boxes. Summarizing the analysis I concluded: 
It is tempting to infer from the size and spread of his 
vote that Laki, as the endorsed Pangu candidate, 
received a party vote. The uncomfortable facts are, 
however, that Laki received the same percentage of the 
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vote in 1987, as Pangu-endorsed candidate and sitting 
member, as he did in 1982, as an unendorsed challenger, 
and that Sane, the endorsed NP candidate in 1982 
supported by Okuk and the MA, as an Independent in 
1987 improved his share of the vote (from 12 to 21 per 
cent), and achieved a geographical spread comparable 
to that of Laki (as, to a lesser extent, did Unumba) . 
Moreover, the concentrated vote for Tamoane in what 
has to have been lower Sepik, suggests that in the Pangu 
heartland itself local loyalties prevailed over party. 
On the basis of these observations, the most that can be 
said with any certainty is that energetic campaigning 
and 'being known' (both of which parties facilitate) 
gain votes, but that local support factors are still of 
great importance, especially for minor candidates (May 
1989b : 119-20). 
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In 1992 Laki was again the endorsed Pangu candidate. Against 
him were ranged twelve candidates :  
A lois Anmokm, aged 38 in 1992, from Arango village, a former 
bank officer and a member of the suspended provincial 
government; 
Januanus Sarni, 39, from Marienberg, a former employee with 
W antok Publications and provincial public servant; 
Martin Anskar, 30 from Yip government station, a former patrol 
officer and the son of a former MP from Upper Sepik, Anskar 
Karmel; 
L udwig Schulze (S ch u lz) ,  42, from Angoram town (and 
originally from New Ireland Province), a local businessman 
(dealing primarily in crocodile skins); 
Lumek Johnson, 31, from Kambaramba, a 'self-employed' former 
PTC technician; Victor Terenfop, 43, from Akuram village 
(Yuat), a former 
Francis Ali, 36, from Angoram, a former policeman; 
schoolteacher; 
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Paul Japhlom, 43, from Angoram, a UPNG graduate who had 
served as a patrol officer and as national commissioner for 
housing; 
Andrew Kaur, 31, from Chimunco, another UPNG graduate, who 
described himself, cryptically, in 1992 as 'under-study; 
Sarry (Sari) Wimban, 50, from Mindimbit (Middle · Sepik) but 
living in Wewak, a former health extension officer; 
John Maiben, 42, a Middle Sepik man resident in Wewak and 
employed as a mechanic with the National Works Department; 
and 
foe Kenny (Keni), 48, originally from Yangoru but long-time 
resident in Angoram, where he is a prominent businessman. In 
1972 Kenny had stood as the endorsed Pangu candidate, but was 
defeated by Eichorn (see Wandau 1976) .  
Of the twelve, Sarni, Terenfop and Wimban had all  stood in 
1987 (placing tenth, fourth and fifth respectively), and Schulze and 
Maiben had stood in 1982 (though neither contested in 1987) . In 1992 
Terenfop stood as a Melanesian Alliance candidate, and Ali for the 
LNA. Sarni, Anskar and Wimban were all said to have covert or 
'undercover' PDM support, while Maiben and Kenny had earlier 
Pangu association, and Schultze was believed to have PPP support. 
I witnessed very little of the campaign in Angoram (spending 
most of the time in Yangoru-Saussia), but local gossip suggested that 
Laki and Ali, at least, had done some fairly serious patrolling, 
while Schulze, Japhlom, Wimban and Kenny campaigned less 
extensively but were able to exploit komiti networks from a strong 
base in Angoram. Angoram is one of the largest electorates in the 
country, and in 1992 had suffered severe flooding. Funds were short 
and travel often difficult. Not surprisingly, most candidates, as in 
1987, focussed their efforts on areas of anticipated support. The 
general feeling prior to polling seemed to be that the real contest 
was between Laki, Schulze and Kenny, and so it proved to be. These 
three took 61 per cent of the total vote, ahead of Terenfop (10 per 
cent) and Wimban (8 per cent) (see table 2). 
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Table 8.3: Analysis of Ballot Box Results 
B al l o t  Total First and second Candidate with Two candidates 
b o x  v o t e s  ranked candidates most votes as with most votes 
i n  box percentage of as percentage of 
total votes cast total votes cast 
3 06 Laki, Schulz 9 4 . 1 9 8 . 7  
2 2 7 1 Laki,  Wimban 9 4 . 5 9 7 . 0  
3 2 9 5  Wimban, Laki 5 4 . 2  9 4 . 9  
4 3 24 Laki,  Wimban 5 0 . 0  8 4 . 9  
5 2 8 6  Laki,  Schulz 6 6 . 4  8 4 . 3  
6 4 1 8  Laki,  Schulz 3 2 . 5  5 8 . 9 
7 8 5  Keni,  Laki 4 7 . 1  7 0 . 6  
8 2 9 9  Laki , Schulz 7 0 . 6  8 4 . 6  
9 3 7 6 Laki , Keni 5 0 . 3  7 1 . 8 
1 0  2 8 2  Schulz, Keni 5 1 . 1  8 0 . 1 
1 1  5 2  Laki ,  Schulz 9 8 .  l 1 00 . 0  
1 2  3 5 5  Schulz,  Johnson 3 8 . 3  5 3 . 5  
1 3  4 2 8  Keni , Schulz 3 5 . 3  6 1 . 0 
1 4  2 7 7  Keni , Wimban 3 2 . 9  5 3 . 4 
1 5  4 9 3  A l i ,  Wimban 2 0 . 7  3 5 . 1 
1 6  5 6 2  Ali , Anskar 2 4 . 9  4 5 . 7  
1 7  3 5 4 Japhlom, Kaur 4 2 . 7  6 2 . 7  
1 8  3 7 8  Terenfop, Laki 3 8 . 4 6 6 . 4  
1 9  3 3 8  Keni , Laki 3 9 . 1 6 0 . 4  
2 0  3 4 8  Keni , Januarius 4 1 .  7 6 0 .  l 
2 1  3 9 1 Ali ,  Japhlom 2 5 . 6  4 3 . 0  
2 2  3 24 Johnson, Keni 5 8 . 0  7 7 . 8  
2 3  3 9 8  Terenfop, Laki 3 3 . 2  6 3 . 3  
2 4  3 99 Terenfop, Wimban 7 0 . 2  8 0 . 7  
2 5  3 6 0  Terenfop, Maiben 8 3 . 1 9 3 . 1  
2 6  3 6 8 Terenfop, Laki 7 0 . 9  8 1 . 8 
2 7  5 00 Schulz, Keni 4 8 . 2  7 4 . 4  
2 8  4 6 2  Keni , Schulz 4 7 . 4  8 7 . 4  
2 9  5 1 5  Keni,  Laki 3 2 . 8  6 4 . 3 
3 0  3 1 2 Laki , Terenfop 44 . 9  7 0 . 5  
3 1  1 3 3 Japhlom, Schulz 64 . 7  7 8 . 2  
3 2  2 7 5  Anmokm, Keni 3 0 . 2  5 3 . 1 
3 3  2 4 0  Schulz, Maiben 2 5 . 8  4 2 . 9  
3 4  3 5 9  Schulz, Ken: 3 7 . 3  4 8 . 5  
3 5  3 0 7  Schulz, Keni 2 9 . 3  5 6 . 7  
3 6  3 46 Keni , Laki 2 2 . 3  4 1 . 9 
3 7  2 7 7  Keni , Schulz 2 2 . 0  3 9 . 0  
3 8  3 3 2  Laki , Schulz 6 3 . 9  7 8 . 9  
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Table 8.3: Analysis of  Ballot Box Results (continued) 
B al lo t  Total First and second Candidate with Two candidates 
b o x  votes  ranked candidates most votes as with most votes 
in  box percentage of as percentage of 
total votes cast total votes cast 
3 9  3 9 5  Laki,  Wimban 7 3 . 4  9 5 . 9  
4 0  2 4 5  Laki,  Keni 6 5 . 7  8 2 . 0  
4 1  1 1 1  Keni , Schulz 9 4 . 6  9 7 . 3  
4 2  2 1 6  Wimban, Laki 5 4 . 6  7 7 . 3  
4 3  2 8 3  Laki , Schulz 5 3 . 4 7 9 . 5  
4 4  9 0  Schulz, Laki 6 1 . 1  9 3 . 3  
4 5  3 2 2  Laki,  Keni 6 1 . 2 8 9 . 4  
4 6  3 3 3  Laki,  Keni 3 3 . 6  6 1 . 9 
4 7  2 4 6  Keni , Anmokm 4 0 . 7  7 4 . 0  
4 8  3 3 0 Anmokm, Keni 8 5 . 2  9 3 . 6  
4 9  2 9 4  Keni, Anmokm 4 0 . 8  6 4 . 6 
5 0  2 8 0 Keni , Schulz 4 8 . 9  8 7 . 1  
5 1 3 4 2  Keni , Laki 3 2 . 7  5 7 . 3  
5 2  1 8 3 Schulz, Wimban 3 5 . 0 6 2 . 8  
5 3  1 84 Keni , Schulz 29.9 5 4 . 9  
5 4  2 9 5  Keni , Schulz 3 0 . 8  5 4 . 6  
5 5  2 3 6  Schulz, Wimban/Laki 5 2 . 1 6 1 . 4 
5 6  2 3 3  Anmok, Schulz 3 3 . 9 6 2 . 2  
5 7  3 8 1 Keni , Laki 3 8 . 3  7 0 . 9  
5 8  3 7 0  Terenfop, Laki 5 3 . 8  7 3 . 0  
5 9  1 74 Keni , Schulz 5 7 . 5  7 4 . 7 
Tables 8.2 and 8. 3 look at the spread of votes, on roughly the 
same basis as calculated in 1987 (May 1989b : tables 1 and 2) .  
Interestingly, the results are much the same. In 1992 Laki's votes 
were again fairly well spread, being placed first in 14 of the 59 
ballot boxes and second in another 14 (13/37 and 9/37 in 1987), but 
nevertheless receiving 32.0 per cent of his vote from six ballot boxes 
(31 per cent from four in 1987) and scoring less than 30 votes in 
seventeen of the boxes. In 1987 the second placed, independent 
candidate, Sane, surprisingly received a similar spread; in 1992 the 
third placed candidate Schulze (independent) also recorded a 
comparable spread (see table 8 .2) ,  while the second placed 
candidate, Kenny had a more concentrated vote (57.7 per cent of 
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votes coming from six boxes) but actually outscored Laki in the 
number of first placings (18) . 
Voting for the minor candidates was again, predictably, more 
highly concentrated. Terenfop, who stood as an independent in 1987 
and received 50.2 per cent and 65.5 per cent of his votes from two and 
four boxes respectively, was the endorsed MA candidate in 1992 but 
nevertheless recorded a very similar spread-46.l  per cent and 65.7 
per cent from three and six boxes-again casting doubt on the value, 
per se, of party endorsement. Four candidates (Sarni, Anskar, Kaur 
and Maiben) failed to win a single ballot box, though three of them 
came second in at least one. Overall, considering that campaigning 
seems to have been more restricted in 1992 and that parties were at 
least nominally more in evidence in Angoram, the pattern of voting 
seems remarkably similar. 
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding their apparent disenchantment with 'politics ', 
parties and politicians, the people of East Sepik turned out to vote 
in 1992, and voted to return six of the seven sitting members (five 
Pangu, one MA); only in Yangoru-Saussia was the sitting member 
defeated, and he was defeated by the previous (1977-1983) member. 
Despite the pronouncements of Pangu' s opponents in the East Sepik, 
and of opposition leader Wingti, the forecast groundswell against 
Pangu did not translate into votes, except perhaps in Yangoru­
Saussia, which has something of a record for producing contrary 
results. 
Whether Pangu' s success reflects support for the party as such, 
support for the candidates personally, or simply an advantage of 
being in office, remains unclear. With the well-established national 
pattern of turnover of MPs at elections of around 50 per cent, there 
does not seem to be much to support the last of these, though it is 
possible that voters in the Sepik pay more respect to sitting MPS­
especially MPs with the acquired status of Somare or Lus-than is 
the case, say, in the highlands. The success of the five Pangu 
candidates lends some weight to the view that Pangu Pati 
endorsements counts, though later results in Angoram, a Pangu 
heartland, as well as the outcome in Y angoru-Saussia, suggest that 
the Pati's endorsement has only limited value and a good campaign 
and strong local support are critical. Whether Pangu will be able to 
maintain its dominance of East Sepik when Somare and Lus 
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eventually leave the scene remains to be seen. Pangu' s loss in the 
('non-partisan') provincial elections in 1987 might be taken as an 
indication that allegiance to Pangu Pati in East Sepik cannot be 
taken for granted (though in fact the subsequent demise of the 
provincial government probably did Pangu no harm). 
Apart from Pangu, the MA seems to have attracted some 
generalized allegiance (including the support of Yumi Yet members), 
but, with the possible exception of Nyani in Wosera-Gaui, only 
Narokobi was able to translate this allegiance into an effective 
vote. Endorsement by other parties seems to have counted for little. 
Thus, twenty years after the last election under colonial 
administration it would seem, from the East Sepik, that there has 
been little progress towards an integrative, ideologically-based 
party system. Even within East Sepik, where party loyalty has 
been maintained over several elections, the value of Pangu Pati 
endorsement lies in the fact that the party is identified with the 
Sepik itself. 
Apart from this, it will be interesting to see if the increased 
number of candidates in 1992 marks the beginning of a trend which 
has been seen elsewhere in Papua New Guinea, and which has 
tended to produce a pattern of restricted campaigning, increasing 
parochialism (during the course of the campaign in 1992 Somare 
frequently referred to 'ethnic' voting), and occasional violence. The 
victory of the controversial Jaminan in Yangoru-Saussia, where the 
largest increase in candidates occurred, however, suggests no simple 
conclusion. 
Postscript 
In March 1994 a tribunal found Angoram MP Philip Laki guilty of 
twenty-five counts of misconduct in office and misappropriation of 
public monies, and dismissed him from office. In the ensuing by­
election seventeen candidates stood, including Kenny, Schultze, 
Unumba and Sarni. Victory went to Schultze, who stood as endorsed 
PPP candidate, breaking Pangu's  twenty-two year hold on t.he 
Angoram seat and reducing its representation in the East Sepik to 
four seats. 
9 
Electoral Politics in Mount Hagen: The 
Dei Open Election 
/ oseph Ket an 
Introduction 
The 1992 Dei Open election was won by the Pangu Pati candidate, 
Melchior Pep, with 5,435 votes or 27 per cent of the popular vote and 
1 ,998 more than his nearest rival, an Independent candidate, Koi 
Ranpi, who polled 3,437. Another Independent, Reuben Namba 
Pama, came close behind in third place with 3,036. Melchior Pep 
beat seven other candidates to retain his seat, which he had won in 
1987 by beating Reuben's father, Pama Kuri, a long-time MP since 
the colonial House of Assembly days. 
This paper presents an analysis of structural group-b ased 
electioneering in one Open electorate in a Highlands province and 
the law and order problems that are held to stem from such electoral 
behaviour. Purported 'electoral violence' is analysed in the context 
of the underlying relationship among groups and individuals. The 
concept of electoral violence can be rather misleading when 
analysed on its own. In the Highlands, violence during elections 
should generally be explained in terms of the structural organisation 
and in historical relationships among local groups. My analysis of 
violence during the election is restricted to the Dei Open electorate 
because of my knowledge of tribal structures and group alliances in 
the area. 1 
1 This study is based on two months fieldwork conducted in Mount Hagen 
during the 1992 National Elections, with funds from the Papua New 
Guinea Electoral Commission and the PNG National Research Institute. I 
am grateful to both institutions for their support, without which this study 
would not have been possible. I am most grateful to the following: the 
people of Mount Hagen for sharing their experiences with me; Mr Henry 
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Background to the Dei Open Electorate 
The Dei Open electorate is part of the Hagen North District of the 
Western Highlands Province. With a population of 41,849 persons 
(1990 Census), Dei is the largest Local Government Council in the 
area. It comprises almost half of the Hagen North population (see 
Table 9 .1 ), which makes it the only local government council area 
considered big enough to be an open electorate on its own. 
Table 9 . 1 :  Local Government Councils in Hagen North District 
Local Government Council Population (1990) % 
Mul 
Dei 
Baiyer 
Lumusa 
Total 
Source: 
Figures: 
18,813 21 .84 
41,849 48 58 
18,692 21 .70 
6,796 7.90 
86,150 100.00 
PNG National Statistical Office: Final Population 
1990 National Population Census (Port Moresby: 1994). 
The Dei electorate is strategically placed in a very diversified 
geographical area. Contrasting features within its boundaries are: 
(1)  the North Wahgi swamplands which are currently the centre of 
intense commercial activities, including one of the l.argest coffee 
plantations in the southern hemisphere; (2) the rolling plains of 
Hagen North, covered by thick layers of volcanic ash and debris and 
home to some of the world's  oldest agricultural systems (Loffler 
1977; Steensberg 1980; Golson 1981; 1982; Gorecki 1982); and (3) the 
Tiki, Murpup village, for transport assistance on polling day; Dr John 
Muke, Anthropology Department, University of Papua New Guinea, for 
helpful comments; and above all, Dr Bill Standish, Department of Political 
and Social Change, Australian National University, for commenting on an 
earlier draft of this paper. As a Hagener, an individual and part of a local 
group going through the motions of 'development', I have also drawn on 
personal experiences. 
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rugged terrain of the southern slopes of the Sepik-Wahgi Divide 
which is densely covered with rainforest. 
The electorate shares administrative boundaries with five 
other open electorates: Hagen; Mul-Baiyer; Jimi; North Wahgi; and 
Anglimp-South Wahgi. In the east it shares a common border with 
North Wahgi at Kimil. Westwards it runs parallel with the 
Wahgi River and the Jimi-Wahgi Divide till it reaches the Gugla 
creek, a tributary of the Gumanch River which empties into the 
Wahgi at Rukmump. In the northwest, it drops over the Jimi­
Wahgi-Baiyer Divide at Mbukl, then crosses the plains of Baiyer 
and onto the slopes of the Miti Range where it separates Dei from 
Mul. In the southwest Dei shares a common border with Hagen 
Central at Kuk (Burton 1987a; 1987b; 1988). In the south the Wahgi 
River separates Dei from Anglimp-South W ahgi. 
The bulk of the population occupy the fertile valleys, where the 
population density is about 200 persons per square kilometre. In 
parts of the valley where portions of land have been allocated for 
resettlement, the figure is even higher. Swamplands which were 
once considered the domain of bad spirits (kor rakra in Melpa 
language) are now filled with human settlements. This is a by­
product of the Health Department' s  malaria eradication 
programme which began soon after European contact, and the 
improved methods of swamp drainage introduced by the 
Department of Agriculture and Livestock (DAL), both of which 
have helped to cause a shift in perception in the socio-religious 
system. The peopling of the Wahgi Valley floor began after the 
eradication of malaria and the 'malevolent spirits' which were 
held responsible for the high fever that used to be endemic there. 
A.J .  Strathern (1984:87-88) provides a discussion on such 
relocation of settlements. Examples of such movements are: (1) the 
Kawelka's return to their lower-altitude Kuk territory from Mbukl; 
(2) Tepuka kinsfolk who have joined the Kawelka there and also at 
the ancient Raemb settlement not far from Kuk; (3) the movement of 
various groups, including many Minembi clansmen, who have 
migrated down to the Baiyer valley around Tiki plantation, where 
coffee grows fast at an altitude of less than 2,000 metres; and (4) 
Minembi and Kombukla tribesmen who have moved down to the 
Kugmi and North Wahgi swamplands. This considerable relocation 
of settlement, both towards roads when they are newly built and, 
more strikingly, from high to low-altitude terrain, is a widespread 
phenomenon. Muke (1994) presents an excellent discussion on both 
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historical and prehistorical population movement in South Wahgi. 
As inward migration continues to accelerate towards the twenty­
first century, these fertile valleys will face major population 
pressure. In fact, it has already resulted in conflicts among the 
occupants, with several clans brutally evicted from the Tiki area 
following the Kawelka-Minembi war (1986-1990) and another war 
fought over the Kugmi swampland between the Kombukla and 
Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair during the early 1980s. Furthermore, the 
Remdi-Minembi war (1984-1989), although triggered by an incident 
at a local tavern, had its roots in conflicts over land. That the Tenga 
valley was used as a battlefield was not fortuitous; antagonists on 
both sides had their eyes on the prime land. 
The people of Dei speak Melpa, a Non-Austronesian language 
classified as part of the Central Language Family, East New Guinea 
Highlands Stock, Trans-New Guinea Phylum (Wurm and Hattori 
1981) .  They ideally live in territory-claiming named groups. These 
groups, called tribes, are made up of clans which often claim remote 
common ancestry. These groups can be very competitive and often try 
to outdo each other with gifts of money and pigs in the never ending 
politics of reciprocity (A.J. Strathem 1971; A.J. and A.M. Strathem 
1971:3; Rubel and Rosman 1978:195-196) . The Mount Hagen moka 2 
ceremonial exchange system is one such arena of competition but 
electoral politics is arguably fast becoming an attractive arena for 
such competition in the modem era. 
Structural organisation of Hagen society 
In Hagen, as in other parts of the Highlands, we find a highly 
elaborate hierarchy of structures. Individuals belong to an elaborate 
set of progressively more inclusive named groups, such as tribes 
which have a segmentary structure (A.J. Strathern 1971 : Chap.2; 
1972: 18; Burton 1989:256). These group levels, from the largest to the 
smallest, are: phratry, tribe-pair, tribe, tribe section, clan, clan 
section, subclan, subsubclan, and lineage (A.J. Strathem 1971; 1972) .  
Although Hagen social organisation is really based on tribes (Burton 
1989), I have included phratry and tribe-pair as levels above the 
2 Moka is the term in Hagen for reciprocal exchanges of wealth between 
partners, in which the rule is that a main gift should exceed an initial or 
initiatory one (cf. A.J. Strathern 1981 :10; 1971 ) .  The main items of 
exchange used in moka are pigs, pork, previously pearlshells and 
nowadays cash. 
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tribal level because of their relevance to the discussion on political 
organisation. Hageners have no direct translations for these terms 
although there is definite organisation along these lines. However, 
they do have words for the other levels: the tribe is referred to as 
reklaep ten ta3 ('one line') ;  clan as tepam ten ta ( 'one father' ) ;  
subclan as manga rapa tenta ('one men's house') ;  and the lineage as 
tepamkangemal ('father and his sons' ) .  
Hagen tribes 
Difficulties in the use and definition of group structures have 
received much attention. A prolonged debate in the anthropological 
literature is whether the PNG Highlands social structure is 
exclusively based on (1)  a patrilineal descent system or (2) a descent 
dogma based on a cognatic system. Under the latter an individual 
can claim dual membership (through both the father and the 
mother), whilst under the former one can ideally claim group 
membership only through the father's line (Barnes 1962; 1 967; 
Langness 1 964; Sahlins 1965; Meggitt 1965; Scheffler 1966; 1973; 
Lepervanch 1 967; 1968; A.J. Strathern 1969; 1972) .  Many of the 
problems encountered by early Highlands ethnographers were of 
their own making. The application of Western anthropological 
concepts to Highlands group structures, or trying to explain 
Highlands societies using African models, was a common mistake 
made by many early ethnographers. What appears to outsiders as 
bewildering makes perfect sense to Highlanders and one only needs 
to ask the people themselves. Hageners, for example, agree that 
some of the members of their lineages are wua-nt-mei ( 'born of the 
man') while others are amb-nt-mei ('born of the woman', i.e., the 
sister), without implying that the latter are 'second-class members' 
(A.J .  Strathern 1 966:357) . This clearly indicates that group 
membership in Hagen is not restricted to agnatic descent (father-to­
son), even though the lineage ( tepam kangemal, 'father and his 
sons') is described that way. In practice, a sister's sons as well as 
others, including war refugees, can gain membership of a group 
3 Reklaep tenta is a term that can also be used when referring to other group 
levels. Other idioms applicable to the whole range of group levels are: mbo 
tenta ('one stock' or 'one kind'); mbi tenta ( 'one name') .  A.J. Strathern 
(1972:chap.l)  provides a more comprehensive discussion of Melpa 
structural idioms. 
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without necessarily tracing descent to an apical ancestor. However, 
most members of a group can trace descent to a putative ancestor. 
Table 9.2: Phratry organisation in Dei Open Electorate 
Raembka Pipilka Welyi-Kuta Non-Phratry 
Tepuka Remdi Minembi Mapkli 
Kawelka Kimka Kombukla Palke 
Nelka Ro kl  aka Welvi  Purke 
Kentpi Kiklpukla Romalke Punti 
Kumungaka Ko pi Kimbo 
Klamakae Roipke 
Dakapkae Mungapka 
Epikae Mentem-Mema 
Waklupka Gulke 
Prandke 
Note: Based on information supplied by Kawelka informants (Yap Goimba, 
Pati Manga and Komonsi Ongky). It is possible that there are smaller groups 
which have not been included in this table. Also, note that Gulke, Kimbo, and 
Mungapka, amongst others, have recently been included in Raembka mainly 
for political reasons. 
In spite of all the difficulties, the language of descent used in 
ethnography today when describing social units is still littered 
with words such as lineage, clan, tribe, and phratry (Feil 1987:34; 
Barnes 1962; A.J. Strathern 1969; 1971; Scheffler 1985).  While 
accepting that there is considerable difficulty in putting these terms 
to use, some working definitions will suffice here. A tribe can be 
defined as a politically or socially coherent and autonomous group 
occupying land or claiming a particular territory (RAI 1951; Burton 
1988; Muke 1994). In fact, it is true in some areas that the tribe is the 
most cohesive and autonomous political group. Tribes, as indicated 
in Figure 1, have a segmentary structure and may, depending on size, 
be subdivided into several levels of sections, clans and subclans (A.J. 
Strathern 1972; Burton 1988; 1989) .  In Hagen, the biggest tribes, in 
order of numerical strength, are: the Jika and Mokei of Hagen 
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Central, with an estimated population of 20,000 and 15,000 
respectively; the Kumdi (c . 10,700 of Mul Council; the Minembi 
(c .7,000) of Dei; and the Kuli (c .5,000) of Anglimp-South Wahgi 
district .  
Figure 1: A typical Hagen segmentary structure: that of the 
Kawelka 
,... KundmbO 
KAWELKA -
(tnl>e) 
-[ Roklarnbo 
Dakaprnbo 
,... Rok.lambo 
Kumambo 
{ Kiklpuklambo 
._ Kumapei 
Eltimbo 
Kbmbo [=bo Akelcmbo 
r- Mandembo Romalkembo 
Rokmbo . 
(clan-section) Kalmbo . Kalmbo IDgk 
__J Roklambo 
--{Oyambo� 
...._ Oyambo ingk Mernbo 
(clan) 
Keiyambo 
{ Elpuklmbo 
(subclan) Keiyambo ingk 
(sub-subclan) 
Source: Based on A.J. Strathem (1972:35), Kawelka informants and 
personal observation 
Electoral politics in Mount Hagen 247  
The tribe is  probably the most important political and military unit 
in Hagen society. It is an alliance of clans which may or may not 
claim common descent and membership is ideally by agnatic descent 
(through the father's line). Hageners speak of 'tribe' as something 
to be reckoned with in terms of warfare, ceremonial exchange and 
commercial enterprise. In the event of war, tribesmen may have to 
defend their territory together or face decimation. Apart from this 
military function, a tribe may stage a moka or a singsing as a single 
unit. It can also sponsor candidates to contest elections as well as 
promoting business enterprise. While it is true that these functions 
are currently being performed at this level in smaller tribes, they 
have been transferred down to the section or clan level in bigger 
tribes. Jika as a tribe, for example, is so large and fragmented that in 
1986 warfare broke out within its Maipngel section. The Jika Komb­
Akelemb clanpair, as a result, was routed by the Melakambo­
Komapei-Opromb triad of clans. 
Opinion on the function of the clan is divided but most 
anthropologists agree that the clan is strictly the largest exogamous 
unit in any given structural hierarchy (LowmanVayda 1971 :322; 
Brown 1971 :212; Meggitt 1971 : 196; A.J. Strathern 1972:18; Rubel and 
Rosman 1978 : 187; Burton 1988: 15) .  Exogamy is the rule which 
requires that individuals must seek a marriage partner outside the 
group. Major characteristics of the clan, according to Vivelo (1978) 
are: (1 )  based on unilineal descent ( 'one-line' descent; tracing of 
descent through one parent and that parent's same-sexed 
progenitors, i.e., all males or all females); (2) from this can be 
formed local or residence groups (of people living together); (3) may 
be a corporate group, i.e., they may control some valued commodity 
(such as land); (4) may be exogamous (cannot marry from within the 
group); (5) often have group taboos (a proscription, a 'don't', which 
usually carries with it supernatural sanctions); and 6) contain 
members of both sexes originally but, following the rule of exogamy, 
one sex must leave the group upon marriage (Vivelo 1978: 162- 163). 
Using these general characteristics as a check-list, an 
examination of Hagen social structure shows that none of these fit 
perfectly but, with some modifications, the first four points and the 
last one may be applicable. In this way, one may conclude that in 
Hagen the clan is a landholding local group of which the core 
members are related by patrilineal descent, tracing bloodlines to a 
common male ancestor, which means that one cannot marry from 
within the group. Descent, however, is not the only criterion of 
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membership because marriage into the group also provides members, 
while marriage out of the group results in loss of active membership 
(Vivelo 1978:163).  
A major problem with this definition is its disregard for 
exceptions to rules governing this type of organisation. Hageners, for 
instance, describe the clan (and levels below the subclan) as of 
tepam tenta; mema tenta ( 'one father; one blood') but that does not 
mean patrilineal descent is a charter for recruitment, nor can all its 
members claim common descent. Females born into the clan, upon 
marriage, gain membership to a husband's group, but never entirely 
relinquish their own, and are addressed by using the name of their 
descent group as a prefix to their personal names. Clansmen rely on 
their sisters for assistance in staging large events, such as ceremonial 
exchange, and often encourage them to shift residence, together with 
their husbands and children, back to their place of birth. A sister's 
sons, in particular, are usually encouraged to return to their maternal 
kin and sponsored by their uncles to do so. This and other factors 
show how flexible Highlands groups are when it comes to defining 
their social structures. 
This flexibility and continuous evolution can be seen all around. 
Some groups are clearly named and historically autonomous. The 
Tungei of South Wahgi are a good example (Burton 1988). But others 
have developed into large exogamous tribal sections, such as Jika 
Maipngel. A tribal section in the making is the Kawelka example 
shown in Figure 1. The three Kawelka clans-Kundmbo, Mandembo 
and Membo-can be more accurately described as tribal sections 
rather than clans because the Kawelka themselves do not have a 
name for this level today. Currently the most commonly used names 
are Membo Keiyambo, Membo Oyambo, Krupmbo, Klammbo and 
Kundmbo. This clearly indicates that Krupmbo and Klammbo, 
previously subclans, have now almost assumed clan status while 
Keiyambo and Oyambo, former sub-subclans, have evolved into 
subclans and possibly clans . This leaves Kundmbo which still 
remains as a clan. 
Above the tribal level is a loosely organised level called 
phratry (see Table 9.2).  A typical Hagen phratry is an alliance of 
tribes which do not necessarily claim common descent but may have 
corporate property and functions.  Pipilka Business Group, which 
owns Hagen Park Motel and several coffee plantations, is a good 
example. Others are the Welyi-Kuta business group and the 
Raembka, an alliance of Tepuka, Kawelka and Nelka interests. It is 
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evident (Strathern 1984:87) that these business groups, whose 
membership was founded on neo-traditional coalition-style ties 
between existing large groups, facilitated the plantation acquisition 
scheme which began in the mid-seventies. These groups have also 
facilitated the political ambitions of individuals. Former Dei MP 
Parua Kuri, for example, had successfully utilised both Raembka 
and the Tepuka-Kawelka alliance as his political foundation for 
three successive parliamentary terms, from 1972 to 1987, until the 
Kawelka pulled out of the alliance. Likewise, Kuri's successor, 
Melchior Pep, appeared to have consolidated his position within 
his Welyi-Kuta group since taking office in 1987. He was returned to 
Parliament during the June 1992 elections (but was forced to resign 
under the provisions of the PNG Leadership Code) . 
Between the tribe and phratry levels can be found another level 
of organisation called the tribe-pair. These are mainly political 
units whose membership is drawn from traditional ties based 
originally on military alliances between tribal groups.  Although 
Hageners have no definite term for this, it is, however, a 
widespread phenomenon, in which moka exchange is usually intense 
and many wives are taken from each other. Within the Tepuka­
Kawelka pair, for example, members of each partner refer to those 
of the other as ang wua ( 'brother-man') .  The intriguing phenomena 
of tribe pairing and neo-traditional coalition-style alliance are 
discussed below. 
What needs to be emphasised is that in Hagen politics at both 
local and national levels are generally organised along these broad 
l ines .  There is evidence suggesting that candidates have been 
sponsored by all levels of group. Former Dei MP, Parua Kuri, for 
example, had largely been a (Raembka) phratry-based candidate 
during his early days in the House of Assembly and later a (Tepuka­
Kawelka) tribal pair-based candidate when tribes from within 
Raembka began sponsoring their own candidates. In contrast, his son, 
Reuben Parua, was a (Tepuka Kiteipi) clan-based candidate during 
the 1992 elections. Paias Wingti was another clan-based candidate 
when he first contested the Hagen Open seat in 1977. Melchior Pep 
is a good example of a tribal-based candidate. While he may have 
consolidated his position amongst the Welyi-Kuta phratry during 
the 1992 election, his Kombukla tribe provided the necessary 
foundation for his win during the 1987 election. 
250 Ketan 
Candidates and group affiliates 
Eight candidates contested the Dei Open Electorate seat held by 
Melchior Pep, a Pangu party member. As indicated in Table 9.3, the 
major phratries of Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta were all 
represented by candidates. Both Raembka and Welyi-Kuta had 
three each while Pipilka had two candidates. Out of the eight 
candidates, only four were serious contenders with 'big money', 
resources and strong support. They were Koi Ranpi, Wikai Membi, 
Namba Parua and the incumbent Melchior Pep. The others, in spite 
of genuine interest they held in contesting, provided little 
competition for Pep and mostly ended up being used as political 
stooges by others for the purpose of splitting votes in opposition 
strong-holds. It was widely believed that Melchior Pep, with Pati 
Wamp's assistance, encouraged Matrus Mel amongst the Tepuka and, 
possibly, Puri Ruing4 amongst the Roklaka to split Raembka and 
Pipilka votes, respectively. This facilitated the prevalence and 
dominance of Welyi-Kuta in Dei. Accidentally or by design, the 
choice of available candidates somewhat favoured the sitting 
member. While the results suggest the employment of the principle 
of divide-and-rule, this, however, cannot be proven conclusively. 
As against the widespread belief, it has to be noted that Tepuka 
Kelmbo clansman, Matrus (Dokta) Mel, appears to be emerging as a 
'power broker' type of politician in Dei generally and, particularly, 
in Raembka politics .  He is, by virtue of tribal membership and a 
special relationship maintained with his maternal Kentpi uncles, 
in a unique position to influence stability in Raembka politics. 
Conversely, he could easily cause instability because of his 
vulnerability to external forces .  By accepting a campaign vehicle 
from Pangu Party president and Kombukla tribesman Pati Wamp, 
Matrus may have compromised his own position, in addition to 
jeopardizing the chances of his fellow Raembka candidates by 
splitting their vote. But Matrus alone cannot be blamed for risking 
the position of the Raembka group in Dei politics. All the Raembka 
4 In spite of what other people may have said and believed at the time, after 
having spoken to the candidate, I am not convinced tnat he was a political 
stooge. The significant increase in Puri Ruing's vote during the 1993 Dei 
Open By-Election reinforces this view that he was a serious contender in 
1 992. 
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candidates were equally responsible for narrowing Raembka 
chances; for three to stand was always going to be risky. 
Table 9.3: Candidates, tribes, tribe-pairs and phratries of Dei 
Candidate Tribe Tribe-pair Phratry 
Koi Ranpi Rerndi Kumdi-Remdi1 Pipilka 
Puri Ruing Roklaka Roklaka-Waklupka2 Pipilka 
Wikai Membi Minembi Kombukla-Minembi Welyi-Kuta 
Michael Y ona Minembi Kombukla-Minembi Welyi-Kuta 
Melchior Mack Pep Kombukla Kombukla-Minembi Welyi-Kuta 
Philip Bobby Kentpi Kumungaka-Kentpi Raembka 
Reuben Namba Parua Tepuka Tepuka-Kawelka Raembka 
Matrus Dokta Mel Tepuka Tepuka-Kawelka Raembka 
Notes: 
1 . Although the Kumdi-Remdi is a more traditional alliance, and the 
relationship is continued in Mul Council area ('where 'Upper Remdi' is 
paired with Kumdi), the Remdi in Dei (a.k.a. 'Lower Remdi') are now closely 
associated with the Kimka-Roklaka pair. 
2. Like Remdi, Roklaka is also geographically divided. The Roklaka nu-por­
pei ('those who live downstream') are commonly paired with the Waklupka 
while those residing at Gumanch are paired with Kimka. 
As it turned out, Tepuka-Kawelka votes were mainly divided 
between Matrus Mel and his fellow tribesman Namba Parua, while 
a large proportion of Raembka votes were spread among the three 
candidates. Although Matrus was expected to pick up a good 
fraction of the Kumungaka-Kentpi votes, it is difficult to determine 
a more accurate figure due to lack of relevant data. Progressive tally 
sheets, with records of individual ballot-box counts, are essential for 
this type of analysis. These, however, were not available at the 
time of writing.5 
5 Pending results of challenges in the Court of Disputed Returns, the 
Electoral Commissioner is understood to have instructed his officers not to 
provide access to data. 
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Table 9.4: The 1992 Dei Open Election Results 
Candidate Votes Polled 
Melchior Mack Pep 5,435 
Koi Ranpi 3,437 
Reuben Namba Parua 3,036 
Wikai Membi 2,345 
Philip Bobby 2,079 
Puri Ruing 1,989 
Matrus Dokta Mel 1 ,539 
Michael Yona 85 
Informal 45 
Total 19,990 
Source: Electoral Commission of Papua New Guinea 
% 
27. 19 
17.19 
15.19 
11 .73 
10.40 
9 .95 
7.70 
0.43 
100.00 
(1992b) .  
Meanwhile, at Gumanch, fellow Pipilka candidates Puri Ruing 
and Koi Ranpi were pitted against each other in a contest which 
would ultimately determine the fate of Pipilka as a unit in Dei 
politics .  The Pipilka, now also a registered business name, 
historically comprised the mainly Dei resident Kimka, Roklaka, 
Remdi, Waklupka tribes and the Hagen, Anglimp and Nebilyer 
resident Kopi-Nokpa tribe-pair (Burton 1988). Pipilka's relatively 
small size in Dei suggests that as a political unit it cannot for many 
years win the Dei Open seat if more than one Pipilka candidate 
runs. It can be argued that Puri Ruing was able to collect votes which 
otherwise may have gone to Koi Ranpi. Furthermore, he picked up 
Waklupka votes which otherwise may have gone to Philip Bobby 
and Namba Parua. Yet, it can also be argued that had Puri Ruing not 
contested, his votes would not necessarily go to Koi, because the 
Waklupka votes would have gone to Philip Bobby and his fellow 
Raembka candidates. 
Even at this crude level of analysis, it is clear that a Raembka 
candidate was never going to win. It was boxed in from all comers 
right from the beginning. Pipilka was never going to make it either. 
With the Kimka-Roklaka alliance thrown behind Puri Ruing, Koi 
Ranpi depended entirely on his own Remdi tribe with a bit of help 
from some Kawelka. Although the Kopi tribe belongs to the Pipilka 
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alliance, its members live closer to the Tepuka and are in fact 
Namba's matrikin. Namba, therefore, picked up most of the Kopi 
votes and Koi only a few. 
The Welyi-Kuta group, on the other hand, were well in control. 
The votes of their principal candidate, Melchior Pep, came mainly 
from his own group, the Kombukla, the Minembi Papike clan who 
reside on Kombukla territory, as well as 'bloc votes' from the Welyi 
tribe. That was enough to give him a good foundation. He made up 
the extras from the Kawelka Kundmbo clan, through his 
relationship with an aspiring politician, Pik Ruin,6 and he may 
have picked up the usual marginal or swing votes from all over. 
Considering that he was a minister in the Namaliu government, his 
chances of picking up swing votes were pretty good. 
That Namba Parua was able to come third had to be a strong 
warning to the others because no one expected him to do that well. 
Although his father, Parua Kuri, was a former MP, Namba was 
believed to have been rejected by some Raembka leaders in favour of 
his younger brother, llam (Robert) Parua, during the planning 
stages. But he insisted on standing as an independent. Even his own 
father, who was silently entertaining the idea of re-entering 
national politics himself, did not endorse Namba's nomination. This 
became apparent during Namba's abduction by Nengka tribesmen 
when Parua was said to have 'celebrated' with two cartons of beer 
at his Urunga home: 'What did I say? Go tell his mother, Kopi amb 
(woman) . . .  to go and get him' (Kawelka informants: pers. comm.) .  
Part in anger, part in remorse at his helplessness, he appeared to 
·have blamed those who had endorsed his son as a Raembka 
candidate and Namba for not consulting and listening to advice 
offered by his father. Whatever the case, Namba attracted enough 
support to come third, after winning candidate Melchior Pep and 
runner-up Koi Ranpi.7 Having briefly discussed the individual 
candidates, I now turn to their primary political support bases. 
6 
7 
While Pik Ruin does enjoy a speciai relationship with Melchior Pep, the 
Kombukla-Kawelka-Kundmbo relationship is an historicai one. For 
example, Strathem's analysis of marriage patterns showed that 'Kundmbo 
have intermarried mainly with groups among the Minembi and Kombukla 
with which they do have either traditional military alliances or recently 
developed exchange partnerships' (1972:134). 
Following Melchior Pep's resignation, Rueben Namba Pama won the 1993 
Dei Open Byelection with 4,494 votes, improving on his 1992 position by 
1 ,458 votes. Koi Ranpi came second with 3,522 votes, only 85 more than 
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Friend or foe: a relationship of sorts 
The phenomenon of tribe-pairing is widespread throughout Hagen 
society . It is a relationship that is formed and nurtured by close 
proximity, mutual trust and reciprocity of goods and services. 
Ideally, women are given and taken as wives from within such 
groups and ceremonial exchange is usually intense between the 
partners . Disputes at this level are easily resolved and tribal 
partners will assist each other in the event of external adversity. In 
his discussion on alliances, Strathern ( 1972) extends pairing to the 
major levels: 
Pairing indicates either a former or a current special 
linkage between two groups; and groups can be paired 
together in this way at any level from the sub-sub-clan 
up to tine tribe. Paired clan-groups intermarry fairly 
closely and are more likely to share territory with each 
other than with other groups. From their close 
association disputes also arise, in which their 
separateness is temporarily emphasised (1972:223).  
Table 9.5: Special Alliances (tribe-pair and others): population data 
Tribe-pair I Alliance 1979a 1990b Adjusted 1995c 
Tepuka-Kawelka 4,358 7,5 19  
Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka 4,596 2,680 
Kombukla-Minembi 7,066 6,795 
Kumungaka-Kentpi 3,988 4,363 
a. From Western Highlands Provincial Data System (NSO 1982); 
b. 1990 National Population Census (NSO 1993); 
c. Based on 1979 figures (a) and at two per cent compounded 
population growth rate. 
5,865 
6, 1 85 
9,509 
5,367 
his 1992 score of 3,437. Puri Ruing made a significant improvement, from 
1,989 to 3,138 (a positive difference of 1,149 votes). 
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Three examples of  this form of alliance are discussed here, with 
special emphasis on political organisation. They are : ( 1 )  the 
Tepuka-Kawelka pair of Raembka; (2) the Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka 
coalition-style alliance; and (3) the Kombukla-Minembi pair. 
While the discussion is mainly centred around this election, 
relevant historical references are included. 
The Tepuka-Kawelka: an uneasy alliance 
The Tepuka-Kawelka alliance had been a particularly strong one. 
There are as many sons of Tepuka women among the Kawelka as 
there are Kawelka nephews among the Tepuka. Elaborate exchange 
ceremonies have been staged between the two groups, the most 
famous being Kawelka's moka to the Tepuka in 1974, which was 
portrayed in a Granada Television Disappearing World Series 
documentary as Ongka's Big Moka. This moka comprised a large 
herd of pigs-including one called 'Rut Pepa' owned bl the Kawelka 
big-man Ongka-as well as a Toyota Land Cruiser and a motor 
bike. The major recipients were the then MP Parua Kuri, and Dei 
businessman, Goimba Kot, both the sons of Kawelka women. What 
follows is Ongka' s own account: 
At our big moka we gave away as many as 20 cattle as 
extra gifts. We purchased 20 commercially raised pigs 
and added these to our own home-reared ones. We gave 
40 cassowaries. As for our own pigs, how could you 
possibly count them? At the head of the row of pigs I put 
my own pigs: Rut Pepa, named after our place Rut or 
Mbukl. It is the one I wagered against the cargo cultists, 
and I had Andrew [Strathem] take a picture of it which 
I still keep. Next in line was my Rut Wane, then Pklok 
Wane, then my Rut Pokl. These were the four pigs with 
personal names which I gave. As extra gifts I myself 
bought two cows and gave them away. The car too was 
purchased as a result of my persuasion: we all 
contributed to its price (Ongka 1979: 123) . 
8 A grey Toyota Landcruiser vehicle, which Parua began to use long before 
the final moka ceremony, was bought at a cost of AU$3,600 (A.J. Strathern 
explanatory note in Ongka 1979:123) . The use of the car as a moka gift 
was the first of its kind anywhere in Mount Hagen. 
256 Ketan 
It took ten years before the return moka was made. Parua Kuri, 
still an MP in 1984, orchestrated the presentation during that year. 
Old exchange partners from the Kawelka felt that they were 
treated unfairly. Pama conveniently forgot to include the Land 
Cruiser and the motor bike. Ongka, a long-time exchange partner 
and Pama strong-man, felt betrayed. He laid out a photograph of 
'Rut Pepa' in front of him and said, 'Pama has the young boys in the 
centre of the moka pena (ceremonial ground) and me at the 
periphery' (pers. comm.) .  Pama lost the bulk of the Kawelka 
support that year and the elections three years later. 
In 1986, two years after Parua's moka, war broke out between the 
Kawelka and Minembi following the death of a Kawelka Kundmbo 
clansman who died outside clan territory under dubious 
circumstances (Iamo and Ketan 1992: 103) .  The Minembi, with the 
exception of the Kimbo clan, are traditional enemies of the 
Kawelka. The Tepuka, like the other pair-partner, the Kopi and 
Kimbo, are traditional allies of the Kawelka. However, in this 
war, circumstances did not permit the involvement of the Tepuka. As 
a result, Kawelka, Kopi and Kimbo, went to war without Tepuka. 
Tepuka's case was quite understandable: with Pama Kuri vying for 
another term in Parliament, his Tepuka tribe could not afford a war 
against the Minembi. 
The allied forces of Kawelka-Kopi-Kimbo eventually routed a 
section of the Minembi in 1986, but not without loss. The war (1986-
1990) cost them many young men before the Minembi were brutally 
evicted from their Tiki territories.  While the combined forces were 
taking stock of their losses, Pama Kuri announced his decision to 
contest the Dei Open for another term of office. In June 1987 he was 
voted out of office. Parua thus tasted his first defeat at the polls. 
Until then, he was one of the few surviving MPs from the days of the 
House of Assembly. He was bitter and vowed not to forgive his 
Kawelka uncles. The Kawelka had broken away and thrown their 
weight behind rival candidates, Koi Ranpi and Melchior Pep. It 
was Pep who unseated Parua in 1987 and successfully retained his 
seat in 1992. This was Ranpi's second time to come second in an 
election: he was narrowly beaten by Pep in 1987. Parua, like his son 
Namba in 1992, came third during the 1987 elections. The support 
behind these candidates was determined by that of the tribal groups 
behind them. The split in Parua' s tribal base in 1986 led to his loss 
in 1987 which was replicated by his son's loss in 1992. 
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The Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka: a triad of  business convenience 
The Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka triad came about as a result of the 
plantation acquisition scheme. Its first main objective was to acquire 
the Gumanch coffee plantation, one of the largest in the southern 
hemisphere. The Remdi, with the help of current company secretary 
Kopi Puklma and Hagen businessman and politician Michael Mel, 
registered a business group called Pipilka Development 
Corporation. The neighbouring Kimka and Roklaka were invited to 
purchase group shares in the company. It is interesting to note here 
that Pipilka as a phratry prevailed over the tribe-pair level : 
Roklaka was separated from Waklupka and Remdi from Kumdi, in 
order to form this neo-traditional coalition-style alliance with 
Kimka. They bought a few more businesses, including the Hagen 
Park Motel, and fought a war against the Minembi over the Kugmi 
land. Although the principal combatants were the Kimka-Roklaka 
tribe-pair versus the Kombukla clans, it was widely believed that 
both Minembi and Remdi assisted in various capacities. This was 
made clear when full-scale warfare erupted between the Remdi and 
Minembi in 1986. This war lasted nearly five years, costing many 
lives and millions of kina in massive destruction of property and 
cash crops (Ketan 1995) .  
But soon the relationship turned sour when the Kimka-Roklaka 
faction of the group complained about non-payment of dividends 
from the businesses owned by Pipilka Development Corporation. 
The dispute was still not resolved by election time in 1992. 
Inevitably, the Kimka-Roklaka faction withdrew their support for 
the Remdi candidate, Koi Ranpi, and endorsed their own man, Puri 
Ruing, a move that suited Melchior Pep and Pate Wamp. Puri, a Port 
Moresby-based policeman and a somewhat reluctant politician, 
went into the race well behind the others. He did not have the time 
to do any planning, nor did he have many resources with which to 
compete effectively. His was a case of too little, too late. 
Despite his Pipilka base, Koi Ranpi was still able to pick up 
Raembka votes . But whether Koi might have mustered the numbers 
to win, had he had the support of the KimkaRoklaka voters, is 
anyone's guess. Pipilka may well be too small a group and perhaps 
too timid a cat to make it on its own in the jungle of Dei politics. 9 
9 It could well be the case that Pipilka' s primary focus still is business, not 
politics and war (which can destroy business). 
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Kombukla-Minembi: an unlikely pair 
The Kombukla-Minembi pair is a very unlikely combination. If 
anything, it is the Miti Ku chain of mountains they share 
territorially that makes them a group. Historically, the Kombukla 
have been paired with an Anglimp-South Wahgi tribe called 
Warike. And the Minembi have always been a loosely organised 
cluster of clan sections. Owing to their large size the Minembi are so 
fragmented that they have never accomplished any major event in a 
cohesive manner. They have lost wars to relatively smaller tribes 
whom they would otherwise have defeated easily . They have 
never endorsed a Minembi candidate as a group. Rather it has 
always been a situation of smaller clans and sections fighting their 
own wars or endorsing their own candidates . Consequently, the 
Kombukla took advantage of this situation. On their own, 
Kombukla elders know they are not big enough for a political base. 
Hence, their pact with the Minembi, beginning with the acquisition 
and development of the Kugmi coffee project in the early eighties. 
But the Minembi fought several wars without the Kombukla. 
Kombukla, however, was more than willing to make up for this in 
other ways . And what better way than to deliver goods and 
services. In Pati Wamp and Melchior Pep, the Kombukla have 
tacticians who can plot and manipulate supporters to win elections. 
With access to government resources, they have built roads and 
have brought business into the area. They have poured in thousands 
of kina into the area. Thus, they have successfully won two elections 
in this manner. 
1Electoral violence': cases and explanations 
'Electoral violence', as a term denoting various types of violence 
during elections, is being deliberately avoided here mainly for 
analytical reasons. This is because of the argument that there is no 
such thing as 'electoral violence' per se. , and that purported 
'electoral violence' cannot be fully understood without knowledge of 
the underlying historical and structural organisation of the groups 
involved. The term, election-related violence, is used instead. 
Election-related violence can be divided into three broad categories: 
(1 )  violence that occurs before polling; (2) violence during polling; 
and (3) violence that occurs after the polling period. 
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Pre-pol ling violence' 
'Pre-polling violence' is a term that can be used when referring to 
election-related violence which occurs before the polling period. It 
includes any form of violent act: ranging from fist-fights to the total 
destruction of property and lives. During the 1992 Dei Open election 
a number of cases fitting these criteria were observed. The first 
involved the alleged 'kidnapping' of Raembka candidate, Reuben 
Namba Parua, in which he was said to have been forcefully taken 
by members of the Nengka tribe. 10 Allegedly, Reuben angered the 
Nengka by jumping onto the bonnet of a car they were driving and 
tried to rip the mesh on the windscreen. Afraid that he would 
damage the vehicle, the driver shifted into gear and took off 
abruptly, whereupon the force sent Reuben sprawling onto the roof. 
He was pulled over into the back of the utility as the vehicle 
accelerated towards Kotna and away from his home. His Tepuka 
tribesmen gave chase rather gallantly but in vain. According to 
Remdi informants, he was taken into Nengka territory and held 
captive until his release was negotiated by a fellow candidate (Koi 
Ranpi) and his supporters on the following day. 1 1  
The second case involved a fight between supporters o f  Melchior 
Pep and those of two other candidates, which resulted in damaged 
vehicles and minor bruises. Pep's supporters were alleged to have set 
up a road-block between Kotna and Kondopina in an effort to stop 
other candidates from 'poaching' votes . Vehicles belonging to Puri 
Ruing and Wikai Membi were stopped at this road-block and during 
the ensuing struggle, Ruing's vehicle was extensively damaged 
while Membi's escaped with minor dents. 12  The next day, a PMV 
1 O Nengka are traditional enemies of the Tepuka and a number of Raembka 
allies. In 1970 former Dei MP and Tepuka tribesman, Pama Kuri (father to 
Rueben) sustained serious axe wounds to his cheek after an attempt was 
made on his life at Muglamp by members of the Nengka tribe. This violent 
attack, according to Strathern (1984:25), was an attempted revenge for an 
earlier event in which a Mul driver was killed inside Dei. Consequently, a 
member of this Mul Council tribe was sentenced to jail for a lengthy period 
because of the attack on Pama. 
1 1  When questioned about the incident two weeks later, Rueben Parua, 
however, shrugged his shoulders and brushed aside the issue as anything 
but important. 
l 2 Wikai Membi's Land-Cruiser station wagon was said to have escaped 
with minor dents because of the extensive wire mesh and iron 
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bus owned by a Kombukla big-man, Krai, was confiscated by Ruing' s 
Roklaka tribesmen in a road-block at Gumanch and was damaged in 
revenge. 
Case three also involved the impounding of a vehicle. But this 
time the vehicle did not belong to either a candidate or his 
supporters . It was the Returning Officer's official vehicle which 
was taken. Melchior Pep's supporters were alleged to have seized 
the vehicle from the Assistant Returning Officer while he was 
returning to Muglamp station from an official run. The Assistant 
Returning Officer, Steven Korowa, happens to be a fellow Remdi 
tribesman of Pipilka candidate Koi Ranpi. 
These examples show that violence, arising from issues to do 
with the structural and historical relationship among Hagen 
groups, is becoming increasingly important in elections. Reuben's 
apparent act of aggression towards the Nengka can easily be 
explained in this context. Naturally he was suspicious of the 
presence of Nengka tribesmen inside Tepuka territory during an 
election period. Certain historical events were carved into his young 
mind at an early stage and probably will remain important in his 
life. At a tender age he witnessed the brutal attack on his father,. 
Then as a young man he watched his father being toppled from 
power. Now he saw his clan's traditionally loyal Raembka 
supporters turn their back on him. It is widely known that a large 
number of Raembka voters were successfully courted by Pipilka 
candidate Koi Ranpi. The Nengka, owing to their traditional ties 
with the Remdi, were perceived by Reuben Parua as supporters of 
Koi Ranpi. In this context, their unceremonious flight from Tepuka 
territory, with Reuben as captive, is quite understandable. 
Likewise, the second pre-polling incident can also be understood 
from a structural and historical perspective. Wikai Membi' s vehicle 
may have escaped with minor dents because of its precautionary 
reinforcements but one must consider the fact that Wikai Membi is a 
Minembi tribesman and Pep needs Minembi numbers in order to win 
elections.  Any attempt by Pep's supporters to hurt Wikai's 
supporters or damage his property would be seen by the Minembi as 
reinforcement on the windscreen and side glass. Wikai' s Minembi tribe is a 
traditional pair partner of Melchior Pep's Kombukla tribe; Puri Ruing's 
Roklaka tribe had fought a war against the Kombukla over land 
(Strathern 1984:24-25) .  
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an offence against them as a group. Pep, therefore, would do his 
utmost not to offend Minembi voters. Conversely, to offend Puri Ruing 
and his Roklaka tribesmen would not be of major electoral 
consequence to Melchior Pep. It is generally believed that Pep does 
not rely on Roklaka votes because they are not only traditional 
enemies but also a relatively small tribe. 
The third incident involving Pep supporters and the Assistant 
Returning Officer can also be explained in terms of structural and 
historical relationship of Hagen grouping. The Remdi are 
traditional enemies of the Minembi-Kombukla pair and modern 
business enterprises are organised along similar lines. It is obvious 
that Pep supporters were suspicious of a Remdi tribesman, albeit an 
electoral official, found inside their territory with a government 
vehicle. In this instance, it is also reasonable from a Hagen world 
view to suspect rival candidates and their supporters of 'voter­
poaching' inside one's own territorial boundaries, also known as a 
base-vote area. Elsewhere, I have discussed the composition of a 
base-vote group, how it is nurtured and protected from rival 
candidates, and other similar strategies designed by local groups in 
an attempt to win elections (Ketan 1995) .  
This pre-polling violence fitted the patterns of conflict which 
already existed, but flared up in the context of intergroup rivalry 
during the elections. In many instances, personal confrontations 
between powerful individuals often made situations very volatile, 
invariably resulting in assault on persons and destruction of property 
such as vehicles. 
'Polling violence' 
The term, polling violence, is used here when referring to instances 
of violence which occur during the polling period. While some cases 
of violence during this period can be explained in terms of 
traditional relationship between groups, it is disturbing to see that 
state-generated violence13  is on the increase. Dissatisfaction over 
the logistical organisation of the elections resulted in heated 
arguments between electoral officials and candidates, which 
1 3  This refers to violence in response to action, or inaction, by polling 
officials, such as nondelivery of ballot-papers, coupled with an apparent 
lack of police presence at polling stations. 
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culminated in the punching of a Returning Officer.1 4  Generally, 
polling in the Western Highlands was peaceful, with minimal 
disruptions. In Dei it was no different; it was particularly pleasing 
to see that polling in the home-base of candidates was 
exceptionally peaceful and very orderly. 
There were only two reported cases of violence during polling in 
Dei. According to electoral officials, a bus-load of Pep supporters 
were attacked by Wikai Membi supporters at Kumbunga village.1 5 
Compensation of K90 was later paid to the Pep supporters and the 
conflict resolved. The other incident involved an attack on Reuben 
Parua's supporters by those of Melchior Pep. Informants claimed 
that a vehicle hired by Reuben Pama for his supporters was 
smashed, a man was injured and a substantial amount of cash was 
stolen from the truck.16 
It is significant to note that the incident involving Pep and 
Membi supporters was resolved quickly while the case of the 
missing money and the attack on Reuben Parua's supporters was not 
treated with similar urgency .  It is a reflection of the kind of 
relationship that exists between the various groups. 
'Post-polling violence' 
Any form of election-related violence which occurs after the polling 
period is referred to as post-polling violence here. This also includes 
violence that continues even after the election results have been 
announced. Whilst data on post-polling violence are limited my own 
assessment, based on election monitoring studies, suggests that post­
polling violence usually culminates in tribal fights. These conflicts 
1 4  Western Highlands Provincial Returning Officer, Kapping Isong, was 
attacked on the 16 June 1992 at Kagamuga, allegedly by supporters of 
Paias Wingti, over the non-delivery of ballotpapers. Mr Isong, when 
questioned in Port Moresby over the incident, blamed the Electoral 
Commission for the delay which resulted in his attack, but said he was 
reluctant to lay charges against the assailant. 
1 5  This information was supplied by Assistant Returning Officer Steven 
Korowa and Presiding Officer Henry Rumints. Stationed at Kumbunga 
polling place, Mr Rumints, who was on site, agreed that Wikai supporters 
possibly resented the Kombukla intruders. 
1 6 As revealed by Robert Parua, a victim of an incident at Mitamp on the eve 
of elections, two of Rueben Parua's campaign vehicles were allegedly 
attacked by Kombukla tribesmen, with damages valued at almost K3,000. 
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are organised along tribal and phratry lines.  Whether they 
escalate into full-scale alliance-based warfare, or are resolved 
peacefully, often depends on kinship networks which cut across clan 
and tribal boundaries, and thus become a prime factor in conflict 
resolution. 
After the election only one serious case of post-polling violence 
was reported for the Dei Open electorate. While it had been widely 
believed that several cases of tribal warfare would eventuate, and 
people had predicted considerable violence during and after the 
1992 elections, only this one election-related conflict resulted in 
fatalities :  three brutal deaths, several hospitalised with serious 
injuries and massive destruction of property. The conflict, the 
Welyi-Kentpi War, started over the fatal shooting of a Simbu 
security man while employed by a business group representing 
Welyi-Kuta interests. The deceased was one of many Simbu workers 
employed by the company to work on its coffee estates. He lived at 
Yan, a small Simbu settlement inside Kentpi territory, with his 
family and friends .  Owing to their residential status, the Simbu 
migrants were expected to 'bloc-vote' for the Kentpi candidate, 
Philip Bobby. But, as it turned out, they were already committed to 
their employer. It is commonly held that most of them voted for 
Welyi-Kuta strongman Melchior Pep.1 7 
Raembka informants insist that the deceased was attacked by a 
gang whose motive is believed to have been robbery; they were after 
the labourers ' wages and coffee money which was kept at the 
factory office. The Kentpi and their Raembka allies maintain that 
the deceased was merely an unfortunate victim of circumstances and 
that there was no foul play. But, for the Welyi, the Kentpi were 
responsible, they were upset over the election results and this was 
their way of exacting revenge. Kentpi denied this and put the blame 
back on the Welyi. Warfare erupted. In the battle, two Kentpi 
warriors were killed. A Welyi sustained injuries and had to be 
hospitalized .  
Thus two hypotheses vie for acceptance: ( 1 )  a murder was 
committed as part of an attempt to restore tribal authority; (2) 
robbery was the motive leading to an unplanned death, which 
triggered conflict in an already strained relationship . The first 
1 7 In the absence of progressive tally sheets containing results of specific 
ballot-box counts, voting patterns were largely based on assessment of 
information supplied by scrutineers. 
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hypothesis suggest some people were desperate to restore tribal 
authority. The Simbu settlers owed their jobs to the Welyi but lived 
on Kentpi land. By supporting the Welyi in their election bid, they 
could be said to have been in defiance of Kentpi authority. 
Retribution comes in various forms-some more hideous than 
others-and death might have been the form of retribution that was 
chosen. On the other hand, the Simbu man-a security guard­
might have been shot on the spur of the moment in a robbery that 
went horribly wrong. If so the shooting of the Simbu was exploited 
by both sides to wage war on each other. That the outbreak of war 
was so sudden, with little attempt at exploring avenues for a 
peaceful settlement, was indicative of an unfriendly relationship in 
which any little incident is capable of providing a pretext for a 
fight .  
The magnitude of  this hostility was potentially very large, 
considering that the Kombukla and Minembi tribes could have 
thrown their support behind their fellow Welyi-Kuta phratry 
colleagues. And if that had happened, fellow Raembka tribes of 
Kumungaka, Nelka and Gulka might have joined forces with 
Kentpi. Even Tepuka, in spite of their differences, might have 
j oined in, with the rest of Raembka members following suit. That 
would surely have resulted in a large-scale phratry warfare­
something which has been unheard of in recent times. 18 
Conclusion 
My analysis leads to two major conclusions: ( 1 )  Dei politics is still 
centred around neo-traditional coalition-type groups; (2) election­
related violence is largely determined by these underlying social 
and historical factors. 
Dei politics largely revolve around the major phratries of 
Pipilka, Raembka and WelyiKuta. Tribal groups may compete 
against each other in endorsing candidates. But it is necessary for 
each candidate to court prominent leaders in order to gain phratry­
wide support. This is absolutely vital for winning elections. Both 
1 8  According to accounts given by a Kawelka big-man, Goimba Onombe, the 
last major phratry war was fought between the Raembka and Welyi-Kuta 
some time in the 1930s, when the Welyi were almost decimated by the 
combined forces of the Tepuka-Kawelka pair and their Klamakae, Kopi 
and Kimbo allies. 
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Pama Kuri and Melchior Pep used Raembka and Welyi-Kuta, 
respectively, to win elections. Raembka did not win the 1992 
election because it had three candidates and so its vote was split 
three ways. In addition, none of the candidates was able to muster 
the support of 'neutral' groups, either from within or outside the 
phratry. This raises an important point. In spite of the availability 
of a primary kin-group, it requires skill to mobilise support. In other 
words, all candidates may claim a solid vote-base, comprising 
kinsfolk and clansmen, but it is the more skilful candidates who can 
convert that support into votes, and go a step further to compete 
effectively for votes in marginal areas. 
Similarly, election-related violence is rooted in the kind of 
relationship maintained by individuals and groups in the area. The 
type of relationship is often determined by historical and structural 
factors .  The likelihood and severity of election-related violence 
depend on such factors. Warfare, such as the one between the Welyi 
and Kentpi indicated an already deteriorating relationship before 
the issue which triggers hostilities, especially as avenues for 
resolving the conflict were not sought. That hostilities did not 
escalate into a full-scale alliancebased warfare was largely because 
of cross-cutting kinship ties. Groups may be politically aligned one 
way, but individuals, including some very powerful and influential 
ones, may have interests on all sides. Large-scale warfare is thus 
usually averted, as in this case. But perhaps another reason why 
large-scale warfare did not eventuate was because of the impending 
by-election. The need for each group to obtain the maximum possible 
vote for its own candidate dictated the need for conciliatory gestures 
towards other groups. Thus, in fact, in the structural groups set-up in 
the Dei electorate, election violence or violence during elections is 
understood to be counter-productive. But existing tensions and 
disagreements may erupt into violent conflicts during elections 
because of all the added pressures from competing for direct access to 
the state's mega resources. 
10 
The Election in the Imbbongu Open 
Electorate 
Joseph Yasi 
The Imbbongu Open electorate is one of the eight open electorates in 
the Southern Highlands Province. I will discuss the following 
aspects of the general election in relation to the Imbbongu Open seat: 
the general background of candidates and their motivation to run, 
their campaign strategies and techniques and the results. The ideas 
presented and discussed have been obtained in three main ways: 
firstly, by interviewing the candidates where possible; secondly by 
interviewing relatives and close friends of the candidates; finally 
by being there and following the progress of the election campaign in 
the electorate . Because of the way the information has been 
collected, its reliability may be questionable. However, I have tried 
to present here what I believe to be useful and reliable information. 
The candidates 
Eight candidates contested the Imbbongu Open electorate. They are, 
in the order they appeared on the ballot paper: ( 1 )  Robert Posu 
Mindi, (2) Julius Piel Kera, (3) Albert Napinu Mambu, (4) Anthony 
Temo, (5) Glaime Warena, (6) Dominic Melawe Kanea, (7) Korowa 
Pokeya, and (8) Robert Tawa. 
I wish to mention at the outset that those who contest elections 
in Imbbongu these days and wish to be taken seriously are expected 
to have either the material resources or proven leadership ability 
or both. The voters in 1992 were looking for people who have had 
previous leadership roles and /  or have the necessary material 
resources to compete. The ordinary grassroots or rural people do not 
look at a degree from a university. They are first and foremost 
interested in what a person will do for them in terms of development 
in their area and, secondly, whether he or she is capable of paying 
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them for their votes. Otherwise, in  the absence of these two 
considerations, the candidate will have to be a 'wantok' or a 
relative in order to secure their votes. 
The eight candidates were all males. All of them were married. 
Marital status represented an important element in the calculation 
of support. Most of the candidates believed that they would receive 
votes from their wives' clan and village. Slightly under a half of 
the candidates were between thirty and forty years of age, with two 
in their late twenties and three over forty. All eight candidates 
were Southern Highlanders and from areas within the electorate. 
Table 10 . 1  presents the educational background of the 
candidates. All eight candidates had had some form of formal 
education, with three having attained tertiary level. 
Table 10. 1 :  Education profile of candidate 
Candidate Community High College University 
School 
Robert M. Posu Grade 6 
Julius P. Kera LLB 
Albert N. Mambu UPNG student 
Anthony Y. Temo Grade 8 
Glaime Warena Grade 6 
Dominic M. Kane Grade 10 
Korowa Pokeya C .T .C . *  B.Ed (UPNG) 
Robert Tawa Adcol. 
*Community Teaching Certificate 
Church affiliation ranked high among the calculation of support by 
candidates. Three were affiliated with the Pentecostal church, two 
were members of the Catholic church, while the remainder 
dispersed over a number of religious denominations . Candidates had 
early contact with their church and church members and they 
expected their votes in their favour. Some had been fully involved 
in church-organized activities . The church thus provided an 
additional opportunity for leadership of the group. During the 
campaign, candidates emphasized their church membership and 
past work and appealed to church groups for support. Church 
activity is seen to be politically significant. 
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Unlike church affiliation, party affiliation counted only with 
some candidates, and definitely not with the voters . Some 
candidates were overtly, officially, endorsed by a political party 
and others ran as associated with, and covertly in receipt of funds 
from, a political party. The rest of the candidates are classified as 
Independents. The following table gives a breakdown of party 
affiliation . 
Table 10.2: Party affiliation of candidates 
Candidate 
Robert Posu Mindi 
Julius Piel Kera 
Albert N. Mombu 
Anthony Temo 
Glaime W arena 
Dominic M. Kane 
Korowa Pokeya 
Robert Tawa 
Party Comments 
Independent Pro-PDM candidate 
PDM Officially endorsed candidate 
PIR* 
PAP 
PPP 
Independent Genuinely independent 
candidate 
LNA Officially endorsed candidate 
Pangu 
Of the eight candidates, six were officially endorsed by political 
parties and two ran as independent candidates . Robert Posu and 
Dominic Melawe Kanea were the independent candidates, although 
Robert Mindi Posu was a PDM sympathizer and was in receipt of 
funds from that party. 
The final background consideration relates to occupational 
experience. Table 10.3 shows the proportion of candidates who were 
public servants immediately prior to the election. 
* 
(Ed. :  Peoples Independent Right was a loose collection of independent 
candidates around Hugo Berghuser, a PAP minister in the Namaliu 
coalition who was standing in the National Capital District (NCD) 
electorate; it was not a registered party.) 
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Table 10.3: Occupation of candidates 
Candidate 
Robert M. Posu 
Julius P. Kera 
Albert N. Mombu 
Anthony Y. Temo 
Glaime W arena 
Dominic M. Kane 
Korowa Pokeya 
Robert Tawa 
Public servant 
Clerk - Dept of S. H'lands 
Lawyer - Public Prosecutor's 
Office 
Purchasing Officer, DW &S-Mendi 
Principal, Dauli Teachers Coll. 
District Manager, Pangia Dist. 
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Other 
Arts II-UPNG 
Sitting MP 
Businessman 
Three of the candidates had had previous political experience, 
while five had not. The three with political experience were 
Anthony Temo, the Sitting Member for Imbbongu Open, Glaime 
Warena, former MP from 1977 to 1987, and Robert Mindi, who 
contested the 1991 Southern Highlands Provincial Elections, coming 
second to his uncle who defeated him by 72 votes. 
Robert Posu-Robert Posu, an Independent candidate with some 
assistance from PDM, was born in 1962 in Wakwak village in the 
SHP. He is the son of a village headman who was the first Mendi 
man to greet and welcome the first white Patrol Officer (Ivan 
Champion) into the Mendi Valley with a singsing. He is a former 
Defence Force soldier who has in the past unsuccessfully contested 
the Mendi Constituency in the SHP Provincial Assembly. He came 
second overall in this election. 
Robert Posu's decision to contest can be explained by his background 
in social organizations (political involvement and association) and 
by his evaluation of his character (self-conception of leadership) .  
He i s  a politically-minded person. This i s  probably influenced by 
the fact that he is the son of a well respected village leader. 
He was also critical of the way the Imbbongu MP and Minister 
for Transport, Honourable Anthony Temo, was using the Electoral 
Development Fund (EDF). The minister was building new roads and 
maintaining old ones using his own company. He was standing 
against Temo to expose the conflict of interest and end the corruption 
by defeating him. 
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Julius Piel Kera-At thirty-seven, Julius Piel Kera entered the 
campaign with considerable experience in law. He was born in 
Maral village in the Ialibu District in 1957. After secondary school 
at Mendi High School, he had a stint with the Ialibu Local 
Government Council as a Council Executive Officer (CEO) . He 
entered UPNG in 1979 and graduated in 1983 with an LLB Degree. 
He has worked with the public prosecutors office ever since. He has 
assisted people with free legal services. 
Julius appears to be very self-confident of his leadership 
potential. He ran for election for three central reasons: (i) to see a 
change of government; (ii) to fight for better services for the rural 
population; and (iii) to help curb the law and order problems in the 
country, particularly tribal warfare. 
Albert Napinu Mombu-Born in Yore village in Lower Mendi in 
1963, Albert Mombu was a Second Year Arts Student at the UPNG. 
He was the president of the Southern Highlands Students 
Association at the UPNG Waigani campus. The student crisis in 
1 991 ,  which saw the closure of the University in the second 
semester, gave him the opportunity to campaign and contest the 
elections. 
He had two reasons for contesting the elections. First, he wanted 
to assess his chances in future elections; in a sense, this was a trial 
run to register his name with the electors . Second, he wanted to 
contribute to the defeat of the sitting MP-Anthony Terna-because 
he believed the minister was involved in several corrupt dealings 
and cheating the people. 
Anthony Yarnaik Temo-At the time of the election Anthony 
Temo was forty-five years of age and the sitting member for the 
Imbbongu Electorate . He was running for his second term in 
parliament. He was firmly established in Mendi as a businessman 
and politician. He had been the member for the Upper Mendi 
constituency in the SHP Provincial Assembly for two terms. He 
resigned to contest the 1987 national elections. He is married to 
seven wives who have been very influential in the lead-up to his 
campaign and in contributing to the success of his community 
standing. 
Anthony Temo decided to run for the second term for three main 
reasons: firstly to defend his seat and form the next government; 
secondly to promote the policies and platform of the Peoples Action 
Party and thirdly to bring more essential services to the people of 
the Imbbongu Electorate. 
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Glaime Warena-Glaime was the officially endorsed candidate 
of the Peoples Progress Party and had served for two terms in 
parliament as a minister and government backbencher, from 1977 to 
1987. Of the eight candidates, he was the oldest at forty-eight and 
ranked as one of the 'hot favourites ' .  He was confident that his 
record of service and past political involvement would identify him 
as a man of achievement. However, his chances of winning were 
made slimmer by the fact that there were four other candidates 
from the same area in the race including the other highly fancied 
candidate Julius Kera . To improve his chances, Glaime had 
attempted to do a deal with Julius. In vain, he asked Julius to step 
down and support him with the promise of wealth and a senior 
position in the government bureaucracy should he win. Glaime 
Warena was serving as a Director on the Board of Directors for the 
Beechwood Logging Company operating in his area of Kaupena. 
Dominic Melawe Kanea-Dominic Melawe Kanea had deep 
roots in the lmbbongu Electorate. He was born in 1958 in Kendal 
village where he presently lives. He received his education at 
Mendi High School to Grade 10 level. He served as a stores 
supervisor and purchasing officer for the Division of Works and 
Supply (DW&S) in Mendi. He resigned in 1990 because he had 
planned to contest the elections as an independent candidate in 1992. 
He had one main reason for contesting: to show the general 
public that election was not only for the rich and powerful. He was 
overall the most upright of the candidates. He said he intended to 
show the parents of young people that by accepting bribes from the 
candidates, they were undermining their own children's chances of 
becoming leaders through elections. If bribes became an integral part 
of elections, then their children could have leadership qualities 
and the prospects of a future leader, but their opportunities would be 
made slim because they would not have the resources to bribe voters 
in order to get their votes. By his campaign method he hoped people 
will vote honestly and freely for the candidate of their choice. 
However, his campaign strategy of educating the voters was in vain, 
as shown by the number of votes he received and the amount of 
money that was received by groups of people who sold their votes. 
Sums of up to K200 were offered to individual voters. 
Korowa Pokeya-Like Dominic Kanea, Korowa Pokeya has 
deep roots in the Imbbongu Electorate . He was born in 1951 in 
Kaupena village (which is also the village of the Governor 
General, Wiwa Korowi) . Korowa Pokeya received his High School 
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education at Awaba High School in the Western Province and then 
attended Awaba Teachers College (which has since been transferred 
to Dauli in the Southern Highlands Province). Prior to standing for 
election, he was the principal of his college, which is run by the 
Evangelical Alliance Mission of Papua (EAMP) . He had been 
associated actively over the years with EAMP, having held various 
positions within the church as a committee member, youth 
organizer, etc. He was an executive member of the EAMP for the 
Eastern Papua region. 
Korowa explained his decision to run as a candidate by two 
factors. First his past and present work in the church, the help he 
extended to people in his community and his initiatives in various 
associations contributed to a favourable assessment of his 
leadership ability. Second, he wanted to see more government 
assistance towards church activities. He felt the churches can do 
more in producing good citizens of the country. 
Robert G. Tawa-Robert Tawa was born in 1956 in Orei village in 
Ialibu. He is married with four children. He considers himself to be 
a Lutheran although not a regular church goer. He completed six 
years of primary school and four years of secondary school. He was a 
banker for several years and then turned to a completely different 
career as a patrol officer (kiap or a District Manager I Co-ordinator, 
the new name for the kiap ). His decision to contest was influenced 
by his position and also by his people's pressure on him to contest. 
He was working as a District Manager for the Pangia District in the 
SHP when he resigned to contest the elections. Being a District 
Manager, he saw that the basic services were not reaching the 
people. Also, as a kiap, he believed he had the experience to work 
closely with the people. 
He believed that people were better served when there were no 
provincial governments. From his experience, he was critical of the 
provincial government system and wanted it to be overhauled. He 
would like to see the resurrection and improvement of the local 
government system . 
The candidates' motivation to stand 
To borrow from Premdas and Stevens (1978: 16-95), several reasons 
can be identified to account for the decision to stand. Usually more 
than one variable is significant. 
The first is the individual candidate ' s  perspective on 
leadership . All the candidates believed they were leadership 
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material: they had (1 )  a high self-esteem, that is, a feeling they 
were more capable of representing the interests and needs of the 
constituents than other individuals, or (2) a strong desire to serve in 
the capacity of leader in the political arena, or (3) a sense of duty to 
stand in order to advance and defend the interests of the electorate. 
A second reason for standing stresses the relationship between 
the individual and his/her associates. The decision to enter politics 
is often planted and nurtured by 'wantoks' who feel that the group 
should have one of their own to represent them. There was an 
element of this in most of the cases above. 
The third variable underlying the desire to stand relates to the 
existence of compelling local issues . Corruption and lack of 
development were central issues for several of the candidates. All 
these reasons are not incompatible with a wish to advance oneself 
materially and socially by becoming an MP. 
Some of the reasons given by Premdas and Stevens as bases for 
the decision to run for election do not seem to apply to the Imbbongu 
situation. For instance, the motivation relating to party loyalty and 
identification does not apply in Imbbongu. When party sponsorship 
was sought, it was purely for whatever material or organisational 
support that could bring, not for any belief in what the party stood 
for. 
Campaign strategies and techniques 
The techniques and methods of campaigning available to each 
candidate contesting the Imbbongu Open seat can be divided into four 
categories: ( 1 )  radio (media);  (2) public rally (meeting); (3) 
organization and (4) community leaders. 
Radio Southern Highlands was used for three main purposes 
before and during the election. The first one was to campaign for a 
good and peaceful election. A candidate would ask everyone to play 
politics in a clean and honest way to avoid conflicts. Secondly, the 
station was used to inform the constituents of planned meetings and 
visits by candidates. A candidate would tell the people he was to 
meet of the date, time, place and the purpose of his visit. He would 
also tell them how he would be arriving, using helicopter etc., and 
who would be accompanying him. Thirdly, it was used by 
candidates to warn people about voting for candidates who would 
mislead them. 
A candidate could use 'meetings' or 'public rallies' to convey his 
message. These included mass meetings, community-based meetings 
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and other forms of small group gatherings. A large rally that was 
held in Mendi left one person dead and several others injured when 
it ended in chaos. The rally was organized so that all candidates 
could speak, debate issues and ask questions of one another. 
Each candidate resorted to a system of organization to conduct 
the campaign. This ranged from the highly sophisticated and 
specialized apparatus established by the major candidates, but 
particularly exemplified by the sitting MP, Anthony Temo, to small 
groups of friends and relatives who organized the campaign of the 
lesser candidates. 
Between the candidate and the large number of constituents is a 
significant tier of community leaders. These include the leaders of 
local churches, sports clubs, local government council and other 
associational groups which play an important role in shaping the 
political opinion of voters. Practically all candidates sought to 
recruit as many of these leaders as possible, especially in 
traditional villages where they literally hold the key to the 
collective preference of the community. Some candidates used these 
leaders to buy from people who had votes on the 'market' for cash or 
kind. The most successful ones were often 'tipped' with large 
amounts of cash or taken to Port Moresby on the government kumul 
aircraft. 
The factors that most likely influence or determine the choice of 
campaign strategy and techniques can be grouped into four main 
headings: (1 )  resources; (2) structure of the electorate; (3) expected 
sources of support, and (4) experience and personality of the 
candidate. All four are important for winning election, but I 
personally view resources as the most important one, particularly in 
relation to politics in the Highlands in general. 
Result of the election and analysis of candidates' performance 
Robert Posu Mindi received 2339 votes. His votes came from his 
traditional village surrounding Mendi town and a good number of 
votes from the workers in town. There were two factors which 
prevented him from scoring more than this. The first one is to do 
with boys from his village harassing workers in town. He lost some 
votes through this. Secondly, during the election period, he was 
living separately from his wife because of a domestic argument. His 
wife's relatives did not vote for him. These votes were given to 
either Anthony Temo or Albert Mombu who are related to Posu's 
wife. I believe that if Posu had had the resources and if the 
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problems I have just mentioned had been ironed out, he would have 
fared much better. 
Julius Piel Kera scored 2767 votes. During the campaign he was 
considered as one of the candidates likely to win the election. But 
when the votes were counted, he received votes from his area only 
and a few votes from elsewhere. His failure to secure more votes can 
be explained in two main ways: (i) he was not well known outside 
his own area, and (ii) there were four other candidates from his 
home area. Had he campaigned a year earlier, he would have fared 
better than this. He supported other candidates on the Mendi side to 
split Anthony Temu's votes, but Temu still managed to win the 
election by a big margin. 
Albert Nypini Mambu contested the seat mainly to assess his 
future chances and to oust the sitting M.P. by splitting his vote. He 
collected 1430 votes which are votes which would normally go to 
Anthony Terna. For a student he did very well. He did split Temo's 
votes, but not enough to see his downfall. He would have got more 
votes had he been serious about contesting and had he obtained the 
support of a major political party like Pangu or PDM. He did not go 
out and campaign in all parts of the electorate but concentrated 
mainly on Anthony Temu's strongholds. 
Anthony Temu had the resources, manpower and the support to 
easily win the election. His 6438 votes were much better than his 
previous winning margin. He won by 1000 votes in the previous 
election in which he ousted Glaime Warena. In this election, he won 
by 3060 votes from his old rival, Glaime Warena. He won because of 
these factors: (i) the dishing out of cash and kind through his 
campaign managers; (ii) development projects he has brought into 
the electorate and (iii) his campaign message that he was to hold 
the position of Deputy Prime Minister of the country. This third was 
probably the strongest factor, swinging support in his favour. 
Nevertheless, the other factors were also important. 
Glaime Warena came second overall with 3378 votes .  His 
performance was greatly affected by the other candidates from his 
home base who contested against him. If these four candidates had 
allowed him to contest unchallenged, he would have obtained 
enough votes to emerge as the winner. However, political 
differences among themselves made it impossible to give him that 
opportunity. The great bulk of his votes came from his own clansmen 
and other faithful supporters. From reliable sources he used K60,000 
to campaign in this election. 
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Dominic Melawe Kanea emerged as the weakest candidate, 
scoring only 75 votes. Due to lack of resources (money, vehicle, party 
support etc . )  he did not stage an effective campaign. His 75 votes 
came from his own clan and his wife's clan. 
Korowa Pokeya' s 1903 votes came from the Ialibu side of the 
electorate where he concentrated a great deal of his campaign. His 
failure to travel extensively within the electorate cost him votes . 
But he received votes from members of his church denomination. 
Even though a big figure in the electorate, he did not impress the 
voters sufficiently to get their votes. 
Robert Towa received 2850 votes . The great bulk of his votes 
came from his own area. He got some votes from workers of the Local 
Government Services in Mendi. He was not that familiar with 
voters on the Mendi side of the electorate. However, on his first 
time out, his votes represented nearly 14 per cent of the votes which 
is quite good. 
A total of 20,380 votes were cast for the Imbbongu seat in the 1992 
election. Forty eight per cent of the votes were received by the three 
candidates contesting from the Mendi side of the electorate. This 
includes the winning candidates' votes. Fifty two per cent went to 
the five candidates from the Ialibu side of the electorate. 
The implications 
Three broad overall implications can be derived from the results of 
the elections in the Imbbongu Electorate in 1992. First, clearly the 
candidate who won and those who came close to winning had the 
backing of large communities and also of organizations such as a 
party or a church group. Second, people did not vote on party basis. 
They continue to vote primarily for the candidate with whom they 
are associated traditionally. This implies that 'wantokism' and 
kinship are still strong in the minds of the constituents. But the 
support of secondary associations is required to gain support beyond 
the primordial group. Third, the ability to buy votes also made a 
difference. 
11 
Elections in Simbu: Towards Gunpoint 
Democracy? 
Bill Standish 
Introduction 
In 1992, just as in 1972, unsuccessful Simbu candidates told me they 
had talked all night about the best 'road to power' and were still 
seeking ways of mobilizing sufficient electoral support. The intense 
competitiveness of Simbu politics demands innovation whenever 
opportunity allows. The 1992 election saw all seven MPs defeated, 
so the winners, at least, were successful pathfinders and some were 
innovative. Recent elections in Chimbu (commonly named Simbu) 
Province reflect the intensification of political competition within 
Highlands society into conflict, and the decreasing administrative 
capacity of the state. After a five year gap since I observed the 1987 
national election, I spent six weeks in Simbu in May-July 1992, and 
subsequently four weeks in June-July 1993 and two weeks in March­
April 1995.1 
In contrast to my chapters on the 1972, 1977 and 1982 elections 
(Standish 1976, 1983, 1989), which focussed on political recruitment 
and voting patterns as part of a study of local-level politics, this 
I wish to express my thanks to those in Papua New Guinea who made this 
study possible: the Electoral Commissioner, Mr Reuben Kaiulo, MBE and 
his staff including Messrs Alwyn Jimmy and Henry Gull; Mr Pokware 
Kale, Director, Advisory Services, National Parliament; the Simbu 
Provincial Secretary, Mr Joe Bal and his Deputy, the Provincial Returning 
Officer, Mr Robert Matbob and their assistants; my host Mr Rudi de Jong; 
my fellow Bamugl villagers and the many candidates, officials and other 
Simbu friends who responded to my curiosity. In Canberra I thank my 
colleagues Professor Yaw Saffu, Mr Sinclair Dinnen, Dr Ron May, Ms 
Allison Ley, Mrs Bev Fraser and Ms Sue Andrews. 
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paper will identify issues of national significance in the changing 
politics of contemporary Simbu, and refer to similar observations of 
violence and predictions of increasing turbulence in the Western 
Highlands (Ketan 1995 and this volume; Strathern 1993; Reay 1987) . 
If replicated elsewhere these trends would threaten national 
democratic structures and indicate the political weakness of the 
state. The main findings of this paper-reduced administrative 
capability, the use of public funds for individual benefit, the low 
moral authority of the state and limited state control of the society, 
the intensification of local political competition into conflict, the 
large scale of electoral cheating and the use of force and 
intimidation by state and non-state actors in politics-will be seen to 
be inter-related, and reinforce each other. 
Campaigning in the 1990s continues a pattern of highly intense 
and localised campaigning, (by now) ritualised campaign feasts­
once again the main form of 'parties' in these elections-the free­
wheeling distribution of cash to buy support (or at least a hearing) 
from voters, and the large-scale use of state funds by political 
incumbents which first emerged in 1987.2 The crossover effects 
between provincial and national political arenas first seen in the 
1 980 provincial and 1 982 national elections (Standish 1 989) 
increased, this time with state resources from the provincial sphere 
used in the national-level electoral contest. 
The progressive decline in overall administrative capability 
and the loss of state control over Simbu society has been exploited by 
both candidates and their supporters, so that elections are now very 
turbulent events which disrupt other government activities in the 
province for months. In each election the problems of electoral 
administration under ever more unstable and tense conditions have 
increasingly tested the capacity of the available officers and the 
willingness of candidates and their supporters to exercise restraint 
and play by the rules. The state does not deeply penetrate and 
control clan society, and has been unable to prevent increasing 
intimidation of voters to make them follow the wishes of local 
candidates and their close supporters and scrutineers. It has not been 
able to prevent post-election retribution which contributes to the 
ongoing inter-group disputes expressed in clan warfare. Nor has it 
2 As explored by Hastings (1987), after I alerted him to the issue, and Brown 
( 1989) .  
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been able to prevent escalation in the scale of electoral malpractice 
each successive election. 
In both 1982 and 1987 the number of votes under Section 141 
(whereby people formally declare their eligibility to vote even if 
not on the roll; hence, a mechanism often thought to involve election 
fraud) had increased dramatically. In both 1987 and 1992 it was 
believed in Simbu political circles that multiple voting by many 
voters helped certain candidates win. In the one day poll initiated 
in 1992 there was no security presence at most polling booths. In the 
belief that this had made it possible for officials to be coerced into 
allowing double voting on a large scale, in the 1993 Simbu Provincial 
Assembly elections many candidates and their supporters 
intimidated officials into facilitating cheating on a truly massive 
scale. Both officials and winning candidates and their supporters 
admitted that armed intimidation of both voters and polling 
officials occurred across the entire province, and that the election 
results were corrupted. Post-election violence increased, and a 
number of the Simbu political elite in 1993 expressed concern at the 
increasingly violent expressions of these new forms of political 
conflict, and predicted they would lead to [civil] war. 
Cumulatively, this means it is no longer possible to describe 
elections in Simbu as free and fair. Electoral politics in Simbu are 
seen by Simbu observers and participants alike as likely to become 
even more violent. I have drawn attention to the security dimension 
of these trends elsewhere (Standish 1994). This chapter concludes 
by re-endorsing3 the argument of Simbu political players that not 
only does the lack of security and degree of electoral fr�md affect the 
viability of the electoral process but, ultimately, they reduce the 
legitimacy of state structures in the country as a whole, with serious 
implications for development and political stability. 
The political context 
Provincial and national politics have been interwoven in Simbu since 
Iambakey (later Sir Iambakey) Okuk was 'regional' (from 1975 
officially 'Provincial')  member. Okuk used his expertise and 
capacity as Deputy Prime Minister in 1980 to marshal the resources 
to bring together the first elected Simbu Provincial Government, 
headed by his fellow Kamanegu tribesman, Matthew Siune. In 
3 Department of Political and Administrative Studies (University of PNG) 
seminars, 22 July 1987 and 22 July 1992. 
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early 1981 the political instability surrounding Siune's government 
contributed to ethnic mobilisation and a series of killings in 
Kundiawa. This in turn provided impetus for a southern or 'bomai' 
bloc alliance to form behind John Nilkare, who defeated Okuk in 
the 1 982 election. Okuk, a culture hero throughout the PNG 
Highlands, subsequently won the Eastern Highlands seat of Unggai­
Bena and was Minister for Agriculture when he died of cancer in late 
1986. In 1984 Siune won another provincial election, again with 
Okuk's help, but in his role of Provincial Affairs Minister Nilkare 
initiated investigations which led to the Simbu government's 
suspension for maladministration and Siune' s imprisonment for 
misappropriation. The replacement premier, Peter Gull, was seen as 
being a protege of regional member John Nilkare. 
Okuk's former campaign manager, Peter Kuman, was from 1982 
MP for Kundiawa Open, and became Minister for Transport in 1985 
and thereby gained access to sectoral funds which he used during his 
successful 1987 campaign against Nilkare for the regional seat and to 
help the other five Open MPs, who-unusually-were all re-elected 
in 1987. It is widely believed that they succeeded because in the run­
up to the elections they collectively distributed over KO.Sm of Minor 
Roads funds obtained from Kuman, which had gone immediately 
into the hands of voters. In the 1988 provincial elections Gull was 
replaced as premier by a former provincial planner, David Mai, who 
had links to the Peoples Progress Party leader, Sir Julius Chan, the 
deputy leader of Paias Wingti's coalition. When a coalition headed 
by Pangu Pati's Rabbie Namaliu replaced Wingti in July 1988, 
Kuman in the Opposition lost access to all funding except the 
discretionary votes (Electoral Development Funds, EDF, known as 
'slush funds') shared by all MPs. 
Mid-1992 was a period of acute cash shortage in Simbu. The 
national government had lost almost 20 per cent of revenues with the 
forced closure of the giant Panguna Copper Mine in 1989 following 
sabotage and terrorist attacks by landowners. Then from 1990 with 
the attempted secession of Bougainville the country not only 
underwent a World Bank inspired minor structural adjustment 
program, with nominal 10 per cent cuts across the board in 
government outlays, but experienced a heavy fiscal drain in funding 
the military attempt to defeat the Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army. Provincial budgets were squeezed most by the cash flow 
crisis, while national government expenditure actually grew. Yet 
Premier Mai' s government spent about K2m per annum, starting in 
1990, on a 'free education policy' which meant that for parents of 
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community and high school students in Simbu there would be no fees, 
usually K20 or K250 per student. The revenue foregone was the 
equivalent of one third of the province's non-salary budget, and 
hence absorbed much of the government's annual operating and 
maintenance funds, and contributed to the almost total lack of 
activity in road maintenance and agriculture and the rapid decline 
in education and health services. 
Coffee is the principal cash earner in Simbu but roadside 
marketing had almost ceased in 1992. Prices were very low and 
production reduced slightly because of coffee rust disease. Incomes 
were very low and production down despite a substantial government 
subsidy to exporters, because two of the province's three factories in 
the 1 980s had closed after political interference and landowner 
discontent, while the trafficability of the feeder road network and 
even the Okuk Highway had declined because lack of maintenance 
and raskol banditry made carrying valuable cargoes a dangerous 
activity. In 1992, Simbu was definitely not awash with the coffee 
earnings which had funded large beer parties as a standard feature 
of the 1977 and 1 982 campaigns (Standish 1983 and 1989) .  But 
neither was this a return to the almost cashless campaign of 1972 
(Standish 1976), because in the two decades since then the country 
had become self-governing and many state resources and business 
opportunities had become available to politicians and public 
servants. 
The official electoral structures had also been changed for the 
1992 poll. The main change was the newly legislated requirement 
removing 'Section 141' votes and requiring people to get themselves 
on the electoral roll in order to vote. The second was the 
administrative decision made in March 1992 under the amended 
legislation to conduct a poll in one day, rather than the usual two to 
three weeks which in 1987 was thought to have contributed to large 
scale double-voting and other forms of cheating. Publicity material 
about the need to be on the roll arrived very late in 1991, just before 
the roll closed. Provincial administration staff were annoyed at the 
shortage of funds to update and then correct the roll, especially after 
the Electoral Commission (EC) charged the Chimbu electoral funds 
fifteen thousand Kina for EC pullovers which they did not order or 
want. The province had not held a detailed village census for over a 
decade. The update exercise was conducted in part by school leavers 
and other casual staff in their home areas, some of whom told me 
they had deliberately inflated the lists by including dead, underage 
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and absentee clan members, in order to expand their clan's vote. (I 
verified their claims in one subclan.) 
When the draft printouts were received back for checking in 
February 1992 many errors were found, and the provincial officials 
unsuccessfully sought the computer disks to correct the roll 
themselves . However, it was alleged that further fictional names 
were placed on the roll during this checking period. When the 
printed rolls appeared only a few days before the voting, more major 
errors were found, with whole clans in the wrong electorate and some 
groups duplicated. On some occasions duplicated sections were 
ripped out, and in others lists of certified voters were inserted into 
the rolls . Problems with the roll became grounds for a later 
(unsuccessful) petition against the Sinasina Open result, discussed 
below. 
Simbu had 186,000 residents in the 1990 census, but the initial 
total on the roll was 227,845. After checking and removing obvious 
duplication this was cut back to a final total of about 120,000 names.4 
In PNG the median age is 18, the same as the voting age, so in 1992 
there should have been only approximately 93,000 eligible voters 
resident in Simbu. Clearly the roll was unreliable, and all 
interested parties knew it, well before what had long promised to be 
a period of frenzied electoral competition. 
Candidates and alliances 
Once again Simbu had many candidates, 224 in all, with an average 
of thirty-four per Open seat in 1992, compared to 184 candidates in 
1987, an average of twenty-eight. The smallest Open field was 
Karimui-Nomane with twenty-one contestants and the largest (in 
the country) Sinasina-Yonggamugl, with forty-seven men and the 
province's sole woman candidate, Tamo Printa Engnui. The first to 
stand since 1982, she was brave, and received only seventeen votes. 
There were twenty-two candidates in the regional contest, a rise 
from sixteen in 1987. Clearly the new KlOOO nomination fee was no 
deterrent-rather, the payment of this fee became a matter for 
assertion by candid.ates' clan members and other supporters. Some 
rumoured candidates dropped out of the field once they realised who 
4 120 OOO figure, personal communication, Chimbu Provincial Returning 
Officer; 137 OOO figure calculated by adding Open electorate totals from 
Open Electoral Officers' mimeoed working documents. 
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their opponents were, and one withdrew after a severe assault, in 
order to prevent clan warfare erupting and probably causing deaths. 
The history and motives of each candidacy vary, with Simbu's 
best and brightest attracted to politics. As in previous elections, 
some were perennials, such as Yauwe Riyong who finally won the 
Chuave contest after first trying in 1972. Some clearly stood in order 
to gain the status of candidate and improve their renown, as noted 
for earlier elections (Standish 1976, 1983, 1989; Brown 1989) .  
University graduates, including engineers and accountants, stood in 
most electorates, and senior kiaps and two provincial police 
commanders also stood. Some candidates with prominence in 
business and the bureaucracy appeared unenthused about 
campaigning, stating that they had been persuaded to stand partly 
as a matter of pride for their clan and tribe, and, they hinted, to 
provide an initiatory feast of pigs and the basic beer party they said 
were expected of all candidates since Okuk' s big campaigns of 1977 
and 1982. Where they had connections with a local Open contestant, 
similar parties were frequently paid for in advance by regional 
candidates. Elections are times of redistributive consumption, rare 
times when the meek can consume at others' expense. 
As usual, rumours abounded that many candidates were dummies 
or splitters, set up by some candidates or their supporters to divide 
the vote of potentially strong candidates. Clearly there was little 
sense-except a spoiling role-for three candidates from Dirima 
village in Gumine standing. Two of these lived and campaigned 
yards apart from each other, although the third-a former 
university student who belonged to a different clan-had .done his 
sums with census figures and was sure he had the numbers to win. He 
got his clan's base vote, but no more, and they all lost. Although 
most candidates appeared genuinely to believe they stood a good 
chance, clearly in some cases their candidacy was part of a local 
popularity contest, sometimes testing the water for provincial 
assembly elections due within a year. 
Inter-group collaboration also occurs. Fragile election deals are 
made in the years before each election between older leaders of 
neighbouring clans and tribes, depending on the strength of their 
known possible candidates. One aim is to alternate parliamentary 
representation between groups. These alliances, some of which date 
back 15 years, are based on common opposition to third parties or the 
rest of the electorate and their hopes of sharing the spoils of 
development funds if successful. However they are often broken 
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when a new young candidate emerges late in the day and refuses to 
defer his plans simply because of an agreement made without his 
p articipation. The ambitions of younger individuals and 
unpredictable inter-group rivalries, as well as any deliberate vote­
splitting by dummies set up by outsiders, thus all undermine such 
schemes, which unintentionally serve to increase the likelihood of 
bitter recriminations when-inevitably-all candidates lose bar 
one. 
The most noteworthy candidates in the regional contest were 
known by the parts of their name emphasized here: 
• Peter Kuman Kakep, aged 38, from Papanigl area near the 
Kundiawa /Kerowagi border, was sitting member; his self­
adopted last name means the 'spokesman' .  In early 1992 he was 
married to the daughter of a provincial politician from the 
Kamanegu tribe, Matthew Siune, then standing for Kundiawa 
Open. As a police riot squad officer before the 1982 election, 
Kuman was feared for his reputed toughness. He was campaign 
manager for Okuk in 1982 and had been a minister from 1 985 until 
the 1988 change of government. Previously a member of Paias 
Wingti's People's Democratic Movement (PDM), in 1 992 Kuman 
campaigned as leader of the Country Party, saying he had the 
blessing of Sinake Giregire, well-known former Daulo MP and 
Country Party founder, and claimed he would form a government 
and become prime minister; 
• David Coro Mai, aged about 40, from East Elimbari in Chuave, 
the Premier of the Simbu Provincial Government and previously 
provincial planner with training in Canberra. While Premier, 
he-along with other cabinet ministers and politicians­
obtained many tens of thousand Kina through the provincial 
Agricultural Guarantee Scheme to establish a large coffee 
plantation near his village. As well as 'free education' he also 
made sure a new high school was started in his home area; 
• John Bola Endemongo Kua, in his late twenties, Deputy Premier 
and son of Endemongo, a former luluai of Endugwa (No 3) tribe of 
Kup subdistrict. As the main critic of the provincial government, 
John Bola was the effective leader of the opposition in the 
province, and made explicit allegations of corruption against the 
Premier and a senior official, while he was himself on bail for 
corruption charges during the campaign. He was thought likely 
to appeal to younger voters because of his fearless opposition to 
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police rough-house tactics . His blunt personal style was 
reminiscent of Okuk, and his single campaign slogan was "For 
Leadership" .  While supporting the free education policy he 
acknowledged that he only stood at the last moment because 
David Mai refused to step aside from the Premiership during the 
campaign, which would have made John Bola acting premier. 
(A number of senior public servants had raised the idea with the 
Provincial Secretary that the Premier should stand down for the 
duration of the campaign, and the Premier reportedly rejected 
this suggestion.) Bola agreed with me that by standing he would 
take votes from Kuman, whose clan's fighters in 1990 had killed 
between a dozen and twenty of Bola's Endugwa No 3 tribes' 
warriors and allies with a high-powered rifle during clan 
warfare; 
• Sir Joseph Nombri, aged 51 ,  a Kamanegu tribesman who was 
married to Siune's paternal uncle's daughter. (Siune supported 
his son-in-law, Kuman, at the poll, but his clanspeople mostly 
voted for their fellow Kamanegu. )  Nombri had recently 
returned after 1 1  years as PNG Ambassador to Japan, a position 
he had used to obtain a fire truck for Kundiawa and also funding 
for a new K8m provincial hospital, which government officials 
had wanted for 20 years. Unfortunately for Nombri, construction 
of this new complex did not start during the campaign period. 
Nombri said the hospital was "My campaign in a nutshell", and 
myths abounded, with one old luluai, Kuatinenem, saying 
patients in the new haus sik would be diagnosed and treated by 
computers, with no need for doctors . (Sadly, when it was 
finished, doctors were indeed in short supply.)  'Sir Nombri' was 
the first highlander k i a p  (patrol officer) and district 
commissioner, and had been a Public Service Commissioner. He 
was a member of the mid 1960s Bully Beef (political) Club and a 
founding chairman in 1967 of the Pangu Pati (Kiki 1968: 149, 
158), unusually for a highlander in the 1960s, advocating rapid 
progress to Home Rule . He remained close to Sir Michael 
Somare, who in early 1992 clearly wished to recycle himself as 
Pangu leader. Officially, in 1 992 Nombri was an independent 
candidate; his supporters proclaimed him to be a possible prime 
minister; 
• Peter Kamis Miugle Koglkia, aged 34, an economist from Upper 
Chimbu, had also been provincial planner. Until recently Kamis 
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was director of the South Simbu Rural Development Project, a 
KSm AIDAB-International Bank for Agricultural Development 
funded four-year attempt to improve development in southern 
areas, with agricultural research and advice, vegetable 
marketing, new schools, roads, literacy training and women's 
programs. Although the project was regarded as only a mixed 
success, with its successful marketing side dependent largely on 
American Peace Corps workers, people were grateful to Kamis 
and he hoped to convert this into a huge block of votes in the 
southern area; 
• Yalwai Boniwan, aged 45, had been a welfare worker in Simbu 
for over two decades and most recently Provincial Youth Officer. 
Born on Manus Island, but with a Simbu wife from near Peter 
Kuman's village, Boniwan was the first non-Simbu to stand for 
the regional seat after Independence; 
• Palma Embia, aged 33, a coffee buyer from Kerowagi District, 
was expected to poll well with support from his fellow Seventh 
Day Adventist church people; 
• Fr Louis Ambane, aged 49 from Goglme in the Upper Simbu 
Valley, was the second Simbu priest to stand, following the 1972 
and 1 987 candidacies of Sir Ignatius Kilage (later Govemor­
General) . Fr Louis had served in several Simbu parishes, was a 
Chaplain to the police and was concerned about issues of 
political morality and corruption; 
• Aribill G onapa, aged 32, a senior kiap from Iabakogl area in 
Sinasina, had stood in 1987 and this time was endorsed by the 
People's Solidarity Party, and had very strong support from 
Nimai tribe and the large Koge Village; 
• Dr Errol Sipa, from Gumine in south Simbu, was Provincial 
Medical Officer and reportedly was provoked into standing by a 
rash comment from Peter Kuman to the effect that Kundiawa 
was filled with Gumine people who had no right to live and 
work there; 
• John Numi (Nime), aged 39, was a Port Moresby-based 
businessman from Yonggamugl who had held the Sinasina­
Yonggamugl seat since 1982, but apparently chose to stand for the 
regional seat to maximise his chances of re-election; 
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• Kerenga Andambo Rabisman, a villager from Yonggamugl aged 
40, was the most widely publicised candidate because his name 
means, literally, 'rubbish man', a Tokpisin expression for person 
with low status and low energy, with few possessions and 
usually no wife. His name made the newspapers and Rabisman 
was seen as a joker in Simbu with rumours that he dreamt the 
dwarves would vote for him, but for a time he campaigned 
publicly in Kundiawa, and it was widely alleged his nomination 
and fee were organised by a Kamanegu political family in order 
to block Nombri. 
Some of the most important Open electorate contests and candidates 
were those in: 
• Chuave with sitting member Brown Sinamoi (Minister for 
Telecommunications, businessman and former Speaker) 
challenged by Yauwe Riyong, about 43, a high school teacher 
from Lofaifo in Nambaiyufa, and twenty-two others including 
the first naturalised citizen to stand in Simbu, a former 
agriculturalist, Robin Benson, who walked the entire electorate 
but ultimately received only 274 votes; 
• Kundiawa, with an unusual candidate in Joseph Bare Onguglo, 
33, radical nationalist, Australian and UPNG educated. This 
Port Moresby-based businessman and founding leader of the 
Black Action Party (BAP, sometimes Blacks Action Party), comes 
from Bongugl in the Upper Chimbu, the only candidate in the 
densely populated Womatne area, and was challenging Open 
MP, Wagi Merimba, from even further up the Chimbu; 
• Gumine where John Mua Nilkare, about 44, campaigned from his 
Omkolai birthplace, although he is now a Goroka-based 
successful businessman-cum-pig farmer-cum-political consultant. 
A former Chimbu regional MP and Minister for Provincial 
Affairs ( 1982-85), he challenged sitting member Bill Ginbol 
Ninkama, son of a former MP, Ninkama Bomai. A businessman­
coffee planter, former agriculture teacher and minister (1985-88),  
Ninkama had a base vote from his mother's Kaukau village just 
next to Nilkare' s Omkolai; 
• Kerowagi, where the sitting member, Jim Yer Waim, a former 
school teacher, nationalist youth activist and Pangu Pati 
Minister for the Environment, was unable to move openly out of 
his Gena tribe's heartland because of a resurgence of decades-
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long fighting with the Siku clan (Standish 1973) and was visibly 
quite demoralised by public hostility which followed his rough 
electioneering in 1987; 
• Sinasina-Yonggamugl, always a fragmented electorate (Kuabaal 
1976), where forty-eight candidates were standing, perhaps one 
reason the sitting member since 1982, John Numi, transferred to 
the regional contest. Among the strongest candidates would be a 
former provincial police commander, Ben Okoro, 42, from the 
large Dumun village, and Ludger Mond, 35, from Mai in 
Yonggamugl, a Catholic church worker who had been supported 
by Fr John Momis of Melanesian Alliance; and 
• Karimu-Nomane, where two members of the Provincial 
Government, Philip Biriwae Yomo and Seberai Domu were 
standing against sitting MP Paul Powa Sisioka. All three came 
from the thinly populated southern sector of this divided 
electorate, which usually succeeded in providing the MP because 
their vote was concentrated, rather than split excessively. 
Parties 
The Simbu elections were not primarily contests between political 
parties. Five sitting Open members were listed as independents on 
the ballot papers, although some, like Ninkama, received help 
from one or two and were grateful not to have their opponents 
endorsed. In all, thirty eight candidates (or seventeen per cent) had 
party endorsement on the ballot, one per cent fewer than in 1987. By 
the time the results were printed the Electoral Commission reported 
53 party candidacies, including many new names but with some 
earlier party nominees now independent or linked to different 
parties .  Apart from possible latecomers and confusion among 
officials at either end, the cause may have been changed loyalties 
once the nomination period was over with the richer and better 
organised parties gaining new followers. 
The three parties with local leaders were the most visible in 
Simbu. The Country Party appeared most active with twenty 
candidates in Open seats, thereby enabling Peter Kuman to have 
many local campaign meetings and show his photo as party leader 
on all ballot papers, with five extra endorsees by the time of the 
count. The League for National Advancement (LNA), nominally led 
by Karl Stack from West Sepik but with John Nilkare as Chairman, 
had seven nominees, some announced as late as early June. One, 
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Yauwe Riyong, had stood with LNA in 1987. Nilkare sought an 
alliance with Yalwai Boniwan, who was thought to be popular in 
the Gumine area, but there was never a close relationship with 
Boniwan, whose main campaign was against rich politicians, and he 
criticised those who campaigned by helicopter (which Nilkare had 
done in 1987). The Black Action Party, led by Onguglo, endorsed two 
others and campaigned strongly with rallies where it had effective 
local campaign organizers. 
The major parties of the late 1970s had almost disappeared in 
Simbu, the National Party after Okuk's 1982 regional defeat and 
1986 death, and Pangu after the splits in 1985 and 1986, when PDM 
then LNA separated. In 1992 Pangu suffered from the disadvantage 
of incumbency, which made it the target of all political aspirants. 
There was a perception, widespread among Simbu elite members, 
that Namaliu, with his consultative and consensual style, was 
indecisive as national leader. Pangu only claimed four adherents on 
the ballot papers, including Jimmy Yer, and was damaged by the 
rivalry between Namaliu and Somare, neither of whom was 
remembered as having visited during 1992. Simbu's most prominent 
Pangu supporter, Nombri, was not even officially endorsed on the 
ballot paper, yet was criticised for failing to campaign with or 
assist other Pangu candidates. PDM leader Wingti apparently did 
not campaign in Simbu-he had been asked to stay away in 1987-
and only endorsed three candidates, although PDM claimed four 
including Premier Mai. Sir Julius Chan briefly visited the province 
before the campaign, without endorsing Mai and, with his Peoples 
Progress Party (PPP) never having had a strong team in Simbu, 
endorsed only one candidate. The National Party, Okuk's campaign 
vehicle which once dominated Simbu but split since 1987, only 
endorsed two. The Papuan-based People's Action Party had four 
endorsements, the Liberals eight, and the People's Solidarity Party 
and the Melanesian Alliance two each. Most parties appeared even 
more unfinancial and disorganised than in 1987, after a high point in 
1982. With the minor exceptions of the LNA under Nilkare, the 
Country Party and the BAP, party campaigning was insignificant in 
Simbu and had ceased by June. Gone were the head-to-head 
National-Pangu party contests of 1977 and 1982. 
Issues and Ideologies 
The Simbu campaigns, in as much as they are about policy issues 
rather than prestige for the candidates and their groups, centred on 
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development issues, with the common claim that there had been 
stagnation with no development in the 17 years since Independence. 
In broad terms this is true, with several major businesses and mission 
stations closed, but trunk roads have been improved and three new 
high schools built. Locating the causes and a way out of this 
developmental paralysis was less obvious . The decline of 
government services was obvious, and the provincial government's 
'free education policy'  was blamed by both electors and candidates 
with whom I talked. Other causes such as the national fiscal crisis 
caused by the Bougainville revolt were not mentioned. 
Campaigning was not meant to be easy, not even for an old hand 
like John Nilkare, coming back into politics after five years in 
business. On the policy level he was unable either at a large rally or 
in private conversation to clarify his party's Village Services 
scheme, although he emphasised it would bring older leaders back 
into prominence. He ran an expensive campaign, which climaxed 
with a huge party rally at Omkolai's former airstrip, at which he 
danced in traditional dress and distributed many cooked pigs, made 
speeches and organized a leaflet drop by aircraft. On Australian 
ABC Television he said this was a traditional event, and the 
recipients of his hospitality swore they would vote for him (ABC 
TV 1 992) . Nilkare told me he found campaigning for an Open seat, 
with the need to initiate and activate alliances and mobilize votes 
at the local clan level, with many feasts and exchanges, to be much 
harder than campaigning for the regional seat, which he had done 
three times previously. Nilkare was fortunate his funding came 
from his own sources, rather than public funding, and although he 
was criticised for alleged big spending he was not accused of 
misappropriating state funds, charges faced by all incumbent 
politicians.  
Five ministers of the Namaliu government had faced 
Leadership Tribunal charges for misappropriation, which enabled 
Wingti and Opposition candidates generally to focus on 'bribery and 
corruption' (Pos t-Courier, 2 April 1992:33), Eight other MPs were 
charged. Namaliu proposed an Anti-Corruption Authority to weed 
out the problem (The Times of Papua New Guinea, 21 May 1992:32). 
'Corruption' was the most commonly heard and most nationally 
relevant campaign issue in the Simbu campaigns, and 'Honesty' the 
common pledge. The usual explicit focus was on the wastage 
involved in the uncontrolled use of slush funds by MPs and provincial 
assemblymen, a perceived waste of resources which particularly 
Elections in Simbu: Towards Gunpoint Democracy? 2 9 1  
annoyed public servants and police-some o f  whom were provoked 
into standing by the EDF. These funds were not insignificant in 
Simbu, totalling millions of kina over a few years. 
As an example, the Opposition frontbencher, Bill Ninkama of 
Gumine, agreed that in early 1 992 he had K200,000 available, 
comprising EDF (Kl00,000), Local Government Commissioner's Tied 
Grants (paid via the province), Education and Health subsidies.  
His liberal use of funds was brought to the attention of officials 
during the campaign. His comment was: 'The sitting members have 
the resources for the election. That's the system. It's not my wrong. 
It's the system. They may change it. Politics is very different now 
from in the 1970s ' .  He told me by the end of the election he had 
Kl2,000 unspent. His support had been targeted to local leaders, if 
after watching them he judged them suitable. He said Nilkare, an 
absentee 'without a permanent materials house at Omkolai', had 
thrown Kl00,000 around and killed many pigs, whereas he had 
killed none. 'You have to be smart, the thing to do is to know the 
electorate and target where you'll get support ' (Interview, 24 June 
1992). 
On ABC TV Ninkama smiled while saying he had many friends 
from 'dubious dealings'. He denied he gave money for votes, but said 
he helped people with 'buying people's wives, having friends, 
having a few drinks, typical of Melanesians anyway. '  He was 
running on an anti-corruption platform, but when asked about his own 
activities, said : 'But that is to the smaller side . I'm talking about 
white collar corruption that is more destructive, more unpleasant' 
(ABC TV 1992) . This public acceptance of money as part of the 
political game in PNG annoyed other Simbu political figures who 
saw the interview and were concerned that Australia would cut aid 
to PNG as a result of such frankness. At the same time, most MPs 
argued that-given the implementation capacity in government­
the EDF was the only way to get development to the people, and 
clearly many candidates were intending to gain control of such funds 
themselves. It was not until 1995 that Sir Mekere Morauta, a former 
Finance Secretary, pointed out that MPs are not project managers. 
Yet while the corruption issue damaged sitting MPs it did not 
differentiate non-MPs candidates from each other. Something 
similar had occurred with the 'Grassroots' slogan of the 1 987 
election, the appeal to the little people against the prosperous and 
powerful. These are useful slogans for candidates without the funds 
for a splashy campaign, but they do not help political aspirants to 
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prove they can deliver the goods in the form of the desired projects, 
cash or jobs, if or when they achieve office. 
The most controversial interpretation of Papua New Guinea's 
underdevelopment was voiced by Onguglo, BAP leader, who 
demanded 'economic independence' (Pos t-Courier, 6 September 
1991 :44-45) and in Simbu reportedly blamed foreigners for the lack of 
employment. I did not meet Onguglo during the campaign. His 
election poster was written in Kuman, the electorate's sole language, 
using symbolism. It said he was a true leader for the men's house, 
and would divide the resources (scale the pig) for every men's house. 
It was translated to me as saying that foreign business is taking the 
wealth ( 'gris') from the country. The poster spoke about changing 
from strong sweet potato as food, but argued against addiction to 
expensive and highly taxed imported rice and tinned fish. It 
pledged a modern lifestyle (We will not have wooden houses and 
sleep with the fleas) and tin roofs [which would collect clean 
water],  and roads so women never had to carry bilums. Under 
Onguglo the government would provide cash for people's pockets to 
help them with businesses to be run by local people. Onguglo 
reportedly argued also for education for all to Year 12, and for a good 
hospital. His policies implied a dramatic transformation of society 
and rewriting of the constitution, which was taken by educated 
Simbu as implying revolutionary change. 
Some Onguglo rallies were turbulent events and Peoples Action 
Party leader Akoka Doi was chased away from one near Minggende 
Catholic mission complex. Aspects of the BAP campaign and this 
reaction were reminiscent of the Okuk campaign in 1972. Like Jimmy 
Yer in 1987, Onguglo argued as a central plank that expatriates­
without distinguishing between their role or expertise-should be 
expelled, and like Yer at that time some of his supporters advocated 
'revolution', without explaining this term, which is now used often 
by some radical Simbu activists.5 Although there was considerable 
resentment in Simbu at the influx of Taiwanese and Korean 
businessmen into Kundiawa, some of whom allegedly had paid 
kickbacks to provincial leaders over contracts and were funding some 
electioneering, there was still a perceived need for expatriate 
5 James Yer Waim in the 1987 Kerowagi campaign advocated the deportation 
of some expatriates and for the first time brought the word 'revolution' into 
Simbu political debate. ( In his Post-Courier advertisement, Onguglo was 
more cautious, saying 'check and revoke naturalised citizens' . )  
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expertise in government and mission services. Onguglo was virtually 
the only candidate in Kundiawa Open to campaign outside his home 
area. Villagers said that Onguglo's policies and promises appealed 
to disaffected youth. His perceived anti-expatriate attitudes caused 
anger among some middle-aged people in the Mindima area, which 
led to verbal brawling, and ultimately very few votes. 
Interestingly, a strong supporter of the BAP near Minggende gave 
what was essentially a dependency analysis of PNG's political 
economy, saying that foreign business dominated all PNG 
governments. He argued that all mines and all land should be state­
owned, and factories should be established to create employment. A 
revolution was needed, and if the security forces resisted, he said, 
they would be defeated by popular uprising, as the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army had demonstrated . Onguglo himself was 
popular for helping highlanders in Morata settlement, Port 
Moresby, where he had run a store, and-apart from his focus on 
expatriates-his overall analysis was endorsed by the Melanesian 
Solidarity Movement (Melsol) spokesman Powes Parkop (Personal 
communication, September 1992) . 
Campaigning 
After the nomination frenzy in 1992, there were no major campaign 
rallies in Kundiawa, although most district centres had market 
places where there was some public campaigning by locals who felt 
on safe territory. The regional candidates lodged their nominations 
in Kundiawa township, which has always had a neutral status as a 
government town. As in Mendi in the Southern Highlands,· boasting 
crowds accompanied candidates on these occasions, leading to minor 
disturbances. In the 1970s, candidates could campaign fairly freely 
in the town, despite some near riots in 1977 (Standish 1983) . In the 
1980s campaigning in town was less frequent, and loudhailers were 
frowned upon by public servants and magistrates. It also annoyed 
members of the Kamanegu tribe after they asserted traditional 
claims to ownership of the town land in 1986 by burying Sir 
Iambakey Okuk in the town centre. 
At the end of May 1 992 Aribill Gonapa from Sinasina 
campaigned in Kundiawa, pledging social security payments, 
whereupon Sir Joseph Nombri, a Kamanegu, mocked this as 
unrealistic and unfundable. Premier Mai then used the loudspeaker 
on Aribill' s car to support him, and on some reports was winning the 
argument when angry Kamanegu youth stoned Aribill's windscreen. 
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Over the next hour a riot broke out which led to the stoning of the 
South Pacific Bank, among other buildings. One observer claimed 
the police deliberately let the situation get out of control for an 
hour, in order to have a case to increase police powers. The 
following week the entire province was declared a Tribal Fighting 
Zone till late August, a step long under consideration (Post-Courier, 
10 June 1992: 12) .  The first measure taken was to forbid any 
campaigning within the town boundaries. Apart from one candidate, 
a kiap who persisted with campaigning near the town's western 
boundary, Kundiawa became almost a campaign-free zone and the 
election moved out into the villages and districts, where it 
remained. 
In Simbu society the clans of around a thousand people and tribes 
up to five thousand are large enough in themselves to influence the 
outcome of elections. These groups have been competitive rivals and 
enemies for centuries .  Although elections are contests between 
individuals in wide new arenas set up by the state, all Simbu 
candidates are members of clans and tribes which as corporate groups 
themselves bring their existing identities and oppositions into the 
new electoral arenas set up by the state. In the first instance 
candidates must try to ensure as a base vote the support of their clan, 
and preferably tribe, but because the other candidates have similar 
clan bases they must then try to gain additional votes outside this 
traditional base. Having made this investment, candidates and 
their supporters resent outsider candidates entering 'their' territory. 
Nowadays outsiders are often chased away, with force, if 
necessary. Usually a quick stone through a car windscreen is an 
effective deterrent, and this happened to Okuk in 1977 and to Bill 
Ninkama early in the 1992 campaign. Nombri was pelted with mud 
when attempting to campaign at Kerowagi market on 11 May, and 
when his convoy of vehicles left stones were thrown at Nombri's car, 
injuring him. A fortnight later, soon after the Kundiawa riot, 
Nombri's vehicle was stoned again when parked at Koge village in 
Sinasina, an Aribill stronghold. The following week some police 
and soldiers came to extract payment of compensation for Nombri, 
and burnt seven houses at Koge and killed and took a number of pigs 
and cassowaries. The police commander justified his men's action, 
saying that to ensure a free election candidates had a right to speak 
anywhere, whereas Koge villagers standing in the ashes of their 
houses complained about the violation of their basic human rights. 
Thereafter most campaigning was very quiet, concentrating almost 
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solely on villages and men's houses at  night, or safe, set-piece rallies 
organised by local supporters within their home territories . It 
became doubtful whether effective democratic competition for votes 
was any longer possible. 
Yet voters have some discretion, too, and are able to bargain. 
Candidates reliably reported demands for payments of around KlOOO 
in order to get a hearing. Some wealthier candidates, including MPs, 
gave out many 'Michael Somares ' (KSO notes) in the campaign. 
There appears to be a distinction made between brazen campaign 
generosity, which can be acceptable, and covert payments made to 
gain influence, which are seen as shady . Often these latter 
payments were made at night, as candidates sought to win support 
outside their base area. An LNA organiser, the late Leo Kuabaal, 
was angry that preparations for a funeral at Emai were interrupted 
at night by outsiders seeking to dish out K800 to get votes, and said 
he chased them away. Some potential candidates sought money 
from sitting MPs as a payment not to stand and split the vote, and 
allegations had been made as early as 1982 that rich candidates 
offered large sums to divide their rivals home bases. Once again in 
1992, brokers sought to trade blocks of votes for sums of money or 
valued food items. In 1987 I had seen handwritten notes offering 
blocks of votes in exchange for rice and tinned fish, and in 1992 Bill 
Ninkama claimed he had a folder of such notes 'as thick as a 
Concise Oxford Dictionary' .  The validity of such deals must always 
be suspect, especially if a group has its own candidates. Just as in 
1 982 with Okuk's famous 96,000 bottle beer party at Kundiawa 
airstrip, candidates like the kiap Otto Olmi in Gumine said his 
Dirima village supporters would accept their share of rival 
candidate John Nilkare's  250 pigs at Omkolai airstrip, but he was 
confident that he would still get their votes. 
In March 1992 as in 1987, candidates gave parties (with 100 
cartons of beer worth K2,600 the normal campaign starter) for their 
own clans to ensure their support. From April there was a ban on 
liquor sales in Simbu, which quietened the campaign and no doubt 
saved money for most candidates, while it helped those individuals 
running black markets and those richer candidates prepared to pay 
double (KSO) a carton for beer. Even the smallest campaign these 
days costs about K20,000, with candidates paying for pigs, and 
supplying store food. Wholesale stores thrived during the run-up to 
the poll with sales of rice and tinned fish and freezer meat. Bill 
Ninkama, for instance, bought 29 cartons of frozen beef brisket worth 
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Kl,400 just days before the election. He told me he did not give out 
money, but rather food. 
A businessman and Open campaign manager told me that giving 
out cash was not a binding means of campaigning, whereas food was 
most effective but had to be given out the day before polling so 
people were still satisfied. Yet I am not fully convinced that in 
Simbu votes are actually bought, or in Andrew Strathern's word 
'commoditized', although there are strong reports of candidates 
attempting that for Mount Hagen society (Post-Courier, 30 December 
1994:2; Ketan 1995) .  The time when money is most effective, I would 
argue, is in bribing an individual not to stand (which was done quite 
cheaply, with beer, as early as 1 972 in Chuave) or in funding 
splitters and spoilers. But to obtain a mass vote, money is never 
enough, and there is never enough money. In 1987 a Simbu MP 
allegedly cashed an EDF cheque for K35,000 into KS notes, which he 
gave out just before the poll-and lost, with each vote costing K20 
plus foodstuffs and beer. Okuk spent about K250,000 plus on his 
Sirnbu campaign in 1982, and discovered a gift to one group always 
antagonizes others. 
It is my understanding that outside the clan, 'vote buying' in 
Simbu is still regarded as somewhat improper and is attempted 
secretively, or else through agents-who may not actually disperse 
the funds but keep them. While money is needed even to consolidate 
the base vote for a member of his clan or tribe, without insuring total 
support, there is no guarantee money will work outside a candidate's 
home area. Candidates clearly need to spend money, even to gain an 
audience, but that does not guarantee them votes. Campaigning is, 
as they say, a gamble. The best funded people are likely to be recent 
returnees who have made their fortunes elsewhere in the country, 
yet they may not have the local knowledge or contacts to link up 
with the most effective campaign assistants. In campaigning beyond 
the home base, policies and personality and a well-known personal 
record of service can count, as was demonstrated by Onguglo in 
Kundiawa and some regional candidates. In the regional contest, a 
demonstrated ability with government funded pork-barrel can be 
very effective, if not essential, but (except in Kuman's crude use of 
roads funds in the 1987 campaign) this is not just a matter of 
spreading cash around. 
Four provincial members stood, two against each other for the 
regional seat and Karimui-Nomane, and two were ultimately 
successful. They had evidently retained the support used to win 
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their Provincial Assembly seats, and were not at  all disadvantaged 
by the patronage and discretionary funds available in their 
provincial posts. Other provincial linkages were shown in the way 
campaign assistants to MPs are frequently men who have aspirations 
for future provincial candidacy, and use the campaigns (and their 
chance to distribute other people's largesse) as a means to develop 
political credit which hopefully could be called upon in later 
elections such as the planned 1993 provincial assembly poll. 
Pork-barrel and patronage were the main forms of actually 
demonstrating political capacity. The leading regional candidate, 
David Mai, freely agreed with me that his campaign was based on 
the 'free education' policy, later adopted by Wingti's PDM, but 
already implemented by Mai's government. At Karawiri in his 
home area, Mai had built a new high school from provincial 
resources, for which national government funding was now being 
sought. Although he visited most areas of the province Mai is not an 
orator; apart from possible links with provincial assemblymen he 
had no obvious political machine and his campaign was clearly 
based on his skills in pork-barrelling. Some instructions to issue 
funds-including a KlOOO ex-gratia payment to the relatives of the 
late Asuwe Kawage, a former MPA and Siambugla clan leader­
clearly annoyed public servants, as had occurred in 1987. In 1992 
some district officials refused to distribute government funds, so this 
was done by the Premier's own staff. 
Mai' s principal rival seemed to be the former welfare and youth 
worker, Yalwai Boniwan, who had walked about the province for 
months, sometimes barefooted, with a friendly low-key approach 
particularly appealing to women, I was told. He criticised 
established politicians for their helicopters, wealth and waste, and 
spoke of the need for development for youth, a reminder that he had 
distributed funds-reputedly hundreds of thousands of kina over the 
years-to help local youth groups, and that he would be their kago 
boi (servant) and, unlike other politicians, would return once elected. 
It was not surprising, then, that when Premier Mai heard of 
Yalwai's campaign he reportedly diverted KS0,000 of provincial 
funds late in the campaign and sent out KS0,000 of cheques to youth 
groups-some to people who had not even lodged a proposal. 
Another strong rival was Kuman, who campaigned as an 
archetypal, macho Highlands man. At ridgetop rally at Onguma in 
Yonggamugl he claimed to dominate another Simbu MP, 'a little 
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baby' .  After July 4, when in power, other leaders would see his 
tomahawk, he said. 
While I was national Minister for Works I created a 
record, I broke the law and brought K3.2 million6 into 
Simbu, and the Simbu people consumed it. Yes ! The 
people of Simbu and I were very happy. And I will do it 
again, this time!7 
The crowd whooped with delight. Having blamed Pangu for uniting 
the country with a culture of thievery (stil pasin), Kuman pledged to 
send the thieves and corruptors in all levels of government to court. 
Much of his abuse of Namaliu, Wingti and his rivals Mai and Bola 
was unprintable. As might be expected of a Country Party leader, he 
promised when in government to improve rural roads and bridges and 
bring services back under the national government, to sack the Simbu 
Provincial Government, remove duties on agricultural imports, and to 
lower prices for electricity to help local business create jobs and to 
help public servants. He blamed the 'fakin Pangu Pati '  for only 
subsidizing coastal crops like copra and cocoa and promised a K2 per 
kilo subsidy for coffee, across the board, regardless of price, to be 
funded by gold and oil revenues, including the Lihir project [still 
years away] and Bougainville [still closed] . A woman in the crowd 
of 200 gently commented 'Ohooo ! What a good government ! '  
Despite the verbal aggression, it was a fun occasion for the audience 
(field notes and tape, 8 June 1992).  
In 1992 the main form of discretionary funds available to MPs 
were the EDF. These funds became something of a liability for MPs. 
It is impossible to satisfy an electorate with this kind of funding, 
although Nilkare as regional MP for 1982-87 did well by organising 
the purchase of ambulances which carried his name as donor. Wagi 
Merimba, Kundiawa MP, had passed all his EDF funds on to the 
provincial authorities to spend, which gained him little credit, and 
he was blamed in southern parts of his electorate for having done 
6 The amount spent in Simbu was estimated by officials at the time as about 
K0.65m., with about half of that amount transferred to Open MPs. 
Hastings (1987) said $A0.423rn (K0.3m) went to Kuman himself. 
7 In Tokpisin: 'Taim mi stap olosem Minista bilong Woks insaid long Papua 
New Guinea mi karim, mi brukim recod, mi brukim lo, karim 3.2 million kina 
ikam insaid long Simbu . Pipol bilong Simbu ol i kaikai .  Yes! Pipol bilong 
Simbu na mi i hamamas. Nau bai mi wokim gen !' (Tape) . 
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nothing. The province, in fact, lacked the planning and 
administrative capacity to use such funds on complex new projects, 
but needed the funds for maintenance. Other MPs were accused of 
only helping their own group or family with these funds, and I 
heard no MP take credit for any specific project. Chuave MP Brown 
Sinamoi was Minister for Telecommunications, and as such had a 
discretionary role to play in the allocation of multi million kina 
upgrade contracts to Asian bidders, but he had no funds to attempt 
the kind of discretionary role initiated by Kuman in the lead-up to 
the 1987 poll. Sinamoi ran a solitary campaign as an independent 
(with a campaign vehicle proclaiming that he, too, would be PM) .  
After an unfortunate campaign vehicle accident which killed one 
man and seriously injured another he was under acute pressure for 
K40,000 compensation in the days before the poll. (He told me he 
settled for Kl0,000 and numerous pigs.) 
Two campaign techniques were new to me in 1992. The first was 
the use of a small printed business card with the candidate's 
photograph, handed over quite ceremonially, which in some remoter 
areas was held by voters as a kind of talisman, a pledge of 
commitment which seemed to oblige the holder by some magic power 
to vote for the person pictured. The second was a more directly 
physical form of campaigning. A week before the poll, while 
driving southeast from Kerowagi township, I was forced to the side 
of the road by well over a thousand running youths and adults, 
brandishing sticks, booming out the deep Simbu chant 'Uwooooo! '  as 
they surged a kilometre to the edge of their Siku clan territory at 
Kerowagi road junction. They had come from a rally in support of 
Open candidate John Kamb at Siure village, opposite Goglme 
Catholic church, yet showed no sign of his Peoples Action Party 
endorsement. It was merely a blunt display of numbers which scared 
my passengers-one fled-and Kamb' s people announced by sheer 
mass of flesh that he would receive a large vote. 
Intimidation from all sides 
Simbu political players themselves emphasize the hyperactivity 
and tension of their frenetic campaigns. After several elections, 
candidates have told me with hindsight that they were surprised 
at what they had done in the heat of the moment, craziness brought 
on by power hunger: 'Mipela hangri na longlong long paua ' Having 
invested a fortune to ensure (or try to buy) the loyalty of their own 
people, at least some 1992 candidates were prepared to seek to 
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enforce the solidarity of their vote-keeping the voters honest, as it 
were. This is what leads to threats to voters before the poll and 
intimidation of voters at polling places. Candidates and their close 
supporters are literally saying 'If you don't vote for me-especially 
after accepting my hospitality-I'll take revenge . '  Scrutineers 
watch to make sure voters vote ' the right way' .  Their reports can 
and do lead to recriminations after polling if individuals or groups 
are believed to have broken the obligation to deliver their votes 
which they acquired in accepting the candidate 's  hospitality . 
Electoral kiaps officially reported details to the police of threats 
in the case of one candidate in Sinasina who was believed to be 
armed, and such statements were reported in some detail in Brown 
Sinamoi' s Court of Disputed Returns statement appealing Yauwe 
Riyong's victory in Chuave Open.8 I know of several such threats in 
two parts of Kundiawa Open, and heard of others. Claims of such 
intimidation have been made but not tested for Simbu, for example 
by Okuk in 1982. Election results have been nullified by Courts of 
Disputed Returns in the past, because such intimidation clearly 
involves undue influence. In the case brought by Sinamoi only one 
case of intimidation was tested in the court, found valid, and 
Riyong's election was eventually declared void. Justice Tracy 
Doherty concluded that a court 
should not lightly overturn the decision and wishes of 
an electorate but our Laws are intended to maintain a 
free and unfettered right to cast a vote as the individual 
wants without having to look over his shoulder for fear 
of offending anyone and that is the right the Court 
protects .9 
The intensity of political conflict is one of several dimensions of 
the growing violence in the unstable Highlands region. As well as 
explicitly mobilizing in the electoral arena alliances originally 
made in clan warfare, the parochial nature of political conflict in 
1992 was increased as candidates were often deterred or prevented 
8 
9 
Shepherds Lawyers, Port Moresby, petition to National Court of Justice, 
MP 174/92 Brown Sinamoi v .  Yauwe Riyong and Electoral Commission 
(Chuave Open Electorate) 
National Court of Justice, MP 1 74 of 1992, Brown Sinamoi v. Yauwe 
Riyong and Electoral Commission, dated 31 March 1994, p21 . (Riyong 
defeated Sinamoi in the consequent by-election. )  
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from campaigning outside their home base area. In 1990 the first 
high-powered automatic weapons had been used in clan warfare to 
complement the home-made and factory-made shotguns by then 
commonly used in clan warfare. In May 1992 there were reports of 
battles under way in Gumine district and at the government station 
at Gembogl, almost the only flat land in the Upper Chimbu valley. 
That month rifle shots were heard near Pari village in Kamanegu, 
the base of two candidates. A storekeeper was shot at Kerowagi 
during an armed robbery. What most alarmed officials was the 
potential combination of campaign passions and traditional conflicts 
and the availability of deadly weapons, in particular in the post­
election period when recriminations were most likely to erupt, and 
competition become conflict. Partly to discourage others, before the 
poll three Simbu candidates were charged with election related 
violence, in cases of alleged threatening behaviour and assault, and 
one sitting MP was questioned about the movement of two military 
rifles and another charged with having two unlicensed pistols (Post­
Courier, 22 June 1992: 1 ) .  Other incidents did not reach the courts, or 
press. 
It has been noted in Mount Hagen society that the boundaries 
distinguishing election and clan conflict feed into each other 
(Strathern 1993). In Simbu, clans and tribes will give support to some 
of their neighbours in their battles, kn owing they will be 
compensated for any losses, in the explicit expectation of reciprocal 
backup in their own disputes with third parties.  I heard a 
prominent candidate state to a small crowd in his neighbouring tribe 
the evening before polling 'Remember our alliance. We have fought 
alongside each other. We have the guns and in the fighting we 
killed many' .  There was real tension in the air, relieved by a loud 
shout, because as well as being a superficially joking reminder of the 
support given in warfare this was taken as a real threat, later 
allegedly spelt out but not carried out, to use deadly weapons against 
recent allies in war who he saw as now being disloyal in voting 
against him. 
Fears of violence during the 1 992 election were not baseless. 
Several voters had been assaulted by 'witnesses' in 1982, and in the 
worst case in 1987 the fracturing of one woman's skull in the polling 
booth requiring her hospitalisation. Furthermore there had been 
cases in 1987 of houses burnt at Kup because the owners voted against 
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the local candidate.1° Clan warfare has arisen in the supercharged 
atmosphere of campaigns since 1977, and have become a regular 
aftermath of elections in Simbu. As alliances based in warfare are 
mobilised in hyperactive campaigning, it is a relatively small step 
for campaigning to slide into fighting. I have mentioned reliable 
reports in 1 992 of candidates intimidating voters with firearms.  
Some of  these were brought to  police attention by officials and 
villagers . Well before the poll Foreign Minister Somare had 
mentioned police reports of high-powered weapons imports and 
police fears that such weapons might be used to intimidate voters 
(Post-Courier, 10 February 1992:5) . 1 1  
Even without an election, Simbu people are often regarded as 
volatile . People from all over the province visit Kundiawa 
regularly, especially on fortnightly pay days when the population 
of 5000 usually trebles with about 10,000 rural visitors seeking cash, 
food and excitement. In 1992 any minor incident such as the arrest of 
a shoplifter could escalate into a disturbance beyond the crowd 
control capacity of the small and poorly equipped police 
detachment, and minor urban riots on several pay Fridays increased 
tension in Simbu before the poll. The Kundiawa police were said to 
have only two shotguns; the Provincial Police Commander (PPC), 
Robert Kalasim, was aware of police guns being 'given to wantoks' 
and stolen. As a practical sign of co-operation and goodwill the 
provincial government purchased for K7000 twenty-four pump-action 
shotguns, ammunition and four pistols (Post-Courier, 10 June 1992:2) 
which the Premier presented to Kalasim at a public ceremony. 'We 
are', said the grateful PPC, 'in a desperate situation with regard to 
security'. 
In January, months before the National Election (NATEL) 92 
exercise plans were announced, Simbu officials and police requested 
military help because police resources would be stretched too thin 
even for a security presence confined to mobile teams. They realised 
10 At nearby Minj in the Western Highlands, houses were burnt and women 
raped in 1982 fo:r voting against their husband's group (Reay 1 987; 
personal communication, July 1994) and there are similar reports 
(Strathern 1993:51 )  from Mount Hagen after the 1990 provincial assembly 
election. 
1 1  Police concerns about a guns-for-drugs trading commenced around 1987; 
whether marijuana was being traded on a large scale I do not know, but 
certainly its usage was widespread in Simbu by 1992. 
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that for the nation's international image it  would be better if  there 
was no military callout at all. They sought troops not because they 
expected a revolution, they said, or because they wanted to suggest 
Simbu was a wild and dangerous place, but because of their desire for 
an efficient one day poll. They noted the need for caution in a 
province where the respect for law enforcement authority had 
eroded over the last few years and police parties had come under 
armed attack in the past twelve months. (An example of this was 
the incident in early June when a kiap who was an election official 
was assaulted and wounded on the Gumine road. He was removing a 
roadblock which had been set up to extract payment for road works, 
a not uncommon ploy in Simbu.) 
The regular Simbu police force of 144 was reinforced a fortnight 
before the 22 June vote by about the same number of extra police and a 
platoon of Defence Force (PNGDF) infantry in the combined NA TEL 
exercise, discussed in Sinclair Dinnen's chapter in this book. The 
national plan and agreement with the provincial government was 
that the soldiers would be kept in reserve, separate from the regular 
police. In practice, men from both forces soon formed combined units, 
and after a few days in the bush started wearing bits of each other's 
uniforms, with police wearing green army face paint and-according 
to provincial officials, who were scandalized-procuring women for 
the soldiers. The police seemed keen to show the soldiers how tough 
they were, and an off duty policeman commonly swaggered through 
the town in motley uniform holding a shotgun on his hip, a woman on 
his other arm. 
In Simbu the combined security force appeared at a loss to know 
how to prevent violence or its escalation. As mentioned above, the 
whole province was declared a Tribal Fighting Zone and a liquor ban 
declared. The Highlands provinces were unable to reach unanimity 
on this ban, which in Simbu was broken by some of the rich and 
powerful-including some candidates, a few police and a hard 
boiled kiap. The PPC gave a number of election 'awareness' talks at 
gatherings and election rallies around the province. At Nilkare's 
Omkolai rally the PPC's loudspeaker barked out that people who 
created disturbances would have their pigs shot and taken and 
houses burnt, without compensation, and the stirrers would be 
caught, 'dead or alive. DEAD OR ALIVE! '  He subsequently told me 
that the police needed the 'respect' of the Simbu, and the way to get 
it was to be tough, and he described as necessary deterrents the 
extra-judicial punishments he called 'destructions' .  Following what 
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had become the standard procedure for an 'operation', in the run-up 
to the poll the security forces shot, killed and took many valuable 
pigs, goats and cassowaries, intimidation intended to deter 
troublemakers. To my knowledge they burnt around 100 houses both 
before and after the poll in a temporarily successful effort to deter 
inter- and intra-group fighting. Villagers regarded the police 
tactics as excessive: 'ol i overinz ' .  
The security operation was seen as  necessary, but created constant 
headaches for electoral officials . It was to be funded by the 
Electoral Commission, through the provincial accounting system. An 
initially high budget estimate for a five day polling operation was 
cut back on the suggestion of officials, but twice before and after the 
poll the PPC threatened to withdraw all staff from election security 
work immediately unless he was paid additional sums of some 
hundreds of thousand Kina, pressure the Provincial Secretary 
described to me as 'blackmail' and grounds for official complaint. 
Nonetheless, creative accounting was used and after negotiations 
with a commercial bank provincial officials pulled money from 
district accounts to fund the police, in the hope of receiving a refund 
from the Electoral Commission at a later date. Providing security on 
the scale needed for the campaign period, the poll and the count, 
and the period of adjustment after results are known, is expensive. 
Police sources say their budgeting arrangements and logistics 
capabilities are very weak. Policemen are virtually expected to eat 
off the land, without proper catering and accommodation not only 
when in the field but in provincial bases . Once again, electoral 
administration was hampered by systemic problems of state 
administration. 
The one day poll 
Simbu was one of four Highlands provinces which opted for a one 
day poll in 1992. The plan was for polling teams (originally 311 
were planned) to collect votes on Tuesday 22 June at 250 polling 
places, replacing the usual 50 mobile teams each moving around 
several locations over a two week period. This plan necessitated the 
training of about a thousand casual electoral officials, many non­
public servants, who camped out in unfamiliar places with new 
people for four days before returning to Kundiawa for the count. It 
also meant it would not be possible to have the usual four policemen 
per polling place, and indeed no police at most booths, but rather 
about twenty mobile security teams. The security operation required 
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very tight co-ordination, with any delay likely to  cause problems in 
a domino effect. The thousands of extra police announced as part of 
NA TEL in the Highlands in reality were about 500. The additional 
police were intended to move from province to province, with a three 
day relocation period between securing the polls in each province. 
The extra police already located in Simbu went west to Enga 
Province where the poll was delayed by the late printing and 
distribution of ballot papers. 
On Thursday 17 June the Simbu polling teams were preparing to 
move out to their polling stations and the Simbu public was at a 
pitch of excitement, when Simbu officials heard that late receipt of 
ballot papers in Enga had delayed voting, but with one third of the 
population Seventh Day Adventist a Saturday poll was impossible. 
Enga deferred its voting till the Monday, and kept almost all the 
extra police. After considering their options, Simbu officials made 
an explicit gamble, to hold their poll without the planned extra 
mobile security teams-and indeed with no police at most polling 
booths-but also without announcing the changed security 
arrangements. Although most teams lacked vehicles or radios to 
call for help, it was hoped that in case of major disturbances they 
could signal for help to officials overhead in a helicopter, who could 
call in one of the five mobile truckloads of police and soldiers. 
The gamble worked. Voting was mostly very orderly, with 
people keeping their own places calm. Witnesses were kept 
cordoned off, away from voters, a sensible innovation. The one 
disturbance, which I witnessed, took place at Ywagle, near Mindima 
village. A poll clerk assisting an elderly woman allegedly marked 
a ballot paper outside the little box in her chosen candidate's  
square. Tables were turned, papers sent flying and clerks roughed up 
as underlying tension erupted. Extra police who happened to be 
passing on the highway were soon called to the scene, along with a 
squad of soldiers; they showed their weapons but exercised restraint 
as the complainants refused to be mollified. The incident occurred 
partly because of a misleading briefing by an election official, and, 
although carelessly marked, the paper was still a valid vote for the 
intended candidate . After an hour the Returning Officer arrived, 
broke the tension with his explanation and a joke, the woman voted 
again and polling resumed. Overall, Simbu was quieter than 
Western Highlands and Enga, for which senior police and an army 
officer took credit ( 'We hit them hard, early')-yet clearly the 
306 Standish 
credit lay with the Simbu public, determined to record their vote for 
their pref erred candidate in their own place. 
Double-voting was allegedly very common, with the finger nail 
dye easily removed with bleach or a lime. It was widely believed 
that at Siure, near Kerowagi, John Kamb's supporters had coerced 
officials into signing hundreds of ballot papers, thus allowing 
multiple voting on such a scale that his relatively small group of 
people gave him a winning margin of over 900. (I provide statistics 
below which tend to disprove this allegation.)  
The last stage of polling day was to truck the ballot boxes 
through the night to shipping containers in the Kundiawa police 
compound. In January it was initially anticipated by Simbu officials 
that this would be a time of acute danger requiring numerous 
military patrols to secure the roads .  Ultimately only two trucks 
were hired for the soldiers. The fears were not groundless. A few 
boxes had been stolen in previous Simbu provincial elections. (In 1992 
ballot boxes were stolen in the Western Highlands, and a NATEL 
commander was reported as saying this was a matter of electoral 
administration, not a security issue.)  In Simbu some tired and rather 
limp police arrived in town draped over the boxes, rather like coffee 
buyers guarding bags of coffee, but mostly it was kiaps who rode 
shotgun as if on a stagecoach carrying the gold. Escort vehicles were 
provided free by candidates themselves, determined to ensure that 
their expensive base vote reached the vote bank unscathed. 
The major difficulties of the one day poll arose from problems 
with ballot papers arriving late from Port Moresby. The logistics 
were nightmarish. Papers for one seat had to be reprinted in the last 
few days to correct names and photographs, and most of the papers 
arrived only a day before the poll. The bundles varied enormously 
and had to be checked and recounted overnight into standard lots of 
500 before dispatch, often by helicopter, mostly on the day of voting. 
The last papers arrived so late that one polling booth only received 
theirs at 3pm on polling day, but people waited patiently till 
midnight to complete the poll. Such delays have occurred with all 
elections in Simbu, but a one day poll does not allow for 
administrative glitches. At 6 pm at the two booths at the large 
village of Dumun in Sinasina there were hundreds of people waiting 
to vote (some allegedly for the second or later time ! )  and a decision 
was taken to extend the poll by a day. Dumun was the base of two 
candidates, including the tough police officer, Ben Okoro, and in my 
observation the crowd was volatile on both days . The decision to 
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extend polling was later challenged in a Disputed Returns petition 
by the second candidate (see below), along with the use of part of an 
old roll by the Returning Officer because a large section of names had 
been omitted inadvertently in Port Moresby. Such problems could 
perhaps have been reduced if Simbu officials had more time and 
resources in the preceding months, but they sheeted the blame onto 
the Electoral Commission. 
The ten day count 
Four days later, after an unreal hiatus, the count started on the 
Saturday evening at three locations in Kundiawa town. It continued 
all night. Each candidate was entitled to one scrutineer in each 
tally room, so as well as dozens of poll clerks there were up to 70 
scrutineers plus police in the tally rooms. On several occasions the 
crowds had to be thinned out to enable a smooth count, and I saw a 
policeman ram a shotgun into the buttocks of one man hurrying from 
the room. A hundred people watched in shocked silence. Tensions 
were high and the process slow because it took a long time for 
routines to become established, and for some Open seats they were 
never established. Scrutineers obviously wanted to hasten the 
process and rarely had a chance to play a constructive role and 
challenge dubious votes . Some appeared not to understand the 
processes under way, but the most attentive were able to watch the 
flow of votes by box, before the totals were tallied and double 
checked and then posted on large blackboards for the crowd outside. 
Usually the process was transparent, and knowing where the boxes 
came from explained each candidate's changing tally. Yet at times, 
when several boxes were posted at once, apparently sudden large 
j umps in candidates'  totals lacked explanation and aroused 
suspicion. So too did delays caused when some returning officers 
decided to freeze counts and backtrack to try to identify errors as 
they crept into their counts. Apparently frustrated after five nights 
of waiting with his supporters, the policeman, Okoro, slipped past 
two sets of security, found one of the boxes from his own area, tipped 
the contents out, saying 'Count that! '  and stormed off, unhindered. 
When it was clear that he had won, at four in the morning, some of 
his friends in the police force left the counting room, which had been 
locked up with all personnel inside in an attempt to prevent rumours 
and trouble, and shot flares into the sky, thereby signalling news of 
his success to Okoro, ten kilometres away. 
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Despite an early decision after the first night to keep the count 
to daytime, after pressure from the Electoral Commission for quick 
results most returning officers decided to keep up night time counting 
in the belief that this would assist crowd control and security. Most 
staff were camped with wan toks around the town and tried to sleep 
during the days. After two days and nights work they moved 
slowly, the work slowed down, and mistakes proliferated . Some 
teams tried to count night and day, and with one exception most ROs 
felt unable to delegate and set up different shifts headed by their 
assistants . The ROs personally checked each box tally, a slow 
process, and some double-checked figures during the day while 
keeping an eye on routine government administration. 
With 110  to 176 boxes per electorate, the whole process became 
too much for some of the electorate teams, and indeed for the ad hoe 
group in the provincial tally room. Volunteers tried hard, but paper 
and data management skills were in short supply. Computers and 
adding machines were scarce, as were skilled people with easy 
familiarity with mind-numbing numbers . The Sinasina and 
Kerowagi teams, for instance, each had to make over 10700 separate 
additions in the vertical columns on the tally sheets, and then 
repeat them on the horizontal lines as a cross check .  Not 
surprisingly, mistakes crept in; the problem was that without 
constant cross-checking they remained unnoticed-despite the 
scrutineers-for hours and sometimes days, and then on occasion the 
count was halted for hours or days trying to pinpoint mistakes. I 
pointed out errors in Sinasina additions, one involving 2000 votes, 
and it took the Kerowagi RO almost another week after the result 
was announced to double check his figures and make adjustments of 
hundreds and even thousands to the already announced figures. In 
the regional there were sixteen changes (eight in excess of 100 votes, 
three over 1000) to the announced totals before these were rushed to 
Lae by armed kiaps to be flown to Moresby, where one apparent 
typographical error of 1000 appears to have occurred at the 
Electoral Commission itself. 
Fortunately, none of these latter mistakes would have affected 
the results. Errors are an inevitable by product of human nature; we 
are not machines. Mistakes in addition are not a recent phenomenon 
in Simbu; they occurred in the 1982 election, and took a long time to 
rectify in 1987 as well .  The simple mistake in addition which I 
pointed out in Sinasina before the figures were released may well 
have been picked up by an official, but probably would not have been 
Elections in Simbu: Towards Gunpoint Democracy? 309  
noticed by any scrutineers in the room because they were not being 
given box-by-box progressive totals . If it had not been noticed it 
would have affected the outcome. I dwell on the difficulties because 
they show that willing officers were stretched beyond the limit of 
human efficiency. 
These people worked heroically under great pressure, but the 
Provincial Returning Officer later said that night-time counting had 
been a mistake. Centralising the count had lowered security stresses 
in 1992 compared to 1987, when a planned attempt to burn Kerowagi 
tally room was aborted, and there were near-riots from intimidatory 
crowds at Gumine and Chuave. And in 1992, fortunately, pressure 
from Port Moresby was less than in 1987 when the previous Electoral 
Commissioner angrily demanded results within hours at a time when 
days and nights of work remained, and threatened to sack volunteer 
officers who had volunteered primarily out of a sense of civic duty. 
But Simbu generated real tensions, nonetheless, and they can only 
become greater as heightened electoral competition increases the 
complexity and volume of work in future elections. 
Staff and casual election workers in Simbu have since 1977 
expressed unwillingness to work on elections when their lives can be 
threatened (Standish 1983) . In July 1992 over KO.Sm was owed to 
Simbu, causing resentment of the Electoral Commission, which was 
clearly experiencing a shortage of funds from the national 
government. It took the better part of a year for all the electoral 
staff allowances to be paid by Port Moresby, despite one of the 
returning officers staying there to extract funds from the Electoral 
Commission. Meanwhile ROs were harassed and threatened by 
their erstwhile workers, and Kerowagi District Office was 
paralyzed for months by a blockade of angry young people 
demanding their entitlements. 
Results 
The Open campaigns had mostly been based on particularism and 
localism so it was no surprise that the solidarity of clan votes was 
even tighter than in previous elections. Despite the potential for 
fragmentation with so many candidates, box totals were small, and 
the valid votes in most boxes went almost entirely to one candidate, 
especially for Open seats. Indeed it was possible where there were 
several boxes at one polling place for the first box to go to one 
candidate, the rest to others, as different clans started voting. This 
is a continuation of corporate decision-making and clan solidarity 
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noted since 1972. Time and space preclude me giving a more detailed 
analysis in this report, although the contrast with Angoram 
described by May (this volume) is stark. 
What was unusual in 1992 was the failure of any sitting member 
to gain re-election. Despite their funds and patronage, they all 
received votes much lower than in 1987. In Open seats, the winners 
and their percentage of votes were as follows Riyong (Chuave, 
12.09), Nilkare (Gumine 7.71 ), Yomo (Karirnui-Nomane, 9.90), Kamb 
(Kerowagi, 10.76), Onguglo (Kundiawa, 15 .95) and Okoro (Sinasina­
Yonggamugl, 6.31). Two were LNA, one Peoples Action Party and one 
Black Action Party. Of these, only Nilkare was reputed to have 
had an expensive campaign. The winners either had such a large 
base vote from several polling booths that they won on that alone, or 
else-like Nilkare and Onguglo-had not only a large base vote 
over several booths (982 and 2,961 respectively) but significant 
blocks of votes away from their base areas (639 and 700) .  Although 
most candidates worked mostly on their clan and tribe and relatives 
by marriage to form a base vote, few succeeded in dividing other 
people's base votes; this tends to undermine the argument about 
commoditization. Rather than buying votes, it seems that money 
may merely have ensured base votes. 
I have already mentioned Kerowagi controversies .  As noted 
above, there were delays of days in the Open count as exhausted 
officers tried to locate and correct mistakes, and Kerowagi was not 
completed for days after other electorates. During one such delay, 
James Kirnin Pikip, who with 1915 votes was running second at box 
Count 127, was brought in a Western Highlands government car to a 
meeting with Sinasina winner Okoro at Kundiawa to discuss forming 
a Simbu bloc in the process of post-election coalition making. Pikip 
was angrily abused by the crowd at Kundiawa airstrip for 
associating with Hageners and described as a 'political 
prostitute ' . 12 Visibly shaken at this onslaught, Pikip may have 
been secretly relieved when John Kamb gained 2576 between Counts 
128 and 147, and by the final Count 1 76 Pikip had only received 
another 15 votes (totalling 1 944) to come in third behind Kamb 
(3120) and Camilus Bongro (2124). Kamb's golden streak started at 
Barawagi polling place, and continued through Gagul, Siure, Goglme 
and Tauglpene. The first four of these places had 3923 voters 
12 A woman who complained at this language was whacked and told to shut 
up because this was men's business. 
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registered on the draft of the roll. At Siure, Kamb's own place, there 
were 1043 registered voters and only 945 voted. Of these Kamb 
received 907. These figures would seem to disprove the rumour put 
around by unsuccessful candidates that Kamb's sudden surge was 
based on massive double voting at Siure. Kamb's political baptism 
was just starting. For a week helicopters on charter to political 
parties buzzed the Highlands provinces, carrying political agents 
seeking to induce the winners into their party and coalition. John 
Kamb avoided the crowds at Kundiawa airport and was collected 
from a nearby ridge top, only to discover later that he was with the 
wrong party. 
Premier Mai won the regional contest with 23,273 votes (16.82 
per cent), a clear 10,811  votes ahead of Palma Embia on 12,462 and Fr 
Louis Ambane on 10,894. All these men had widespread appeal, Mai 
adding to his high poll in Chuave Open of 10,902 (47 per cent of his 
total) with a strong vote in all areas except the central Kundiawa 
Open. Probably he succeeded because of his 'free education' policy 
and some resentment of the periphery against the centre . The 
runners-up, Embia and Ambane, were well known churchmen with 
strong connections into widespread congregations. The two former 
kiaps Aribill Gonapa and Sir Joseph Nombri followed close behind. 
The vote for most candidates was concentrated, with over half their 
votes in their home Open electorates, as shown in Table 1 1 . 1 .  The 
exceptions were for the most part strong candidates who could expect 
high votes outside their home areas because of their career 
performance and reputation. They included Nombri (with 41 per 
c:ent and the rest evenly spread); Peter Kamis (with 50 per cent of 
votes at home but 26 per cent in Karimui-Nomane); Peter Kuman (39 
per cent but only 8 and 15 per cent respectively in his previous 
extended bases of Kerowagi and Gumine). 
The volatility of the Gumine vote is interesting. As expected, the 
outsider Boniwan polled well there with 3058 votes.  However Dr 
Erol Sipa polled 7244 votes and defused any local resentment by 
having a celebratory parade to mark his victory among the local 
Gumine candidates . He later returned to head up the Kundiawa 
Hospital. Peter Kuman had been elected on a southern vote in 1987, 
which collapsed in 1992. His opponents in the campaign had 
occasionally mentioned in a 1990 battle the deadly effectiveness of a 
high-powered automatic rifle reputedly owned by Kuman. Indeed, 
this issue was alluded to in public even by Kuman himself, and was 
widely believed to have cost him his huge southern vote in 1992. 
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Three weeks later he was proud of his 1 0  years in parliament ('a 
Simbu record')  and said he would start doing something for himself. 
The aftermath 
Tensions were high as the results trickled out, and villagers stayed 
awake all night writing down results broadcast on Radio Chimbu. 
Inevitably as results were known there was squabbling among losing 
electoral battle lines, and from disappointed candidates and their 
supporters the individual snide comments and verbal 'back stabbing' 
known in Tokpisin as suitim tok. Tensions are highest when closely 
related candidates divide their communities and the fear of internal 
conflict is greatest. Houses were burnt at Mogl in Yonggamugl, in one 
payback between in-laws. Cooler heads prevailed in most instances, 
yet one big loser twice threatened in his own village to attack a 
neighbouring clan which had not voted for him. Families moved 
with their pigs away from the clan border, and the police were 
informed . When visited in his place, the losing candidate 
reportedly told police his weapons were in Lae; he was warned 
against making threats . Gradually the tension eased-until the 
provincial assembly election in 1993, that is . 
As in Simbu elections since 1977, however, it was usually easier 
for losers to find an outside scapegoat and blame officials with bias 
or accuse rivals and their supporters of massive electoral fraud. So 
conspiracy theories flourish and officials are accused of bias, if not 
of actually rigging the election. In general the centralized count 
meant there was much less trouble than on previous occasions when 
crowd control was impossible in remote locations. Once again 
enormous energy was devoted by groups of losing candidates to collect 
evidence for appeals to Courts of Disputed Returns, in some cases 
alleging that polling teams camped on site before the poll had been 
plied with women and drink to make sure they allowed multiple 
voting the next day. Pre-poll briefing always warns against 
officials compromising themselves in any way. 
Most complaints related to inadequacies in the electoral rolls, 
especially in Kundiawa where hundreds of people were not listed 
and hence were denied votes; to the delays in voting; and to the few 
occasions when voting was carried over till the next day. More 
allegations of intimidation by winning candidates and their 
supporters surfaced at this time, and were reported in detail in 
Brown Sinamoi's petition for the Chuave electorate noted above. 
The greatest  accusation of electoral  malpractice and 
3 1 4  Standish 
maladministration allowing fraud was made in Sinasina, where 
Ludger Mond's supporters argued that Okoro's loud intervention in 
the count and additional name lists added to the roll (from earlier 
certified rolls) contributed to many improper votes being allowed . In 
this case, as in many others; the candidate who had led for most of 
the count was overtaken when the last few boxes covered a strong 
candidate 's base area. On several occasions the loss of face when the 
leading candidate was overtaken in the last hours of the count 
precluded rational discussion-the prize had seemed so close for so 
long. Ludger appealed to the Court of Disputed Returns, alleging 
errors of electoral administration, but his petition was dismissed. 1 1  
The appeal mechanism to a Court o f  Disputed Returns was a useful 
safety valve, but eventually the expense and legal advice deterred 
most would-be appellants. 
Nonetheless, there was a backlash and some fighting between 
different clans in a few areas, such as among the Dage tribe near the 
Kerowagi-Western Highlands border. There many houses were 
burnt in different locations by police in a swift attempt to deter large 
scale conflict. It worked in the short term, but people waited till the 
police left and fighting broke out again, and continued in 1995. At 
Mogl, mentioned above, police and soldiers used firearms and burnt 
houses with the logic of deterring further arson. On hearing rumours 
of agitation, the police (allegedly accompanied by soldiers) burnt 
twenty-five houses in total around Mindima and also near the 
Marigl River in Gumine. There was a strong belief among district 
officials and local villagers that the police had been manipulated 
by individuals in such cases, had asked no questions of local officials 
and had gathered no local intelligence before they lashed out. The 
principal problem of violence after the 1992 poll, then, may well 
have been the security forces, but there was probably less fighting­
in the short term-than after previous national and provincial 
elections. Neither critics nor supporters of police can prove that 
their presence prevented disturbances or caused it. 14 However in the 
l3  David Lambu and Associates Lawyers, Hohola, petition to National Court 
of J ustice MP 1 60 / 92, Ludger Luker Mond v. Kerenga Ben Okoro and Leo 
Tualir and the Electoral Commission of Papua New Guinea - Sinasina­
Yonggmugl Open Electorate : N ational Court of J ustice, MP 1 60 of 1 992, 
Sakora AJ, W a igani 30 October and 30 N ovember 1 992; W oods,) . ,  
Kundiawa, 1 0  February 1 993. 
14 The Provincial Secretary sought to extend the liquor ban after the soldiers 
left, as a controlled study to see if there was any change later when the 
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following year there were several major fights under way, 
especially in the Gumine (Marigle and Dom) and Kerowagi areas, 
with up to 22 killed in each of two fights that lasted months . The 
extra security had gone, the PPC was changed, and Simbu people 
clearly saw no permanent improvement arising from their stressful 
1992 experience. 
However the Simbu way of electioneering had changed, and the 
following year's provincial assembly election became the most 
violent to date. It was widely believed in Simbu political circles 
that John Kamb had won his seat by organizing large scale double 
voting, effected by coercing polling officials .  Once again in 1993, 
competition was fierce, with huge expenditures in money and ego at 
stake. It was a two-week poll, but this time there were also two 
policemen, unarmed, at each booth. The poll was extraordinary. 
Even the Premier, Edward Bare, was prevented from voting for 
himself in his own Gena tribe area, despite the presence of the 
Provincial Secretary and the Police Commander. Declaration 
(section) voting remained in Simbu's provincial election law, and the 
Provincial Secretary wrote to the Electoral Commissioner that 
'candidates . . .  bring in people by truck loads to cast 
[section] votes . . .  even if they are not from a particular 
constituency'; ' . . .  the policemen were over-powered by 
the people'; ' . . .  because of threats being issued to our 
polling officials . . . polling officers were forced to sign 
and hand out ballot papers', and 'double voting has 
become the order of the day . . .  throughout the whole 
province. In all instances the ballot papers issued had 
exceeded the names on the common roll' . 15 
I have reliable reports from voters, officials, journalists and 
candidates themselves that in many areas candidates and their core 
supporters encouraged and even forced their own people to vote 
repeatedly for them, openly showing rifles, axes, knives and pistols, 
with menace. Similarly, they coerced polling officials to allow 
multiple voting by individuals, up to twenty times or more, and in 
liquor ban was lifted. (I do not know the outcome of this experiment, but 
certainly warfare had escalated by 1993.) 
15 Simbu Provincial Secretary to Electoral Commissioner, 'Widespread 
malpractices in the Simbu provincial elections', file 29-3-6, 21 June 1993. 
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some instances stole papers and forced presiding officers to sign 
them. A very experienced officer wrote 
A polling team cannot impose any control when 
surrounded by 600 to 1000 voters with soot blackened 
faces with orders or the desire to intimidate voters as 
they please. Weapons are being waved under polling 
officials noses to keep them quiet while people vote 
time and again. 
Some groups checked voters' papers before putting them into 
ballot boxes. 'Unfavourable votes are destroyed on the spot and the 
hapless voter dragged out and dealt with. Polling officials have 
become mere spectators at a sick anti-democratic live show. '  
Eventually the death which officials had feared occurred . An 
intending voter approaching the booth at W andi booth was stoned 
and later died; he came from another clan, and it was thought he 
would vote against the local man. The police had decided not to 
carry arms because they could be overwhelmed, and their arms 
seized. When three mobile squad members visited Emai (No 2 
Dingga) in Sinasina, carrying arms, they were attacked with an axe 
and their weapons were seized. Thereupon the police burnt thirty­
five houses at Emai in the presence of the Provincial Secretary, 
himself an Emai man. Soon the weapons were returned and the 
culprits were handed over. 16 They were publicly whipped in the 
police compound, and a policeman injured in the original attack 
subsequently used his service gun to shoot up some houses in Emai, a 
central place for a tribal enemy of his own people (Standish 1994) .  
Politicians are not the only people who confuse their state roles and 
clan obligations. This whole sequence did not deter fighters in 
several areas after the election, and five more people were reported 
killed in retribution or in election-related clan warfare. 
Halfway through the poll the Provincial authorities faxed a 
series of ever more anxious letters to the Electoral Commissioner 
which documented fourteen separate types of violation of the 
Electoral Act. The Provincial Secretary called for the election to be 
aborted, and for the use of stronger security-including PNGDF 
troops-in a fresh election. 
1 6  In 1992 weapons were taken from soldiers at Minggende and used in a 
Highway robbery . On that occasion the villagers handed over the 
weapons and youths before the police had a chance to rampage. 
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There is no democracy in the current conduct of the 
elections in Simbu province. In the interests of the 
province and the country I call on you to declare the 
current elections in Simbu province null and void.17 
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These calls were publicly supported b y  John Nilkare, the 
Minister for Village Services and Provincial Affairs (Pos t-Courier, 
23 June 1993 and The Times of PNC, 24 June and 7 July 1993). Because 
members of all political camps in Simbu were participating in the 
malpractice Nilkare probably had no partisan stake in the outcome, 
although subsequently a new Simbu Provincial Government was 
formed with the assistance of Prime Minister Wingti. Nilkare 
discussed the election with real anger, and had no interest in Simbu 
political outcomes being determined by force. The Electoral 
Commissioner's legal advice was that he could only suspend the 
elections briefly in the event of a riot or such disturbance. He asked 
for full reports, including police reports, which were needed so that 
in the event of an appeal the matters could be documented. Only a 
Court of Disputed Returns could overturn the election, he said. There 
is no sign that the cabinet and the parliament sought legal opinion 
on whether they could Declare a State of Emergency and/ or whether 
it was possible to suspend the entire provincial administration in 
order to abort the election process. An implication of the Electoral 
Commissioner's advice appears to be that some legislative 
amendment must be considered with some urgency to enable a 
response within the constitution in case in future a similar situation 
arises.  
Both anecdotes and figures demonstrate the sheer scale of 
malpractice in 1993. In the Kup area, some booths did not vote 
because all available ballot papers had been used at Bi village 
booth, and something similar occurred in Lower Koronigl 
(Kerowagi) . In the entire poll, some 254,346 votes were collected, 
from a population thought to number 185,346, including children and 
non citizens, so provincial officials calculated that at least 68,470 
'extra persons voted', although on my calculation the figure was 
probably more like 150,000 extras. 18 
1 7 Op.cit. (note 15 above) 
1 8 Figures from Provincial Returning Officer, July 1993, using National 
Statistical Office census figures. 
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Members of the Simbu political elite were stunned by what they 
had done and witnessed. In his broadcast speech opening the new 
Provincial Government, the new Premier, Edward Aba, said 'We got 
here by foul means not fair, but we are in power now, and here we 
shall stay. '  In the April 1995 meeting of the Assembly, the last 
before the whole system was aborted in the 1995 constitutional 
changes, Aba repeated this refrain. Asked about the use of weapons, 
one assembly member told me 'We all did it. We went crazy'. Some 
maintained their lust for power. A week later, an assemblyman who 
had been excluded from the cabinet was widely believed, including 
by his own clanspeople, to have masterminded a major attack on the 
Kundiawa commercial sector by about a thousand people protected 
by high-powered weapons. The police on duty were outgunned, a 
vehicle would not start and they were powerless to stop Kl00,000 of 
food and other stock being taken over a four hour period. This event 
was a deliberate assertion that this tribe could make the provincial 
capital ungovernable, and hence had to be included in any provincial 
ministry. (The provincial member's village house was reportedly 
one of eight burnt by police, but he later received a ministry . )  
Displaying fear and a feeling o f  inevitability, maybe a dozen 
members of the Simbu elite in 1993 predicted-without any 
prompting from me-that the next elections in Simbu would be a form 
of w ar, with candidates fielding armies, and that belief had spread 
by early 1995. 
Conclusion 
At face value, and taken in isolation, the 1992 Simbu national 
elections were reasonably democratic, but the campaigns and 
elections followed trends which have developed consistently since 
1977 towards increasing bribery, intimidation and malpractice. The 
Simbu political public know this, and often argue that the MP 
represents only that sector of the electorate which voted for him. 
Open winners in Simbu in 1992 received only between 6.31 and 15 .95 
per cent of the valid votes, and the highly successful regional winner 
received only 16.82 per cent. In each electorate, those who lose can 
unite against the winner. As has occurred after previous elections, 
several winners apparently felt endangered, and every one left the 
province by helicopter in the post-election coalition-making period. 
In early 1995 one MP was rumoured never to have returned to his 
electorate (and later in the year when he did return his car was 
hijacked as a sign of hostility) .  Another only visited his corner of 
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the province b y  helicopter, it was alleged, fearing to drive on the 
(admittedly very bad) roads through his opponents' territories . ' 
Clearly, some of the electorate's anger arises from what MPs do, and 
do not do, after the election. It is often impossible for elected 
members to move freely and perform as a representative of their 
entire electorate. The implications of the low votes of winners and 
continuing post-election hostility are that the elections are currently 
not a mechanism which give popular legitimacy to the parliament 
and authority to the government, and nor do they provide a chance 
for continuing democratic participation in decision-making. 
These points were used in 1987 to advocate a coup, an extreme 
response by defeated candidates, yet one which reflects profound 
disillusionment with the political system and its foundation in 
elections. The 1993 provincial election, with its dangerously 
widespread use of threats and actual violence, further reinforces 
such concerns. Subsequent violence in the Western Highlands 
provincial poll (Ketan 1995) indicates not that Highlanders are 
wild men, although they can be, but that there are systemic 
problems in Papua New Guinea society and politics. 
Despite the heroic efforts of officials on the ground, the two 
elections described here were not free and fair. While Simbu-based 
observers and participants will have heard much of the information 
in this paper, it has not been pulled together before. Open Returning 
Officers have apparently written few formal reports to the 
Electoral Commission in the last four elections, out of a combination 
of exhaustion and frustration with what they see as lack of 
understanding of the difficulties of their dedicated work. The new 
PPC told me in July 1 993 he had no written reports of the 
intimidation of polling teams, although he knew of many such 
incidents.  Simbu j ournalists with personal and professional 
connections with the provincial government, and perhaps inhibited 
from reporting bad news about their province, do not report much of 
the detail of local politics to the local media . Thus the Port 
Moresby elite and international observers hear little of the kind of 
sad and bad news in this paper, and the detailed studies of Reay 
(1987) and the recent writing of Strathern (1993) and Ketan (1995) .  
I have argued elsewhere, using Migdal's terminology, that 
Papua New Guinea has 'strong' societies, autonomous but divided. 
The state, by contrast, is 'weak' (Migdal 1988, Standish 1994) . It 
lacks administrative and service capacity, without the political 
strength to make difficult policy decisions and implement 
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programmes; it does not politically penetrate and dominate the 
society. Sometimes state resources can be used for local benefit, but 
politicians lack authority outside their own communities, and the 
state as a whole lacks popular legitimacy, worsened by its own 
excesses in the attempt to gain control. The societies are increasingly 
isolated from the state, which is irrelevant to their needs, and 
withdraw from engagement with the state. 
In many ways this paper illustrates state weakness and lack of 
administrative capacity and co-ordination, both at the centre and at 
the periphery. Changes can be made to electoral administration, but 
the difficulties described are symptomatic of weaknesses in the 
whole governing structure . I will not make a series of 
recommendations in this paper, although one immediate conclusion 
is that an optional preferential system would be too complex for both 
the electoral staff in this province and the scrutineers and 
candidates. Before the 1992 poll I had recommended a return to the 
kind of system which in 1972 I saw creating the environment for co­
operative campaigning between candidates who sought each other's 
preferences .  That system operated in the last years of a relatively 
strong colonial state, and the political culture of Simbu since then 
has become a tougher game, zero-sum, winner-takes-all. 
Provincial officials in Simbu are clearly concerned at the shift in 
political practice in their province. Official structures can influence 
political behaviour, but they are also themselves influenced by the 
political activities of national actors, who in tum are operating in 
an international economy which is primarily interested in the 
country's minerals and which craves political stability. Politicians 
put their energies into the immediate issues, and for the 
parliamentarians elected in 1 992 their main concerns have been 
controlling and expanding the minerals sector and removing the 
provincial tier of politics. The present parliamentarians succeeded 
under the present electoral system, and at present may lack a motive 
to change it, having in 1995 removed their provincial government 
rivals. As in 1991, when changes were made to the constitution and 
electoral system, this may change in the run-up to the 1997 poll. 
Issues of security and the authority of state agencies are likely to 
remain contentious. Police officers admit their men are hated by 
villagers; they seek public respect but know the public have little 
cause to trust police when police cannot protect themselves, let alone 
the public. The 1 992 poll in Simbu may have been relatively 
peaceful on a 'once only' basis, a bluff which succeeded then but 
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which was blown away forever in the 1993 provincial election. 
Although the state is in part  maintained by s ometimes 
indiscriminate use of force, the excesses of the security personnel had 
quite antagonized senior provincial officials by the end of the 1992 
election. The state itself is fragmented, and although provincial 
officials in 1993 called for a strong army presence in a new provincial 
poll, the capacity is not there for an intense presence right across the 
Highlands, let alone other parts of the mainland or Islands regions. 
When elections are conducted by improper means, the whole 
parliament and whole state is discredited. Yet paradoxically, the 
Simbu want their political prizes to have some legitimacy, and even 
while conducting a poll at gunpoint in 1993 they went through a 
distorted ritual of democratic voting. Just as Simbu political 
practice has evolved, the national rules have changed under the 
new provincial government system introduced in 1995, which gives 
great powers to provincial governors (usually regional members) .  
The new system greatly privileges sitting members. They become 
the targets for the next cohort of political aspirants . Simbu politics 
promises to intensify still further. 
In one of his strongest statements as Governor-General, the late 
Sir Ignatius Kilage made a public plea for wisdom and judgement by 
the people of Papua New Guinea, and discussed the challenges faced 
by the government at that time and the stresses on the country's 
democracy: 
It is certainly not the easiest of systems because it 
demands a permanent state of compromise among all 
sections and all opinions in the community. The system 
works only if we the people believe in it and act 
positively to make it work. (Pos t-Courier, 31 March 
1 989:p31 . )  
I t  remains to  be  seen whether the political will can be  found in  the 
new system to confront the problems of an increasingly turbulent 
society, for politics to be seen as an activity of national scope rather 
than local self-interest of the crudest kind. Even if there is a 
reversal of recent trends in Simbu towards money politics, 
intimidation and violence, it remains to be seen whether sufficient 
government resources can be provided to give provinces the capacity 
to conduct efficient, free and fair elections. Unless the kind of issues 
raised in this paper are faced, elections in Simbu, in the Highlands 
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generally, and possibly in some other parts of the country, will only 
be a dangerous sham-a form of democracy at gunpoint. 
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APPENDIX A 
RESULTS OF THE 1992 PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
NATIONAL ELECTION 
A: ISLAND PROVINCES 
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
BOUGAINVILLE PROVINCIAL 
Fr. John Momis 1 2,556 68.27 MA SMPl 
Samuel Karol 2,401 1 3 . 05 IND ppp* 
John Banono 2,062 1 1 .21  IND 
Informal 1 ,374 7 .47 
Total 1 8,393 
CENTRAL BOUGAINVILLE 
Joseph Egilio 769 50 .39 IND SMP 
Samuel Akoita 582 38 . 14 IND 
Raphael Bele 5 0  3.28 MA 
Patrick Itta 7 0 .46 IND 
Informal 1 1 8  7 .73 
Total 1 ,526 
NORTH BOUGAINVILLE 
Michael Ogio 4,801 29 . 10 PDM SMP 
James Togel 4,51 9  27.39 MA 
Donatus Mola 2,287 1 3 . 86 IND PPP* 
Sylvester Niu 1 ,931 1 1 . 70 IND 
U zziah T oukes 1 ,658 1 0 .05 IND 
Martin Golu 880 5 .33  IND 
Informal 424 2 .57 
Total 1 6,500 
1 Sitting Member 
* This indicates that the party affiliation on the ballot paper (shown by the 
portrait of the party leader next to the candidate's photo) is different from 
the party affiliation reported in the Electoral Commissions's official results 
as shown under Party. 
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Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE 
Michael Laimo 1 35 36 . 39 IND NMP2 
Peter Kungka 6 3  16 .98  MA 
Martin Bonai 4 1  1 1 .05 IND 
Paul Nerau 1 0.27 IND 
Informal 1 ,374 7 .47 
Total 371  
E.N. BRITAIN PROVINCIAL 
F. Koimanrea 1 4,446 25 .81  IND NMP 
E. Tobaining 8,1 71 1 4 .60 PANGU SMP IND* 
Sir R. Tovue 6,928 12 .38 IND 
Martin T ovadek 6,357 1 1 . 36 MA IND* 
Damien Kereku 5,351 9 .56 IND 
Michael Konjib 3,377 6 .03 IND 
Henry Tokubak 3,260 5 .82 IND 
Ereman Tomete 2,561 4 .58 IND 
Francis Vagene 2,027 3 .62 IND 
Informal 3,494 6 .24 
Total 55, 972 
GAZELLE OPEN 
Nakikus Konga 8,267 39 . 87 PANGU NMP IND* 
Tonny Wong 5,584 26.93 IND 
S.S. Manikot 5,456 26 .31  MA SMP IND* 
J. Marshall 780 3 .76 IND 
Informal 650  
Total 20,737 
KOKOPO OPEN 
Rabbie Namaliu 5,559 41 .41  PANGU SMP 
Oscar Tammur 5,201 38 .75 IND 
S.T. Tokutang 1 ,276 9 .51  IND 
Jack Diuvia 1 ,042 7 .76 MA 
Informal 345 
Total 1 3,423 
2 New Member 
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Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
POMIO OPEN 
Alois Koki 6,355 55 .47 PDM SMP 
Patrick Pangun 3 ,195 27.89 IND PANGU* 
Edward Melo 3 ,195 1 1 .66 IND 
Leo Longi 429 3 . 74 MA 
Informal 1 42 
Total 1 1 ,457 
RABAUL OPEN 
John R. Kaputin 2,857 27.59 IND SMP 
T. Tobunbun 2,679 25 .87 IND 
Martin Kelly 1 ,533 14 .81 IND 
Ronnie Kalulu 1 ,349 1 3 . 03 IND 
S. Topuipui 1 , 103 1 0 .65 MA 
Abakuk Tomaing 493  4 .76 NAT 
Informal 340 
Total 55,971 
MANUS PROVINCIAL 
A. Marsipal 2,547 1 9 . 65 PANGU SMP 
James Pokasui 2,434 1 8 . 78 IND 
M. Pondros 2,1 60 16 .67 IND 
T. Kasou 1 ,935 14 .93  MA 
R.  Pious Pogat 1 ,254 9 .68 IND 
Paliau Benard 1 ,0 1 7  7 .85 IND 
Vincent Tonam 775 5 . 98 IND 
Andyson Kaspou 684 5 .28 IND 
Informal 1 54 
Total 1 2,960 
MANUS OPEN 
M. Thompson 4,759 36 . 72 LNA SMP 
Memel Pohei 4,408 34. 0 1  M A  
M. Kuweh 1 ,337 1 0 . 32 PANGU 
James Nali 1 , 1 67 9 .00 IND 
Mark H. Sinai 9 74 7.52 PDM 
C.S. Kanamon 227 1 .75 PSP 
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Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(MANUS OPEN continued) 
Informal 8 8  
Total 1 2,960 
NEW IRELAND PROVINCIAL 
Paul Tohian 16,563 48.44 IND NMP PPP* 
Michael Singan 1 1 ,886 34 . 76 IND PANGU* 
M. Maraleu 3,35 1 9 . 80 PPP IND* 
Ilias Kasikit 1 ,081 3 . 1 6  IND 
Informal 1 ,314  
Total 34, 1 95 
KA VIENG OPEN 
Micah Ben 5,391 37 .54 PPP SMP 
Lapaseng Meli 3,332 23 .20 MA 
Sition Gion 1 ,976 1 3 . 76 IND 
Tokau Kamalu 1 ,598 1 1 . 1 3  PANGU 
Mesulam Aisoli 1 ,052 7 .33 IND 
Kevin Patai 747 5 .20 IND 
Informal 265 
Total 1 4,361 
NAMATANAI OPEN 
Sir Julius Chan 1 1 ,567 58 .45 PPP SMP 
Esekia Tomon 7 .686 38 .84 PANGU 
Informal 5 3 7  
Total 1 9, 790 
WEST NEW BRITAIN PROVINCIAL 
Lucas J. Waka 7,612  2 1 . 23 PANGU SMP 
Gregory Mongi 6,826 1 9 .04 MA 
Vincent Ulelio 6,316 17.62 
Joseph Gori 5,069 1 4 . 1 4  IND 
John Dako 3,762 1 0 .49 IND 
Paul Nakmai 2,81 2  7 .84 PPP 
Theodore Baisi 1 ,620 4 .52 IND 
Jacobus Guldin 9 3 1  2 .60 IND PDM* 
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Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(WEST NEW BRITAIN PROVINCIAL continued) 
Informal 902 
Total 34,850 
KANDRIAN GLOUCESTER OPEN 
Andrew Posai 2,583 1 9 . 83 PPP NMP 
R. Lawrence 2,294 1 7 .61  IND 
Bernard Vogae 2,263 1 7.37 PANGU SMP 
Francis Auram 1 ,999 1 5 . 34 IND 
Issac W. Dau 1 ,512  1 1 .60 BAP IND* 
David Nasar 1 ,401 1 0 . 74 MA 
Lucas Wanskin 795 6 . 1 0  IND 
Informal 1 82 
Total 1 3,029 
TALAS EA OPEN 
Patterson Lowa 5,794 25 .43 MA SMP 
Moses Nahia 3,296 1 4 . 46 LNA 
Philip Ragi 2,383 1 0 . 46 PPP 
Caspar Nuli 2,353 10 .33 IND 
Dennis Galia 1 ,575 6 .91  PANGU 
Dr B. Tonar 1 ,436 6 . 30 PDM 
Siaken Komboli 1 ,364 5 .99 IND 
John Raka 1 , 1 1 8  4 .91  PDM 
Baundo Tangika 696 3 .05 IND 
Benny Mataio 644 2.83 INS 
Jerry Walala 5 1 1  2 .24 IND 
Tumu Tumex 433 2 .90 IND 
Thomas Namui 354 1 . 55 IND 
Peter Puana 220 0 . 97 IND 
M. Tobob 1 67 0 .73 IND 
Informal 444 
Total 22,788 
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B: MAMOSE I NORTHERN LOWLAND 
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
EAST SEPIK PROVINCIAL 
Sir M. Somare 54,714 53.65 PANGU SMP 
Tobias K. Sakra 1 7,774 1 7.43 IND 
H.L. Kabai 10 , 194 1 0 .00 MA IND* 
Jacob Wama 8,628 8 .46 IND 
Teddy Sane 7,631 7.48 IND 
John Ulai 1 ,798 1 .76 IND 
Informal 1 ;235 1 .21  
Total 1 0 1 ,974 
AMBUNTI DREIKIKIR OPEN 
Judah Akesim 5,521 32.26 PANGU SMP 
H. Massimbor 2,362 1 3 . 80 PPP 
Klapat Nick 2,259 1 3 .20 MA 
Jezrel Hambak 2,049 1 1 .97 IND 
Jack Wangu 1 ,5 1 0  8 .82 IND 
CainYapi 1 ,314 7 .68  PDM 
Silas K. Keble 1 , 158 6 . 77 IND 
Joe Cornelius 834 4 .87 IND 
Informal 1 09 0 .64 
Total 1 7, 1 1 6  
ANGORAM OPEN 
Philip Laki 4,541 24 . 72 PANGU 
Joe Kenny 3,488 1 8 . 99 IND 
Ludwig Schulze 3,156 1 7 . 1 8  IND 
V. Terenfop 1 ,822 9 . 92 MA 
Sarry Wimban 1 ,506 8 .20 IND 
Paul Jajphlom 771 4 .20 IND 
Alois Anmokm 687 3 . 74 IND 
Francis Ali 655 3 .57  LNA 
Luimek Johnson 440 2 .40 IND 
John Maiben 385 2 . 1 0  IND 
Martin Anskar 364 1 .98 IND 
J anuari us Sarni 249 1 .36 IND 
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Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(ANGORAM OPEN continued) 
Andrew K. Kaur 1 74 0 .95 IND 
Informal 1 30 0 .71  
Total 1 8,368 
MAPRIK OPEN 
Sir Pita Lus 6,692 33 .72 PANGU SMP 
F. Wandahwan 3,039 15 .31  IND 
Bill Yalikwien 2,587 1 3 .04 IND 
Daniel Dopi 2,049 1 0 . 33 PDM 
C. Yalikiti 1 ,595 8 .04 IND 
Paul Azaluen 1 ,480 7 .46 IND 
David Sipani 905 4 .56 IND 
S. Yalongi 549 2 .77 MA IND* 
Benny Gabi 4 1 6  2 . 1 0  IND 
M. Taminja 3 1 6  1 . 59 IND 
Informal 2 1 7  1 .09 
Total 19 ,845 
WEWAK OPEN 
B. Narakobi 6 , 107 39 .91  MA SMP 
Baran Sori 3,786 24 .74 PANGU 
Dr M. Manwau 2,336 1 5 .27 PPP 
Laura Martin 1 , 1 85 7 .74 IND 
Luke Gukain 823 5 .38 IND 
Ben Gene 722 5 .38 PDM 
Informal 342 2 .24 
Total 1 5,301 
WOSERA-GAUI OPEN 
Paul Wanjik 4,948 32 .52 PANGU SMP 
Albert Nyani 2,301 1 5 . 1 3  MA 
Cletus Cox 2,1 96 14 .44 IND 
James Walange 1 , 790 1 1 . 77 IND 
Edward Suaiman 1 ,643 1 0 . 80 IND 
Brian C. Tapi 687 4 .52 IND 
Luke Don Misha 580 3 .81  IND 
Markus Bande 577 3 . 79 IND 
3 3 0  
Name of Votes 01  lo Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(WOSERA-GAUI OPEN continued) 
J. Y angomban 4 0 2  2 . 64 IND 
Informal 8 9  0 . 5 9 
Total 1 5 ,21 3 
YANGORU-SAUSSIA OPEN 
John Jaminan 2,2 1 4  1 3 . 6 1  PDM NMP 
John Wawia 1 , 770 1 0 . 8 8  PANGU SMP 
B.  Hagoria 1 ,247 7 . 66 IND 
Greg M .  Mais 1 ,206 7 . 4 1  IND 
Tony Bais 1 , 1 5 1  7 .07 IND 
Paul Kafafi 1 ,406 6 . 43 IND 
J. Yuamiamba 8 5 6  5 .26 IND 
Tom Nidof 745 4 . 5 8 IND 
J.P. Hombomia 674 4 . 58 LNA 
Petrus Wafi 6 1 7  3 . 79 IND 
A.K. Hoandie 6 0 0  3 .69  IND 
A. Wagambio 5 94 3 . 6 5  IND 
Henry Konduo 5 3 7  3 . 30 IND 
Mark Mauludu 4 9 4  3 . 04 IND 
Tomi Hekao 4 6 8  2 . 88 IND 
H. Marasembi 4 2 5  2 . 6 1  PPP 
H.  Hasimani 3 72 2 . 2 9  IND 
T. Benguma 2 8 4  1 . 75 IND 
P.J. Waranak 273 1 . 68 IND 
John Waranduo 2 3 8  1 . 46 IND 
Billy Kuari 2 2 0  1 . 35 IND 
Jonathan Sengi 1 8 3 1 . 1 2  IND 
Informal 5 8  
Total 1 6, 272 
MADANG PROVINCIAL 
Peter Barter 35, 1 5 7 39 . 05 IND 
Peter Yama 1 6, 0 1 8  1 7 . 79 IND 
Jackson J. Kas 1 0,444 1 1 . 60 IND 
Melchior Kasap 9 . 055 1 0 .06 MA 
Tom Pais 5,095 5 . 66 PANGU 
S. Yasina Bulu 4,073 4 . 52 IND 
3 3 1  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(MADANG PROVINCIAL continued) 
N. Bunag Derr 3,521 3 .91  IND 
Jerry Warun 2,934 3 .26 PPP 
Mathew Kabig 2,093 2 .32 IND 
Indimu P. Korah 640 0 .71  IND 
Informal 1 ,002 
Total 90,032 
BOGIA OPEN 
Tim Ward 2,1 1 0  1 3 . 78 PDM SMP 
B. Mollok 1 ,606 1 0 .49 MA 
C.  Silari 1 ,512 9 .88 IND 
N .P. Kirriwon 1 ,500 9 . 80 IND 
Tom Kumana 1 ,443 9 .42 PANGU 
Thomas igam 1 ,405 9 . 1 8  IND 
PR. B. Sulum 1,016 6 .64 IND 
T. Soalilibia 8 1 5  5 .32 IND 
Peter Kombe 799 5.22 IND 
Joseph Bomkai 772 5 .04 IND 
Robert Magun 498 3 .25  IND 
Gabriel Magun 456 2 .98 IND 
Joe N. Tola 437 2 .85 PPP 
Rudolf Mongali 4 1 7  2 . 72 IND 
M. Kahumbu 400 2 .61  IND 
Informal 1 2 5  
Total 15 ,311  
MADANG OPEN 
Stanley Pil 2,480 1 5 .68 IND NMP 
Paul Kamod 2,140 1 3 .53 PANGU 
F. Sawan Bahin 1 ,713 1 0 .83 NAT 
W. Jongamup 1 ,282 8 . 1 1  IND 
Sanol Malaga 1 , 1 1 1  7.02 PPP 
William Banjoy 1 ,060 6 .70 IND 
C. Kramer 997 6 .30 LNA 
John G. Gig 832 5 .26 IND 
Max Moeder 799 5 .05 IND 
Stanley N aifa 749 4 . 74 IND 
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Candidate Polled 
(MADANG OPEN continued) 
J. Bukikun 657 4 . 1 5  IND 
Tom M. Namora 480 3 .03 IND 
Meliakey Oss 4 1 1  2.60 IND 
J. Sau Kasom 286 1 .81  IND 
M. William Puio 283 1 .79 IND 
Joe Bon 2 1 0  1 .33 IND 
Informal 327 
Total 1 5,817  
MIDDLE RAMU OPEN 
G.A. Oringawai 2,741 1 7 . 1 7  MA NMP 
Henry S. Yei 1 ,769 1 1 .07 IND 
Michael Mimpi 1 ,674 1 0 .49 NAT 
John W. Soisek 1 ,523 9 .54 IND 
James Yakip 1 ,488 9 .32 IND SMP PDM* 
Paul Jorimbi 1 ,064 6 .67 PANGU 
Fr D.G. Mump 9 1 5  5 .73 IND 
Steven Kaskas 906 5 .68 IND 
Lalau Karmonga 672 4.21 IND 
Ermot B. Bai 661  4 . 14  IND 
John Opan 5 8 8  3 . 68 IND 
Solomon Ambro 530  3 . 32 IND 
Sambal J. Imus 4 85 3 .04 IND 
Nick Yarington 466 2 .92 IND 
A. Iriaman 3 70 2 .32 IND 
A. Jevi Kaiyul 8 4  0 .53  IND 
Informal 2 7  
Total 1 5,963 
RAI COAST OPEN 
Samuel Pariwa 3,038 2 1 . 99 LNA SMP 
Marcus Kawo 2,278 1 6 .49 PPP 
Baafae Sia 1 ,887 1 3 .66 IND 
James Yali 1 ,658 1 2 .00 IND NAT* 
Peter Nombo 860 6 .23 IND 
Sosenu D. Jerry 8 1 5  5 .90  IND 
Mendai Kimbei 747 5 .41  IND PDM* 
3 3 3  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(RAI COAST OPEN continued) 
John Poe 623 4 . 5 1  IND 
Galga A. Kaitip 5 3 3  3 . 86 IND 
Mafuk Gainda 4 4 4  3 .21  PANGU 
Sapia Gemungo 3 9 7  2 . 8 7  IND 
Malagu Lalu 2 0 9  1 . 5 1  IND 
Steven P. Saud 1 34 1 . 39 IND 
Informal 1 34 
Total 1 3, 8 1 5  
SUMKAR OPEN 
Galeng Lang 3, 1 79 1 8 .45 PANGU SMP 
Mathew Gubag 2,643 1 5 . 34 MA 
Mugiar Bass 1 , 823 1 0 . 5 8  IND 
Peter K. Bais 1 , 709 9 . 92 IND 
Mark M. Arek 1 ,436 8 . 33 NAT 
Kare Bawe �faor 1 ,4 1 1  8 . 1 9  IND 
John Y. Babau 1 ,365 7.92 PPP 
Kume S. Warren 1 ,202 6 . 9 8  PANGU 
Anton H. Koss 1 , 1 42 6 . 63 IND 
Kulubob Matei 7 8 5  4 . 5 6  IND 
Kalala Aelong 3 8 1  2 . 2 1  IND 
Informal 1 5 6 
Total 1 7,232 
USINO BUNDI OPEN 
George Wan 1 ,646 1 3 . 8 7  PPP NMP 
Amath Siaki 1 ,5 76 1 3 .28 IND 
Iogurua Dorea 9 9 8  8 . 4 1  IND 
Tedor Tuya 9 3 8  7 .90 PANGU SMP 
Bob Wati 7 8 5  6 . 6 1  IND 
Jack Tulia 705 5 . 94 IND 
Joseph Koroma 622 5 . 24 IND 
John Kimbuna 6 0 8  5 . 1 2  MA 
A. Alles Kopai 5 1 0  4 . 30 IND 
Anton Gakana 5 0 2  4 .23 IND 
Hari Mutan 4 9 0  4 . 1 3  IND 
Garima P .  Tai 4 1 4  3. 49 IND 
3 34 
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(USINO BUNDI OPEN continued) 
John Sarett 3 8 0  3 .20 IND 
J. Kormino 3 6 6  3 .08 IND 
Kiap G. Tomas 3 1 8  2 . 68 IND 
Stanis Gilo 2 8 3  2.38 IND 
John Kaupa 1 9 2 1 .62 IND 
0. Mangoroa 1 3 9 1 . 1 7  IND 
Norbert Buak 1 23 1 . 04 IND 
John T. Kunjon 1 2 1 1 . 02 IND 
Eddy T. Toure 7 8  0 . 66 IND 
Utu Y. Mathew 5 0  0 . 2 1  IND 
Informal 1 5 6 
Total 1 7,232 
MOROBE PROVINCIAL 
Jerry K. Nalau 30, 546 24 .47 PANGU NMP 
Utula U Samana 2 1 , 0 8 1  1 6 . 8 9  IND SMP 
Jonathan Soten 1 3,472 1 0 . 79 IND 
Hama Anga 1 2 , 047 9 . 65 IND 
Daan R. Marc 1 1 , 507 9 .22 IND 
Kimbun Keindip 1 0,587 8 . 4 8  PSP 
John Maran 1 0, 1 50 8 . 1 3  IND 
Martin Tapei 5 , 1 1 9  4 . 1 0  IND 
Boyamo SaLI 4,595 3.68 IND 
W. Siawong 2,712 2 . 1 7  IND 
Informal 1 5 6 
Total 1 7,232 
BULOLO OPEN 
Samson C. Napo 5,403 25 . 66 IND NMP 
John Muingnepe 4,4 1 9  20 . 9 8  PPP 
Mathew Bendumb 3,045 1 4 .46 PANGU 
Peter N. Mon 1 ,578 7 .49  IND 
Sa uaro Bore a 1 , 340 6 . 3 6  IND 
Joseph Ben 1 , 1 77 5 . 59 IND 
Ronald Asaiya 720 3 .42 IND 
B.G. Peter 582 2 . 76 IND 
Roy L. Y asiling 4 8 7  2 . 3 1  IND 
3 3 5  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(BULOLO OPEN continued) 
Mathias Philip 429 2 . 04 IND 
David Philip 2 77 1 . 32 IND 
David I. Hukulu 269 1 . 28 IND 
Robert Ottio 2 6 1  1 .24 IND 
Manase G. Niaru 2 1 2  1 . 02 IND 
Y. Bingiding 2 1 2  1 . 02 IND 
Y. Kaimato 1 6 5 0 . 78 IND 
Moses Mumengau 1 1 1  0 . 5 3  IND 
Michael W anamo 70 0 .33 IND 
Informal 3 0 1  
Total 21 ,058 
FINSCHHAFEN OPEN 
Yaip Avini 2,652 1 9 . 02 PANGU NMP 
T. Mionzing 2,437 1 7 .48 IND 
Manzau Lengko 1 ,966 1 4 . 1 0  IND PPP* 
A.T. Mandan 1 ,746 1 2 . 52 IND 
Musalu Geamec 1 ,530 1 0 . 97 IND 
R. Williong 1 , 1 83 8 . 49 IND 
Umbi Taunarn 1 ,055 7.57 IND 
Q. Bazinu 4 73 3 . 39 IND 
John Titigiong 2 78 1 . 99 IND 
S. Mugarenang 2 4 0  1 . 72 LNA 
Baficnus Fuseo 2 1 2  1 . 52 IND 
Bakung B. Idac 1 5 3 1 . 1 0  IND 
Informal 1 7  
Total 1 3,942 
HUON GULF OPEN 
Tuka pe Masani 1 ,651  1 1 . 70 IND NMP 
Peter Narnus 1 ,294 9 . 1 7  LNA 
Ben Garry 1 ,2 1 6  8 . 62 PANGU SMP 
Enny M. Moaitz 1 , 1 3 0  8 . 0 1  IND 
Paul C. Mantila 1 ,082 7 . 67 IND 
Morgan Langim 1 ,081  7 . 66 IND 
Eddie T. Maino 9 5 4  6 . 76 IND 
Hagai Joshua 8 9 6  6 . 35 PPP 
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Candidate Polled 
(HUON GULF OPEN continued) 
Bill Itarnar 894 6 .34 IND 
Wally Mondo 542 3 .84 IND 
Emma Manlmo 524 3 .71  IND 
Adam Munana 496 3 . 52 IND 
Joseph Kawage 460 3 .26 PSP 
Elisha Ahipurn 430 3.05 IND 
John K. Siroi 336 2 .38 IND 
Dr Musi Sau 264 1 .87 IND 
Kotoerno Tauye 259 1 . 84 PAP 
David Jacob 255 1 . 59 IND 
Tek Jana 200 1 .42 PDM 
Informal 1 74 
Total 14, 1 08 
KABWUN OPEN 
Ginson G. Saunu 3,610  28 .39 IND NMP 
Torn Horick 2,476 1 9 .47 PDM SMP 
Atong Dirnoing 1 , 1 44 9 .00 PANDU 
Giana Gawo 1 ,095 8 .61  IND 
Imbong James 930 7 .31  IND 
Garn Niala 805 6 . 33 IND 
Henzi Yakarn 796 6 .26 IND 
Joe W ahasoka 549 4 .32 LNA 
Wagao Openg 4 3 1  3 .39 IND 
Muteng Basa 278 2 . 1 9  IND 
Gigo Zallion 249 1 .96 IND 
Teteng G. Wike 232 1 . 82 IND 
Linzon Banban 1 0 1  0 .79 IND 
Informal 1 9  
Total 12,71 5 
LAE OPEN 
Bart Philernon 1 ,266 9 .27 IND NMP 
Michael Badui 1 ,121  8 .21  IND 
Sam Moses 9 1 5  6 . 70 IND 
Tirnbing Kahata 809 5 . 92 IND 
J arnes Baibary 588 4 .31 IND 
3 3 7  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(LAE OPEN continued) 
Titus Wambun 5 6 6  4 . 1 4  IND PAP* 
Jack Wahern 5 64 4 . 1 3  IND 
Tony Ila 5 4 3  3 . 9 8  PANGU SMP 
Bala Poyia 5 3 0  3 . 8 8  IND 
Davis Koringo 4 5 0  3 . 29 IND 
Leo Kende 4 3 5  3 . 1 8  IND 
Mike Konia 4 3 1  3 . 1 6  IND 
Jonathan Saing 4 1 2  3 . 02 IND 
Andrew Vinara 3 8 6  2 . 8 3  IND 
David Kepak 3 73 2 . 73 IND 
Kenny Irnbong 3 6 6  2 . 68 IND 
Levi Zairo 3 3 1  2 .42 IND 
Daniel Nato 3 0 5  2 . 23 IND 
Uncle Thom 3 0 5  2 . 23 IND 
Billy T. Noi 2 9 4  2 . 1 5  IND 
Bob Maronga 2 8 1  2 . 06 IND 
John Omar 2 6 3  1 . 93 IND 
John H. Auafuru 2 2 8  1 . 67 IND 
Gerry M. Bewa 2 1 4  1 . 57 IND 
Kabi Mande 2 0 0  1 . 46 IND 
John Garap 1 9 1  1 .40 IND 
Peter Tiba 1 9 0 1 . 39 IND 
Tofa Boto 1 76 1 .29 PSP 
Andrew Palawa 1 72 1 .26 LIB 
Peter Seske 1 64 1 .20 IND 
Sikop Imbong 1 4 7  1 . 08 LNA 
George Mack 1 3 1  0 . 96 IND 
Tony Gabuogi 8 3  0 . 6 1  IND 
Informal 2 2 8  
Total 1 3,658 
MARKHAM OPEN 
Andrew Baing 3,035 2 2 . 5 5  PPP NMP 
S.B. Mambon 2,326 1 7 .28 IND SMP 
Parirn Chim 1 , 1 9 3  8 . 6 1  IND 
Buva Y. Yakutu 1 , 1 84 8 . 80 PDM 
P. Tongon 9 0 5  6 . 73 IND 
3 3 8  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(MARKHAM OPEN continued) 
Thomas Karnrni 766 5 . 69 IND 
I. Ben Jerry 6 9 1  5 . 1 3  LNA 
Geoffrey Magas 6 1 7  4 . 58 PANGU 
Kerry S. Wapip 4 3 1  3 . 20 IND 
Jesse Bunum 3 5 7  2 . 65 IND 
Paia Rifi 3 04 2 .26 IND 
A Waiyum 2 74 2 . 04 PLP 
Informal 5 5  
Total 1 3,457 
MENYAMYA OPEN 
Thomas Pelika 2,005 1 5 . 5 9  LNA NMP 
B. Philip 1 , 1 88 9 . 24 IND 
Ainde Wainzo 9 2 1  7 . 1 6  IND SMP 
N. Yakayarnz 9 0 5  7 . 04 IND 
Seth Jaru 8 3 6  6 . 50 IND 
Giatulu Eva 8 1 3  6 . 32 PANGU 
Jenato Awamu 7 1 5  5 . 5 6  PDM 
Aaron M. Akui 6 6 1  5 . 1 4  IND 
Job Talau 6 2 5  4 . 86 IND 
N. Bourne 5 3 1  4 . 1 3  IND 
Ngkiye Paje 5 2 4  4 . 07 IND 
B. Natiapango 5 1 5  4 . 00 Il\JU 
S. Kaiamoto 4 9 1  3 . 82 IND 
Michael Koni 4 8 0  3 . 73 IT\.TI 
A. Ivango Menos 4 6 4  3 . 6 1  IND 
Sam Thomas 446 3.47 IND 
H. Anapeinato 3 9 6  3 . 0 7  IND 
Informal 3 4 5  
Total 1 2, 8 6 1  
NAWAE OPEN 
Yarnandi Amos 2,521 2 1 . 3 1  IND NMP 
Philippe Gaman 1 , 549 1 3 . 09 IND 
Tim Bonga 1 ,547 1 3 . 0 8  PANGU SMP 
Baia Sindi 1 , 1 95 1 0 . 6 0  IND 
Nangaring Bapi 1 ,061  1 0 . 1 0  PAP 
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Candidate Polled 
(NAWAE OPEN continued) 
BangimJim 650 8 .97  IND 
Michael M. Angi 485 4 . 10  IND 
J. Silingi 423 3 .58 LNA 
Paul T. Timaro 368 3 . 1 1  IND 
Jack Keakop 271  2.29 IND 
Tim Bafenu 267 2 .26 PSP 
Tuyom Lucas 1 09 0.92 IND 
Informal 1 29 
Total 1 1 ,829 
TEWAI SIASSI OPEN 
Peter L. Garong 3,460 26.93 PANGU SMP 
Soling Zeming 1 ,939 1 5 . 09 IND 
Pitta Lotung 1 ,557 1 2 . 1 2  INDGU 
Joshua Ongom 942 7.33 INDS 
Asitore N. Tim 908 7 .07 IND 
Michael D. Livi 660 5 . 1 4  PSP 
Tom Jalambi 648 5 .04 PDM 
Willard Wemalo 569 4.43 IND 
Amos W. Berg 427 3 .32 PPP 
Bayang S. Mare 427 3 .32 IND 
Fadibang Matu 358 2 .79 IND 
Micah Rex Lapu 3 1 6  2.46 IND 
Richard Maribu 264 2.06 IND 
NBiding Simau 1 62 1 .26 IND 
Amos Tali 1 4 1  1 . 1 0  IND 
Japhet Kodong 3 1  0 .24 LIB IND* 
Informal 3 7  
Total 12,846 
WEST SEPIK PROVINCIAL 
John T. Talu 9,31 0  1 5 .04 PAP 
Rex Namah 6,761 1 0. 92 PDM 
Jeffrey Tiksep 6,161 9 .95 PSP 
Clement Tumana 5,367 8 .67 PANGU 
Alex Nonwo 5,230 8 .45 IND 
Uwen Wotong 5,032 8 . 1 3  IND 
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Candidate Polled 
(WEST SEPIK PROVINCIAL (continued) 
Martin Enda 5,014 8 . 1 0  IND 
Karl W. Stack 4,825 7 .80 LNA SMP 
Paul Langro 4,291 6 .93 IND 
John Moipu 3,060 4 .94 IND 
Peter Saroya 2, 1 88 3 .53 IND 
Harry Wunum 1 ,954 3 . 1 6  IND 
Hank Yakai 1 ,453 2 .35 IND 
Aloitch Peien 0 0 .00 PPP 
Informal 1 ,250 
Total 61 ,896 
AITAPE LUMI OPEN 
Paul H. Mambei 4,51 9  26 . 1 7  PANGU SMP 
B. Akuire 3,754 2 1 . 74 IND 
Wakopu Thomas 2,963 1 7 . 1 6  IND 
S. Rainbubu 1 ,722 9 .97 LNA 
Jack Auto 1 ,483 8 .59  IND 
Peter Mumbru 9 71 5 .62 IND 
Robert A. Sai 844 4 .89 LIB PDM* 
Peter Meros 544 3 . 1 5  IND 
Andrew Morien 221  3 . 15  IND 
Informal 244 
Total 1 7,265 
NUKU OPEN 
C. Sambre 2,930 1 8 . 1 7  PANGU SMP 
A. Kumbakor 2,359 1 4 .63 IND 
Joe Kawa 1 ,492 9 .25 IND 
Mauri Nemantu 1 ,396 8 .66 PPP 
G. Apkusha 1 ,384 8 .58  PDM 
Simon Wama 1 ,291 8 .01  PSP 
Peter S. Wauwau 904 5 .61  IND 
Carlos Yuni 888  5 .51  IND 
N. Sitook 659 4 .09 IND 
Melchior Mokul 6 5 1  4 .04 IND 
Tom Yuankou 638 3 .96 IND 
Andrew Komboni 5 1 1  3 . 1 7  IND 
3 4 1  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(NUKU OPEN continued) 
Luke Tom 432 2 . 68 IND 
Primus Hari 306 1 . 90 IND 
Nick K. Moyik 1 6 1  1 . 00 IND 
Informal 1 2 0 
Total 1 6, 1 22 
TELEFOMIN OPEN 
Bob Netin 2, 1 52 1 5 . 1 0  IND NMP PPP* 
Clarkson Dikinsep 2, 1 30 1 4 . 9 5  PANGU 
Felix Tapineng 2,055 1 4 .42 LNA SMP 
John Makau 1 ,592 1 1 . 1 7 IND 
Danny Bangal Lane 1 ,335 9 . 37 MA 
Mathew A. Futengim 1 ,257 8 . 82 IND 
Wesani Iwoksim 1 ,020 7 . 1 6  PSP 
Mathew Nawan Dupkut 8 3 9  5 . 89 IND 
Percy Winau 7 1 9  5 . 05 PDM 
Yayef Yahe 5 7 3  4 . 02 IND 
Wagera Buia 3 2 1  2 . 25 IND 
John Dua 1 24 0 . 87 IND 
Informal 1 3 1 
Total· 1 4,248 
VANIMO GREEN RIVER OPEN 
Nappotti Buru 2, 077 1 4, 5 7  IND NMP 
Tom inohha 1 ,947 1 3 .66 IND 
Micah Wes 1 ,438 1 0 . 09 PDM 
Joe K. Nali 1 ,405 9 . 8 6  LIB 
Wap Yawo 1 , 359 9 . 5 3  PPP SMP 
Gerald Gubon 1 , 1 89 8 . 34 LNA 
Enda Zachary 1 , 1 06 7 . 76 MA 
Wini Marcus 9 84 6 . 9 0  IND 
Peter Apoi 9 6 1  6 . 74 IND 
Daniel Maskim 787 5 . 52 PANGU 
Nanau Susuma 6 8 0  4 . 77 IND 
John Kawa 2 0 7  1 .45 BAP 
Informal 1 1 6  
Total 1 4,256 
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Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
CHIMBU PROVINCIAL 
David Goro Mai 23, 273 1 6 .82 IND NMP PDM* 
Palma Embia 1 2,462 9 . 00 IND 
Ambane Louis 1 0, 8 94 7 . 87 IND 
Aribill Bonapa 1 0,437 7 . 54 IND PSP* 
Joseph Nombri 9,336 6 . 78 IND 
Errol Siba 8, 878 6 . 4 1  IND 
Peter Koglkia 8,481 6 . 1 3  IND 
Yalwai Boniwan 7, 770 5 . 6 1  LNA 
Peter Kakep 7 . 085 5 . 1 2  CP SMP 
Martin Lulu 4,482 3 . 24 IND 
Arnold Aglai 4,31 5 3 . 1 2  IND 
A Rabisman 3, 9 1 1  2 .83  IND 
John Numi 3, 839 2 . 77 IND 
Guambo Tinake 3,758 2 . 71 IND 
Marome Y albir 3,563 2 . 5 7  LIB 
P Aulakua 3,448 2 .49 IND 
John E Kua 3, 1 77 2 . 30 IND 
Dokta Kiage K 2,527 1 . 83 IND 
James Balua Mu 2,014 1 . 46 IND 
Clement Kalap 1 , 901  1 . 37 IND 
Simon Kauba 1 , 574 1 . 1 4 IND 
Tom Bomai 8 4 0  0 . 6 1  Ir-...ro 
Informal 3 8 0  
Total 1 38, 395 
CHUAVE OPEN 
Yauve Riyong 2,636 1 2 .09 LNA NMP 
Sinamoi Brown 2,481 1 1 .38 IND SMP 
David F. Anggo 2,321 1 0 . 64 IND 
George S. Muroa 2, 1 1 1  9 . 68 IND 
Kumon Launa 1 , 8 1 4  8 . 32 IND 
Elias Kurubu 1 , 538 7 . 05 IND 
Jim Nomane 1 , 5 1 7  6 .96 IND 
Martin Dama 8 4 8  3 . 89 IND 
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Candidate Polled 
(CHUA VE OPEN continued) 
Moree Nimbe 8 3 7  3 . 84 IND 
Steven K Otan 8 0 9  3 . 71 IND 
Kern Ciano 6 1 7  2 . 83 IND 
Pasta Koma 5 6 7  2 . 60 IND 
Stanley Koi 5 5 9  2 . 56 IND 
Danley M Gue 4 9 0  2 . 25 LIB 
Kiman K Mori 4 6 0  2 . 1 1  IND 
Robert Fonggu 434 1 . 99 IND 
Kopon tonari 3 6 0  1 . 65 IND 
Nime F Tapie 3 3 1  1 . 52 IND 
Michael Kiagi 3 0 0  1 . 38 CP 
Robin Benson 2 74 1 . 26 IND 
Malcolm Kopon 2 4 9  1 . 1 4  IND 
Martin Mundawa 1 84 0 . 84 IND 
Gerry Ninbe 5 1  0 . 23 IND CP* 
Informal 2 0  
Total 2 1 ,808 
GUMINE OPEN 
John M Nilkare 1 ,621  7. 1 7  LNA NMP 
Kale Clement 1 , 379 6 . 1 0  IND PAP* 
Fred T Arre 1 , 358 6 . 00' IND 
Aulkupa Wamil 1 , 349 5 . 96 IND 
John M Dulume 1 ,201  5 . 3 1  IND 
Dorn Alphonse 1 , 1 95 5 . 28 IND 
Noah Kool 1 , 1 1 4 4 . 92 IND 
Kuble Kaiule 1 , 002 4 . 43 LIB 
David K Maima 9 3 9  4 . 1 5 IND 
Otto Olmi 9 3 9  4 . 1 5 IND 
John More Aula 9 2 2  4 . 08 IND 
Tolpari Sipa 9 0 0  3 . 9 8  CP 
Bil Ninkama 8 0 5  3 . 56 IND SMP PDM* 
Nul M Taima 720 3 . 1 8  IND 
James M Yopa 6 5 3  2 . 89 IND 
Sipa Simon Bon 6 3 2  2 . 79 IND 
Mathew Yobale 5 7 0  2 . 52 IND 
Kopan Barth 5 4 9  2 . 43 IND 
James Aiwa 5 2 5  2 . 32 MA 
Clement Kirin 422 1 . 87 CP 
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Candidate Polled 
(GUMINE OPEN continued ) 
Oltai Baago 4 2 1  1 . 86 IND 
Tala K Arol 4 1 8  1 . 85 IND 
Bob Wai Kona 3 9 7  1 . 75 IND 
Paul Ninkam 3 74 1 . 65 PDM 
Moses M Aina 3 6 8  1 . 63 IND 
Kaupa Wemin 3 3 7  1 . 49 IND 
Peter Kumo 1 1 7 0 . 52 IND 
Gaull K Gaul 1 1 5  0 . 39 IND 
Yaldrua J Olmi 8 8  0 . 39 IND 
Joseph Kumo 8 4  0 . 37 Ii\J'D 
Andrew S Aula 3 2  0 . 14 IND 
Joseph Kolkia 1 4  0 . 096 IND 
Informal 3 7  
Total 22,623 
KARIMUI-NOMANE OPEN 
Philip Yomo 1 , 638 9 . 90 IND NMP 
Peter Balbe 1 ; 3 1 4  7 . 94 IND 
Jacob Wai 1 , 1 5 5  6 . 98 IND 
Teebee A Aure 1 , 005 6 . 07 IND 
Amos B Kawale 9 9 9  6 . 04 BAP 
Peter 0 Wemin 9 9 4  6 . 0 1  IND 
Habai R Hobel 9 0 9  5 . 49 IND PSP* 
Paul P Sisioka 8 5 7  5 . 1 8 1 IND 
Seberai Domu 8 1 8  4 . 94 IND 
Mu Peter Nimbe 7 1 0 4 . 29 CP 
Koin Siape 6 9 9  4 . 22 IND CP* 
Nick Tom Kore 6 7 0  4 . 05 IND 
Steven S Magi 5 2 8  3 . 1 9  CP 
Tinne Kaube 5 0 8  3 . 07 IND 
Geoffrey Kama 4 4 8  2 . 71 IND 
Kubulo Y David 3 8 9  2 . 35 CP 
Wange Ku 3 8 8  2 . 34 LNA 
Thomas Kawale 378 2 . 28 LNA 
Mondo N Moro 3 7 1  2 . 24 IND 
Peter Gelua 3 0 3  1 . 83 IND 
Daniel Ninkama 2 8 2  1 . 70 IND 
Bare T Vitus 2 6 7  1 . 6 1  IND 
Esau 0 Seao 264 1 . 60 IND 
Tony Olabe 2 3 6  1 . 43 LIB 
Sena Korarome 1 3 7 0 . 83 LIB 
3 4 5  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(KARIMUI-NOMANE OPEN continued) 
John Yoba 1 0 6 0 . 64 IND 
Jona tha Aise 9 7  0 . 59 IND 
John Duma 4 1  0 . 25 PANGU 
Neil Kaupa 7 0 . 04 IND 
Hasanuga Parai 7 0 . 04 IND 
John Kamun 2 0 . 01 IND 
Sarn Kundi 0 0 . 00 IND 
Informal 2 2  
Total 1 6,549 
KEROWAGI OPEN 
John Kamb 3 , 1 20 1 0 . 76 PAP NMP 
Camilus Bongro 2,214 7 . 64 IND 
James K Pikip 1 , 944 6 . 70 IND 
Zerike Duambo 1 ,933 6 . 67 IND 
Nil Yongumulg 1 , 658 5 . 72 NAT 
Jim Yer Waim 1 , 4 1 0  4 . 86 PANGU SMP 
Joe K Tumun 1 , 396 4 . 8 1  IND 
A Edward 1 , 1 8 3  4 . 08 CP 
Paul Nuglai 1 , 1 6 7  4 . 02 IND NAT* 
Steven A Gene 1 , 1 43 3 . 94 IND 
Alois Siune 9 0 7  3 . 1 3  CP 
Joe Nerebare 8 84 3 . 05 LNA 
Dewe Embia 8 0 1  2 . 76 IND 
John Kauga 784 2 . 70 IND 
Mandi Teine 7 5 0  2 . 59 IND 
Dawe James Kai 6 6 5  2 . 29 CP 
David D Gagma 6 3 3  2 . 1 8  IND 
Geregl Walter 6 3 3  2 . 1 8  IND 
Andrew M Waguo 6 2 5  2 . 1 6  IND 
David Tul 6 0 9  2 . 1 0  PDM 
Joseph Numambo 5 5 1  1 . 90 IND 
Kagl Mundua 5 3 3  1 . 84 BAP 
Thomas G Kaman 4 6 9  1 . 62 LIB 
Kurumba Taia 4 4 0  1 . 52 IND 
Bolkun P Bame 3 9 9  1 . 38 IND CP* 
Mark Danga 3 9 1 1 . 35 IND 
Robert Mondia 3 6 0  1 . 24 IND 
Joseph W Apa 344 1 . 1 9  IND 
Yagl K Yogl 2 8 8  0 . 99 IND 
Joseph Mondo 2 7 7  0 . 96 IND 
3 4 6  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(KEROWAGI OPEN continued) 
Kigl B Duru 1 4 0 0 .48 IND 
Joe I Ulka 1 1 0 0 . 38 IND 
Korangie D Warn 8 1  0 .28 IND 
John Ulkanve 5 7  0 . 20 IND 
R Kuanande 3 4  0 . 1 2 IND 
Informal 6 1  
Total 28,995 
KUNDIAWA OPEN 
Joseph Onguglo 3,661 1 5 .95 BAP NMP 
Wagi Merirnba 2,566 1 1 . 1 8  IND 
Francis Dama 1 ,299 6 . 67 IND 
Mathew Siune 1 , 1 88 5 . 1 8  PAP 
Kire W illiarn 1 , 1 22 4 . 89 IND 
Peter Baka 1 , 029 4 . 48 PANGU 
Kernai Wire 9 3 1  4 . 06 QJ 
Fred Nua 8 1 8  3 . 56 IND 
K Gorornauglo 7 3 6  3 .2  IND 
Andy Siure 7 1 1 3 . 1 0  IND 
F Kombukun 702 3 . 06 IND 
J arnes W Ulka 6 4 8  2 . 82 QJ 
Wally Y egiora 6 1 7  2 . 69 IND 
Misirn Goiye 5 7 1  2 . 49 IND 
James Dindongo 5 4 9  2 . 39 IND 
Kogl Peter 5 3 6  2 . 34 IND 
Joe Toa 4 9 0  2 . 1 4  QJ 
Siwi Muruk 4 6 6  2 . 03 LNA 
Arnold Kunda 4 3 5  1 . 90 IND 
Thomas Wairn 4 3 4  1 . 89 LIB  
Kuman K Kawage 3 7 5  1 . 63 IND 
Andrew Deglba 3 1 5  1 . 37 IND 
Dominic Kama 2 5 2  1 . 1 0  IND 
Joe Wau Kuman 2 3 6  1 . 03 IND 
Fabian Kawao 1 9 1 0 . 8 3  IND 
Jack Biange 1 5 6 0 . 68 QJ 
Lukas K Kiak 1 1 6  0 . 5 1  IND 
Joe Komba 1 0 3 0 . 45 IND 
Michael Aigal 8 2  0 . 36 IND 
Urnba Guane 2 2  0 . 1 0  IND 
Informal 6 0  
Total 22,948 
347  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
SINASINA YONGGOMUGL OPEN 
Kerenga Okoro 1 ,532 6 .31  IND NMP 
Ludger Mond 1 ,450 5 . 97 MA 
Kale K Garap 1 , 1 05 4 .55 IND 
Nibson Nibabe 989 4 .07 CP 
Samuel W Kama 988  4 .07 IND 
Mogia Wemin 9 8 1  4 . 04 IND 
M Waisime 9 1 2  3 . 75 IND 
John Tangila 897  3 .69 IND 
Thomas G Apa 8 8 1  3 .63 IND 
Koningi Mui 8 1 4  3 .35 IND NAT* 
Paul Mane Papa 730 3 .01  IND 
Nime Dabire 6 9 8  2 . 87 PPP 
Ware Mukale 671  2 . 76 IND 
Mogmane Wamil 646 2 . 66 IND 
Tom K kune 632 2 . 60 IND 
David Aukamane 6 1 9  2 .55 IND 
Waiang Michael 603 2 .48 IND 
Boi Degemba 570 2.35 IND 
John Ninkama 5 6 7  2 . 33 LNA PDM* 
Moipa Nilkapp 5 5 0  2 .26 IND 
Taul Peter 5 3 7  2 .21 IND 
Gola Dom Ray 494  2 . 03 IND 
John G Aina 4 74 1 .95 IND 
Kjune Paul 4 74 1 .95 CP 
John Tai 4 5 1  1 .86 IND 
Bart Bokun 439  1 .81 IND 
John Dege 4 1 6  1 . 71 IND 
Kiage Wel 373 1 .54 PDM 
Philip Talmba 335 1 .38 IND 
Joe Maul 327  1 . 35 IND 
Anthony Konia 322 1 .33 IND 
James Baundi 3 0 1  1 .24 LIB 
Sue K Drua 296 1 .22 IND 
Gipmai Kiak 286 1 . 1 8  IND 
Jonathan Kale 280 1 . 1 5  PAP 
Sam Y Mogia 229 0 . 94 PANGU IND* 
Peter Tugo 2 1 4  0 .88 CP 
Peter Gull 1 9 8  0 . 82 LNA 
Lister Baule 1 74 0 . 72 IND 
Bonney Aravil 1 65 0 .68 IND 
3 4 8  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(SINASINA YONGGOMUGL OPEN continued) 
Dama Rino Poka 1 34 0 . 55 IND 
James Kowia 1 0 7  0 . 44 IND 
John Korul 9 0  0 . 37 IND 
John Kultu 8 1  0 . 3 3  IND 
Bulake Maule 6 5  0 . 27 IND 
Hubert M Kui 5 6  0 . 23 IND 
Yuke Komba 4 3  0 . 1 8  IND 
Tamo P Engnui 1 7  0 . 07 IND 
Informal 5 
Total 24,288 
EASTERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCIAL 
Aiva Ivarato 2 0, 3 77 29 . 1 0  PDM SMP 
Barry Holloway 6,880 9 . 81 LNA 
Vegu Javono 3, 877 5 . 54 IND 
Tisa K Mixio 3, 684 5 . 26 IND 
Ifisoe Segeyar 3,274 4 . 68 IND 
Silas Atopare 2,924 4 . 1 8 PANGU 
Philip A vuti 2,605 3 . 72 IND PSP* 
Simon Guri 2,322 3 . 32 IND 
Ferao Ori 2,079 2 . 97 IND 
Dekot Koki 2,040 2 . 9 1  CP 
Tepi Ya'Ato 1 , 878 2 . 68 IND PPP* 
Hona S Javati 1 , 868 2 . 67 IND 
Paddy K Fagon 1 ,537 2 . 1 9  IND 
Abundi Ende 1 ,374 1 . 96 IND 
Umuna Biaote 1 ,340 1 . 9 1  IND 
Musa P Auve 1 ,304 1 . 86 IND 
Bune Sogomari 1 ,248 1 . 78 IND 
Talf K Siove 1 ,239 1 . 77 IND 
James Yanepa 1 ,2 1 1  1 . 73 NAT 
Saio A Godfrey 1 , 1 28 1 . 61 IND 
James Korarome 1 , 026 1 . 47 IND 
Kassa Mohamet 9 6 8  1 . 38 IND 
Kone P Koko 9 5 4  1 . 36 PAP 
Lobuna Umanda 9 1 3 1 . 30 IND 
Kafe Kopi 79 5 1 . 14 IND 
Soti Sihuvo 702 1 . 00 LIB 
Kiri Miori 4 8 1  0 . 69 IND 
Informal 
Total 70,028 
3 4 9  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
DAULO OPEN 
Gunia Sowa 1 , 326 6 . 77 MA NMP 
Keruai Gorofo 1 ,270 6 .48 LIB 
Ganarafo F Ron 1 ,221 6.23 LNA 
Koyangko Tony 1 , 1 70 5 . 97 IND 
Gerus Y Moses 1 , 1 1 8  5 . 71 IND 
Paul Bayango 1 ,073 5 . 48 IND 
L S  Robebe 9 9 0  5 . 05 IND PSP* 
Gorosahu Ekime 8 4 4  4 . 3 1  PANGU 
Nathan Aputi 729 3 . 72 IND 
Bire K Peter 722 3 . 69 IND 
Gimiseve John 6 9 2  3 . 53 IND 
Kare K Jocob 6 7 9  3 .47 IND 
Tenige Ohuno 674 3 . 44 IND 
Kamawe K Bilak 6 7 3  3 . 26 IND 
Fege Joe 6 3 8  3 . 22 IND 
Dawa J Arapi 6 3 0  3 . 0 1  L I B  
Ron Unurufo 5 9 0  2.48 CP 
Gafie Benefa 4 8 5  2 . 47 NAT 
Duwabene Gai 4 8 4  2 . 46 IND SMP 
Wogaro Kevin 4 8 2  2 . 3 1  IND 
Sirifav Samuel 4 5 3  2 . 1 2  IND 
Sou Ifu James 4 1 6  1 . 82 IND 
Garahe Robert 3 5 6  1 . 78 IND 
Foxy Forukave 3 4 8  1 . 72 IND 
Ghabilih Wally 3 3 7  1 . 70 IND 
Baru M Kiripo 3 3 4  1 . 61  IND 
Gotuno Colvis 3 1 5  1 . 1 2 IND 
George Kimiho 2 1 9  0 . 82 IND 
Kipoi Jim 1 6 1  0 . 28 IND 
Rambi Robert 5 4  0 . 22 IND 
Guri N Mai 4 3  0 . 19 IND 
Kanimbo Thomas 3 7  0 . 08 IND 
Hongoro Goya 1 5  0 . 07 IND 
John Bimai 1 4  0 . 07 IND 
Informal 
Total 1 9,592 
GOROKA OPEN 
Mathias Ijape 4,6 1 4  22 .73 IND SMP 
Enoch Asineha 2, 1 28 1 0 .48 NAT 
3 5 0  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(GOROKA OPEN continued) 
Argo Ohue 1 ,465 7 .22 PDM 
Bebes Korowaro 1 ,087 5 . 35 PANGU 
Michael Gotaha 1 . 038 5 . 1 1  IND 
Ubum Makarai 9 2 9  4 . 58 PPP 
Vaiha Gosoware 776 4 . 58 IND 
Wilson Pegipo 7 6 8  3 . 78 IND 
Samson Akunaii 722 4 . 58 IND 
Jim Joavari 674 3 . 32 IND 
Alfred Kerenga 662 3 . 26 PAP 
Moses Divilake 6 3 1  3 . 1 1  IND 
Huhuna Inapero 6 2 3  3 . 07 IND 
Ronald Janis 5 8 8  2 . 90 IND 
douglas Warii 5 2 0  2 . 56 IND PSP* 
Gipene Pirehu 3 9 0  1 . 92 IND 
Cecil Tol uana 3 8 3  1 . 89 CP 
Murray Paiyesi 3 6 0  1 . 77 IND 
Henry Nenizo 3 4 6  1 . 70 IND 
Gou Sine 2 8 6  1 . 41 IND 
Robert Hiemute 2 8 4  1 . 40 IND 
Joe Andrias 2 8 4  1 .40 IND 
Ken Yasihe 1 . 1 2  1 . 1 2  IND 
Jeffrey Tehe 1 . 00 1 . 00 IND 
Koni Aize 0 . 70 0 . 70 IND 
Bryan Kahayhor 0 . 54 0 . 54 IND 
Informal 6 0  
Total 20,301 
HENGANOFI OPEN 
Viviso Seravo 3,487 1 6 . 1 4 IND NMP NAT* 
John Giheno 3,031 1 4 . 0 3  PANGU SMP 
Peter Hinome 2,050 9 . 49 IND 
Pelly Beglana 1 , 706 7.89 IND 
Vincent Hatefa 1 , 547 6 . 82 PDM 
Kijon Korarome 1 ,473 5 . 22 IND 
Obi K Eseni 1 , 1 27 4 . 04 IND 
Kisopa Sagao 8 73 3 . 38 IND 
Monkofa Bafina 73 1 3 . 09 IND 
Vini Arihafa 6 6 8  3 . 02 IND 
Philip Akif 6 5 2  2 . 95 IND 
3 5 1  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(HENGANOFI OPEN continued) 
Jota K Sifu 6 3 7  2 . 95 IND 
Simon Naka 522 2 . 42 IND 
Sepo A Joseph 4 5 4  2 . 1 0  IND 
Aaron Kasse 442 2 . 05 IND 
David Lupa 4 3 8  2 . 03 IND 
Seah Pupuk 4 3 1  1 .99 IND 
Yamis Gigimat 4 2 7  1 . 98 IND 
Megani Kahentoi 3 5 8  1 .6 IND 
Wesley Tankore 3 1 2  1 .44 IND 
Jack J Kagamo 244 1 . 1 3  IND 
Informal 6 0  
Total 2 1 ,6 1 0  
KAINANTU OPEN 
Avusi E Tanao 2, 126 9 . 72 PDM SMP 
Yuntuvi 1 ,907 8 . 72 IND 
Jerry Mantavi 1 , 828 8 . 36 IND 
Zoregos Aejofa 1 , 2 1 3  5 . 55 IND 
David Tuvisuvi 1 ,209 5 . 53 IND 
Kapi Honerinke 1 ,208 5 . 52 LIB 
John C !nape 1 ,201 5 .49 IND 
S Kamunda 9 2 7  4 .24 NAT 
Yamu Esseo 8 9 4  4 . 09 IND 
K Tokave 8 4 0  3 . 84 IND 
Terry M Onawa 7 5 0  3 . 43 IND 
Tonny W Kafane 7 5 0  3 .43 IND 
Mankly Nonao 7 1 2  3 .25 PANGU 
Nimo Masio 6 3 9  2 . 92 IND PSP* 
Matie Pe'E 5 8 8  2 . 69 IND 
Bob Wa'O 5 8 6  2 . 68 IND 
B Pinunke 5 2 6  2 . 40 IND 
George Sio Moa 5 2 5  2 . 40 IND 
Samo Tofuya 442 2 . 02 IND 
Tony Agonami 4 4 0  2 . 0 1  IND 
Koi Nakime 4 0 4  1 . 85 IND 
Patrick Sukao 3 6 1  1 . 65 IND 
Tota Kauve 3 2 8  1 . 50 IND 
Steward Apaika 3 0 3  1 . 39 IND 
Tuse Risonave 2 5 3  1 . 1 6  IND 
Tisa J Yubiko 1 6 1  0 . 74 IND 
Jebi Andy 1 6 0  0 . 73 IND 
352 
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(KAINANTU OPEN continued) 
Wewiak Erinuwe 1 0 1  0 .46 IND 
Sai Temita 5 6  0 .26 IND 
Tolobai Turua 4 9  0 . 22 IND 
Chris N Togino 4 7  0 .21  IND 
Freemon Hugao 8 0 .04 IND 
Paul 0 Foro 3 0 .01  IND 
Informal 0 
Total 21 ,875 
LUFA OPEN 
Mathias Karani 2,864 1 3 .37 NAT NMP 
Komane Wasege 1,791 12.50 IND 
Iya K Nopa 1 ,774 8 .36 PDM SMP IND* 
Jeffrey Kauve 1 ,488 8 . 28 IND PSP* 
Jacob Isapi 1 ,442 6 .95 IND 
Neskege Aigava 1 ,438 6 . 73 IND 
Tovoi D Kima 1 ,011  6 . 71 PPP 
Eleen Hamena 979 4 .72 IND 
David Biritu' 707 4 .57 IND 
Yaya Denewari 635  3 . 30 LNA 
Yaviri Famundi 634 2 .96 IND 
Famundi Atara 6 3 1  2 .96 IND 
David Kemigota 5 9 7  2 .95 IND 
Stephen Avian 540  2 .79 PAP 
Kulifano Heyo 466  2 .52  IND 
Bonu Aunu 4 6 1  2 . 1 8  IND 
Uve Sabumei 436 2 . 1 5  IND 
Tiki L Kaphipa 282  2 . 04 CP 
Philip Sokom 2 1 7  1 . 32 LIB 
Tom Umave 1 99 1 .01  IND 
Deyaba iyodeke 70  0 . 93 IND 
John D Kisivi 2 2  0 . 33 IND PDM* 
Johnson Eklipe 3 0 .01  IND 
Informal 5 5  
Total 21 ,420 
OBURA WONENARA OPEN 
Peter Gaige 4,838 20 .64 IND SMP 
Muki Taranupi 3, 1 33 1 3. 37 IND 
Lenni Aparaima 2,931 8 . 36 IND 
Hea Hahamani 1 ,788 7 .63 IND 
3 5 3  
Name of Votes % Party RemarJ<s 
Candidate Polled 
(OBURA WONENARA OPEN continued) 
Joe Eha 1 ,633 6 .97 IND 
Mota Bun 1 ,406 6 .00 IND 
Jones Sa' Asia 1 ,079 4 .60 IND 
Duobe .Kiambu 9 3 1  3 .97 IND 
S Sarireka 925 3 .95 IND 
Mine Kipefa 829 3 .54 IND 
Mono Ata 822 3 .51  IND 
Paru Tukundo 803 3 .43 IND 
John Orame 649 2 .77 IND 
Sambeni Kawena 6 1 5  2 .62 IND 
Bikul H Noni 4 9 0  2 .09 IND 
Aruna .Kingsley 432 1 . 84 IND 
Peter Andau'O 6 3  0 .27 IND 
Jessy Sanima 4 2  0 . 1 8  IND 
Tuai David 3 1  0 . 1 3  IND 
Informal 5 5  
Total 23,440 
OKAPA OPEN 
Castan Maibawa 4,069 1 6 .79 IND SMP 
Oriva Iki 1 ,625 6 . 70 IND 
Tekura Regani 1 ,470 6 .06 MA 
Frank Fikena 1 ,402 5 . 78 LIB 
William Wanlek 1 ,399 5 . 77 IND 
Sam Fakii 1 , 365 5 . 63 IND 
Wato K Avinaga 1 ,272 5 .25 IND PSP* 
Epaga Taigi 1 ,270 5 . 24 NAT 
Terry Umolo 1 ,209 4 .99 LNA 
P Kosinto 1 , 1 68 4 . 82 IND 
G Eigavara 1 , 060 4 . 37 IND 
Tanoi Meuro 9 0 1  3 . 72 IND 
I Sarni A yolepi 9 0 1  3 .72 IND 
B Sagata 737 3 .04 IND 
Paul Oyaboso 669 2 .76 IND 
David Tagindo 648 2 .67 IND 
Smith W lkoe 632 2 .61  CP 
Andrew Wande 5 77 2 .38 IND 
Robby Ananas 546  2 .25 IND 
Jacob B Wanu 502  2 .07 IND 
Legos W Aiyata 3 1 5  1 . 30 IND 
Iso Morabo 2 5 3  1 .04 IND 
3 5 4  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(OKAP A OPEN continued) 
Rivai Hafime 1 6 8  0 . 69 IND 
Asa Kabo 4 8  0 .20 IND 
Informal 3 5  
Total 24,241 
UNGGAI BENA OPEN 
Kevin Masive 3,41 6  1 8 .55 PPP NMP PAP* 
B Sabumei 2,861 1 5 .53  IND SMP 
Kapi Sarohafa 2 . 502 1 3 .58 IND 
Nana P Stagg 2,330 1 2 .65 IND 
David Oino 1 , 1 24 1 1 .53 IND 
K Abisinito 1 ,262 6 . 86 IND 
Lomutop Philip 1 ,260 6 . 84 IND 
Jason Sinopane 1 , 1 36 6 . 1 7  IND 
T Laganaso 880 4 . 78 IND 
G Solomohafa 3 5 8  1 .94 IND 
Ricky Aiyowiye 8 0 .04 IND 
Informal 282 
Total 1 8,419 
ENGA PROVINCIAL 
J .  Balakau 26,822 1 7 .48 IND SMP 
Dokosa Amean 1 7,465 1 1 .38 PDM 
Sanis Kaka 1 5,874 1 0 .35 IND 
Kandep Pyanji 1 5,295 9 .97 IND 
Peter Ipatas 1 5,044 9 .81  IND 
K Joseph 1 1 ,643 7 .59 IND 
Paul Torato 1 0,905 6 . 63 IND 
Anton Parao 8,396 5 . 47 MA 
E Kombeakali 4,957 3 . 23 PSP 
Poteyalin Nepo 3,787 3 .02 PAP 
Makole A Kapo 3,262 2.47 IND 
Poketa J Minas 3,787 2 . 1 3  IND 
Kare S Makape 3,262 1 .66 IND 
Sauan Amaiu 2,551  0 .99 IND 
Aino Y angala 1 ,521 0 .36 IND 
Perema K Mek 5 5 0  0 .33 IND 
James Tengen 499 0 .33 IND 
lnf ormal 4 8  
Total 153,425 
3 5 5  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
KANDEP OPEN 
Jimson Papaki 8,557 3 5 . 89 PDM SMP 
Job Takesane 3,234 1 3 . 5 6  IND PAP* 
Tum Erasi 2,837 1 1 .90 IND 
Sakias Tamao 2 , 1 26 8 . 92 LIB 
Peter Y Pasul 1 , 621 6 . 80 IND 
Mup Mapitu 1 , 598 6 . 66 IND 
John S Lau 1 , 364 5 . 72 LIB 
Jack Lombaiya 1 ,268 5 . 32 IND 
Peter A Pyaso 1 ,237 5 . 1 9  II\U 
Rawers Was Per 3 0 . 01 IND 
John Yaka 0 0 . 00 MA 
Informal 9 
Total 23,845 
KOMPIAM-AMBUM OPEN 
John T Pundari 2,630 1 1 . 3 5  IND NMP 
Comlius Kakal 2,609 1 1 . 26 MA 
Leo N igiman 2, 364 1 0 . 2 1  IND 
Michael Mangal 2, 1 84 9 . 43 IND 
Jack Tiakai 1 , 649 7 . 12 IND 
T Pyalanda 1 , 549 6 . 69 IND 
Tom Amaiu 1 , 543 6 . 66 IND SMP 
Charles S Nar 1 , 5 1 9  6 . 56 IND 
Robert Y al ui 1 , 1 42 4 . 93 IND 
Peter T ambuak 1 ,002 4 . 33 PANGU 
Pakea Mana 7 8 0  3 . 37 IND 
Tinalapin Siki 767 3 .31  IND 
Laima Koraka 7 3 5  3 . 1 7  IND 
N Kemben 5 9 1  2 . 55 IND PPP* 
Otto Napi 5 5 3  2 . 39 LIB 
Candy Lombange 5 0 2  2 . 1 7  IND 
Michael Lugu 3 3 0  1 . 42 IND 
Mark Kukuni 2 2 3  0 . 96 IND 
Jeffrey S Kaki 1 4 9 0 . 64 PAP 
Tenny Pakawa 7 7  0 . 33 IND 
Sauen B Yakyo 5 3  0 . 23 IND 
Informal 2 1 1  
Total 2 3, 1 62 
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Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
LAGAIP POGERA OPEN 
Anton Pakena 6,020 9 . 34 IND NMP 
Philip Kuala 4 ,3 1 8 6 . 70 II\.1D 
Yadas Kutato 3, 894 6 . 04 IND 
Jonatan Paraia 3,841 5 . 96 IND 
Tenda Lau 3,094 4 . 80 PANGU SMP 
Jack K Amu 2,800 4 . 34 IND 
Waite Yapipa 2, 775 4 . 3 1  PDM 
Napi Kandaso 2,538 3 . 94 IND 
Mark Ipuia 2,5 1 4  3 . 90 IND 
Op is Y andapake 2,327 3 . 6 1  IND 
Wambea Makapa 2,321 3 . 60 IND 
Kaen Poko 2,293 3 . 56 IND 
Lai pen Wallen 2,209 3 . 43 IND 
Yasowa Kome 2, 1 89 3 .40 IND 
Jack L Kutal 2, 1 78 3 . 38 IND 
Yesu Kulina 2, 1 06 3 . 27 IND 
D Waiakali 2,078 3 .22 IND 
Solo Pita 2,053 3 . 1 9  IND 
Godfrey Waip 1 ,972 3 . 06 IND 
Ned J Lakari 1 ,921  2 . 98 IND 
Sambe Kolaip 1 ,76 2 . 74 PAP 
Philip M Sa' A 1 ,697 2 .63  IND 
J Wailingi 1 ,4 1 8  2 .20 IND 
Luke Ero 8 1 6  1 .27 IND 
Rolan Paina 684 1 . 06 LIB 
Waro Pol Waro 6 6 5  1 . 03 IND 
Jack Kuro Lome 5 8 5  0 . 9 1  IND 
Yange T Kappin 5 1 3  0 . 80 IND 
Chris K Paiya 4 3 5  0 . 67 IND 
Kapilo Maso 280 0. 43 IND 
Yaka L Uma 64  0 . 1 0  IND 
Kunali tindipa 3 0 . 00 LIB 
Informal 8 5  
Total 64,451  
WABAG OPEN 
Albert Kipalan 3,567 1 2 . 3 7  IND SMP PPP* 
K Joe Tengea 3, 368 1 1 .68 IND 
Daneli Kapi 2, 792 9 . 68 IND 
Jim T Kongo 2 ,551  8 . 85 IND 
Kandes Philip 2,264 7 .85  IND 
3 5 7  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(WABAG OPEN continued) 
Roy K Maramuni 1 , 958 6 . 79 IND 
Martin T okopae 1 , 9 1 5  6 . 64 IND 
Maiting Laima 1 ,7 1 0  5 . 93 IND 
Maso Samai 1 , 5 1 4  5 . 25 IND 
Yakan Yoke 1 ,494 5 . 1 8  IND 
Kandan G Kia 1 ,430 4 . 96 IND 
Aaron P Heron 1 ,364 4 . 73 PANGU 
Paul Nili 1 , 1 24 3 . 90 IND 
Michael Puio 9 9 3  3 . 44 IND 
Y ali Kandakin 3 9 7  1 . 38 IND 
Otto L Y all on 3 8 9  1 . 35 IND 
David I Pake 6 0 . 02 PSP 
Tasan Talian 5 0 . 02 IND 
Informal 
Total 28,841 
WAPENAMANDA OPEN 
M Iangalio 7,800 3 0 . 1 6  PDM SMP 
Ronald Rimbao 5,378 2 0 . 79 PANGU 
I Keowaip 3,204 1 2 .39 IND PAP 
Yambatani Taso 3,099 1 1 . 98 IND 
Frank Iki 1 ,6 1 0  6 . 22 IND 
S Amhulini 1 ,565 6 . 05 IND 
Pato Kakarya 1 ,55 6 . 02 IND 
Gerry M Paya 9 1 1  3 . 52 IND 
Mek Kaki 3 1 7  1 . 23 IND 
Nisia Lawrence 2 9 5  1 . 1 4 IND 
Palyaka Ipi 9 6  0 . 37 IND 
Sake Ben Wia 1 3  0 . 05 IND 
Informal 2 0  
Total 25,864 
SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCIAL 
Nipa Die Mone 43,345 26 . 22 PAP SMP 
Paul Poto 4 1 , 504 24 . 00 PSP 
Anderson Sia 23,341 1 3 . 5 0  PDM 
Dabura Kamuna 1 9,548 1 1 .30 IND 
Dabura Kamuna 1 5,985 9 . 24 IND 
S Mendepo 1 1 ,765 6 . 80 IND 
Hotwan Awaru 8,739 5 . 05 IND 
Nambi Rapula 5,855 3 . 39 IND 
3 5 8  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCIAL continued) 
Informal 8 5 8  
Total 1 72,940 
IALIBU PANGIA OPEN 
Roy Yaki 5,948 3 2 . 54 PDM SMP 
Pundia Kange 3 ,227 1 7 .66 PANGU 
Uma Moore 2,388 1 3 .06 PAP 
Paul Turi Wari 2,230 1 2 .20 IND 
Emo Wapiri 1 ,457 9 . 57 IND 
Simon Yopai 6 9 8  3 . 82 IND 
Kenneth Turi 2 8 6  1 . 56 LNA 
Tindua Benong 1 9  0 . 1 0  IND 
Informal 275 
Total 1 8,278 
IMBONGGU OPEN 
Anthony Temo 5,465 29 . 30 PAP SMP 
Glaimi Warena 3, 354 1 7.98 PAP 
Robert G Tawa 2,839 1 5 .22 IND 
Julius Kera 2,761 1 4 .80 PDM 
Posu Mindi 2,2 1 1 1 1 . 8 5  MA 
Korowa Pokey 1 ,079 5 . 78 IND 
Albert Mombu 8 6 3  4 . 63 IND 
Dominic Kanea 5 9  0 . 32 IND 
Informal 2 2  
Total 1 8,653 
KAGUA ERAVE OPEN 
Daniel Tulapi 4,301  1 8 .60 PAP NMP 
Mata Topa 3,277 1 4 . 1 7  IND 
Yano Belo 2,601 1 1 .25 IND 
Ken Nakisi 2, 320 1 0 . 03 IND 
John Mandali 2, 1 48 9 . 29 IND 
Benny Malu 2, 1 09 9 . 1 2  IND 
Soso Tomu 1 , 994 8 . 62 PANGU SMP 
Ade Kiap Toi 1 , 606 6 . 94 IND 
Dokta R Kanea 1 , 093 4 . 73 IND 
Joseph M Limu 5 9 9  2 . 59 IND 
W Baisakesi 4 8 6  2 . 1 0  IND 
Kare Metepa 4 4 9  1 . 94 IND 
S Paglipari 7 5  0 . 32 LIB IND* 
3 5 9  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(KAGUA ERA VE OPEN continued) 
Kevin Polopea 4 5  0 . 1 9  IND 
David L Dolo 5 0 .02 LIB IND* 
Informal 1 7  
Total 23,1 25 
KOMO MARGARIMA OPEN 
Balus Libe 4,538 35 . 1 3  MA NMP 
Alfred Kaiabe 2,857 22 . 1 2  PSP SMP 
Marabe Makiba 2,690 20.82 PANGU 
S Kabilali 2,629 20.35 IND 
David D Pole 1 8 1  1 . 40 PPP 
John L Kuabu 1 2  0 .08 IND 
Informal 1 1  
Total 1 2,9 1 8  
KOROBA LAKE KOPIAGO OPEN 
Herowa Agiwa 
Urape 2,683 1 8 .94 PANGU NMP 
D Arababali 2,465 1 7.40 IND 
P Herason 2,334 1 6 .48 PPP 
Matiable Aruru 1 ,720 1 2 . 1 4  IND SMP 
Mathew Magaye 1 , 303 9 .20 IND 
Yawale Kulu 1 ,202 8 .49 IND PAP* 
Julius T Kiapa 1 , 1 87 8 . 38 IND 
Epe Peri Loya 6 1 6  4 .35 IND 
Topo S waswa 382 2 .70 IND 
Elo W Gill 1 72 1 .21 IND 
Payale Elo 4 6  0 . 32 IND 
Kenny W Kewi 7 0 .05 IND 
Informal 4 7  
Total 1 4,264 
MENDI OPEN 
Michael B N ali 4,627 1 6 .37 IND NMP 
Huli Joseph 4,029 1 4 .26 PPP IND* 
Harry Komba 3, 9 1 3  1 3 .85 IND 
William M Ank 3,447 1 2 .20 IND 
Francis Pusal 2,855 1 0 . 1 0  PANGU SMP 
Sili Koriam 2,854 1 0 . 1 0  IND 
Epeya Benson 2,722 9 .63 IND 
Paul K Sorom 2,223 7 .87 IND PPP* 
360 
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Candidate Polled 
(MENDI OPEN continued) 
Philipus Hapon 1 ,498 5 . 30 IND 
Joseph W anne 62 0 .22 IND 
Mendep J Ungia 0 0 . 00 PAP 
Informal 2 9  
Total 28,259 
NIPA KUTUBU OPEN 
Philemon Embel 9,9 1 9  28.67 PDM SMP 
Joshua Polis 5,153  1 4 .89 IND 
Yut Uhae Iabo 4,370 1 2 .63 IND 
Sosoro Hewago 3,950 1 1 .42 IND 
John K Korpis 3,81 2  1 1 .02 IND 
Dunstan Ami 2, 1 38 6 . 1 8  IND 
Porop Stanley 1 ,987 5 . 74 PSP IND* 
Robert K Solo 1 ,874 5 . 42 IND 
Bai-abi Irahigu 727 2 . 1 0  IND 
Meri Hosta Tai 405  1 . 1 7  IND 
Informal 9 6  
Total 34,600 
TARI OPEN 
Mathew M Yago 3,688 2 1 . 1 3  MA NMP 
Habia Babe 2,933 1 6 .80 IND 
Haralu Mai 2,592 1 4 .85 PANGU SMP 
Joseph Hungi 1 ,619  9 .28 IND 
Thomas Talu 1 ,478 8 .47 IND 
Bara Kamiali 1 ,423 8 . 10 IND 
David Takirako 993  5 . 69 IND 
Ebabe Jame Aba 834  4 .78 IND 
Joseph Palive 778 4 .46 IND 
Dokta J Tebela 5 0 3  2 . 88 PSP 
Peter A Irai 489  2 .80 IND 
Steven Agilo 6 5  0 . 37 IND 
Mathew Honapi 5 3  0 . 30 PAP 
Informal 1 6  
Total 1 7,454 
WESTERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCIAL 
Pais Wingti 69,067 39 .30 PDM SMP 
Andrew Tai 33,924 1 9 .31  IND 
C Kulangie 20,270 1 1 .54 IND 
3 6 1  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(WESTERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCIAL contii1ued) 
Thomas Nolonga 1 1 ,383 6 .48 IND 
Michael M Y aki 1 0,41 6  5 . 93 IND 
Kundi Pok 8,572 4 . 88 IND 
Apa John Aris 6,371 3 . 63 IND 
Brian K Lawi 5,425 3 . 09 IND 
Robert Enga 4,440 2 .53 IND 
Poto T Akis 3,445 1 .96 IND 
Paul Marida 1 ,369 0 . 78 BAP IND* 
Informal 1 ,040 
Total 1 75,722 
ANGLIMP SOUTH WAHGI OPEN 
William E Wii 5 , 155 1 5 .59 IND NMP 
Kuk Kuli 4,369 1 3 .21  MA 
G Kuma Waipek 4,369 1 3 . 1 0  LNA 
Michael Mel 4,272 1 2 .92 NAT SMP 
Roger T Palme 3,358 1 0 . 1 5  PPP 
Opai Kunangel 2,539 7 .68 UNT 
Pius N Kuri 2,430 7 .35 IND 
John Kundi 2,280 6 . 89 IND 
Michael T Onum 1 ,650 4 .99 PANGU 
Benny B Yembe 1 ,303 3 . 94 IND 
Daniel D goma 1 ,034 3 . 1 3  IND 
Ronald M Banga 2 3 1  0 . 70 IND 
Ul Pena 5 0  0 . 1 5  IND 
Informal 6 9  
Total 33,071 
BAIYER MUL OPEN 
Robert Nagle 3,274 1 5 .09 IND NMP 
Joel P Pepa 2,838 1 3 .08 IND SMP 
Awap Rumint 2,825 1 3 .02 IND 
Mokwa Mamando 2,499 1 1 .52 PPP 
Moses Mamando 1 ,967 9 .07 IND 
Fikus Noki Kau 1 ,882 8 . 68 IND 
Tom Rangip 1 ,835 8 . 46 PDM 
John Nii 1 , 761  8 . 12  IND 
Jeffrey Puri 1 ,500 6 .91  PANGU 
Trapura Yaluma 802 3 . 70 PAP 
Kundi Maku 1 00 0 . 46 IND 
Robert L Tapi 4 0  0 . 1 8  IND 
362 
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(BAIYER MUL OPEN continued) 
Paul Dokta 7 0 . 03 IND 
S Kinjikali 5 0 .02 IND 
Rose Uaiang 5 0 .02 IND 
Kundi Miki 5 0 .02 IND 
Informal 348  
Total 21 ,693 
DEi OPEN 
Melchior M Pep 5,435 27. 1 9  PANGU SMP 
Koi Ranpi 3,437 1 7 . 1 9  IND 
Reuben Parua 3,036 1 5 . 1 9 IND 
Wikai Membi 2,345 1 1 .73 IND 
Philip Bobby 2,079 1 0 .40 IND 
Puri Ruing 1 ,989 9 .95 IND 
Matrus D Mel 1 ,539 7 .70 IND 
Michael Y ona 8 5  0 .43 IND 
Informal 4 5  
Total 1 9,990 
HAGEN OPEN 
Paul Pora 9,21 3 34.60 IND SMP 
John Rapura 3,636 1 3 .66 NAT 
Nixon Anis Koi 3,527 1 3 .25 IND 
Patrick Kolta 3,271 12 .29 IND 
Bob Tepra 2,41 5  9 .07 IND 
Allan Kulunga 2, 140 8 . 04 NAT 
John Elepa 1 , 1 42 4 .29 IND 
Glen Komonga 1 ,203 4 .52 PPP 
Informal 7 8  
Total 26,625 
JIMI OPEN 
Kimb Tai 3,536 23.63 IND NMP 
James Kupul 2,275 1 5 .20 IND SMP PDM* 
Paul Tondul 1 ,624 10 .85 IND 
Sir T Kavali 1 ,262 8 .43 IND 
Koromb Tulpa 1 , 1 76 7 .86 IND 
Felix Bangi 1 ,258 8 .41 PDM 
William Pok 8 9 7  5 .99 BAP 
Didimas Gai 878 5 . 87 IND 
Ingwai Dire 8 1 1  5 . 42 PANGU 
3 6 3  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
UIMI OPEN continued) 
Peter N Sekan 724 4 . 84 IND 
John Taime 4 9 9  3 . 33 IND 
Informal 2 7  
Total 1 4,967 
NORTH WAGHI OPEN 
Yimbal Aipe 3,301 1 5 .38 IND NMP 
William Wii 2,578 1 2 . 0 1  IND SMP 
thornas Kommon 2,265 1 0 .5 5  IND 
David Bal Mol 1 , 543 7 . 1 9  IND 
Robert Maima 1 ,228 5 . 72 LIB 
Vincent Anamb 1 ,222 5 . 69 IND 
Wilson N Wile 1 , 1 58 5 . 40 IND 
Peter M Ka 1 , 045 4 . 8 7  PSP 
Paias Banga 1 ,033 4 . 8 1  PAP 
Tony K Kapil 9 9 8  4 . 65 LNA 
James G Koimo 9 3 1  4 . 34 IND 
Raphael Tolgna 8 8 6  4 . 1 3  IND PDM* 
Caspar Guan 8 8 5  4 . 12 IND 
Tony Walep 7 3 6  3 . 43 IND 
Alfred W Kolio 5 9 0  2 . 75 IND 
William B. Pel 5 0 9  2 . 37 IND 
Palnge Burum 5 0 5  2 . 35 IND 
Informal 4 9  
Total 2 1 ,462 
T AMBUL NEBIL YER OPEN 
Vincent Sipaka 7,269 2 5 . 36 PDM NMP 
Thomas Negints 4,870 1 6 . 99 IND SMP 
Yano Poponawa 3,825 1 3 . 34 IND 
Kome Topela 3,000 10 .47 IND 
Fred Kiman Wur 2,802 9 . 77 
Simon Numa 2,356 8 . 22 
Kole Ninjipa 1 ,639 5 . 72 IND PPP* 
Paliwa Mapikon 1 ,505 5 .25 
Ayaka Kepo 8 1 7  2 . 85 IND PANGU* 
Joseph Waguba 3 4 7  1 . 21  
Informal 2 3 5  
Total 28,665 
364 
D: PAPUA AND NCD 
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
CENTRAL PROVINCIAL 
John Orea 1 3,851 23 . 14  PAP SMP 
Paul Bodi 7,279 12 . 1 6  IND 
Peter Pako 6,864 1 1 .47 IND 
Willie A Valie 5,200 8 .69 IND 
Kone Vanuawaru 4,821 8 .06 IND 
Rima Kikulu 4,798 8 .02 IND 
Tony Huai 3,900 6 .52 IND 
Isaiah Oda 3,837 6 .41 PANGU 
Moses Anai 3,674 6 . 14  IND 
Aisi Loko 1 ,328 2 .21 IND 
Kwalimu Lofena 1 ,321 2.21 IND 
Gima Kepo 1 , 1 1 1  1 . 86 IND 
Andrew Dani 964 1 . 16 IND 
Informal 901  
Total 59,849 
ABAU OPEN 
Jack Genia 2,436 1 7.64 PANGU SMP 
Desmon Baira 1 ,998 14 .47 PAP 
Aaaron Bebao 1 ,640 1 1 .87 IND 
David Rakilea 908 6 .57 IND 
Opa Taureka 7 1 6  5 . 18  IND 
Gavu Maria Lama 6 1 1  4 .42 IND 
Ila Pagave 607 4 .40 IND 
Gavi Mae 586 4 .24 IND 
S Roakeina 579 4 . 1 9  IND 
Daniel Mera 459 3 .32 IND 
Bonou Dedele 438 3 . 17  IND 
Zelma Gagari 4 1 8  3 .03 IND PSP* 
Augerega 4 1 5  3 .00 IND 
Rai Ova 374 2 .71 LIB IND* 
Edi Kapigeno 293 2 . 12 IND 
Gerega Pepena 252 1 .82 IND 
Oruba Oruba 249 1 .80 IND 
Pat Ila'ava 239 1 .73 IND 
Kei V Kapa 2 1 5  1 .56 IND 
Donald Value 201  1 .46 IND 
Michael Hilake 1 02 0 .74 PPP 
3 6 5  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(ABAU OPEN continued) 
Informal 75 
Total 1 3, 8 1 1 
GOILALA OPEN 
Camillo Esef 2,309 2 5 . 24 PANGU NMP 
Andrew Ruddaka 1 , 565 1 7. 1 1  PAP SMP 
Perai Manai 9 4 1  1 0 .29 PPP 
Sylvester Moge 9 1 4  9 . 99 IND 
Joe Manau 69 1 7 . 55 IND 
Elijah Onne 5 4 6  5 . 97 LIB IND* 
Allan Woila 5 1 9  5 . 67 PDM 
Louis Mona 472 5 . 1 6  IND 
Allan Koma 4 4 9  4 . 9 1  IND 
Ajax E Bia 3 7 8  4 . 1 3  IND 
L Kilemu 3 3 6  3 . 67 IND 
Informal 2 7  
Total 9, 1 47 
KAIRUKU-HIRI OPEN 
Moi Avei 3,495 1 5 .41  PAP NMP 
Joseph Aoae 3,028 1 3 .35 IND SMP 
James Mopio 2 . 426 1 0 . 70 IND 
Seri Hi=game 2,405 1 0 . 6 1  PANGU 
Tamarua Trudi 1 , 7 1 8  7 . 58 IND 
Ammanuel Ume 1 ,602 7 . 07 IND 
Kere Moi 1 , 1 98 5 . 28 IND 
Ammanuel Ume 9 3 8  4 . 1 4  IND 
Aihi Ovia 8 1 2  3 . 58 IND 
Louis V Ido 7 9 0  3 . 4 8  IND 
John Koaba 777 3 . 43 IND 
John Apini 6 1 9  2 . 73 IND 
Kuea Kaeka 4 5 7  2 . 02 IND 
James K Moaba 4 3 8  1 . 93 IND 
John H tali 4 1 2  1 . 82 PPP 
Joe Aitsi 340 1 . 50 IND 
Kose A Aisi 3 2 5  1 .43 IND 
Louisie A Aitsi 2 7 5  1 . 2 1  IND 
Ernesto C Awo 2 70 1 . 1 9  IND 
Jack Aila 9 4  0 . 4 1  IND 
Informal 2 5 5  
Total 22,674 
3 6 6  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
RIGO OPEN 
Dibara Y agabo 3,997 28 . 1 1  IND NMP 
Galeva Kwarara 2,534 1 7 . 82 IND SMP 
Steven Vaira 1 ,4 1 3  9 . 94 PANGU 
Tufi Sega 1 , 0 3 1  7.25 PSP 
Teio Ila 9 9 0  6 . 9 6  PDM 
Mou Barea 8 7 5  6 . 1 5  IND 
Philip Bouraga 872 6 . 1 3  IND 
Launce Vetari 8 3 4  5 . 8 6  PDM 
Vavine Tauni 76 1 5 . 35 PAP 
Roby Gave Duri 6 6 6  4 . 68 IND 
Mairi Mehutu 1 8 5 1 . 30 IND 
Informal 6 2  
Total 1 4 ,220 
GULF PROVINCIAL 
Chris Haiveta 5,385 1 9 .45 IND PANGU* NMP 
Jacob Kairi 4, 1 06 1 4 . 83 IND 
Akia Kairi 2,339 8 . 45 IND 
Posa M Posa 2,042 7 . 3 7  IND 
Dominic Evere 1 , 9 1 2  6 . 90 MA 
Lemek Kum 1 , 5 52 5 . 60 IND 
M Maravila 1 , 5 5 1  5 . 60 IND 
Chris Hova 1 , 532 5 . 53 IND 
Dominic Paulus 1 , 393 5 . 03 IND 
John T Poha 1 , 355 4 . 89 IND 
John Kavo 1 , 1 47 2 . 35 IND 
Ope Oeaka 6 5 2  2 . 33 IND 
Kelly Tauraki 6 4 5  2 . 25 II\J'D 
F Malaisa 6 2 4  1 . 96 IND 
Tony Malaisa 5 4 4  1 . 20 PAP SMP 
Aaron Noaio 3 3 2  1 . 1 0  SMP 
Leo Kavaua 272 
Informal 275 
Total 27,691 
3 6 7  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
KEREMA OPEN 
Tom Koraea 1 , 765 1 1 . 1 7  IND NMP 
Robert Maera 1 , 7 1 5  1 0 .85 IND PANGU* 
Haro Sarufa 1 , 1 74 7.43 LNA IND* 
Samuel Kamiato 1 , 048 6 . 63 IND 
Daniel Itu 9 7 7  6 . 1 8 PAP SMP 
H Erekofa 9 6 3  6 . 09 IND 
Susuve Laumaea 888 5 .62 IND 
Adamson Yavako 8 8 6  5 . 6 1  IND 
Pou Toivita 7 1 4  4 . 52 PPP 
E Karukuru 7 0 1  4 . 44 IND 
Mathew Donaipa 6 5 9  4 . 1 7  IND 
Augustine Hako 6 2 3  3 . 94 IND 
Reuben Aka 5 2 8  3 . 34 IND 
Peter Ginau 5 2 2  3 . 30 PSP 
Joseph Mangabi 5 0 6  3 . 20 IND 
Joiu Koaru 4 9 9  3 . 1 6  IND 
Makeu M Auhova 3 8 8  2 . 46 IND 
Harry Aitam 3 4 9  2 . 2 1  IND 
Joseph Meata 3 2 9  2 . 08 IND 
Ika Oavera 2 9 9  1 . 89 LIB IND* 
Wesley Oakari 2 6 8  1 . 70 IND 
Informal 1 04 
Total 1 5,801 
KIKORI OPEN 
Roy Evara 2 , 1 28 1 7. 9 1  IND NMP 
R D Kimave 1 , 845 1 5 .53 PANGU 
Allan Ebu Marai 1 ,798 1 5 . 1 3  IND SMP 
Horepa Evara 1 ,292 1 0 .88 IND 
Ivei Kurei 1 , 085 9 . 1 3  IND PAP* 
Francis Heardo 725 6 . 1 0  IND 
Avae Kaia 5 2 1  4 . 39 PPP 
rola Miere 5 1 4  4 . 33 IND 
Rev Oria Gemo 4 8 4  4 . 07 IND 
R Haroavila 4 2 1  3 . 54 IND 
Ron Hoka 3 0 1  2 .53  LIB 
Kuberi Epi 2 9 4  2 . 4 7  IND 
Esau Mailau 2 0 0  1 .68 IND 
Philip Omohae 1 02 0 . 86 IND 
Nao Kouoru 8 7  0 . 73 MA 
3 6 8  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(KIKORI OPEN continued) 
Informal 8 3  
Total 1 1 ,880 
MILNE BAY PROVINCIAL 
Tim Neville 23,743 4 1 . 39 IND NMP 
J. Abaijah 9 . 044 1 5 . 76 IND 
Dennis Young 5, 640 9 . 83 IND SMP 
Aiden Moliola 4 , 1 49 7.23 LNA 
Jacob T. Lemeki 3 , 6 1 6  6 . 30 PAP 
Billy Inafala 3,434 5 . 99 PANGU 
Dan Hesaboda 2,970 5 . 1 8  IND 
John Tubira 2, 1 44 3 . 74 IND 
Kaidama Elliot 1 ,840 3 . 2 1  LIB 
Informal 7 9 0  
Total 57,370 
ALOTAU OPEN 
Iairo Lasaro 3,648 1 9 .67 PDM SMP 
John Penrose 1 ,929 1 0 .40 IND 
Simon Mumuri 1 ,605 8 . 65 IND 
Peter Sandery 1 , 3 1 8  7. 1 1  IND 
Moses David 1 , 1 25 6 .06 IND 
Lyle O'Connor 1 ,0 1 5  5 .47 IND 
Gerald Senapil 9 6 9  5 .22 PAP 
Joe Area 9 0 5  4 . 88 IND 
Jerome Uliyelo 1877 4 . 73 IND 
Jules Deboi 8 5 4  4 . 60 PANGU 
L. Jellico 767 4 . 1 3  PPP 
Joseph Isako 743 4 . 0 1  IND 
Simeon Kibikib 6 6 0  3 .56 IND 
Kevin Yabaga 6 5 1 3 . 5 1  IND 
BlasiusBiu 4 7 5  2 . 56 IND 
Kaliton Sali 354 1 .91 IND 
Alfred Kaniniba 3 1 8  1 . 71 LNA 
Informal 3 3 7  
Total 1 8,550 
3 6 9  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
ESA'ALA OPEN 
John Kanadi 2,365 2 1 .40 LIB NMP 
J. Maladina 1 , 582 1 4 . 32 PDM SMP 
Lassam Kelebi 1 ,403 1 2 . 70 IND 
Wens Kenodega 1 , 2 1 6  1 1 . 00 IND 
Wilson Ephraim 1 , 143 1 0 . 34 IND PPP* 
David Petelo 1 , 1 08 1 0 . 0 3  PANGU 
Justine Weimate 9 3 0  18 .42 PAP 
Rex Leleibuna 625 5 . 66 IND 
Donald Kisianid 4 1 0  3 7 1  IND 
Henry Andrew 1 7 1 1 .5 5  IND 
Informal 9 8  
Total 1 1 , 0 5 1  
KIRIWINA GOODENOUGH OPEN 
Beona Motawiya 2,430 1 6 .54 PAP SMP 
Kevin Daidaday 1 ,699 1 1 .56 IND 
Patrick Tomausi 1 , 582 1 0 . 77 LNA 
J. Sikwaileta 1 ,438 9 . 79 PANGU 
Robert Ulitaia 1 ,428 9 . 72 PPP 
William Rudd 1 , 4 1 8  9 . 65 IND 
Kevin Kaidoga 1 , 375 9 . 36 IND 
Tom Cameron 1 , 1 98 8 . 1 5  IND 
Topsi Tubasi 9 0 3  6 . 1 4  IND 
R. Mugwagata 5 8 6  3 . 9 9  IND 
G. Mwasaluwa 522 3 .55  LIB 
Informal 1 1 6  
Total 1 4,695 
SAMARAI-MURUA OPEN 
Titus Philemon 2,997 22.95 PPP NMP 
Gordon Wesley 1 ,749 1 3.40 PDM 
Ebe Kasaiwabu 1 ,258 9.63 IND 
David Bagita 1 , 1 77 9 . 0 1  IND 
Israel Edoni 1 , 1 71 8 .9 7  PSP 
Noino Losane 1 , 054 8 . 0 7  IND 
Perry Dotaona 7 3 8  5 . 65 IND 
B. Taukuro 6 0 9  4 .66 IND 
David Morona 5 9 3  4 .54 PANGU 
N. Kapowota 375 2.87 IND 
James Muraga 372 2 .85 IND 
Israel Sabbath 3 5 4  2 .71  PAP 
3 70 
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(SAMARAI-MURUA OPEN (continued) 
Sheldon Frank 322 2 . 47 IND 
Manako Gaunede 1 9 9  1 . 52 IND 
Informal 8 9  
Total 1 3,057 
NATIONAL CAPITAL DISTRICT 
Bill Skate 7,763 1 6 . 1 1  NAT NMP 
Hugo Berghuser 6 . 956 1 4 . 44 PAP SMP 
L. Titimur 6, 1 92 1 2 . 85 IND 
Jack Pidik 3,972 8 . 24 PANGU 
Margaret Loko 3, 785 7 .86 IND 
Solepe Tunofi 3,656 7.59 PPP 
Vani Vaieke 2,216 4 . 60 U1,;U 
Mabel Gavera 1 ,906 3 .96 IND 
Jimmy M. Varika 1 , 858 3 . 86 IND 
Thomas Guare 1 ,629 3 . 38 IND 
John Agui Sele 1 ,371 2 .85 IND 
Tau Po'o 1 ,065 2 .21 IND 
Joe Mesa 923 1 . 92 PSP 
Michael Teke 889 1 .85 IND 
Stanley Amua 8 1 1 1 . 68 IND 
Aria Yopo 629 1 .3 1  IND 
Paul Sare Bray 566 1 . 1 7  IND 
Andrew Kawage 4 7 7  0 . 99 BAP 
Informal 1 ,5 1 6  
Total 48, 1 80 
MORESBY NORTH-EAST OPEN 
David Unagi 1 ,905 1 4 . 48 IND SMP 
John Makabe 1 , 879 1 4 . 29 IND 
Amos Yali 1 , 027 7 . 8 1  IND 
Peter Mondo 848 6 .45 IND 
Fred M. Bokoi 796 6 . 05 IND 
Girty Simon 736 5 .60 PANGU 
R. Y angomina 6 1 7  4 . 69 IND 
Pisson Wiye 5 7 1  4 .34 IND 
Airi Frank Ray 554 4 .21  IND 
Thomas Domu 526 4 . 0 0  IND 
Albert Pou 429 3.26 IND 
Elizabeth Yama 4 0 9  3 . 1 1  IND 
Anjo Minao 4 . 05 3 . 08 PSP 
3 7 1  
Name of Votes o;,, Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(MORESBY NORTH-EAST OPEN continued) 
Harry Hoerler 3 9 7  3 . 02 PAP 
Konze Kara 302 2 .30 IND 
Sina Saraga S 2 9 9  2 . 27 IND 
Alois Wemin 275 2 .09  IND 
William Rumbia 2 5 0  1 . 90 IND 
Mark Tine 1 72 1 . 3 1  IND 
Kaiapa Tebela 1 3 3 1 . 0 1  LNA 
James Gondo 9 6  0 . 73 IND 
Rubert Hatau 8 8  0 . 67 IND 
Joe Waine 7 1  0 .67 IND 
Luke Suba Wai 6 2  0 . 54 IND 
Peter Touabo 5 2  0 . 4 0  IND 
Umasi David 4 8  0 . 3 6  IND 
Daley Maima 5 0 . 04 IND 
Informal 2 0 0  
Total 1 3, 1 53 
MORESBY NORTH-WEST OPEN 
R. Suckling 1 , 8 6 1  9 . 5 8  PAP SMP 
Vincent S. Eri 1 ,800 9 .27 IND 
Laren R. Samai 1 ,583 8 . 1 5  LIB 
Tom Aurnkele 1 ,300 6 . 70 IND 
John H. Hariki 1 , 1 84 6 . 1 0  PDM 
Thomas Willie 1 , 04 1 5 . 36 IND 
Thomas D. Jones 727 3 . 74 IND 
Ila Tiana Ila 6 7 3  3 . 47 IND 
Jack J. Suao 6 6 9  3 . 45 IND 
Maria I. Hayes 6 6 5  3 .42 IND 
Arua A. Miria 5 3 8  2 . 77 PPP 
Dadi Toka 5 1 8  2 . 6 7  IND 
Michael Konjil 506  2 .61  IND 
Mahuru R. Rama 4 9 8  2 . 5 6  IND 
Nou K. Kari 4 5 3  2 . 3 3  PANGU 
M. Ketombing 4 3 0  2 . 2 1  IND 
Luke Tai 3 7 1  1 . 9 1  IND 
John Pokani 3 4 4  1 . 77 IND 
Gima Gini 3 2 0  1 . 65 IND 
Timothy Raula 273 1 .4 1  IND 
Yak Lusup 2 5 3  1 . 30 IND 
David Oaseoka 24 1 1 .24 IND 
Mathew Wii 2 3 5  1 .2 1  IND 
3 72 
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(MORESBY NORTH-WEST OPEN continued) 
John Kosi 2 0 3  1 .05 MA 
S. Giregire 1 8 2 0 . 94 IND 
Nelson Makeu 1 62 0 . 8 3  IND 
Robin Kumaina 1 6 2 0 . 8 3  IND 
Alphonse Umba 1 6 2 0 . 8 3  BAP 
Jack Laad 1 5 9  0 . 82 IND 
Sani Gras Root 1 5 9  0 . 82 IND 
Jimmy Yani 1 3 1  0 . 67 IND 
Andrew Panap 1 2 3  0 . 63 IND 
Ken H. Awaseo 1 1 1  0 . 5 7  IND 
Diana Devessa 1 0 1  0 . 5 2  IND 
Collin Yomba 9 7  0 . 50 IND 
Canny Pipalan 9 6  0 . 49 IND 
Simon Singut 9 3  0 .48 IND 
Paul W. Aisir 8 8  0 .45 IND 
George Kumai 5 5  0 . 28 IND 
Ivan Wandowe 4 9  0 .25 IND 
Gerard Exton 2 3  0 . 1 2  IND 
Informal 778 
Total 1 9, 4 1 7  
MORESBY SOUTH OPEN 
Albert Karo 2, 0 1 3  1 2 . 9 1  PDM SMP IND* 
Raymond Agonia 1 , 3 1 5  8 . 43 IND 
Legu Yagi 1 , 244 7 .98 IND 
George Lavari 1 , 078 6 . 9 1  IND 
Simon Bomai 1 , 1 84 6 . 1 0  PDM 
Wesley Sabiyam 9 8 7  6 . 33 II\i'D 
Bill Dihm 9 5 6  6 . 1 3  IND 
Manu Geno 8 2 3  5 .28 IND 
Mai Makao 672 4 . 3 1  PSP 
Otto Akarapa 6 4 3  4 . 1 2  PPP 
Arua Au 5 0 4  3 . 23 IND 
Jatu Esawo 4 9 7  3 . 1 9  IND 
Joseph Karolo 4 8 6  3 . 1 2 IND 
OpexPaimuru 3 6 2  2 . 32 IND 
David Doriga 342 2 . 1 9  IND 
George Lori 3 3 5  2 . 1 5  IND 
Peter Bal 3 3 5  2 . 1 5  IND 
Isaac Teo 3 0 3  1 . 94 IND 
Biliso Osake 2 6 7  1 . 71 IND 
3 7 3  
Name of Votes O/o Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(MORESBY SOUTH OPEN continued) 
Joe Povoria 2 1 8  1 .40 IND 
Ben Yokon 1 76 1 . 1 3  LIB 
Winis Tua 1 64 1 . 05 IND 
Steven Palisa 1 3 0 0 . 8 3  IND 
Jackson Eka 1 2 9 0 . 8 3  IND 
Kala Kosuwo 9 9  0 . 63 IND 
Informal 4 4 9  
Total 1 5,596 
NORTHERN PROVINCIAL 
S. Siembo 2, 874 8 . 1 6  IND NMP PAP* 
Benson Garui 2,767 7 .85 PAP SMP 
Steven Tago 2,682 7.61 NAT 
Undariba Waimi 2,055 5 . 83 PSP 
Kevin Surute 1 , 922 1 5 . 65 PANGU 
John Arekai 1 . 759 4 .99 IND 
Allan Saruwa 1 , 728 4 . 9 1  IND 
M. Jiregari 1 , 670 4 . 74 IND 
Mark Taua 1 , 625 4 . 6 1  IND 
Hudson Daworo 1 ,408 4 . 00 IND 
Kipling Combo 1 ,243 3 . 5 3  PDM 
Titus Gegera 1 ,243 3 . 5 3  MA 
Dennis Koviro 1 , 1 62 3 . 30 IND 
John Lucas 1 , 076 3 . 0 5  IND 
Albert Oraka 1 , 042 2 . 9 6  IND 
Dennis Kageni 9 9 5  2 . 82 IND 
Cutbert Taiane 9 4 9  2 . 6 9  PPP 
R. Kubuni 9 1 8  2 . 6 1  LIB  
Cecil Kibikibi 9 0 0  2 . 5 5  IND 
Joshual Sovi 872 2 .48 IND 
Wallace Orere 797 2 .26 IND 
P. Sasingako 670 1 . 90 IND 
Basil Koe 649 1 . 84 IND 
L. Sumani 6 0 5  1 . 72 IND 
Dickson Maioni 5 6 9  1 . 62 IND 
Hangiri Ute 5 6 7  1 . 6 1  IND 
Informal 4 0 9  
Total 35,226 
3 74 
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
IJIVIT ARI OPEN 
Simon B. Kaurni 3,231  1 8 . 5 3  IND NMP 
Akoka Doi 2,738 1 5 , 7 1  PAP SMP 
Keli Hau'ofa 1 ,408 8 . 0 8  IND 
Douglas Garawa 1 , 232 7 .07 PDM 
Rex Arek 1 , 022 5 . 8 6  IND 
Hudson Arek 8 8 3  5 . 0 7  PPP 
Gideon Pinoko 826 4 . 74 IND 
J. Marauri 798 4 . 58 IND 
W. Jojoga 782 4 .49 IND 
K. Gegeyo 7 1 9  4 . 1 2  IND 
Pol. G. Toki 5 8 4  3 . 3 5  IND 
D. Furifuri 5 3 0  3 . 04 IND 
Anton Porusa 4 9 4  2 . 8 3  PSP 
William Suremo 4 8 0  2 . 75 IND 
A Muadi 4 6 3  2 . 66 IND 
Evan Sasa 3 9 0  2 . 24 IND 
Jim Kourah 273 1 . 5 7  IND 
A Kofafa 1 77 1 . 02 IND 
Fr M. Asor 1 3 7 0 . 79 IND 
Godwin Bonga 1 2 7  0 . 73 IND 
Informal 1 3 9 
Total 1 7,433 
SOHE OPEN 
John Waiko 2,906 1 6 . 3 3  PAP NMP 
Clement Kerahu 2 , 79 5  1 5 . 7 1  IND 
Edmund Uhe 2,335 1 3 , 1 2  PSP 
George Soka 1 ,473 8 . 2 8  PANGU 
Rex Embahe 1 , 206 6 . 78 LNA 
Wilson Suja 1 ,029 5 . 78 IND 
D. Egimbari 1 , 022 5 . 74 PDM 
Ijumi Karol 9 3 2  5 . 24 IND 
John Kerari 874 4 . 9 1  IND 
John T oivita 746 4 . 1 9  IND 
Rodney Kove 6 2 9  3 . 5 3  IND 
David Beu 5 7 8  3 . 25 IND SMP 
Henry Wariwang 5 5 6  3 . 1 2  IND 
John Porei 3 3 2  1 . 87 IND 
Kris Karogol 2 5 2  1 .42 IND 
Informal 1 2 9  
Total 1 7, 794 
3 75 
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
WESTERN PROVINCIAL 
Dere Wamaro 8 , 1 43 2 0 . 4 8  PAP NMP 
Kala Swokin 5,245 1 3 . 1 9  PSP SMP 
Norbert Makmop 4,254 1 0 . 70 IND 
Kayama Sinba 4, 1 50 1 0 . 44 IND 
Peter Gelau 3 , 5 1 4  8 . 84 IND 
Bulida Gawga 3,330 8 . 38 PANGU 
Gen Gom 2, 677 6 . 73 IND 
Tatie Olewale 2,300 5 . 79 IND 
Katie Yangtem 1 ,408 3 . 54 IND 
SiwareLewis 1 , 3 1 1  3 . 30 IND 
John Bagari 1 , 1 52 2 .90 IND 
Andrew Diak 1 , 1 1 3  2 .80  MA 
Amula Bibaesi 1 ,037 2 . 6 1  IND 
Informal 1 1 8  
Total 39,752 
MIDDLE FLY OPEN 
Bitan Kauk 3 , 1 8 1  25 . 69 IND NMP 
Aina Keiba 2,002 1 6 . 1 7  IND 
Suma Kamaya 1 , 698 1 3 . 7 1  PANGU 
Daeki Kolesa 1 ,288 1 0 . 40 PSP 
Babadi Sawasi 1 ,2 1 1 9 . 78 IND SMP 
Edward Egobia 1 , 1 98 9 . 68 IND 
Iti Didiga 1 ,078 8 . 7 1  IND 
Sowati Bagiya 4 0 5  3 .27 PPP 
Kadalo Abaiya 2 6 3  2 . 1 2  IND 
Informal 5 7  
Total 12,381  
NORTH FLY OPEN 
Bob Bubac 2,499 1 8 . 22 PANGU 
Philip D. Dipai 1 ,898 1 3 . 84 PSP 
Vincent Kadibu 1 , 5 5 1  1 1 . 3 1  IND 
Pius Fred 1 ,272 9 . 28 PAP 
Pious Kuri 1 ,239 9 .04 IND 
Sam Wingen 9 4 5  6 . 89 IND 
Warrent Dutton 9 1 1  6 . 64 PPP 
Keop Kowa 8 6 6  6 . 32 IND 
Simon Aimsep 754 5 . 50 IND 
Steven Kume 5 5 9  4 . 0 8  IND 
Simon Kewa 442 3 .22 IND 
3 7 6  
Name of Votes % Party Remarks 
Candidate Polled 
(NORTH FLY OPEN continued) 
Peter Danga 4 1 1 3 . 00 IND 
John Tae 1 3 2 0 . 9 6  IND 
Aim S. Apinai 1 1 1  0 . 8 1  IND 
Informal 1 2 2 
Total 1 3, 7 1 2  
SOUTH FLY OPEN 
Perry Zeipi 3,352 24 . 1 1  PAP SMP 
G. Gagarimabu 2,999 2 1 . 57 MA 
Iakoe Gariga 2 , 2 1 4  1 5 . 9 3  IND 
Ronnie Pakini 1 ,365 9 . 82 IND 
Sirini Gauga 1 , 339 9 .63 PANGU 
Brian Wyborn 1 , 1 2 5  8 . 0 9  IND 
Lawrence Manu 70 1 5 .04 IND 
John B. Aiede 4 0 0  2 . 88 IND 
Riley Samson 3 1 0  2 .23 IND 
Informal 9 6  
Total 1 3, 9 0 1  
3 7 7  
APPENDIX B 
PERFORMANCE OF PARTIES AND INDEPENDENTS BY 
REGION AND PROVINCE 
A. ISLANDS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PROVINCE PARTY No. of O/o Seats SMP New 
Candidates Vote MP 
B ' VILLE MA 4 49 .5  1 
PDM 1 1 3 . 8  1 1 
INDEPENDENT 1 2  36 . 7  2 1 1 
ENBRITAIN PANGU 3 20 .6  2 1 1 
MA 5 1 3 .4 
PDM 1 5 .9 1 1 
NATIONAL 1 0 . 4  
INDEPENDENT 1 7  5 9 . 6  2 1 1 
MANUS MA 2 24 . 7  
LNA 1 1 8 . 5 1 1 
PANGU 2 1 5 . 1  1 1 
PDM 1 3 . 8  
PSP 1 0 . 9  
INDEPENDENT 7 37 .0  
N / IRELAND PPP 3 50 .0  3 1 2 
PANGU 3 3 1 . 0 
MA 1 5 .0 
INDEPENDENT 5 1 2 . 4  
WNBRITAIN MA 3 20 .0  1 1 
PANGU 3 1 6 . 3  1 1 
PPP 3 1 1 . 1 1 1 
PDM 3 1 0 . 9  
LNA 1 4 . 7  
BAP 1 2.2 
INDEPENDENT 1 6  34 .9  
3 7 8  
B. PAPUA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PROVINCE PARTY No. of % Seats SMP New 
Candidates Vote MP 
CENTRAL PAP 5 1 8 .3  2 1 
PANGU 5 1 0 . 5  2 1 
PDM 3 2 .0  
PPP 3 1 .2 
PSP 1 0 .9  
LIBERAL 2 0 .7  
INDEPENDENT 5 7  67.9 1 1 
GULF PSP 2 4 .2 
MA 2 3.6 
PANGU 1 3 .4  
LNA 2 3 .0 
PAP 2 2 .4 
PPP 2 2 .2 
LIBERAL 2 1 . 1  
INDEPENDENT 4 0  80 .0 3 3 
MILNE BAY PAP 5 7 .3  1 1 
PANGU 5 6 .5  
PDM 3 6 .2 1 1 
LNA 3 5 . 3 
PPP 3 4 .6  1 1 1 
LIBERAL 3 4 . 1  1 1 
PSP 1 1 .0 
INDEPENDENT 3 8  64 .8  1 1 
NORTHERN PAP 3 1 2 . l  1 1 
PSP 3 7.0 
PANGU 2 5 .0  
PDM 3 5 .0 
NATIONAL 1 3 .8  
PPP 2 2 .6 
MA 1 1 .8 
LNA 1 1 . 7 
LIBERAL 1 1 .3 
IND END ENT 44 59 .7  2 2 
3 7 9  
B. PAPUA (continued) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
PROVINCE PARTY No. of % Seats SMP New 
Candidates Vote MP 
WESTERN PAP 3 1 4 .5  2 1 1 
PANGU 4 10 .0  1 1 
PSP 3 9 .5  
MA 2 4 . 6 
PPP 2 1 .5 
INDEPENDENT 3 1  60 . 1  1 1 
C. NATIONAL CAPITAL DISTRICT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PROVINCE PARTY No. of % Seats SMP New 
Candidates Vote MP 
N.C.D. PAP 4 1 1 .0 1 1 
NATIONAL 1 8.4 1 1 
PANGU 3 5 .6 
PDM 3 5.5 2 2 
PPP 2 4 .5  
PSP 3 2.2 
LIBERAL 2 1 .9 
BAP 2 0.7 
MA 1 0.2 
LNA 1 0.1 
INDEPENDENT 9 0  60. 1 
3 8 0 
D. MAMOSE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PROVINCE PARTY No. of % Seats SMP New 
Candidates Vote MP 
EAST SEPIK PANGU 7 40 .6 5 5 
MA 6 1 1 .5 1 1 
PDM 4 3 . 1  1 1 
PPP 3 2 .5  
LNA 2 0.6 
INDEPENDENT 5 2  4 1 .6 
MA DANG MA 5 9 .3  1 1 
PANGU 8 8 . 7  1 1 
PPP 6 5 .5  1 1 
NATIONAL 3 2 .7  
LNA 2 2 .3  1 1 
PDM 1 1 .2 1 
INDEPENDENT 78  70 .3  3 2 
MOROBE PANGU 1 0  1 8 .4  3 1 2 
PSP 5 4 .9  
PPP 4 3 .5  1 1 
LNA 7 2 .2 1 1 
PDM 5 2 . 1  
PAP 2 0 .5  
PLP 1 0 . 1  
LIBERAL 2 0 . 1  
INDEPENDENT 1 2 9 68 .0 5 5 
WEST SEPIK PANGU 5 12 .9  2 2 
PDM 4 8 .4  
LNA 4 8 .0  
PAP 1 7 .6 1 
PSP 3 6 .9  
PPP 3 2 .3  
MA 2 2 .0  
LIBERAL 2 1 . 8  
BAP ] 0 .2 
INDEPENDENT 3 7  49 .8  2 2 
3 8 1 
E. HIGHLANDS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PROVINCE PARTY No. of % Seats SMP New 
Candidates Vote MP 
CHIMBU COUNTRY 1 9  6.4 
LNA 8 5 .3  2 2 
LIBERAL 8 2.6 
BAP 3 1 .9 1 1 
PAP 3 1 . 7  1 1 
PANGU 4 0.9 
MA 2 0.7 
NATIONAL 1 0 .6 
PDM 3 0.5 
PPP 1 0.2 
INDEPENDENT 1 72 79 .4 3 3 
E /H'LANDS PDM 5 1 1 .2 2 2 
LNA 5 4 .3  
NATIONAL 6 3 .7  1 
PANGU 5 3 .6 
LIBERAL 7 2 .5 
PPP 3 2.4 1 1 
COUNTRY P 5 1 . 7  
MA 2 1 .2 1 1 
PAP 3 0-9 
INDEPENDENT 1 79 68.4 4 3 1 
ENGA PDM 4 1 1 .6 2 2 
PANGU 4 3.4 
MA 3 3.4 
PAP 3 2.0 
LIBERAL 5 1 .5 
PSP 2 1 .5 
INDEPENDENT 90 76.6 4 2 2 
3 8 2 
E. HIGHLANDS (continued) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PROVINCE PARTY No. of % Seats SMP New 
Candidates Vote MP 
S/HIGHLANDS PAP 7 1 8 .0 3 2 
PSP 4 1 3 . 8  
PDM 4 12 .4  2 2 
PANGU 6 4 .7  1 1 
MA 3 3 . 1  2 2 
PPP 3 1 . 9 
LNA 1 0 . 1  
LIBERAL 2 0 .0  
INDEPENDENT 64  45 .0  1 1 
W /HIGHLANDS 
PDM 4 23.3 2 1 1 
PANGU 5 4 .4 1 1 
NATIONAL 4 3 .6  
PPP 3 2 .0  
MA 1 1 . 3 
LNA 2 1 .6 
UNITED 1 0 .7  
BAP 2 0 . 7  
PAP 2 0 .5 
LIBERAL 1 0 .4  
PSP 1 0 . 3  
INDEPENDENT 6 8  6 1 . 1  5 1 4 
Source: Electoral Commission of Papua New Guinea 1992b. 
Note: There are discrepancies between the above and Electoral Commission of 
Papua New Guinea 1992a regarding party affiliation of candidates. 
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The studies collected in this book confirm that elections in Papua 
New Guinea continue to be over-subscribed, foxtremely keenly 
contested and free from government control and jnanipulation. They 
also confirm the continuity of the two fundarent�l features: the 
essentially local character of Papua New Guiljl.ea electoral politics 
and the relative unimportance of political P'lTties in the electoral 
process. Other pronounced features of Papua New Guinea elections 
stem from these two: the very/ large number of candidates (an 
average of 15; 48 in one case); the very large number of independent 
candidates who win; the extremely localised support for candidates; 
the relative absence and irrelevance of national issues; the virtual 
impossibility of predicting electoral outcomes in Papua New Guinea; 
and the turning of elections into primaries, where the elected 
representatives with the most imaginative strategems and deepest 
pockets determine, after the elections, who will head the 
government. 
The legitimation function of Papua New Guinea elections is queried 
by these studies: on account of the above features; on account of an 
escalating electoral violence, allegations or corruption and 
administrative lapses; and on the grounds that the' MPs often cannot 
perform their representative functions while their excessively self­
regarding and pragmatic behaviour, as far as their support of 
coalition leaders and policies is concerned, render the coalition 
governments that result from these elections weak. 
The basic conclusion that may be drawn from these studies is that, 
until political parties become better established and undertake a 
massive and continuous public education progran:iine iand assume a 
more central role in the choice calculus of many more electors, the 
negative developmental impacts of Papua New Guinea electoral 
politics will continue and, probably, escalate. 
Yaw Saffu has been at the University of Papua New Guinea since 
1981, and Professor of Political and Administrative Studies there 
since 1989. 
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